166 Ohio opinions name it 9 courts 1889–2026 26 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Fultongreen2 sentences2024Id. at 538 . {¶ 16} In order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair cross-section requirement, Wright was required to demonstrate "(1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a 'distinctive' group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that the underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process." State v. Fulton, 57 Ohio Guernsey County, Case No. 23CA000009 5 St.3d 120, 566 N.E.2d 1195 2006In order to establish a prima facie violation of this constitutional requirement, the defendant must show: "(1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a `distinctive' group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that the representation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process." State v. Fulton (1991), 57 Ohio St.3d 120 , paragraph two of the syllabus. | 8 | 10 |
United States v. Chris Jermaine Allen (96-6635) Corey Antoine Murray (96-6676) Jason Edward Webb (96-6677) Jeffery Ramone Buckley (96-6679)green2 sentences2025Adams App. No. 23CA1171 15 {¶42} “Appellant's failure to point to any evidence supporting a prima facie violation of the fair cross-section requirement defeats this claim.” State v. Elmore, 2005-Ohio-5940, ¶ 57 , citing United States v. Allen, 160 F.3d 1096, 1103-1104 (6th Cir.1998). {¶43} However, “[t]he demonstration of a prima facie fair-cross-section violation by the defendant is not the end of the inquiry into whether a constitutional violation has occurred.” Id. at 367. 2008See, e.g., United States v. Allen , 160 F.3d 1096 , 1103-04 (6th Cir. 1998) (finding no Sixth Amendment fair cross-section violation where defendants failed to meet second and third prongs of prima facie case). {¶ 101} Appellant failed to present evidence outside of the record to make the necessary showing under Fulton, Seabold, Duren , and the other authorities mentioned to indicate deliberate exclusion of "distinctive groups" of the jury venire or jury panel involved. | 4 | 4 |
Mauzy v. Kelly Services, Inc.green2 sentences2025A plaintiff seeking to establish a prima facie claim of disparate- treatment age discrimination through indirect evidence must demonstrate that he or she “(1) is a member of a protected class, (2) was subject to an adverse employment decision, (3) is qualified for the position, and (4) was replaced by a substantially younger person or that a similarly situated nonprotected employee was treated more favorably.” Leeds v. Weltman, Weinberg & Reis Co., L.P.A., 2021- Ohio-4123, ¶ 36 (8th Dist.), citing Mauzy v. Kelly Servs., 75 Ohio St.3d 578, 582 (1996). 2006Mauzy v. Kelly Services, Inc. (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 578 . {¶ 22} To establish a prima facie violation of R.C. 4112.14 (A), a plaintiff must demonstrate (1) he or she was a member of the statutorily protected class, (2) he or she was discharged, (3) he or she was qualified for the position, and (4) he or she was replaced by, or the discharge permitted the retention of a person not belonging to the protected class. | 3 | 6 |
Dimora v. Cleveland Clinic Foundationgreen2 sentences2001Grau v. Kleinschmidt (1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 84 , 90 ; Dimora v. Cleveland Clinic Found . (1996), 114 Ohio App.3d 711 , 716 . 2000Grau v. Kleinschmidt (1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 84 , 90 , 509 N.E.2d 399 ; see, also, Dimora v. Cleveland Clinic Found. (1996), 114 Ohio App.3d 711 , 716 , 683 N.E.2d 1175 . | 3 | 5 |
Duren v. Missourigreen2 sentences2024Id. at 538 . {¶ 16} In order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair cross-section requirement, Wright was required to demonstrate "(1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a 'distinctive' group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that the underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process." State v. Fulton, 57 Ohio Guernsey County, Case No. 23CA000009 5 St.3d 120, 566 N.E.2d 1195 2024Id. at 538 . {¶ 16} In order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair cross-section requirement, Wright was required to demonstrate "(1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a 'distinctive' group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that the underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process." State v. Fulton, 57 Ohio Guernsey County, Case No. 23CA000009 5 St.3d 120, 566 N.E.2d 1195 | 2 | 22 |
Chitwood v. Dunbar Armored, Inc.green2 sentences2024Instead, “the focus at this point should be on Plaintiff’s objective qualifications, such as his [or her] experience in the industry and demonstrated possession of the required general skills.” Chitwood v. Dunbar Armored, Inc., 267 F.Supp.2d 751, 756 (S.D. 2019Rather, "the focus at this point should be on Plaintiff's objective qualifications, such as his experience in the industry and demonstrated possession of the required general skills." Chitwood v. Dunbar Armored, Inc., 267 F.Supp.2d 751, 756 (S.D.Ohio 2003), citing Wexler at 575-76 . | 2 | 2 |
State v. Freemangreen2 sentences2018Freeman at 58, 485 N.E.2d 1043 . " 'Absent some demonstration of an invidious motive, [a] court will not presume intentional or purposeful discrimination from a mere showing of different treatment." LaMar at ¶ 46. {¶ 43} Furthermore, a "defendant is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on a selective prosecution defense unless he sets forth a prima facie claim." Powell at ¶ 23 ; citing Pepper Pike v. Dantzig , 8th Dist. 2014Id., quoting United States v. Berrios 501 F.2d 1207, 1211 (2d Cir.1974). {¶ 14} " 'A mere showing that another person similarly situated was not prosecuted is not enough; a defendant must demonstrate actual discrimination due to invidious motives or bad faith.' " Cleveland v. Trzebuckowski, 85 Ohio St.3d 524, 532 (1999), quoting State v. Freeman, 20 Ohio St.3d 55, 58 (1985). | 2 | 2 |
Kohmescher v. Kroger Co.green2 sentences2013In Coryell, the court further modified the fourth element of the prima facie analysis, stating that the plaintiff must establish that they were "replaced by * * * a person of substantially younger age." Id. at paragraph one of the syllabus, modifying and explaining Kohmescher v. Kroger Co., 61 Ohio St.3d 501 (1991), syllabus. 2004Coryell was decided on March 3, 2004. {¶ 7} R.C. 4112.14 (A) provides that "[n]o employer shall . . . discharge without just cause any employee aged forty or older who is physically able to perform the duties (of the position) and otherwise meets the established requirements of the job and law pertaining to the relationship between employer and employee." {¶ 8} The Supreme Court held in Kohmescher v. Kroger Co. (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 501 , that a discharged employee who is unable to prove an age discrimination violation through direct evidence may yet prove a prima facie violation circumstantia | 1 | 7 |
Bruni v. Tatsumigreen2 sentences2017Bruni v. Tatsumi, 46 Ohio St.2d 127, 130 (1976). 2013Bruni also requires expert testimony on the issue of causation. {¶ 15} Under Ohio Law, in order to present a prima facie claim of medical malpractice, a plaintiff must establish: 1) the standard of care, as generally shown through expert testimony; 2) the failure of the defendant to meet the requisite standard of care; and 3) a direct causal connection between the medically negligent act and the injury sustained. 7 Bruni v. Tatsumi, 46 Ohio St.2d 127 , ¶ 1 of the syllabus. “[P]hysicians are said to owe patients a legal duty to use recognized standards of professional knowledge and skill.” Ryne | 1 | 5 |
Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdinegreen2 sentences2018Id. , citing Burdine at 256, 101 S.Ct. 1089 . {¶ 64} In their motion for summary judgment, appellees argued appellant could not satisfy the first, second, and fourth prongs of the prima facie test. 2012Id. at 256, 101 S.Ct. at 1095 . 9 {¶ 20} Appellees do not dispute that Smith has made the required showing regarding the first three prongs of the prima facie test. | 1 | 4 |
Wille v. Hunkar Laboratories, Inc.green2 sentences2026Meyers v. Goodrich Corp., 2011-Ohio- 3261, ¶ 13 (8th Dist.), citing Wille v. Hunkar Laboratories, Inc., 132 Ohio App.3d 92, 107-108 (1st Dist. 1998). 2023Wille v. Hunkar Laboratories, Inc., 132 Ohio App.3d 92, 107-108 , 724 N.E.2d 492 (1st Dist.1998). | 1 | 3 |
Collins v. Rizkanagreen2 sentences2010A plaintiff must establish a prima facie claim based on the four elements, adopted by the court in Collins v. Rizkana (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 65, 69-70 , 652 N.E.2d 653 , that constitute the tort of wrongful discharge: {¶ 9} “1. 2010A plaintiff must establish a prima facie claim based on the four elements, adopted by the court in Collins v. Rizkana (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 65, 69-70 , 652 N.E.2d 653 , that constitute the tort of wrongful discharge: {¶ 9} “1. | 1 | 3 |
Ryne v. Garveygreen2 sentences2013Bruni also requires expert testimony on the issue of causation. {¶ 15} Under Ohio Law, in order to present a prima facie claim of medical malpractice, a plaintiff must establish: 1) the standard of care, as generally shown through expert testimony; 2) the failure of the defendant to meet the requisite standard of care; and 3) a direct causal connection between the medically negligent act and the injury sustained. 7 Bruni v. Tatsumi, 46 Ohio St.2d 127 , ¶ 1 of the syllabus. “[P]hysicians are said to owe patients a legal duty to use recognized standards of professional knowledge and skill.” Ryne 2013Bruni also requires expert testimony on the issue of causation. {¶ 15} Under Ohio Law, in order to present a prima facie claim of medical malpractice, a plaintiff must establish: 1) the standard of care, as generally shown through expert testimony; 2) the failure of the defendant to meet the requisite standard of care; and 3) a direct causal connection between the medically negligent act and the injury sustained. 7 Bruni v. Tatsumi, 46 Ohio St.2d 127 , ¶ 1 of the syllabus. “[P]hysicians are said to owe patients a legal duty to use recognized standards of professional knowledge and skill.” Ryne | 1 | 3 |
Meadowwood Nursing v. Odjfs, Unpublished Decision (7-21-2005)green2 sentences2020See also Meadowwood Nursing Facility at ¶ 14-15. {¶ 28} Here, the language of Finding of Fact 9 references a prima facie presumption but that reference is modified by the phrase "the validity of Method II established through the evidence presented by ODM." (Emphasis added.) (Report & Recommendation at 8.) Accordingly, we do not read Finding of Fact 9 as a clear expression of the hearing examiner's application of an evidentiary presumption in favor of ODM. 2020No. 04AP-732, 2005-Ohio-1263 , ¶ 14, quoting Cleveland v. Keah, 157 Ohio St. 331 , 337 (1952). {¶ 85} "The presentation of evidence on some audit findings [does] not deprive [the department] of all applicable presumptions" under Ohio Adm.Code 5101:6-50-09(A)(4). | 1 | 2 |
City of Pepper Pike v. Dantzig, Unpublished Decision (5-20-2004)green2 sentences2018Cuyahoga No. 83425, 2004-Ohio-2562 , 2004 WL 1119627 , ¶ 14. 2006See, e.g., Pepper Pike v. Dantzig, Cuyahoga App. No. 83425, 2004-Ohio-2562 , at ¶ 14 . | 1 | 2 |
Berghuis v. Smithgreen2 sentences2017Berghuis v. Smith, 559 U.S. 314, 327 , 130 S.Ct. 1382 , 176 L.Ed.2d 249 (2010), citing Duren at 364 . “[O]nce the defendant has made a prima facie showing of an infringement of his constitutional right to a jury drawn from a fair cross section of the community, it is the State that bears the burden of justifying this infringement by showing attainment of a fair cross section to be incompatible with a significant state interest.” State v. Stockton, 3d Dist. 2015"To establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement, * * * a defendant must prove that: (1) a group qualifying as 'distinctive' (2) is not fairly and reasonably represented in jury venires, and (3) 'systematic exclusion' in the jury-selection process accounts for the underrepresentation." Berghuis v. Smith, 559 U.S. 314, 327 (2010), citing Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979). | 1 | 2 |
| United States v. Armstronggreen | 1 | 2 |
| McDonald v. Stuffgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Gagegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Caldwell v. Niles City Schoolsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Hattongreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Bethel (Slip Opinion)green | 1 | 1 |
| O'Malley-Donegan v. MetroHealth Sys.green | 1 | 1 |
| Vickers v. Wren Ind., Unpublished Decision (7-8-2005)green | 1 | 1 |
| Fall v. La Fitnessgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Parries v. Makino, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Henry Dicarlo v. John E. Potter, Postmaster Generalgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Gagegreen | 1 | 1 |
| State ex rel. Levin v. Schrempgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Adair v. City of Muskogeegreen | 1 | 1 |
| James P. Smith v. Chrysler Corporationgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikensgreen | 1 | 1 |
| David Schneider v. Michael Hardestygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| State v. Michelgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Coryell v. Bank One Trust Co. N.A.
green
2 sentences2013Coryell v. Bank One Trust Co., N.A., 101 Ohio St.3d 175 , 2004–Ohio–723, 803 N.E.2d 781 , ¶ 20. {¶18} In the case sub judice, appellant focuses on the fourth criterion of Coryell, supra, urging that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether he was “replaced” by Nathan Clements, appellee’s comptroller, who was thirty-three years old in 2009.1 Appellant concedes that neither Clements nor anyone else was given the title of general manager after appellant was terminated. {¶19} In discovery, appellant received from Appellee Ziegler Tire a document listing appellant’s former job duties a 2013Coryell v. Bank One Trust Co., N.A., 101 Ohio St.3d 175 , 803 N.E.2d 781 , 2004-Ohio-723 , ¶ 20. {¶17} In the case sub judice, appellant’s age puts him in a statutorily protected class for his present claim (see R.C. 4112.14), and the fact of his discharge is undisputed. | 9 | 2005–2013 |
Taylor v. Louisiana
green
2 sentences2024Id. at 538 . {¶ 16} In order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair cross-section requirement, Wright was required to demonstrate "(1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a 'distinctive' group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that the underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process." State v. Fulton, 57 Ohio Guernsey County, Case No. 23CA000009 5 St.3d 120, 566 N.E.2d 1195 2021It does demand, though, that the “jury wheels, pools of names, panels or venires from which the juries are drawn must not systematically exclude distinctive groups in the community.” Id. {¶ 17} The United States Supreme Court in Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 , 99 S.Ct. 664 , 58 L.Ed.2d 579 (1979), held that to establish a prima facie violation of the cross-section requirement, a defendant must demonstrate that (1) the group purported to be excluded is a “distinctive” group in the community; (2) the representation of the group in venires from which juries are picked is not fair and reasonable | 8 | 1991–2024 |
Grau v. Kleinschmidt
green
2 sentences2009Grau v. Kleinschmidt (1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 84 , 90 * * *. 2005Grau v. Kleinschmidt (1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 84 , 90 . | 7 | 2000–2009 |
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green
green
2 sentences2023The court outlined the requirements that Ora must meet to succeed on the merits of his discrimination claim based on circumstantial evidence using the burden-shifting analysis laid out under McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 , 93 S.Ct. 1817 , 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973): first, the plaintiff must make out a prima facie claim of discrimination; next, the burden of production shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory basis for its actions; finally, the plaintiff must show by the preponderance of the evidence that the defendant’s justification is a mere pretext 2023The court outlined the requirements that Ora must meet to succeed on the merits of his discrimination claim based on circumstantial evidence using the burden-shifting analysis laid out under McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 , 93 S.Ct. 1817 , 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973): first, the plaintiff must make out a prima facie claim of discrimination; next, the burden of production shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory basis for its actions; finally, the plaintiff must show by the preponderance of the evidence that the defendant’s justification is a mere pretext | 6 | 2006–2023 |
Hood v. Diamond Products, Inc.
green
2 sentences2007Springer , 2005-Ohio-3624 , at ¶ 16 . {¶ 22} R.C. 4112.02 , the statute prohibiting unlawful discriminatory practices in the workplace, states that it "shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice" for "any employer, because of * * * disability * * * to discharge without just cause * * * or otherwise to discriminate against that person with respect to * * * any matter directly or indirectly related to employment." R.C. 4112.02 (A). {¶ 23} To establish a prima facie claim of disability discrimination under R.C. 4112.02 , the person seeking relief must establish that he or she (1) suffers from a 2005Hood v. Diamond Prods., Inc. (1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 298 , 658 N.E.2d 738 . {¶ 11} The issue raised is whether Pinchot presented evidence that established that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether he was disabled — the first prong of the aforementioned prima facie test. | 3 | 2000–2007 |
Edward E. ERCEGOVICH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee
green
2 sentences2006Tire, Inc. (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 30, 32 , 748 N.E.2d 36 , citing Ercegovich v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., (C.A.6, 1998), 154 F.3d 344, 352 . {¶ 30} However, in situations like the instant case where the defendant claims a reduction in work force, the plaintiff is not required to plead the fourth prong of the prima facie framework because in a reduction-of-force situation, the plaintiff is not replaced. 2001“A prima facie standard that requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that he or she was similarly-situated in every aspect to an employee outside the protected class receiving more favorable treatment removes from the protective reach of the anti-discrimination laws employees occupying ‘unique’ positions * * *. [I]f the non-protected employee to whom the plaintiff compares himself or herself must be identically situated to the plaintiff in every single aspect of their employment, a plaintiff whose job responsibilities are unique to his or her position will never successfully establish a prima fa | 3 | 2001–2006 |
Byrnes v. LCI Communication Holdings Co.
green
2 sentences2004Further, Coryell asks us to address what allegations are necessary to plead a prima facie case of age-based employment discrimination. {¶ 13} Bank One counters that we have already twice rejected O’Comior in Mauzy v. Kelly Services, Inc. (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 578 , 664 N.E.2d 1272 , and Byrnes v. LCI Communication Holdings Co. (1996), 77 Ohio St.3d 125 , 672 N.E.2d 145 , and that class membership remains a necessary component of a prima facie claim. 2004Further, Coryell asks us to address what allegations are necessary to plead a prima facie case of age-based employment discrimination. {¶ 13} Bank One counters that we have already twice rejected O’Comior in Mauzy v. Kelly Services, Inc. (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 578 , 664 N.E.2d 1272 , and Byrnes v. LCI Communication Holdings Co. (1996), 77 Ohio St.3d 125 , 672 N.E.2d 145 , and that class membership remains a necessary component of a prima facie claim. | 3 | 2000–2004 |
State v. Jones
green
2 sentences2024In State v. Jones, 91 Ohio St.3d 335 , 340, 744 N.E.2d 1163 (2001), the Ohio Supreme Court adopted the test set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 , 99 S.Ct. 664 , 58 L.Ed. 2d 579 (1979), [T]hat in order to establish a prima facie violation of the Sixth Amendment’s fair cross-section requirement, a defendant must demonstrate “(1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a ‘distinctive’ group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such p 2024In State v. Jones, 91 Ohio St.3d 335 , 340, 744 N.E.2d 1163 (2001), the Ohio Supreme Court adopted the test set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 , 99 S.Ct. 664 , 58 L.Ed. 2d 579 (1979), [T]hat in order to establish a prima facie violation of the Sixth Amendment’s fair cross-section requirement, a defendant must demonstrate “(1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a ‘distinctive’ group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such p | 2 | 2002–2024 |
Painter v. Graley
green
2 sentences2023Brown No. CA2013-05-006, 2013-Ohio-5767, ¶ 12 , citing Painter v. Graley, 70 Ohio St.3d 377 (1994), paragraph three of the syllabus. {¶12} To establish a prima facie claim of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy, the employee must demonstrate the following four elements: 1. 2013Painter v. Graley, 70 Ohio St.3d 377 (1994), paragraph three of the syllabus. {¶ 13} To establish a prima facie claim of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy, the employee must demonstrate the following four elements: 1. | 2 | 2013–2023 |
Shirley J. MITCHELL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TOLEDO HOSPITAL, Defendant-Appellee
green
2 sentences2022The fourth element of a prima facie claim may be demonstrated through evidence of better treatment by the employer of a “comparable non-protected person.” Parries v. Makino, Inc., 148 Fed.Appx. 291, 296 (6th Cir.2005), quoting Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp., 964 F.2d 577 , 582- 583 (6th Cir.1992). 1994In Mitchell , a race and age discrimination/termination case, the court held: “As the Sixth Circuit has frequently phrased the requirements of a prima facie claim of disparate treatment using such a ‘comparable non-protected person was treated better’ ■ element as one of the requisites, the plaintiff must produce evidence which at a minimum establishes (1) that he was a member of a protected class and (2) that for the same or similar conduct he was treated differently than similarly-situated non-minority employees. * * * a Hi Hí # “It is fundamental that to make a comparison of a discriminatio | 2 | 1994–2022 |
Cleveland v. Ohio Bur. of Workers' Comp. (Slip Opinion)
green
2 sentences2020However, since the Ohio Supreme Court decided Santos, the Ohio Supreme Court decided Cleveland v. Ohio Bur. of Workers’ Comp., Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-337 , which clarifies the limited circumstances under which a plaintiff may prevail on an equitable claim for unjust enrichment. 2020However, since the Ohio Supreme Court decided Santos, the Ohio Supreme Court decided Cleveland v. Ohio Bur. of Workers’ Comp., Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-337 , which clarifies the limited circumstances under which a plaintiff may prevail on an equitable claim for unjust enrichment. | 2 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Hirsch
green
2 sentences2018State v. Brewster , 157 Ohio App.3d 342 , 2004-Ohio-2722 , 811 N.E.2d 162 , ¶ 5 (1st Dist.) ; State v. Hirsch , 129 Ohio App.3d 294 , 315, 717 N.E.2d 789 (1st Dist.1998). 2018State v. Brewster , 157 Ohio App.3d 342 , 2004-Ohio-2722 , 811 N.E.2d 162 , ¶ 5 (1st Dist.) ; State v. Hirsch , 129 Ohio App.3d 294 , 315, 717 N.E.2d 789 (1st Dist.1998). | 2 | 2017–2018 |
State v. Brewster
green
2 sentences2018State v. Brewster , 157 Ohio App.3d 342 , 2004-Ohio-2722 , 811 N.E.2d 162 , ¶ 5 (1st Dist.) ; State v. Hirsch , 129 Ohio App.3d 294 , 315, 717 N.E.2d 789 (1st Dist.1998). 2018State v. Brewster , 157 Ohio App.3d 342 , 2004-Ohio-2722 , 811 N.E.2d 162 , ¶ 5 (1st Dist.) ; State v. Hirsch , 129 Ohio App.3d 294 , 315, 717 N.E.2d 789 (1st Dist.1998). | 2 | 2017–2018 |
Mauzy v. Kelly Services, Inc.
green
2 sentences2017Mauzy v. Kelly Servs., Inc., 75 Ohio St. 3d 578 , 1996-Ohio-265 , 664 N.E.2d 1272, 1276-77 (1996). 2016Mauzy v. Kelly Servs., Inc., 75 Ohio St. 3d Case No. 2014-00918 -4- DECISION 578, 1996 Ohio 265 , 664 N.E.2d 1272, 1276-77 (1996). | 2 | 2016–2017 |
| Kilbarger v. Anchor Hocking Glass Co. green | 2 | 2015–2016 |
| Fredrick P. Godfredson v. Hess & Clark, Inc. green | 2 | 2006–2011 |
| Csejpes v. Cleveland Catholic Diocese green | 2 | 1999–2011 |
| State v. Butcher green | 2 | 1998–2008 |
| State v. Geraldo green | 2 | 2005–2005 |
| Barker v. Scovill, Inc. green | 2 | 1990–2000 |
| State v. Lowenstein green | 2 | 1990–1991 |
| Moody v. Ohio Dept. of Mental Health & Addiction Servs. green | 1 | 2026–2026 |
| State v. Jones green | 1 | 2026–2026 |
| Ronald C. Majewski v. Automatic Data Processing, Inc. green | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| State v. Elmore, Unpublished Decision (11-3-2005) green | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| Cicero v. Borg-Warner Automotive, Inc. green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| State v. Sellers, 08ap-810 (5-12-2009) green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| Greer-Burger v. Temesi green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| McJennett v. Lake Waynoka Property Owners neutral | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| Brady v. Maryland green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| Peters v. Rock-Tenn Company green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| State v. Baker green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Wholf v. Tremco, Inc. neutral | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Thomas v. PNC Bank, N.A. green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Budhun v. Reading Hospital & Medical Center green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Chandler v. Empire Chemical, Inc. green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Wasserstrom v. Battelle Mem. Inst. neutral | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| State v. Joseph green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Peterson v. Buckeye Steel Casings green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Wilson v. Riverside Hospital green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.