prima facie defense in Michigan

2026Therefore, defendant “inject[ed] the issue of self-defense and satisfie[d] the initial burden of producing some evidence from which a jury could conclude that the elements necessary to establish a prima facie defense of self-defense exist.” Dupree, 486 Mich at 709-710 .

2026Richett asserts that the prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence to overcome his claim of self-defense. “[O]nce the defendant injects the issue of self-defense and satisfies the initial burden of producing some evidence from which a jury could conclude that the elements necessary to establish a prima facie defense of self-defense exist, the prosecution bears the burden of proof to exclude the possibility that the killing was done in self-defense.” People v Dupree, 486 Mich 693, 709-710 ; 788 NW2d 399 (2010) (quotation marks, citation, and ellipsis omitted).

2026“Once a defendant raises the issue of self-defense and satisfies the initial burden of producing some evidence from which a jury could conclude that the elements necessary to establish a prima facie defense of self-defense exist, the prosecution must exclude the possibility of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt.” People v Stevens, 306 Mich App 620, 630 ; 858 NW2d 98 (2014) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

2026“Once a defendant raises the issue of self-defense and satisfies the initial burden of producing some evidence from which a jury could conclude that the elements necessary to establish a prima facie defense of self-defense exist, the prosecution must exclude the possibility of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt.” People v Stevens, 306 Mich App 620, 630 ; 858 NW2d 98 (2014) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

2025To establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement, a defendant has the burden of proving the following: (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a “distinctive” group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this under-representation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in -3- the jury-selection process. [Bryant, 491 Mich at 597 , quoting Duren, 439 US at 364 .] Regarding the first prong, it is undis

2025To make a prima facie claim concerning the fair-cross-section requirement, a defendant must establish that a specific group was underrepresented in their jury pool or venire, and that the underrepresentation was caused by the “ ‘systemic exclusion of the group from the jury selection process.’ ” People v McKinney, 258 Mich App 157, 161 ; 670 NW2d 254 (2003), quoting People v Smith, 463 Mich 199, 203 ; 615 NW2d 1 (2000), quoting Duren v Missouri, 439 US 357, 364 ; 99 S Ct 664 ; 58 L Ed 2d 579 (1979).

2025Riddle, 467 Mich at 126-127 . “[T]he touchstone of any claim of self-defense, as a justification for homicide, is necessity,” id. at 127 , and, “[i]n general, a defendant does not act in justifiable self- defense when he or she uses excessive force or when the defendant is the initial aggressor,” People v Guajardo, 300 Mich App 26, 35 ; 832 NW2d 409 (2013). “[O]nce [a] defendant injects the issue of self-defense and satisfies the initial burden of producing some evidence from which a jury could conclude that the elements necessary to establish a prima facie defense of self-defense exist,” “the

2025Riddle, 467 Mich at 126-127 . “[T]he touchstone of any claim of self-defense, as a justification for homicide, is necessity,” id. at 127 , and, “[i]n general, a defendant does not act in justifiable self- defense when he or she uses excessive force or when the defendant is the initial aggressor,” People v Guajardo, 300 Mich App 26, 35 ; 832 NW2d 409 (2013). “[O]nce [a] defendant injects the issue of self-defense and satisfies the initial burden of producing some evidence from which a jury could conclude that the elements necessary to establish a prima facie defense of self-defense exist,” “the

2026To establish a prima facie claim, the plaintiff must show they were “(1) a member of a protected class, (2) subject to an adverse employment action, (3) qualified for the position, and . . .(4) others, similarly situated and outside the protected class, were unaffected by the employer’s adverse conduct.” Town, 455 Mich at 695 .

2026Under Town, 455 Mich at 697 , a plaintiff who establishes a prima facie claim must also show that his “employer’s nondiscriminatory purpose was not the true reason for the discharge and that the plaintiff’s age was a motivating factor in the employer’s decision” in order to avoid summary disposition.

2022Defendant asserts that Robinson’s complaint was untimely, and that even if it were timely, Robinson cannot establish the necessary elements of a prima facie claim under the WPA.4 4 Defendant, relying on our Supreme Court’s decision in Shallal v Catholic Social Servs of Wayne Co, 455 Mich 604 ; 566 NW2d 571 (1997), argues that Robinson is precluded from even pursuing a WPA claim because she acted in bad faith.

2022Defendant asserts that Robinson’s complaint was untimely, and that even if it were timely, Robinson cannot establish the necessary elements of a prima facie claim under the WPA.4 4 Defendant, relying on our Supreme Court’s decision in Shallal v Catholic Social Servs of Wayne Co, 455 Mich 604 ; 566 NW2d 571 (1997), argues that Robinson is precluded from even pursuing a WPA claim because she acted in bad faith.

2025To establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement, a defendant has the burden of proving the following: (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a “distinctive” group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this under-representation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in -3- the jury-selection process. [Bryant, 491 Mich at 597 , quoting Duren, 439 US at 364 .] Regarding the first prong, it is undis

2019In Duren v Missouri, 439 US 357, 364 ; 99 S Ct 664 ; 58 L Ed 2d 579 (1979), the United States Supreme Court stated: In order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement, the defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a “distinctive” group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process. -2- Ou

2018Because this Court’s review is limited to the record established in the trial court, and a party may not expand the record on appeal, Sherman v Sea Ray Boats, Inc, 251 Mich App 41, 56 ; 649 NW2d 783 (2002), we cannot consider the statistical data from the United States Census Bureau regarding the population of Kent County in 2015 that defendant has attached to his brief on appeal.

2018Because this Court’s review is limited to the record established in the trial court, and a party may not expand the record on appeal, Sherman v Sea Ray Boats, Inc, 251 Mich App 41, 56 ; 649 NW2d 783 (2002), we cannot consider the statistical data from the United States Census Bureau regarding the population of Kent County in 2015 that defendant has attached to his brief on appeal.

2005Our conclusion is based on the language of Batson itself, which describes the prima facie analysis as a “factual inquiry,” Batson, 476 U.S. at 95 , and makes clear that the trial court is to be the primary adjudicator of that analysis: “We have confidence that trial judges, experienced in supervising voir dire, will be able to decide if the circumstances concerning the prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges createf] a prima facie case of discrimination.” Id. at 97 (emphasis added).

2005Our conclusion is based on the language of Batson itself, which describes the prima facie analysis as a “factual inquiry,” Batson, 476 U.S. at 95 , and makes clear that the trial court is to be the primary adjudicator of that analysis: “We have confidence that trial judges, experienced in supervising voir dire, will be able to decide if the circumstances concerning the prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges createf] a prima facie case of discrimination.” Id. at 97 (emphasis added).

2021A. PRINCIPLES THAT UNDERPIN AN EQUITABLE-SUBROGATION CLAIM “Equitable subrogation is a flexible, elastic doctrine of equity.” 19 Thus, “[i]ts application ‘should and must proceed on the case-by-case analysis characteristic of equity jurisprudence.’ ” 20 Equitable subrogation is the “mode which equity adopts to compel the ultimate payment of a debt by one who in justice, equity, and good conscience ought to pay it.” 21 Equitable subrogation has been invoked successfully in a variety of circumstances, 22 but “the mere fact that [it] has not been previously invoked in a particular situation is no

2021A. PRINCIPLES THAT UNDERPIN AN EQUITABLE-SUBROGATION CLAIM “Equitable subrogation is a flexible, elastic doctrine of equity.” 19 Thus, “[i]ts application ‘should and must proceed on the case-by-case analysis characteristic of equity jurisprudence.’ ” 20 Equitable subrogation is the “mode which equity adopts to compel the ultimate payment of a debt by one who in justice, equity, and good conscience ought to pay it.” 21 Equitable subrogation has been invoked successfully in a variety of circumstances, 22 but “the mere fact that [it] has not been previously invoked in a particular situation is no

2021A. PRINCIPLES THAT UNDERPIN AN EQUITABLE-SUBROGATION CLAIM “Equitable subrogation is a flexible, elastic doctrine of equity.” 19 Thus, “[i]ts application ‘should and must proceed on the case-by-case analysis characteristic of equity jurisprudence.’ ” 20 Equitable subrogation is the “mode which equity adopts to compel the ultimate payment of a debt by one who in justice, equity, and good conscience ought to pay it.” 21 Equitable subrogation has been invoked successfully in a variety of circumstances, 22 but “the mere fact that [it] has not been previously invoked in a particular situation is no

2021A. PRINCIPLES THAT UNDERPIN AN EQUITABLE-SUBROGATION CLAIM “Equitable subrogation is a flexible, elastic doctrine of equity.” 19 Thus, “[i]ts application ‘should and must proceed on the case-by-case analysis characteristic of equity jurisprudence.’ ” 20 Equitable subrogation is the “mode which equity adopts to compel the ultimate payment of a debt by one who in justice, equity, and good conscience ought to pay it.” 21 Equitable subrogation has been invoked successfully in a variety of circumstances, 22 but “the mere fact that [it] has not been previously invoked in a particular situation is no

2010Once a defendant establishes a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement, “the government may overcome the right to a proper jury by proffering a significant state interest that manifestly and primarily advances those aspects of the jury selection process that would result in the disproportionate exclusion of a distinctive group . . . .” Hubbard, 217 Mich App at 473 ; see also Duren, 439 US at 367-368 .

1998To establish a prima facie violation of the fair cross-section requirement, a defendant must show "(1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a `distinctive' group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process." [ Id. at 473 , 552 N.W.2d 493 , quoting Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 , 99 S.Ct. 664, 668 , 58 L.Ed.2d 579 (1979).] Although

2014Because plaintiffs have failed to allege sufficient facts to state a violation of § 17755(2), plaintiffs’ remaining derivative claims under the HCFCA and the MFCA are 48 See Roberts v Auto-Owners Ins Co, 422 Mich 594, 597-598 ; 374 NW2d 905 (1985) (“Since we conclude that plaintiff failed even to meet the threshold requirements of proof to make out a prima facie claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, we are constrained from reaching the issue as to whether this modern tort should be formally adopted into our jurisprudence by the well-settled rule that statements concerning a pr

2014Because plaintiffs have failed to allege sufficient facts to state a violation of § 17755(2), plaintiffs’ remaining derivative claims under the HCFCA and the MFCA are 48 See Roberts v Auto-Owners Ins Co, 422 Mich 594, 597-598 ; 374 NW2d 905 (1985) (“Since we conclude that plaintiff failed even to meet the threshold requirements of proof to make out a prima facie claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, we are constrained from reaching the issue as to whether this modern tort should be formally adopted into our jurisprudence by the well-settled rule that statements concerning a pr

2023Under this provision, a plaintiff may establish a prima facie violation of the WPA “by showing that (1) the plaintiff was engaged in protected activity as defined by the act, (2) the defendant took an adverse employment action against the plaintiff, and (3) a causal connection exists between the protected activity and the adverse employment action.” Debano-Griffin v Lake Co, 493 Mich 167, 175 ; 828 NW2d 634 (2013) (cleaned up).

2023Under this provision, a plaintiff may establish a prima facie violation of the WPA “by showing that (1) the plaintiff was engaged in protected activity as defined by the act, (2) the defendant took an adverse employment action against the plaintiff, and (3) a causal connection exists between the protected activity and the adverse employment action.” Debano-Griffin v Lake Co, 493 Mich 167, 175 ; 828 NW2d 634 (2013) (cleaned up).