prima facie presumption in Pennsylvania

2022“The Commonwealth need not prove the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt; rather, the prima facie standard requires evidence of the existence of each and every element of the crime charged.” Id.

2017See, e.g., Marti, 779 A.2d at 1180 (“[T]he Commonwealth need not prove the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt; rather, the prima facie standard requires evidence of the existence of each and every element of the crime charged.”).

2016“The Commonwealth establishes a prima facie case when it produces evidence that, if accepted as true, would warrant the trial judge to allow the case to go to a jury.” Commonwealth v. Martin, 727 A.2d 1136, 1142 (Pa. Super. 1999), appeal denied, 560 Pa. 722 , 745 A.2d 1220 (1999) (quoting Commonwealth v. Allbeck, 715 A.2d 1213, 1214 (Pa. Super. 1998)). “[T]he Commonwealth need not prove the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt; rather, the prima facie standard requires evidence of the existence of -3- J-A10018-16 each and every element of the crime charged.” Id.

2010In the criminal law context, “the prima facie standard requires evidence of the existence of each and every element.” Commonwealth v. Martin, 727 A.2d 1136, 1142 (Pa. Super. 1999), alloc. denied, 560 Pa. 722 , 745 A.2d 1220 (1999).

2025There is no further requirement that the authorized agent be the person who conducted the investigation, and we shall not insert such language where none exists. 11 Next, in response to Petitioner’s contention that the Commonwealth failed to prove that Karen Hunter was authorized to issue the Citation, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that “a prima facie presumption of the regularity of the acts of public officers exists until the contrary appears.” Hughes v. Chaplin, 132 A.2d 200, 202 (Pa. 1957).

2024See Hughes v. Chaplin, . . . 132 A.2d 200, 202 ([Pa.] 1957) (stating that “a prima facie presumption of the regularity of the acts of public officers exists until the contrary appears . . . .

2025See e.g., Molina, 33 A.3d at 63 (stating that the Fifth Amendment “does not impose a prima facie bar against any mention of a defendant’s silence.”).

2024“The Fifth Amendment was enacted to protect against self-incrimination, whether [the suspect is] in custody or not, charged with a crime, or merely being questioned during the investigation of a crime.” Commonwealth v. Molina, 33 A.3d 51 , 63 (Pa.Super. 2011) (en banc) (citation omitted), affirmed, 104 A.3d 430 (Pa. 2014). “[T]he government may not use ... silence as substantive evidence of guilt when a defendant chooses not to testify. ... [That silence] may also not be used against a defendant who remained silent during the investigation of a crime.” Id. (citation omitted). -4- J-S08037-24 H

2010See Albert v. Lehigh Coal and Navigation Co., 431 Pa. 600 , 610 n. 5, 246 A.2d 840 , 845 n. 5 (1968) (“There is a prima facie presumption of the regularity of the acts of public officials which exists until the contrary appear....”).

2010See Albert v. Lehigh Coal and Navigation Co., 431 Pa. 600 , 610 n. 5, 246 A.2d 840 , 845 n. 5 (1968) (“There is a prima facie presumption of the regularity of the acts of public officials which exists until the contrary appear....”).

2022See Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 363 (1979) (articulating tripart test for establishing a prima facie violation of the fair cross-section requirement of the Sixth and Fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution); see also Commonwealth v. Harris, 424 A.2d 1245, 1247 (Pa. 1981) (applying the test articulated in Duren). -7- J-S35007-21 PCRA court lacked jurisdiction to review Appellant’s PCRA petition, and we may not review the substance of Appellant’s claims on appeal.

2004As any trial lawyer knows these questions lack firm answers. ¶ 4 Appellant cites Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 , 95 S.Ct. 692 , 42 L.Ed.2d 690 (1975), for the proposition that the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides for a trial by a jury of one’s peers drawn from a source fairly representative of the community and Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 , 99 S.Ct. 664 , 58 L.Ed.2d 579 (1979), for the standard used to establish a prima facie violation of the fair cross section requirement.

1999Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 , 101 S.Ct. 1089 , 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981); Allegheny Housing Rehabilitation Corporation v. Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission, 516 Pa. 124, 129 , 532 A.2d 315, 319 (1987). ¶ 14 The prima facie standard provides a valuable tool for plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases because direct evidence of discrimination is usually unavailable and the employer has the best access to discover the underlying reasons for the employee’s dismissal.

1999Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 , 101 S.Ct. 1089 , 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981); Allegheny Housing Rehabilitation Corporation v. Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission, 516 Pa. 124, 129 , 532 A.2d 315, 319 (1987). ¶ 14 The prima facie standard provides a valuable tool for plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases because direct evidence of discrimination is usually unavailable and the employer has the best access to discover the underlying reasons for the employee’s dismissal.

2024Commonwealth v. Perez, 249 A.3d 1092 , 1102–1103 (Pa. 2021) (quoting Commonwealth v. McBride, 595 A.2d 589, 591 (Pa. 1991) (citation omitted) (emphasis in original)). -5- J-S16037-24 The Commonwealth establishes a prima facie case when it produces evidence that, if accepted as true, would warrant the trial judge to allow the case to go to a jury. [T]he Commonwealth need not prove the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt; rather, the prima facie standard requires evidence of the existence of each and every element of the crime charged.

2024Commonwealth v. Perez, 249 A.3d 1092 , 1102 (Pa. 2021) (quoting Commonwealth v. McBride, 595 A.2d 589, 591 (Pa. 1991) (citation omitted) (emphasis in original)). -5- J-S16037-24 The Commonwealth establishes a prima facie case when it produces evidence that, if accepted as true, would warrant the trial judge to allow the case to go to a jury. [T]he Commonwealth need not prove the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt; rather, the prima facie standard requires evidence of the existence of each and every element of the crime charged.

2020See Commonwealth v. Troop, 571 A.2d 1084, 1088 (Pa. Super. 1990); see also Commonwealth v. Wojdak, 466 A.2d 991, 995 (Pa. 1983) (holding that the prima facie standard does not require that the Commonwealth prove the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt nor that evidence is available that would prove each element at trial beyond a reasonable doubt). - 17 - J-A23009-20 Moreover, our Rules of Criminal Procedure contemplate that suppression issues are to be addressed after the preliminary hearing stage of the proceedings.

1993“The prima facie standard requires that the Commonwealth produce evidence of the existence of each and every element of the charge; consequently, absence of evidence of a material element is fatal.” Commonwealth v. Styler, 411 Pa. Super. 133, 135 , 600 A.2d 1300, 1301 (1991), quoting Commonwealth v. Wojdak, 502 Pa. 359, 368 , 466 A.2d 991, 996-97 (1983).

2016The United States Supreme Court has cautioned that the prima facie requirement for making out a discrimination claim “is not onerous” and poses “a burden easily met.” Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981); see Marzano, 91 F.3d at 508 (describing the burden of presenting a prima facie case as “relatively simple” and “easily made out”) (citations omitted).

2016The United States Supreme Court has cautioned that the prima facie requirement for making out a discrimination claim “is not onerous” and poses “a burden easily met.” Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981); see Marzano, 91 F.3d at 508 (describing the burden of presenting a prima facie case as “relatively simple” and “easily made out”) (citations omitted).

2024See Commonwealth v. Jones, 304 A.2d 684 ([Pa.] 1973); Commonwealth v. Craver, 688 A.2d 691, 696 ([Pa.] 1997) (“Defendants are not entitled to a jury of any particular composition, but the jury wheels, pools of names, panels, or venires from which juries are drawn must not systematically exclude distinctive groups in the community and thereby fail to be reasonably representative thereof.” (quoting Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538 (1975) (emphasis in the original))). - 14 - J-A14029-24 To establish a prima facie violation of the requirement that a jury array fairly represent the community,

2015With regard to such a challenge, our Supreme Court has explained: “Defendants are not entitled to a jury of any particular composition, but the jury wheels, pools of names, panels, or venires from which juries are drawn must not systematically exclude distinctive groups in the community and thereby fail to be reasonably representative thereof.” Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538 , 95 S.Ct. 692, 701 , 42 L.Ed.2d 690, 703 (1975) (citations omitted; emphasis added). -8- J-S07035-15 In order to establish a prima facie violation of the requirement that the jury array fairly represent the commun

2006See Welsh, 698 A.2d at 584 (‘We granted allocatur to address the issue of what type of evidence is necessary to establish a prima facie claim of corporate liability for negligence against a hospital pursuant to our decision in Thompson v. Nason Hospital, 527 Pa. 330 , 591 A.2d 703 (1991).”). ¶ 12 The Welsh Court found that the plaintiff had established a prima facie case, where the evidence tended to establish that the hospital knew or should have known of the pregnant patient’s need for a cesarean section.

2006See Welsh, 698 A.2d at 584 ("We granted allocatur to address the issue of what type of evidence is necessary to establish a prima facie claim of corporate liability for negligence against a hospital pursuant to our decision in Thompson v. Nason Hospital, 527 Pa. 330 , 591 A.2d 703 (1991)."). ¶ 12 The Welsh Court found that the plaintiff had established a prima facie case, where the evidence tended to establish that the hospital knew or should have known of the pregnant patient's need for a cesarean section.

2025See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Talley, 265 A.3d 485 , 517 (Pa. 2021); Commonwealth v. Montgomery, 234 A.3d 523 , 533 (Pa. 2020); Commonwealth v. Weigle, 997 A.2d 306, 311 (Pa. 2010); Commonwealth v. Santos, 876 A.2d 360, 363 (Pa. 2005); Commonwealth v. Huggins, 836 A.2d 862, 866 (Pa. 2003); Commonwealth v. McBride, 595 A.2d 589, 591 (Pa. 1991).

2024Over the years there have been “varying expressions of this Court” and, “[f]rom some of this Court’s formulations, one might [ ] infer that the prima facie burden attaches only to the facet of the Commonwealth’s obligation to prove that a crime has been committed, and that a separate probable cause standard pertains to demonstrating that the defendant was the perpetrator.” Ricker, 170 A.3d at 503 (Saylor, C.J., concurring), citing, e.g., Commonwealth v. Huggins, 836 A.2d 862, 866 (Pa. 2003) (“A prima facie case exists when the Commonwealth produces evidence of each of the material elements of

2025West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

2023West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

2024Over the years there have been “varying expressions of this Court” and, “[f]rom some of this Court’s formulations, one might [ ] infer that the prima facie burden attaches only to the facet of the Commonwealth’s obligation to prove that a crime has been committed, and that a separate probable cause standard pertains to demonstrating that the defendant was the perpetrator.” Ricker, 170 A.3d at 503 (Saylor, C.J., concurring), citing, e.g., Commonwealth v. Huggins, 836 A.2d 862, 866 (Pa. 2003) (“A prima facie case exists when the Commonwealth produces evidence of each of the material elements of

2020This Court initially granted allowance of appeal in Ricker to consider whether “a defendant does not have a state and federal constitutional right to confront the witness against him at a preliminary hearing” and whether “a prima facie case may be proven by the Commonwealth through hearsay evidence alone[?]” Commonwealth v. Ricker, 135 with Chief Justice Saylor’s salient observation (in the context of discussing confrontation rights), “[d]efining the prima facie standard is not without its complications, particularly given the varying expressions of this Court.” Ricker II, 170 A.3d at 503 (Say

2013Once PennDOT satisfies its burden of proving a prima facie violation, the burden shifts to the licensee to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that the vehicle was insured at the time it was driven. 75 Pa.C.S. § 1786(d)(4)(h); Capone v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 875 A.2d 1228, 1231 (Pa.Cmwlth.2005).

2010See Capone, 875 A.2d at 1231 (“Once [ ]DOT satisfies its burden of proving a prima facie violation, the burden shifts to the licensee to prove, by ‘clear and convincing evidence,’ [that] the vehicle was insured at the time it was driven.”).

2017See, e.g., Beacom v. Robison, 43 A.2d 640, 643 (Pa. Super. 1945) (“[T]he doctrine of omnia praesumuntur rite esse acta, which maxim appears in various forms, but are all approximated in the language that a prima facie presumption of the regularity of the acts of public officers exists until the contrary appears.

1989Our Supreme Court, citing Beacom v. Robison, 157 Pa. Superior Ct. 515, 521 , 43 A.2d 640, 643 (1945), has held that “a prima facie presumption, of the regularity of the acts of public officers exists until the contrary appears.

2017See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543.1 (c)(3); Williams, 35 A.3d at 50 ; see also Commonwealth v. Heilman, 867 A.2d 542, 546-47 (Pa. Super. 2005) (“On its face, the prima facie requirement set forth in § 9543.1(c)(3) and reinforced in § 9543.1(d)(2) requires an appellant to demonstrate that favorable results of the requested DNA testing ‘would establish’ the appellant’s actual innocence of the crime of conviction.

2011Thus, as this Court has previously summarized, on its face, the prima facie requirement set forth in § 9543.1(c)(3) and reinforced in § 9543.1(d)(2) requires that an appellant demonstrate that there is a “reasonable possibility,” 4 that “favorable results of the requested DNA testing ‘would establish ’ the appellant’s actual innocence of the crime of conviction.” Commonwealth v. Brooks, supra, 875 A.2d at 1147 , quoting Commonwealth v. Heilman, 867 A.2d 542, 546-547 (Pa.Super.2005), appeal denied, 583 Pa. 669 , 876 A.2d 393 (2005) (emphasis in Heilman).

2016“The Commonwealth establishes a prima facie case when it produces evidence that, if accepted as true, would warrant the trial judge to allow the case to go to a jury.” Commonwealth v. Martin, 727 A.2d 1136, 1142 (Pa. Super. 1999), appeal denied, 560 Pa. 722 , 745 A.2d 1220 (1999) (quoting Commonwealth v. Allbeck, 715 A.2d 1213, 1214 (Pa. Super. 1998)). “[T]he Commonwealth need not prove the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt; rather, the prima facie standard requires evidence of the existence of -3- J-A10018-16 each and every element of the crime charged.” Id.

2016“The Commonwealth establishes a prima facie case when it produces evidence that, if accepted as true, would warrant the trial judge to allow the case to go to a jury.” Commonwealth v. Martin, 727 A.2d 1136, 1142 (Pa. Super. 1999), appeal denied, 560 Pa. 722 , 745 A.2d 1220 (1999) (quoting Commonwealth v. Allbeck, 715 A.2d 1213, 1214 (Pa. Super. 1998)). “[T]he Commonwealth need not prove the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt; rather, the prima facie standard requires evidence of the existence of -3- J-A10018-16 each and every element of the crime charged.” Id.

2019“While the general rule undoubtedly is that, if the agreement is one for sale of lands, it will be presumed, in absence of an intent to the contrary, the contract of purchase is merged in the deed. . . .” … But the prima facie presumption of the law arising from the [delivery and] acceptance of a deed is that it is the execution of the whole contract. ... [Y]et the general rule is that a purchase is consummated by the conveyance; after which the parties have no recourse to each other except for imposition or fraud, or upon the covenants in the deed.” Dobkin, supra at 184 , 116 A. at 817 .

2017But the prima facie presumption of the law arising from the [delivery and] acceptance of a deed is that it is the execution of the whole contract. … [Y]et the general rule is that a purchase is consummated by the conveyance; after which the parties have no recourse to each other except for imposition or fraud, or upon the covenants in the deed.” Dobkin, supra at 184 , 116 A. at 817 .

2015Nevertheless, the PCRA court cogently reasoned that it properly denied the DNA Motion under the PCRA DNA statute for the following reasons: In Conway, the Court explained that “the prima facie requirement set forth in [42 Pa.C.S.A.] § 9543.1(c)(3) and reinforced in [section] 9543.1(d)(2) requires that [the petitioner] demonstrate that there is a ‘reasonable possibility,’ that ‘favorable results of the requested DNA testing would establish the [petitioner’s] actual innocence of the crime of conviction.’” [Conway, 14 A.3d at 109 (emphasis, footnote and citations omitted); see also Williams, 35 A

2015Nevertheless, the PCRA court cogently reasoned that it properly denied the DNA Motion under the PCRA DNA statute for the following reasons: In Conway, the Court explained that “the prima facie requirement set forth in [42 Pa.C.S.A.] § 9543.1(c)(3) and reinforced in [section] 9543.1(d)(2) requires that [the petitioner] demonstrate that there is a ‘reasonable possibility,’ that ‘favorable results of the requested DNA testing would establish the [petitioner’s] actual innocence of the crime of conviction.’” [Conway, 14 A.3d at 109 (emphasis, footnote and citations omitted); see also Williams, 35 A

2015“The corpus delicti rule is two-tiered; it must first be considered as a rule of evidentiary admissibility using a prima facie standard, and later, under a beyond a reasonable doubt standard, as one of proof for the fact-finder’s consideration at the close of the case.” Id. citing Commonwealth v. Reyes, 381-82, 681 A.2d 724, 727 (Pa. 1996).

2013Commonwealth v. Reyes, 545 Pa. 374 , 681 A.2d 724, 727-30 (1996).

2002Commonwealth v. Deaner, 779 A.2d 578, 581 (Pa.Super.2001) (quoting Commonwealth v. Landi, 280 Pa.Super. 134 , 421 A.2d 442, 445 (Pa.Super.1980)). ¶ 8 In order to obtain relief under 61 P.S. § 81, a petitioner must make a prima facie claim for modification of sentence or transfer.

2002See Deaner, 779 A.2d at 582 . ¶ 9 In Deaner , we held that a prisoner’s allegation that he was afforded incompetent and inattentive care in prison did not establish a prima facie claim for modification of sentence or transfer absent any allegation that his current facility lacked the resources to treat him or that his illness compromised the collective health of the institution holding him.