prima facie presumption in Louisiana

2002In Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 , 99 S.Ct. 664, 668 , 58 L.Ed.2d 579 (1979), the Court outlined the steps for a defendant to establish a prima facie violation of the "fair-cross-section" requirement as follows: [T]he defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a "distinctive" group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is *1098 not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury

2002In Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 , 99 S.Ct. 664, 668 , 58 L.Ed.2d 579 (1979), the Court outlined the steps for a defendant to establish a prima facie violation of the "fair-cross-section" requirement as follows: [T]he defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a "distinctive" group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is *1098 not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury

2016Parish of Jefferson v. Davis, 97-1200 (La.App. 5 Cir. 6/30/98) , 716 So.2d 428, 433 , unit denied, 98-2634 (La.12/11/98), 730 So.2d 460 .

2016Parish of Jefferson v. Davis, 97-1200 (La.App. 5 Cir. 6/30/98) , 716 So.2d 428, 433 , unit denied, 98-2634 (La.12/11/98), 730 So.2d 460 .

2016Parish of Jefferson v. Davis, 97-1200 (La.App. 5 Cir. 6/30/98) , 716 So.2d 428, 433 , unit denied, 98-2634 (La.12/11/98), 730 So.2d 460 .

2016Parish of Jefferson v. Davis, 97-1200, 97-1201 (La.App. 5 Cir. 6/30/98) , 716 So.2d 428, 433 , writ denied, 98-2634 (La. 12/11/98), 730 So.2d 460 .

1975This rule is subject, however, to the following qualification as pronounced by the Supreme Court in Baker Finance Co. v. Hines, 255 La. 971 , 233 So.2d 902 (1970): “While we are cognizant of the jurisprudence that the trial judge is presumed to have had sufficient evidence before him to render a confirmation of default judgment and great weight is given to statements in the judgment that it was rendered ‘upon due proof’, the fact remains that this is only a prima facie presumption and may be overcome by evidence to the contrary.

1975This rule is subject, however, to the following qualification as pronounced by the Supreme Court in Baker Finance Co. v. Hines, 255 La. 971 , 233 So.2d 902 (1970): “While we are cognizant of the jurisprudence that the trial judge is presumed to have had sufficient evidence before him to render a confirmation of default judgment and great weight is given to statements in the judgment that it was rendered ‘upon due proof’, the fact remains that this is only a prima facie presumption and may be overcome by evidence to the contrary.

2016Indeed, such attempts to fashion absolute, per se rules are inconsistent with Batson [ 476 U.S. at 96-97 , 106 S.Ct. 1712 ] in which the court instructed trial courts to consider 'all relevant circumstances.’ ” State v. Duncan, 99-2615 atpp. 21-22, 802 So.2d at 549-50 .

2016Indeed, such attempts to fashion absolute, per se rules are inconsistent with Batson [ 476 U.S. at 96-97 , 106 S.Ct. 1712 ] in which the court instructed trial courts to consider 'all relevant circumstances.’ ” State v. Duncan, 99-2615 atpp. 21-22, 802 So.2d at 549-50 .

1975This court declared in its early decision in the case of Hubbel v. Clannon, 13 La. 494 (1839) that the presumption that judicial proceedings were regular obtains only when the contrary does not appear in the record.

1971This court declared in its early decision in the case of Hubbel [Hubbell] v. Clannon, 13 La. 494 (1839) that the presumption that judicial proceedings were regular obtains only when the contrary does not appear in the record.” Articles 1702 and 1703 of the Code of Civil Procedure provide as follows: “A judgment of default must be confirmed by proof of the demand sufficient to establish a prima facie case.

2020Id.

2020Id.

2010King v. Caddo Parish Commission, supra; Prest v. Parish of Caddo, supra. A prima facie presumption of validity attaches to zoning board actions.

2010King v. Caddo Parish Commission, supra; Prest v. Parish of Caddo, supra. A prima facie presumption of validity attaches to zoning board actions.

1986State ex rel Pitts v. Board of Zoning Adjustments, 327 So.2d 140 (La.App. 4th Cir.1976); State ex rel Korns v. Board of Zoning Adjustments of New Orleans, 223 So.2d 505 (La.App. 4th Cir.1969); State ex rel Phillips v. Board of Zoning Adjustments, 197 So.2d 916 (La.App. 4th Cir.1967)." Also in Cross v. City of New Orleans, 446 So.2d 1253 (La.App. 4th Cir.1984), writ denied 449 So.2d 1359 (La.1984), the court said at 1255: *1234 "This court repeatedly has held that a prima facie presumption of validity attaches to the acts of the Board of Zoning Adjustments.

1978Phillips against Board of Zoning Adjustments for the City of New Orleans, 197 So.2d 916 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1967) wherein we stated the following general rule, page 918: "[1, 2] We are in agreement with the first contention to the extent that there is a prima facie presumption of validity which attaches to the acts of a duly constituted administrative board, such as the Board of Zoning Adjustments in the instant case, and accordingly, on appeal, or on writ as here, from such an act the burden is on the appellant or relator to *1356 affirmatively show the board abused its discretion or its decisi

1972Paz v. Implement Dealers Mutual Insurance Company, La.App., 89 So.2d 514 . . . ." The last portion of that paragraph is not generally quoted: ". . .

1966Paz v. Implement Dealers Mutual Insurance Company, La.App., 89 So.2d 514 ." Thus, in the present case, the affidavits and testimony introduced by defendant insurer to prove proper mailing of the Notice of Cancellation was rebuttable by the evidence of plaintiffs to show lack of delivery or receipt.

2023In Dorthey, 623 So.2d at 1280-81 , the Supreme Court held that this extends to the minimum sentences mandated by the Habitual Offender Law and that the trial court must reduce a sentence to one not unconstitutionally excessive if the trial court finds that the sentence mandated by the Habitual Offender Law “makes no measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punishment,” or is nothing more than “the purposeful imposition of pain and suffering” and “is grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime.” As an initial matter, in this writ application, relator argues that this Court’s fi

2022The prima facie standard, as applied to election lawsuits, was described by the Louisiana Supreme Court in Landiak v. Richmond, 05-0758, (La. 3/24/05), 899 So.2d 535, 541 , as follows: Under Louisiana's civil law, the “burden of proof” may shift back and forth between the parties as the trial progresses.

2014“The prima facie standard of proof to obtain a preliminary injunction is ‘less than that required for a permanent injunction.’ ” Dillon , 08-0989 at p. 6, 7 So.3d at 1231 (quoting Historic Restoration, Inc. v. RSUI Indem.

2014Co., 06-1178, p. 11 (La.App. 4 Cir. 3/21/07), 955 So.2d 200, 208 ).

2011The Supreme Court appears to have streamlined the first step of the Batson analysis in Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162 , 125 S.Ct. 2410 , 162 L.Ed.2d 129 (2005), which made clear that a defendant may satisfy the prima facie requirement without demonstrating that more probably than not the prosecutor’s peremptory challenges reflect racial bias.

2011The Supreme Court appears to have streamlined the first step of the Batson analysis in Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162 , 125 S.Ct. 2410 , 162 L.Ed.2d 129 (2005), which made clear that a defendant may satisfy the prima facie requirement without demonstrating that more probably than not the prosecutor’s peremptory challenges reflect racial bias.

2011Finally, the defendant urges this court to consider the “context in which this trial was conducted.” While the defendant correctly quotes Purkett, supra, for the proposition that once a prima facie case of discrimination has been made, the burden shifts to the proponent of the strike to provide a race-neutral explanations therefor (see 514 U.S. at 767 , 115 S.Ct. 1769 ), the defendant presents no legal support for his argument that the prima facie presumption remains in effect even after the court has accepted the proponent’s race-neutral reasons.

2011Finally, the defendant urges this court to consider the “context in which this trial was conducted.” While the defendant correctly quotes Purkett, supra, for the proposition that once a prima facie case of discrimination has been made, the burden shifts to the proponent of the strike to provide a race-neutral explanations therefor (see 514 U.S. at 767 , 115 S.Ct. 1769 ), the defendant presents no legal support for his argument that the prima facie presumption remains in effect even after the court has accepted the proponent’s race-neutral reasons.

2005Hernandez v. Crawford Building Material Company, 321 F.3d 528 (5th Cir.2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 817 , 124 S.Ct. 82 , 157 L.Ed.2d 34 (2003); Ackel v. National Communications, Inc., 339 F.3d 376 (5th Cir.2003); Roberson v. Alltel Information Services, 373 F.3d 647 (5th Cir.2004).