prima facie presumption in South Carolina

2025See Bell v. Bank of Abbeville, 208 S.C. 490, 494 , 38 S.E.2d 641, 643 (1946) ("The protection of privilege extends generally to remarks made in the prosecution of an inquiry regarding a crime which has been committed; and for the purpose of detecting and bringing the criminal to punishment."); Swinton Creek Nursery v. Edisto Farm Credit, ACA, 334 S.C. 469, 484 , 514 S.E.2d 126, 134 (1999) ("Where the occasion gives rise to a qualified privilege, there is a prima facie presumption to rebut the inference of malice, and the burden is on the plaintiff to show actual malice or that the scope of the

2025See Bell v. Bank of Abbeville, 208 S.C. 490, 494 , 38 S.E.2d 641, 643 (1946) ("The protection of privilege extends generally to remarks made in the prosecution of an inquiry regarding a crime which has been committed; and for the purpose of detecting and bringing the criminal to punishment."); Swinton Creek Nursery v. Edisto Farm Credit, ACA, 334 S.C. 469, 484 , 514 S.E.2d 126, 134 (1999) ("Where the occasion gives rise to a qualified privilege, there is a prima facie presumption to rebut the inference of malice, and the burden is on the plaintiff to show actual malice or that the scope of the

2025"Under the heightened standard of proof for emotional distress claims . . . , a party cannot establish a prima facie claim for damages resulting from a defendant's tortious conduct with mere bald assertions." Hansson, 374 S.C. at 358 , 650 S.E.2d at 72 (emphasis added).

2025"Under the heightened standard of proof for emotional distress claims . . . , a party cannot establish a prima facie claim for damages resulting from a defendant's tortious conduct with mere bald assertions." Hansson, 374 S.C. at 358 , 650 S.E.2d at 72 (emphasis added).

2026See Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979) ("In order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement, the defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a 'distinctive' group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process."); id. at 366 (finding that the existence of a large discrepancy "in eve

2025This percentage is not sufficiently disparate from the overall racial makeup of Newberry County to suggest a systematic exclusion of black individuals from the jury selection process.1 See Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979) ("In order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement, the defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a 'distinctive' group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community;

2026See Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979) ("In order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement, the defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a 'distinctive' group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process."); id. at 366 (finding that the existence of a large discrepancy "in eve

2026See Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979) ("In order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement, the defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a 'distinctive' group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process."); id. at 366 (finding that the existence of a large discrepancy "in eve

2025This percentage is not sufficiently disparate from the overall racial makeup of Newberry County to suggest a systematic exclusion of black individuals from the jury selection process.1 See Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979) ("In order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement, the defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a 'distinctive' group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community;

2025This percentage is not sufficiently disparate from the overall racial makeup of Newberry County to suggest a systematic exclusion of black individuals from the jury selection process.1 See Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979) ("In order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement, the defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a 'distinctive' group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community;

2025This percentage is not sufficiently disparate from the overall racial makeup of Newberry County to suggest a systematic exclusion of black individuals from the jury selection process.1 See Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979) ("In order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement, the defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a 'distinctive' group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community;

2025This percentage is not sufficiently disparate from the overall racial makeup of Newberry County to suggest a systematic exclusion of black individuals from the jury selection process.1 See Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979) ("In order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement, the defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a 'distinctive' group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community;

2025See Bell v. Bank of Abbeville, 208 S.C. 490, 494 , 38 S.E.2d 641, 643 (1946) ("The protection of privilege extends generally to remarks made in the prosecution of an inquiry regarding a crime which has been committed; and for the purpose of detecting and bringing the criminal to punishment."); Swinton Creek Nursery v. Edisto Farm Credit, ACA, 334 S.C. 469, 484 , 514 S.E.2d 126, 134 (1999) ("Where the occasion gives rise to a qualified privilege, there is a prima facie presumption to rebut the inference of malice, and the burden is on the plaintiff to show actual malice or that the scope of the

2025See Bell v. Bank of Abbeville, 208 S.C. 490, 494 , 38 S.E.2d 641, 643 (1946) ("The protection of privilege extends generally to remarks made in the prosecution of an inquiry regarding a crime which has been committed; and for the purpose of detecting and bringing the criminal to punishment."); Swinton Creek Nursery v. Edisto Farm Credit, ACA, 334 S.C. 469, 484 , 514 S.E.2d 126, 134 (1999) ("Where the occasion gives rise to a qualified privilege, there is a prima facie presumption to rebut the inference of malice, and the burden is on the plaintiff to show actual malice or that the scope of the

2018See id. at 484, 514 S.E.2d at 134 ("Whe[n] the occasion gives rise to a qualified privilege, there is a prima facie presumption to rebut the inference of malice, and the burden is on the plaintiff to show actual malice or that the scope of the privilege has been exceeded." (emphasis added) ).

2011Because Parker's application states a prima facie claim under Tilley v. State , 334 S.C. 24 , 511 S.E.2d 689 (1999), we reverse for an evidentiary hearing.

2011Because Parker's application states a prima facie claim under Tilley v. State , 334 S.C. 24 , 511 S.E.2d 689 (1999), we reverse for an evidentiary hearing.

2002See Lewis v. State, 234 Ga.App. 873 , 508 S.E.2d 218, 222 (1998) (stating where the defendant presented no evidence contradicting that he was the person named in the certified court documents, "[cjoncordance of name alone is some evidence of identity”' and was sufficient to show the defendant and the individual previously convicted were the same person) (citation omitted); Murphy v. State, 399 So.2d 340, 346 (Ala.Crim.App.1981) (holding certified copy of prior conviction of individual with the same name as the defendant was sufficient as it “raised a prima facie presumption of the sameness of

2002See Lewis v. State, 234 Ga.App. 873 , 508 S.E.2d 218, 222 (1998) (stating where the defendant presented no evidence contradicting that he was the person named in the certified court documents, "[cjoncordance of name alone is some evidence of identity”' and was sufficient to show the defendant and the individual previously convicted were the same person) (citation omitted); Murphy v. State, 399 So.2d 340, 346 (Ala.Crim.App.1981) (holding certified copy of prior conviction of individual with the same name as the defendant was sufficient as it “raised a prima facie presumption of the sameness of

2002See Lewis v. State, 234 Ga.App. 873 , 508 S.E.2d 218, 222 (1998) (stating where the defendant presented no evidence contradicting that he was the person named in the certified court documents, "[cjoncordance of name alone is some evidence of identity”' and was sufficient to show the defendant and the individual previously convicted were the same person) (citation omitted); Murphy v. State, 399 So.2d 340, 346 (Ala.Crim.App.1981) (holding certified copy of prior conviction of individual with the same name as the defendant was sufficient as it “raised a prima facie presumption of the sameness of

2002See Lewis v. State, 234 Ga.App. 873 , 508 S.E.2d 218, 222 (1998) (stating where the defendant presented no evidence contradicting that he was the person named in the certified court documents, "[cjoncordance of name alone is some evidence of identity”' and was sufficient to show the defendant and the individual previously convicted were the same person) (citation omitted); Murphy v. State, 399 So.2d 340, 346 (Ala.Crim.App.1981) (holding certified copy of prior conviction of individual with the same name as the defendant was sufficient as it “raised a prima facie presumption of the sameness of

2002See Lewis v. State, 234 Ga.App. 873 , 508 S.E.2d 218, 222 (1998) (stating where the defendant presented no evidence contradicting that he was the person named in the certified court documents, "[cjoncordance of name alone is some evidence of identity”' and was sufficient to show the defendant and the individual previously convicted were the same person) (citation omitted); Murphy v. State, 399 So.2d 340, 346 (Ala.Crim.App.1981) (holding certified copy of prior conviction of individual with the same name as the defendant was sufficient as it “raised a prima facie presumption of the sameness of

1999See Herring, 245 S.C. at 294 , 140 S.E.2d at 251 (‘We are here dealing with a four year old child who was incapable of contributory negligence.”); Chitwood v. Chitwood, 159 S.C. 109, 112 , 156 S.E. 179, 180 (1930) (“[I]t is held in this state, by analogy to the criminal law, that an infant under 7 years of age is conclusively presumed to be incapable of contributory negligence; that between the ages of 7 and 14 there is a prima facie presumption of such incapacity, which, however, may be overcome by evidence showing capacity; and, by clear implication, that an infant of the age of 14 years or

1999See Herring, 245 S.C. at 294 , 140 S.E.2d at 251 (‘We are here dealing with a four year old child who was incapable of contributory negligence.”); Chitwood v. Chitwood, 159 S.C. 109, 112 , 156 S.E. 179, 180 (1930) (“[I]t is held in this state, by analogy to the criminal law, that an infant under 7 years of age is conclusively presumed to be incapable of contributory negligence; that between the ages of 7 and 14 there is a prima facie presumption of such incapacity, which, however, may be overcome by evidence showing capacity; and, by clear implication, that an infant of the age of 14 years or

1999See Herring, 245 S.C. at 294 , 140 S.E.2d at 251 (‘We are here dealing with a four year old child who was incapable of contributory negligence.”); Chitwood v. Chitwood, 159 S.C. 109, 112 , 156 S.E. 179, 180 (1930) (“[I]t is held in this state, by analogy to the criminal law, that an infant under 7 years of age is conclusively presumed to be incapable of contributory negligence; that between the ages of 7 and 14 there is a prima facie presumption of such incapacity, which, however, may be overcome by evidence showing capacity; and, by clear implication, that an infant of the age of 14 years or

1999See Herring, 245 S.C. at 294 , 140 S.E.2d at 251 (‘We are here dealing with a four year old child who was incapable of contributory negligence.”); Chitwood v. Chitwood, 159 S.C. 109, 112 , 156 S.E. 179, 180 (1930) (“[I]t is held in this state, by analogy to the criminal law, that an infant under 7 years of age is conclusively presumed to be incapable of contributory negligence; that between the ages of 7 and 14 there is a prima facie presumption of such incapacity, which, however, may be overcome by evidence showing capacity; and, by clear implication, that an infant of the age of 14 years or

1996In attempting to distinguish Burriss from the present case, the majority states "[t]he Court noted, however, that the trial judge in [the] Burriss [] case did not actually charge the jury on that particular statute, and concluded that the judge's instruction constituted harmless error when the charge was reviewed in its entirety." Although the trial court in Burriss did not read the statute in question to the jury, it did charge the jury that wilful concealment of unpurchased goods on or outside a merchant's premises "would give rise to what we call a prima facie presumption that that person w

1996In attempting to distinguish Burriss from the present case, the majority states "[t]he Court noted, however, that the trial judge in [the] Burriss [] case did not actually charge the jury on that particular statute, and concluded that the judge's instruction constituted harmless error when the charge was reviewed in its entirety." Although the trial court in Burriss did not read the statute in question to the jury, it did charge the jury that wilful concealment of unpurchased goods on or outside a merchant's premises "would give rise to what we call a prima facie presumption that that person w

1935Code 1922 [now Code 1932, § 1011]) it is provided that 'the defendant shall be allowed to testify’ (if he desires to do so, but not otherwise) as to the facts and circumstances of the same, but when he becomes a witness in his own behalf, he is subject to the usual duties, liabilities and limitations of ordinary witnesses (State v. Robertson, 26 S. C., 117, 1 S. E., 443 , State v. Knox, 98 S. C., 114, 117, 82 S. E., 278 ), and the defendant in this case having become a witness in his behalf there is a prima facie presumption of fact that he has told the jury the truth concerning the facts and