prima facie presumption in Kansas

2021The United States Supreme Court has set forth three factors that a person must show to establish a prima facie violation of the fair cross-section requirement: "(1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a 'distinctive' group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process." Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 , 99 S. Ct. 664 , 58 L.

2021The United States Supreme Court has set forth three factors that a person must show to establish a prima facie violation of the fair cross-section requirement: "(1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a 'distinctive' group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process." Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 , 99 S. Ct. 664 , 58 L.

2016Elevator & Mercantile Ass'n, 272 Kan. 546, 554 , 35 P.3d 892 [2001]).

2004The elements of a prima facie claim for retaliatoiy discharge for filing a workers compensation claim are: (1) The plaintiff filed a claim for workers compensation benefits or sustained an injury for which he or she might assert a future claim for such benefits; (2) the employer had knowledge of the plaintiff s workers compensation claim injury; (3) the employer terminated the plaintiff s employment; and (4) a causal connection existed between the protected activity or injury and the termination. 272 Kan. at 554 .

2001The Court of Appeals adopted the elements of a prima facie claim for retaliatory discharge for filing a workers compensation *554 claim as set out in Sanjuan v. IBP, Inc., 160 F.3d 1291, 1298 (10th Cir. 1998). 28 Kan.

2001The Court of Appeals adopted the elements of a prima facie claim for retaliatory discharge for filing a workers compensation claim as set out in SanJuan v. IBP, Inc., 160 F.3d 1291, 1298 (10th Cir. 1998). 28 Kan.

2026But Kansas courts have long recognized an additional requirement, which is that "[i]n addition to those four elements, to prove legal malpractice in the handling of litigation, a plaintiff must establish the validity of the underlying claim by showing that it would have resulted in a favorable judgment in the underlying lawsuit had it not been for the attorney's error." 276 Kan. at 120 (citing Webb v. Pomeroy, 8 Kan.

2026As both the Defendants and the LeTourneaus note, establishing a prima facie claim for legal malpractice under Kansas law requires showing "'(1) the duty of the attorney to exercise ordinary skill and knowledge, (2) a breach of that duty, (3) a causal connection between the breach of duty and the resulting injury, and (4) actual loss or damage.'" Canaan, 276 Kan. at 120 .

2024Goodman, 276 Kan. at 590 .

2012The court concluded: “Concerns about troublesome implications of preponderancé-of-the-evidence findings weigh heavily in favor of determining a motion to dismiss on the prima facie standard. [Citation omitted.]” Boit, 967 F.2d at 677 .

2009Jenkins v. Amchem Products, Inc., 256 Kan. 602, 630 , 886 P.2d 869 (1994) cert. denied 516 U.S. 820 (1995); Mays v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 233 Kan. 38, 54 , 661 P.2d 348 (1983).

2009Jenkins v. Amchem Products, Inc., 256 Kan. 602, 630 , 886 P.2d 869 (1994) cert. denied 516 U.S. 820 (1995); Mays v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 233 Kan. 38, 54 , 661 P.2d 348 (1983).

2009Jenkins v. Amchem Products, Inc., 256 Kan. 602, 630 , 886 P.2d 869 (1994) cert. denied 516 U.S. 820 (1995); Mays v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 233 Kan. 38, 54 , 661 P.2d 348 (1983).

2009Jenkins v. Amchem Products, Inc., 256 Kan. 602, 630 , 886 P.2d 869 (1994) cert. denied 516 U.S. 820 (1995); Mays v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 233 Kan. 38, 54 , 661 P.2d 348 (1983).

2009Jenkins v. Amchem Products, Inc., 256 Kan. 602, 630 , 886 P.2d 869 (1994) cert. denied 516 U.S. 820 (1995); Mays v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 233 Kan. 38, 54 , 661 P.2d 348 (1983).

2004Under the burden-shifting analysis, although the prima facie presumption of unlawful intent ‘ “drops out of the picture” once the defendant meets its burden of production, . . ., the trier of fact may still consider the evidence establishing the *439 plaintiffs prima facie case “and inferences properly drawn therefrom . . . on the issue of whether the defendant’s explanation is pretextual,” ’ Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143 , 120 S. Ct. 2097, 2106 , 147 L.

2004Under the burden-shifting analysis, although the prima facie presumption of unlawful intent ‘ “drops out of the picture” once the defendant meets its burden of production, . . ., the trier of fact may still consider the evidence establishing the *439 plaintiffs prima facie case “and inferences properly drawn therefrom . . . on the issue of whether the defendant’s explanation is pretextual,” ’ Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143 , 120 S. Ct. 2097, 2106 , 147 L.

1991Building upon their holding in Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 , the Supreme Court stated the requirements necessary to establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement as follows: “In order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement, the defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a ‘distinctive’ group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepre

1991Building upon their holding in Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 , the Supreme Court stated the requirements necessary to establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement as follows: "In order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement, the defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a `distinctive' group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and *436 reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this under

1989It does not shift the burden of proof unjustly upon the defendant as he may come forth and rebut the inference created if he has the evidence of an innocent intent.” 223 Kan. at 196 .

1983Woods v. Midwest Conveyor Co., 231 Kan. at 767 .

1967(Fooshee v. Kasenberg, 152 Kan. 100, 103 , 102 P. 2d 995 .) It is established that where there has been a showing of either possession of the signed deed by the *370 grantee or its recording, there is a prima facie presumption of delivery, and the burden of proof is on the party questioning delivery.

1967(Fooshee v. Kasenberg, 152 Kan. 100, 103 , 102 P. 2d 995 .) It is established that where there has been a showing of either possession of the signed deed by the *370 grantee or its recording, there is a prima facie presumption of delivery, and the burden of proof is on the party questioning delivery.

1964(State v. Grey, 154 Kan. 442, 444 , syl. 2, 119 P. 2d 468 .) Instructions Nos. 12 and 13 were the usual ones to the effect that one who aids or abets in the commission of an offense may be charged, tried and convicted as though he were a principal.

1964(State v. Grey, 154 Kan. 442, 444 , syl. 2, 119 P. 2d 468 .) Instructions Nos. 12 and 13 were the usual ones to the effect that one who aids or abets in the commission of an offense may be charged, tried and convicted as though he were a principal.

1940(See Ryan v. Tudor, 31 Kan. 366 , 2 Pac. 797 ; Modern Woodmen v. Gerdom, 72 Kan. 391 , 82 Pac. 1100 ; 77 Kan. 401 , 94 Pac. 788 ; Renard v. Bennett, supra; Caldwell v.-Modern Woodmen, 89 Kan. 11 , 130 Pac. 642 ; Mackie v. United Workmen, 100 Kan. 345 , 164 Pac. 263 .) Appellee compares the evidence in this case with that of some of the cases above cited and argues that the evidence was sufficient to raise a prima facie presumption of death, and whether it was sufficient to overcome presumption of continued life was one of fact for the jury.

1940(See Ryan v. Tudor, 31 Kan. 366 , 2 Pac. 797 ; Modern Woodmen v. Gerdom, 72 Kan. 391 , 82 Pac. 1100 ; 77 Kan. 401 , 94 Pac. 788 ; Renard v. Bennett, supra; Caldwell v.-Modern Woodmen, 89 Kan. 11 , 130 Pac. 642 ; Mackie v. United Workmen, 100 Kan. 345 , 164 Pac. 263 .) Appellee compares the evidence in this case with that of some of the cases above cited and argues that the evidence was sufficient to raise a prima facie presumption of death, and whether it was sufficient to overcome presumption of continued life was one of fact for the jury.

1940(See Ryan v. Tudor, 31 Kan. 366 , 2 Pac. 797 ; Modern Woodmen v. Gerdom, 72 Kan. 391 , 82 Pac. 1100 ; 77 Kan. 401 , 94 Pac. 788 ; Renard v. Bennett, supra; Caldwell v.-Modern Woodmen, 89 Kan. 11 , 130 Pac. 642 ; Mackie v. United Workmen, 100 Kan. 345 , 164 Pac. 263 .) Appellee compares the evidence in this case with that of some of the cases above cited and argues that the evidence was sufficient to raise a prima facie presumption of death, and whether it was sufficient to overcome presumption of continued life was one of fact for the jury.

1940(See Ryan v. Tudor, 31 Kan. 366 , 2 Pac. 797 ; Modern Woodmen v. Gerdom, 72 Kan. 391 , 82 Pac. 1100 ; 77 Kan. 401 , 94 Pac. 788 ; Renard v. Bennett, supra; Caldwell v.-Modern Woodmen, 89 Kan. 11 , 130 Pac. 642 ; Mackie v. United Workmen, 100 Kan. 345 , 164 Pac. 263 .) Appellee compares the evidence in this case with that of some of the cases above cited and argues that the evidence was sufficient to raise a prima facie presumption of death, and whether it was sufficient to overcome presumption of continued life was one of fact for the jury.

1940(See Ryan v. Tudor, 31 Kan. 366 , 2 Pac. 797 ; Modern Woodmen v. Gerdom, 72 Kan. 391 , 82 Pac. 1100 ; 77 Kan. 401 , 94 Pac. 788 ; Renard v. Bennett, supra; Caldwell v.-Modern Woodmen, 89 Kan. 11 , 130 Pac. 642 ; Mackie v. United Workmen, 100 Kan. 345 , 164 Pac. 263 .) Appellee compares the evidence in this case with that of some of the cases above cited and argues that the evidence was sufficient to raise a prima facie presumption of death, and whether it was sufficient to overcome presumption of continued life was one of fact for the jury.

1940(See Ryan v. Tudor, 31 Kan. 366 , 2 Pac. 797 ; Modern Woodmen v. Gerdom, 72 Kan. 391 , 82 Pac. 1100 ; 77 Kan. 401 , 94 Pac. 788 ; Renard v. Bennett, supra; Caldwell v.-Modern Woodmen, 89 Kan. 11 , 130 Pac. 642 ; Mackie v. United Workmen, 100 Kan. 345 , 164 Pac. 263 .) Appellee compares the evidence in this case with that of some of the cases above cited and argues that the evidence was sufficient to raise a prima facie presumption of death, and whether it was sufficient to overcome presumption of continued life was one of fact for the jury.

1940(See Ryan v. Tudor, 31 Kan. 366 , 2 Pac. 797 ; Modern Woodmen v. Gerdom, 72 Kan. 391 , 82 Pac. 1100 ; 77 Kan. 401 , 94 Pac. 788 ; Renard v. Bennett, supra; Caldwell v.-Modern Woodmen, 89 Kan. 11 , 130 Pac. 642 ; Mackie v. United Workmen, 100 Kan. 345 , 164 Pac. 263 .) Appellee compares the evidence in this case with that of some of the cases above cited and argues that the evidence was sufficient to raise a prima facie presumption of death, and whether it was sufficient to overcome presumption of continued life was one of fact for the jury.

1940(See Ryan v. Tudor, 31 Kan. 366 , 2 Pac. 797 ; Modern Woodmen v. Gerdom, 72 Kan. 391 , 82 Pac. 1100 ; 77 Kan. 401 , 94 Pac. 788 ; Renard v. Bennett, supra; Caldwell v.-Modern Woodmen, 89 Kan. 11 , 130 Pac. 642 ; Mackie v. United Workmen, 100 Kan. 345 , 164 Pac. 263 .) Appellee compares the evidence in this case with that of some of the cases above cited and argues that the evidence was sufficient to raise a prima facie presumption of death, and whether it was sufficient to overcome presumption of continued life was one of fact for the jury.

1940(See Ryan v. Tudor, 31 Kan. 366 , 2 Pac. 797 ; Modern Woodmen v. Gerdom, 72 Kan. 391 , 82 Pac. 1100 ; 77 Kan. 401 , 94 Pac. 788 ; Renard v. Bennett, supra; Caldwell v.-Modern Woodmen, 89 Kan. 11 , 130 Pac. 642 ; Mackie v. United Workmen, 100 Kan. 345 , 164 Pac. 263 .) Appellee compares the evidence in this case with that of some of the cases above cited and argues that the evidence was sufficient to raise a prima facie presumption of death, and whether it was sufficient to overcome presumption of continued life was one of fact for the jury.

1931(Hatch v. Barrett, 34 Kan. 223 , 8 Pac. 129 ; Bank v. Hutchinson, 62 Kan. 9 , 61 Pac. 443 ; Williamson v. Ackerman, 77 Kan. 502 , 94 Pac. 807 .

1931(Hatch v. Barrett, 34 Kan. 223 , 8 Pac. 129 ; Bank v. Hutchinson, 62 Kan. 9 , 61 Pac. 443 ; Williamson v. Ackerman, 77 Kan. 502 , 94 Pac. 807 .

1931(Hatch v. Barrett, 34 Kan. 223 , 8 Pac. 129 ; Bank v. Hutchinson, 62 Kan. 9 , 61 Pac. 443 ; Williamson v. Ackerman, 77 Kan. 502 , 94 Pac. 807 .

1931(Hatch v. Barrett, 34 Kan. 223 , 8 Pac. 129 ; Bank v. Hutchinson, 62 Kan. 9 , 61 Pac. 443 ; Williamson v. Ackerman, 77 Kan. 502 , 94 Pac. 807 .

1931(Hatch v. Barrett, 34 Kan. 223 , 8 Pac. 129 ; Bank v. Hutchinson, 62 Kan. 9 , 61 Pac. 443 ; Williamson v. Ackerman, 77 Kan. 502 , 94 Pac. 807 .