prima facie presumption in Alabama

2023It does not ensure any particular venire." Gavin v. State, 891 So. 2d 907, 945 (Ala. Crim.

2014So long as the master jury wheel is adequate and the prescribed procedure is thereafter followed, there can be no complaint that the panel ultimately produced by random selection is somehow underrepresentative in result.”) (citations omitted).’ “[Sistrunk v. State,] 630 So.2d [147] at 149-50 [(Ala.Crim.App.1993)]. ‘When raising a claim under [the fair-cross-section] requirement, a defendant “has the burden of establishing a prima facie case of a ‘fair cross section’ violation.” ’ Id. at 149, quoting Pierce v. State, 576 So,2d 236, 241 (Ala.Crim.App.1990). “ ‘In order to establish a prima facie

2009“Tn order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement, the defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a “distinctive” group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process.’ “Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 , 99 S.Ct. 664, 668 , 58 L.Ed.2d 579 (1979).” Pierce v. State, 576 So.2d 236, 241 (Ala.

2005Byrd said that after the method of selecting grand-jury foreperson had changed blacks had been selected as grand-jury forepersons. "`"In order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement, the defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a `distinctive' group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selecti

2023(Johnson's brief, pp. 42-49.) " 'In Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 , 99 S.Ct. 664 , 58 L.Ed.2d 579 (1979), the Supreme Court of the United States explained: " ' "In order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement, the defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be 10 CR-21-0291 excluded is a 'distinctive' group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to syste

2015In Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 , 99 S.Ct. 664 , 58 L.Ed.2d 579 (1979), the Supreme Court of the United States explained: “In order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement, the defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a ‘distinctive’ group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepre-sentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection

1989In Nix v. State , 370 So.2d 1115 , 1117 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 370 So.2d 1119 (Ala. 1979), the court stated: "Where the trial court immediately charges the jury to disregard the prosecutor's improper remarks, there is a prima facie presumption against error." See Allen , 462 So.2d at 1035 .

1989In Nix v. State, 370 So.2d 1115, 1117 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 370 So.2d 1119 (Ala.1979), the court stated: “Where the trial court immediately charges the jury to disregard the prosecutor’s improper remarks, there is a prima facie presumption against error.” See Allen, 462 So.2d at 1035 .

2012Holliday v. State, 641 So.2d 325, 329 (Ala.Cr.App.1994); Mathis v. State, 414 So.2d 151 (Ala.Cr.App.1982).’ ” Smith v. State, 756 So.2d 892, 928 (Ala.Crim.App.1998).

1999Holliday v. State, 641 So.2d 325, 329 (Ala. Cr.App.1994); Mathis v. State, 414 So.2d 151 (Ala.Cr.App.1982)." Smith v. State, 756 So.2d 892, 927 (Ala.Cr.App.1998), aff'd, 756 So.2d 957 (Ala.2000).

2012Holliday v. State, 641 So.2d 325, 329 (Ala.Cr.App.1994); Mathis v. State, 414 So.2d 151 (Ala.Cr.App.1982).’ ” Smith v. State, 756 So.2d 892, 928 (Ala.Crim.App.1998).

2004A "trial court's immediate curative instruction concerning the prosecution's comment creates a prima facie presumption against error." Smith v. State, 756 So.2d 892, 928 (Ala.Crim.App.1997), aff'd, 756 So.2d 957 (Ala.2000).

2026As the United States Supreme Court stated in Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 , 99 S.Ct. 664 , 58 L.Ed.2d 579 (1979): " 'In order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement, the defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a "distinctive" group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury selection process.' 1

2026As the United States Supreme Court stated in Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 , 99 S.Ct. 664 , 58 L.Ed.2d 579 (1979): " 'In order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement, the defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a "distinctive" group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury selection process.' 1

2013This Court has stated: “ ‘There is a prima facie presumption against error when the trial court immediately charges the jury to disregard improper remarks or answers.’ Garrett v. State, 580 So.2d 58, 59 (Ala.Crim.App.1991). “ ‘ “The general rule is that prejudicial statements, even though improper, are considered capable of being eradicated by the trial court in sustaining objections thereto or by appropriate instructions to the jury or both.

2010Young, supra; Dickey v. State, 390 So.2d 1177 (Ala.Cr.App.), ce rt. denied, 390 So.2d 1178 (Ala.1980).” Dixon v. State, 476 So.2d 1236, 1240 (1985). “ ‘There is a prima facie presumption against error when the trial court immediately charges the jury to disregard improper remarks or answers.’ Garrett v. State, 580 So.2d 58, 59 (Ala.Crim.App.1991).” Walker v. State, 932 So.2d 140, 153 (Ala.Crim.App.2004), affirmed, Ex parte Walker, 972 So.2d 737 (Ala.2007).

2012In this regard, our Supreme Court has stated that ‘ “[t]he fact that a person lives at a particular place creates a prima facie presumption that such place is his domicile.” ’ Andrews, 697 So.2d at 56 (quoting Nora v. Nora, 494 So.2d 16, 18 (Ala.1986)); see also 25 Am.Jur.2d Domicilfe] § 56 (1996) (proof that a party resides elsewhere rebuts any presumption of continued domicile and places burden of proof upon the party denying the charge).” Id. at 442 (emphasis added).

2001In this regard, our Supreme Court has stated that "`[t]he fact that a person lives at a particular place creates a prima facie presumption that such place is his domicile.'" Andrews , 697 So.2d at 56 (quoting Nora v. Nora , 494 So.2d 16 , 18 (Ala. 1986)); see also 25 Am.

2012As further noted in Lumpkin , however, ‘[s]uch a prima facie defense can be overcome by a showing that the indictment “was induced by fraud, subornation, suppression of testimony, or other like misconduct of the party seeking the indictment.” ’ Id. at 64 (citation omitted).” 567 So.2d at 1237-38.

1992(Emphasis added.) “One of the necessary elements to be proven by a plaintiff in a malicious prosecution action is that the defendant instigated the prior judicial proceeding against him ‘without probable cause.’ In Lumpkin v. Cofield, 536 So.2d 62, 64 (Ala.1988), this Court stated that a ‘grand jury indictment [of a defendant in a prior judicial proceeding] is prima facie evidence of [the existence] of probable cause.’ As further noted in Lumpkin , such ‘a prima facie defense can be overcome by a showing that the indictment was “induced by fraud, subornation, suppression of testimony, or other

1991State v. Givens , 5 Ala. 747 , 755 (1843). "[T]here is a prima facie presumption against error where the trial court immediately charges the jury to disregard improper remarks." Kelley v. State , 405 So.2d 728 , 729 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 405 So.2d 731 (Ala. 1981).

1987Even those matters which resulted in “ineradicable harm” must at least be called to the attention of this court by a motion for a new trial.’ Harris v. State, 347 So.2d 1363, 1367 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert, denied, 347 So.2d 1368 (Ala.1977). ‘[I]t is axiomatic that the trial court may not be put in error in the absence of any attempt to invoke a ruling of the court in the matters complained of.’ Carter v. State, 30 Ala.App. 251, 253 , 4 So.2d 195 (1941). “ ‘The purpose of the rule requiring objection at the trial level before alleged errors will be considered on appeal ‘is to give the trial court an

1996"There is a prima facie presumption against error when the trial court immediately charges the jury to disregard the improper remarks or answers." Wadsworth v. State , 439 So.2d 790 , 793 (Ala.Cr.App. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 930 , 104 S.Ct. 1716 , 80 L.Ed.2d 188 (1984).

1987"There is a prima facie presumption against error where the trial court immediately charges the jury to disregard improper remarks or answers." Wadsworth v. State , 439 So.2d 790 , 793 (Ala.Cr.App. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 930 , 104 S.Ct. 1716 , 80 L.Ed.2d 188 (1984).

1989In Nix v. State , 370 So.2d 1115 , 1117 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 370 So.2d 1119 (Ala. 1979), the court stated: "Where the trial court immediately charges the jury to disregard the prosecutor's improper remarks, there is a prima facie presumption against error." See Allen , 462 So.2d at 1035 .

1989In Nix v. State, 370 So.2d 1115, 1117 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 370 So.2d 1119 (Ala.1979), the court stated: “Where the trial court immediately charges the jury to disregard the prosecutor’s improper remarks, there is a prima facie presumption against error.” See Allen, 462 So.2d at 1035 .

2010Young, supra; Dickey v. State, 390 So.2d 1177 (Ala.Cr.App.), ce rt. denied, 390 So.2d 1178 (Ala.1980).” Dixon v. State, 476 So.2d 1236, 1240 (1985). “ ‘There is a prima facie presumption against error when the trial court immediately charges the jury to disregard improper remarks or answers.’ Garrett v. State, 580 So.2d 58, 59 (Ala.Crim.App.1991).” Walker v. State, 932 So.2d 140, 153 (Ala.Crim.App.2004), affirmed, Ex parte Walker, 972 So.2d 737 (Ala.2007).

1986As this court, per Judge Taylor, stated in Dixon, supra, “[tjhere is a prima facie presumption against error where the trial court immediately charges the jury to disregard the improper remarks or answers.” (Citations omitted.) In analyzing the procedural and policy implications which underlie the concept of a mistrial, this court in Dixon also stated as follows: “A motion for a mistrial implies a miscarriage of justice and should only be granted where it is apparent that justice cannot be afforded. [Citation omitted.] A trial judge is allowed broad discretion in determining whether a mistrial

1990"When, as here, a trial court immediately charges the jury to disregard improper remarks, there is a prima facie presumption against error." Woods v. State , 460 So.2d 291 , 295 (Ala.Cr.App. 1984), cert. denied , 460 So.2d 291 (Ala. 1984).

1990"When, as here, a trial court immediately charges the jury to disregard improper remarks, there is a prima facie presumption against error." Woods v. State , 460 So.2d 291 , 295 (Ala.Cr.App. 1984), cert. denied , 460 So.2d 291 (Ala. 1984).

1986Where the appellant contended that the State did not adequately lay the predicate for a finding of voluntariness because the officer, whose testimony was the sole source of evidence, was not constantly present with the appellant during his statement, this court indicated that "[t]he State, 'having established by the preliminary proof the voluntary nature of the confession, was not required . . . to array for interrogation every person who might have had access to or conversation with the prisoner during his incarceration in order to remove the prima facie presumption of involuntariness.' " Joh

1986Where the appellant contended that the State did not adequately lay the predicate for a finding of voluntariness because the officer, whose testimony was the sole source of evidence, was not constantly present with the appellant during his statement, this court indicated that "[t]he State, 'having established by the preliminary proof the voluntary nature of the confession, was not required . . . to array for interrogation every person who might have had access to or conversation with the prisoner during his incarceration in order to remove the prima facie presumption of involuntariness.' " Joh

1985There is a prima facie presumption against error where the trial court immediately charges the jury to disregard the prosecutor's improper remarks." Hammins v. State , 439 So.2d 809 , 811 (Ala.Cr.App. 1983).

1985Moreover, there is a prima facie presumption against error where the trial court immediately charges the jury to disregard the prosecutor's improper remark." Wilson v. State , 428 So.2d 197 , 200 (Ala.Crim.App. 1983); see also Hammins v. State , 439 So.2d 809 (Ala.Crim.App. 1983).

2004A "trial court's immediate curative instruction concerning the prosecution's comment creates a prima facie presumption against error." Smith v. State, 756 So.2d 892, 928 (Ala.Crim.App.1997), aff'd, 756 So.2d 957 (Ala.2000).

2003See Ex parte Drinkard, 777 So.2d 295 (Ala.2000), and Ex parte Smith, 756 So.2d 957 (Ala.2000).