prima facie violation in Mississippi

2000Lockett, 517 So.2d at 1349 ; see also Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 359 , 111 S.Ct. 1859 , 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991) (Once a prosecutor has offered a race-neutral explanation for the peremptory challenges and the trial court has ruled on the ultimate question of intentional discrimination, the preliminary issue of whether the defendant had made a prima facie showing becomes moot.).

2000Lockett, 517 So.2d at 1349 ; see also Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 359 , 111 S.Ct. 1859 , 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991) (Once a prosecutor has offered a race-neutral explanation for the peremptory challenges and the trial court has ruled on the ultimate question of intentional discrimination, the preliminary issue of whether the defendant had made a prima facie showing becomes moot.).

2009Simmons directs our attention to Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 , 99 S.Ct. 664 , 58 L.Ed.2d 579 (1979), wherein the United States Supreme Court announced certain criteria that a defendant must meet in order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair cross-section requirement: (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a “distinctive” group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this un-derrepresentation is due to system

2009Simmons directs our attention to Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 , 99 S.Ct. 664 , 58 L.Ed.2d 579 (1979), wherein the United States Supreme Court announced certain criteria that a defendant must meet in order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair cross-section requirement: (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a “distinctive” group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this un-derrepresentation is due to system

2005Furthermore, in Lanier v. State, 533 So.2d 473 (Miss.1988), this Court outlined the elements necessary to establish a prima facie violation of the fair cross-section requirement for an impartial jury: 1) the group alleged to be excluded is a "distinctive" group in the community; 2) the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and 3) this under representation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury selection process.

2002Furthermore, in Lanier v. State, 533 So.2d 473 (Miss.1988), this Court outlined the elements necessary to establish a prima facie violation of the fair cross-section requirement for an impartial jury: 1) the group alleged to be excluded is a “distinctive” group in the community; 2) the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and 3) this under representation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury selection process. 9 Lanier, 533 So.2d at 477 (quoting Duren v. Mi

2023Robertson concerned a post-conviction petition filed in the trial court—not a post-conviction application filed here. 669 So. 2d at 13 (“A prima facie claim must be stated by the defendant in his petition to the lower court in order to obtain an evidentiary hearing . . . .” (emphasis added) (citing Brooks v. State, 573 So. 2d 1350, 1353 (Miss. 1990))).

2012“A prima facie claim must be stated by the defendant in his petition to the [trial] court in order to obtain an evidentiary hearing on the merits of an ineffective assistance of counsel issue.” Robertson, 669 So.2d at 13 (citing Brooks v. State, 573 So.2d 1350, 1353 (Miss.1990)). ¶ 18.

2023Robertson concerned a post-conviction petition filed in the trial court—not a post-conviction application filed here. 669 So. 2d at 13 (“A prima facie claim must be stated by the defendant in his petition to the lower court in order to obtain an evidentiary hearing . . . .” (emphasis added) (citing Brooks v. State, 573 So. 2d 1350, 1353 (Miss. 1990))).

2012“A prima facie claim must be stated by the defendant in his petition to the [trial] court in order to obtain an evidentiary hearing on the merits of an ineffective assistance of counsel issue.” Robertson, 669 So.2d at 13 (citing Brooks v. State, 573 So.2d 1350, 1353 (Miss.1990)). ¶ 18.

2021Wilson v. State, 574 So. 2d 1324, 1331 (Miss. 1990). 61 Yarbrough, 911 So. 2d at 955 (¶7) (citing Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979)). ¶136.

2021Yarbrough v. State, 911 So. 2d 951, 954 (Miss. 2005).

2000Lockett, 517 So.2d at 1349 ; see also Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 359 , 111 S.Ct. 1859 , 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991) (Once a prosecutor has offered a race-neutral explanation for the peremptory challenges and the trial court has ruled on the ultimate question of intentional discrimination, the preliminary issue of whether the defendant had made a prima facie showing becomes moot.).

1999Lockett, 517 So.2d at 1349 ; see also Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 359 , 111 S.Ct. 1859 , 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991) ("Once a prosecutor has offered a raceneutral explanation for the peremptory challenges and the trial court has ruled on the ultimate question of intentional discrimination, the preliminary issue of whether the defendant had made a prima facie showing becomes moot.").

2005This Court has recognized other jurisdictions which have held that "a failure to disclose any of the known and existing risks of proposed treatment when such risks might well affect a patient's decision to submit or forgo the treatment, therefore, constitutes a prima facie violation of that duty." Marshall v. The Clinic for Women, P.A., 490 So.2d 861, 864 (Miss. 1986) (quoting Calabrese v. Trenton State College, 162 N.J.Super. 145 , 392 A.2d 600, 606 (1978)).

2005This Court has recognized other jurisdictions which have held that "a failure to disclose any of the known and existing risks of proposed treatment when such risks might well affect a patient's decision to submit or forgo the treatment, therefore, constitutes a prima facie violation of that duty." Marshall v. The Clinic for Women, P.A., 490 So.2d 861, 864 (Miss. 1986) (quoting Calabrese v. Trenton State College, 162 N.J.Super. 145 , 392 A.2d 600, 606 (1978)).

2003In re Int’l Sys., 693 F.2d at 1242 .

2003In re Int'l Sys., 693 F.2d at 1242.

2010Only then would both the circuit court and this Court be adequately equipped to proceed on facts, instead of mere possibilities or assumptions, in considering whether Sea can rebut the “strong ... presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within a broad range of reasonable professional assistance.” Williams v. State, 3 So.3d 105, 111 (Miss.2009) (quoting McQuarter v. State, 574 So.2d 685, 687 (Miss.1990)).

2009Only then would both the circuit court and this Court be adequately equipped to proceed on facts, instead of mere possibilities or assumptions, in considering whether Sea can rebut the “strong . . . presumption that counsel’s conduct falls 24 “[T]he appellant has the responsibility to present a trial record sufficient to undergird his assignments of error.” Edwards v. State, 800 So. 2d 454, 468 (Miss. 2001). 24 within a broad range of reasonable professional assistance.” Williams v. State, 3 So. 3d 105, 111 (Miss. 2009) (quoting McQuarter v. State, 574 So. 2d 685, 687 (Miss. 1990)).

2010Only then would both the circuit court and this Court be adequately equipped to proceed on facts, instead of mere possibilities or assumptions, in considering whether Sea can rebut the “strong ... presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within a broad range of reasonable professional assistance.” Williams v. State, 3 So.3d 105, 111 (Miss.2009) (quoting McQuarter v. State, 574 So.2d 685, 687 (Miss.1990)).

2009Only then would both the circuit court and this Court be adequately equipped to proceed on facts, instead of mere possibilities or assumptions, in considering whether Sea can rebut the “strong . . . presumption that counsel’s conduct falls 24 “[T]he appellant has the responsibility to present a trial record sufficient to undergird his assignments of error.” Edwards v. State, 800 So. 2d 454, 468 (Miss. 2001). 24 within a broad range of reasonable professional assistance.” Williams v. State, 3 So. 3d 105, 111 (Miss. 2009) (quoting McQuarter v. State, 574 So. 2d 685, 687 (Miss. 1990)).

2006See, e.g., Michigan Prot. and Advocacy Serv., Inc. v. Babin, 18 F.3d 337, 346 (6th Cir.1994).

2005See, e.g., Michigan Prot. and Advocacy Serv., Inc. v. Babin, 18 F.3d 337 , 346 (6th Cir. 1994).

2005This Court has recognized other jurisdictions which have held that "a failure to disclose any of the known and existing risks of proposed treatment when such risks might well affect a patient's decision to submit or forgo the treatment, therefore, constitutes a prima facie violation of that duty." Marshall v. The Clinic for Women, P.A., 490 So.2d 861, 864 (Miss. 1986) (quoting Calabrese v. Trenton State College, 162 N.J.Super. 145 , 392 A.2d 600, 606 (1978)).

2004This Court has recognized other jurisdictions which have held that “a failure to disclose any of the known and existing risks of proposed treatment when such risks might well affect a patient’s decision to submit or forgo the treatment, therefore, constitutes a prima facie violation of that duty.” Marshall v. The Clinic for Women, P.A., 490 So. 2d 861, 864 (Miss. 1986) (quoting Calabrese v. Trenton State College, 392 A.2d 600, 606 (N.J.

2004United States v. Green, 882 F.2d 999, 1003 (5th Cir.1989); Foster v. State, 687 So.2d at 1134 .

1996United States v. Green, 882 F.2d 999, 1003 (5th Cir. 1989); Foster v. State, 687 So.2d at 1134 .

2001Stewart v. State, 662 So.2d 552, 557-58 (Miss.1995).

1999Stewart v. State, 662 So.2d 552, 557-58 (Miss. 1995).

1999Lyle v. Mladinich, 584 So.2d 397, 399 (Miss.1991).

1998Lyle v. Mladinich, 584 So.2d 397, 399 (Miss. 1991).

1996"So long as the trial court applies the correct legal standard, we will not overturn a finding of fact made by a trial judge unless it is clearly erroneous." Chisolm v. State, 529 So.2d 630, 633 (1988), quoting Neal v. State, 451 So.2d 743, 753 (Miss. 1984); see also Lockett v. State, 517 So.2d 1346, 1352 (Miss. 1987).

1990"So long as the trial court applies the correct legal standard, we will not overturn a finding of fact made by a trial judge unless it is clearly erroneous." Chisolm v. State, 529 So. 2d 630, 633 (1988), quoting Neal v. State, 451 So.2d 743, 753 (Miss. 1984); see also Lockett v. State, 517 So. 2d 1346, 1352 (Miss. 1987). ¶16.

1996"So long as the trial court applies the correct legal standard, we will not overturn a finding of fact made by a trial judge unless it is clearly erroneous." Chisolm v. State, 529 So.2d 630, 633 (1988), quoting Neal v. State, 451 So.2d 743, 753 (Miss. 1984); see also Lockett v. State, 517 So.2d 1346, 1352 (Miss. 1987).

1990"So long as the trial court applies the correct legal standard, we will not overturn a finding of fact made by a trial judge unless it is clearly erroneous." Chisolm v. State, 529 So. 2d 630, 633 (1988), quoting Neal v. State, 451 So.2d 743, 753 (Miss. 1984); see also Lockett v. State, 517 So. 2d 1346, 1352 (Miss. 1987). ¶16.

2009If Sea exercises that right, and assuming he states a prima facie claim, “he will then be entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the merits of that issue . . . .” Id.

1996Brooks v. State, 573 So.2d 1350, 1353 (Miss. 1990) (citing Read v. State, 430 So.2d 832, 841 (Miss. 1983)).

2023Archer said that “[i]f [Archer’s] [post-conviction] application states a prima facie claim, he then will be entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the merits of that issue in the [trial court].” 986 So. 2d at 957 (emphasis added). ¶84.

2022In Marx v. Bounds, 528 So. 2d 822, 827 (Miss. 1988), the Mississippi Supreme Court found that a taxpayer’s “own undocumented recollection,” which was “uncorroborated[,] . . . does not fulfill the taxpayer’s burden of proof” to overcome the prima facie presumption of correctness of the tax assessment.

2021Wilson v. State, 574 So. 2d 1324, 1331 (Miss. 1990). 61 Yarbrough, 911 So. 2d at 955 (¶7) (citing Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979)). ¶136.

2019See Lisanby, 47 So. 3d at 1178 (¶18) (“Extracontractual damages, such as awards for emotional distress and attorneys’ fees, are not warranted where the insurer can demonstrate ‘an arguable, good-faith 26 basis for denial of a claim.’”). ¶56.

2019In Pilate v. American Federated Insurance Co., 865 So. 2d 387, 392 (¶27) (Miss.