prima facie claim in Tennessee

2019In order to establish a prima facie claim of negligence . . . a plaintiff must establish the following essential elements: “(1) a duty of care owed by defendant to plaintiff; (2) conduct below the applicable standard of care that amounts to a breach of that duty; (3) an injury or loss; (4) cause in fact; and (5) proximate, or legal, cause.” McCall v. Wilder, 913 S.W.2d 150, 153 (Tenn. 1995); see also Naifeh v. Valley Forge Life Ins.

2018As to a plaintiff’s burden in asserting a negligence claim, the Tennessee Supreme Court has previously explained: 5 In order to establish a prima facie claim of negligence, basically defined as the failure to exercise reasonable care, a plaintiff must establish the following essential elements: “(1) a duty of care owed by defendant to plaintiff; (2) conduct below the applicable standard of care that amounts to a breach of that duty; (3) an injury or loss; (4) cause in fact; and (5) proximate, or legal, cause.” McCall v. Wilder, 913 S.W.2d 150, 153 (Tenn. 1995)[.] Giggers v. Memphis Hous.

2019Auth., 277 S.W.3d 359, 364 (Tenn. 2009) (providing that in order to establish a prima facie claim of negligence, a plaintiff must demonstrate duty, breach of duty, injury, cause in fact, and proximate cause).

2017Auth., 277 S.W.3d 359, 364 (Tenn. 2009) (citing McCall v. Wilder, 913 S.W.2d 150, 153 (Tenn. 1995)) (“In order to establish a prima facie claim of negligence, . . . a plaintiff must establish . . . a duty of care owed by defendant to plaintiff[.]”).

2022“The Sixth Amendment secures to criminal defendants the right to be tried by an impartial jury drawn from sources reflecting a fair cross section of the community.” Berghuis v. Smith, 559 U.S. 314, 319 (2010) (citing Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975)). “[T]o establish a prima facie violation of the Sixth Amendment’s fair-cross- section requirement,” the defendant must show: “(1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a ‘distinctive’ group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the

2022“The Sixth Amendment secures to criminal defendants the right to be tried by an impartial jury drawn from sources reflecting a fair cross section of the community.” Berghuis v. Smith, 559 U.S. 314, 319 (2010) (citing Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975)). “[T]o establish a prima facie violation of the Sixth Amendment’s fair-cross- section requirement,” the defendant must show: “(1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a ‘distinctive’ group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the

2010State v. Nelson, 603 S.W.2d 158, 161 (Tenn. Crim.

2009The court elaborated in its written order that “the selection of the jury was random and unbiased, and further, the only potential juror of African-American descent advised the Court he could not be impartial and was excused by the Court[.]” In order to establish a prima facie violation of his right to have a jury that is selected from a fair cross-section of the community, the defendant must show: “(1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a ‘distinctive’ group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable i

2025Regarding Investigator DeSpain’s testimony, “‘Doyle [and its progeny] do[] not impose a prima facie bar against any mention whatsoever of a defendant’s [invocation of his or her rights] but instead guards against the exploitation of that constitutional right by the prosecutor.” State v. Dotson, 450 S.W.3d 1, 56 (Tenn. 2014) (quoting Lindgren v. Lane, 925 F.2d 198, 202 (7th Cir., 1991)).

2022In reviewing these cases, the Tennessee Supreme Court recognized that Doyle “‘does not impose a prima facie bar against any mention whatsoever of a defendant’s right to request counsel, but instead guards against the exploitation of that constitutional right by the prosecutor.’” Dotson, 450 S.W.3d at 56 (quoting Lindgren v. Lane, 925 F.2d 198, 202 (7th Cir. 1991)).

2025Regarding Investigator DeSpain’s testimony, “‘Doyle [and its progeny] do[] not impose a prima facie bar against any mention whatsoever of a defendant’s [invocation of his or her rights] but instead guards against the exploitation of that constitutional right by the prosecutor.” State v. Dotson, 450 S.W.3d 1, 56 (Tenn. 2014) (quoting Lindgren v. Lane, 925 F.2d 198, 202 (7th Cir., 1991)).

2022In reviewing these cases, the Tennessee Supreme Court recognized that Doyle “‘does not impose a prima facie bar against any mention whatsoever of a defendant’s right to request counsel, but instead guards against the exploitation of that constitutional right by the prosecutor.’” Dotson, 450 S.W.3d at 56 (quoting Lindgren v. Lane, 925 F.2d 198, 202 (7th Cir. 1991)).

2004See also State v. Buck, 670 S.W.2d 600, 610 (Tenn. 1984); Adkins v. State, 911 S.W.2d 334 (Tenn. Crim.

2004Duren, 439 U.S. at 363 , 99 S. Ct. at 668 ; State v. Buck, 670 S.W.2d 600, 610 (Tenn. 1984).

2013Thus, to establish a prima facie violation of the fair cross-section requirement, the defendant must show: “(1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a ‘distinctive group’ in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which -6- juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this [under]representation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process.” Bell, 745 S.W.2d at 861 (quoting Duren, 439 U.S. at 364 ).

2012Thus, to establish a prima facie violation of the fair cross-section requirement, the defendant must show: -5- “(1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a ‘distinctive group’ in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this [under]representation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process.” Bell, 745 S.W.2d at 861 (quoting Duren, 439 U.S. at 364 ).

2013In order to establish a prima facie violation of this requirement, a -11- defendant must show “1) that the allegedly excluded group is a distinctive group in the community; 2) that its representation on the venire is not fair and reasonable in relation to its numbers in the community; and 3) that the under representation resulted from systematic exclusion.” State v. Thompson, 768 S.W.2d 239, 246 (Tenn. 1989) (citing Duren v. Mississippi, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979)).

1999Evans, 838 S.W.2d at 192 ; Thompson, 768 S.W.2d at 246 ; Bell, 745 S.W.2d at 860 ; Cooper v. State, 847 S.W.2d 521, 533 (Tenn.Cr.App.1992).

2022“The Sixth Amendment secures to criminal defendants the right to be tried by an impartial jury drawn from sources reflecting a fair cross section of the community.” Berghuis v. Smith, 559 U.S. 314, 319 (2010) (citing Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975)). “[T]o establish a prima facie violation of the Sixth Amendment’s fair-cross- section requirement,” the defendant must show: “(1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a ‘distinctive’ group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the

2022“The Sixth Amendment secures to criminal defendants the right to be tried by an impartial jury drawn from sources reflecting a fair cross section of the community.” Berghuis v. Smith, 559 U.S. 314, 319 (2010) (citing Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975)). “[T]o establish a prima facie violation of the Sixth Amendment’s fair-cross- section requirement,” the defendant must show: “(1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a ‘distinctive’ group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the

2019Co., 204 S.W.3d 758, 771 (Tenn. 2006).

2009Co., 204 S.W.3d 758, 771 (Tenn.2006).

2018In State v. Nix, 40 S.W.3d 459, 463 (Tenn. 2001), our supreme court said, in the context of a post-conviction petition alleging that due process tolled the statute of limitations due to the petitioner’s mental incompetence, that “the mere assertion of a psychological problem” was insufficient to establish a prima facie claim that the limitations period should be tolled.

2016In State v. Nix, 40 S.W.3d 459, 463 (Tenn. 2001), our supreme court said, in the context of a post-conviction petition alleging that due process tolled the statute of limitations due to the petitioner’s mental incompetence, that “the mere assertion of a psychological problem” was insufficient to establish a prima facie claim that the limitations period should be tolled.

2016“The first element, that of duty . . . is the legal obligation of a defendant to conform to a reasonable person‟s standard of care in order to protect against unreasonable risks of harm.” Id. (citing Burroughs v. Magee, 118 S.W.3d 323, 328-29 (Tenn. 2003)); accord Cullum v. McCool, 432 S.W.3d 829, 833 (Tenn. 2013).

2014“The first element, that of duty, and the dispositive issue in this case, is the legal obligation of a defendant to conform to a reasonable person’s standard of care in order to protect against unreasonable risks of harm.” Id. (emphasis added); accord Cullum v. McCool, No. E2012-00991-SC-R11-CV, 2013 WL 6665074 at *3 (Tenn., filed Dec. 18, 2013).

2015Savings Loan Ass’n, 819 F.2d 434, 437 (3d Cir.1987)); see also Mellon Bank (East) PSFS, Nat.

2015Savings Loan Ass‘n, 819 F.2d 434, 437 (3d Cir. 1987)); see also Mellon Bank (East) PSFS, Nat.

2015Tennessee courts have not specifically defined the prima facie requirement in the context of establishing personal jurisdiction. 1 Federal courts have defined a “prima facie showing of jurisdiction” as requiring that the plaintiff establish “with reasonable particularity sufficient contacts between [the defendant] and the forum state.” Neogen Corp. v. Neo Gen Screening, Inc., 282 F.3d 883, 887 (6th Cir.2002) (quoting Provident Nat’l Bank v. California Fed.

2015Tennessee courts have not specifically defined the prima facie requirement in the context of establishing personal jurisdiction.1 Federal courts have defined a ―prima facie showing of jurisdiction‖ as requiring that the plaintiff establish ―with reasonable particularity sufficient contacts between [the defendant] and the forum state.‖ Neogen Corp. v. Neo Gen Screening, Inc., 282 F.3d 883, 887 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting Provident Nat‘l Bank v. California Fed.

2015As our Supreme Court has explained regarding negligence: In order to establish a prima facie claim of negligence, basically defined as the failure to exercise reasonable care, a plaintiff must establish the following essential elements: “(1) a duty of care owed by defendant to plaintiff; (2) conduct below the applicable standard of care that amounts to a breach of that duty; (3) an injury or loss; (4) cause in fact; and (5) proximate, or legal, cause.” Morrison v. Allen, 338 S.W.3d 417, 437 (Tenn. 2011) (quoting Giggers v. Memphis Hous.

2014As our Supreme Court has explained: In order to establish a prima facie claim of negligence, basically defined as the failure to exercise reasonable care, a plaintiff must establish the following essential elements: “(1) a duty of care owed by defendant to plaintiff; (2) conduct below the applicable standard of care that amounts to a breach of that duty; (3) an injury or loss; (4) cause in fact; and (5) proximate, or legal, cause.” Morrison v. Allen, 338 S.W.3d 417, 437 (Tenn. 2011) (quoting Giggers v. Memphis Hous.

2015See, e.g., Macon Cnty. v. Dixon, 20 Tenn.App. 425 , 100 S.W.2d 5, 9 (Tenn.Ct.App.1936) ("Prima facie evidence is that which, standing alone, unexplained or uncontradicted, is sufficient to maintain the proposition affirmed.

2015See, e.g., Macon Cnty. v. Dixon, 20 Tenn.App. 425 , 100 S.W.2d 5, 9 (Tenn.Ct.App.1936) ("Prima facie evidence is that which, standing alone, unexplained or uncontradicted, is sufficient to maintain the proposition affirmed.

2013Auth., 277 S.W.3d 359, 364 (Tenn. 2009) (quoting McCall v. Wilder, 913 S.W.2d 150, 153 (Tenn. 1995)). “[A]lthough all persons have a duty to use reasonable care to refrain from conduct that will foreseeably cause injury to others, as a general rule, one person owes no affirmative duty to protect or warn others endangered by the conduct of a third party.” Newton v. Tinsley, 970 S.W.2d 490, 492 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997) (citing Bradshaw v. Daniel, 854 S.W.2d 865, 870 (Tenn. 1993); Nichols v. Atnip, 844 S.W.2d 655, 661 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992)).

2003In order to establish a prima facie claim of negligent entrustment, the Concklins “must establish the following: ‘(1) an entrustment of a chattel, (2) to a person incompetent to use it, (3) with knowledge that the person is incompetent, and (4) that is the proximate cause of injury or damage to another.’” Messer Griesheim Indus., Inc. v. Cryotech of Kingsport, Inc., 45 S.W.3d 588, 603 (Tenn.Ct.App.2001) (quoting Nichols v. Atnip, 844 S.W.2d 655, 659 (Tenn.Ct.App.1992).

2011Negligent misrepresentation, on the other hand, applies to a narrower class of claims. “[T]o succeed on a claim for negligent misrepresentation, a plaintiff must establish ‘that the defendant supplied information to the plaintiff; the information was false; the defendant did not exercise reasonable care in obtaining or communicating the information and the plaintiffs justifiably relied on the information.’” Walker v. Sunrise Pontiac-GMC Truck, Inc., 249 S.W.3d 301, 311 (Tenn. 2008) (quoting Williams v. Berube & Assocs., 26 S.W.3d 640, 645 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000)).

2011Negligent misrepresentation, on the other hand, applies to a narrower class of claims. “[T]o succeed on a claim for negligent misrepresentation, a plaintiff must establish ‘that the defendant supplied information to the plaintiff; the information was false; the defendant did not exercise reasonable care in obtaining or communicating the information and the plaintiffs justifiably relied on the information.’ ” Walker v. Sunrise Pontiac-GMC Truck, Inc., 249 S.W.3d 301, 311 (Tenn. 2008) (quoting Williams v. Berube & Assocs., 26 S.W.3d 640, 645 (Tenn.Ct.App. 2000)).

2011Negligent misrepresentation, on the other hand, applies to a narrower class of claims. “[T]o succeed on a claim for negligent misrepresentation, a plaintiff must establish ‘that the defendant supplied information to the plaintiff; the information was false; the defendant did not exercise reasonable care in obtaining or communicating the information and the plaintiffs justifiably relied on the information.’” Walker v. Sunrise Pontiac-GMC Truck, Inc., 249 S.W.3d 301, 311 (Tenn. 2008) (quoting Williams v. Berube & Assocs., 26 S.W.3d 640, 645 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000)).

2011Negligent misrepresentation, on the other hand, applies to a narrower class of claims. “[T]o succeed on a claim for negligent misrepresentation, a plaintiff must establish ‘that the defendant supplied information to the plaintiff; the information was false; the defendant did not exercise reasonable care in obtaining or communicating the information and the plaintiffs justifiably relied on the information.’ ” Walker v. Sunrise Pontiac-GMC Truck, Inc., 249 S.W.3d 301, 311 (Tenn. 2008) (quoting Williams v. Berube & Assocs., 26 S.W.3d 640, 645 (Tenn.Ct.App. 2000)).

2006Id. at 269 ; see also Thompson v. State, 134 S.W.3d 168, 177 (Tenn.2004).

2006Id. at 269 ; see also Thompson v. State, 134 S.W.3d 168, 177 (Tenn. 2004).

2017However, “proof of such relationships coupled with proof of dominion and control, does establish the existence of a confidential relationship, but does not make out a prima facie claim of undue influence unless an additional suspicious circumstance exists.” In re Estate of Brevard, 213 S.W.3d at 303 (citing Kelley, 96 S.W.3d 189 ).

2011However, such proof “does not make out a prima facie claim of undue influence unless an additional suspicious circumstance exists.” Estate of Brevard, 213 S.W.3d at 303 (citing Kelley, 96 S.W.3d at 197 ).