prima facie violation (Hawaii) · Go Syfert
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prima facie violation in Hawaii

13 Hawaii opinions name it 2 courts 1972–2023 1 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Hawaii courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (7)

CaseFollowedCited
State v. Tailogreen
haw · 1989 · cited in 4 Hawaii opinions naming this issue, 2009–2020
2 sentences

2020Id. at 583 , 779 P.2d at 13-14 (emphasis added).

2020Id. at 583 , 779 P.2d at 13-14 (emphasis added).

44
State v. Richiegreen
haw · 1998 · cited in 2 Hawaii opinions naming this issue, 2002–2023
2 sentences

2023State v. Richie, 88 Hawaiʻi 19, 41, 960 P.2d 1227, 1249 (1998) (citing Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979)).

2002Richie, 88 Hawai`i at 41, 960 P.2d at 1249 (quoting Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 , 99 S.Ct. 664 , 58 L.Ed.2d 579 (1979)).

12
Valley Oak Credit Union v. Villegas (In Re Villegas)green
bap9 · 1991 · cited in 1 Hawaii opinions naming this issue, 2018–2018
1 sentence

2018In re Villegas, 132 B.R. 742, 747 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1991), is squarely on point.

11
Ray v. KAPIOLANI MEDICAL SPECIALISTSgreen
haw · 2011 · cited in 1 Hawaii opinions naming this issue, 2015–2015
2 sentences

2015Garcia contends that Robinson’s deposition testimony established the materiality of that risk because “[Robinson] admitted that he should have advised [Garcia] of the possibility that the surgery might not be beneficiai[.]” As noted supra, expert testimony is needed to prove the materiality of an alleged risk, which includes “the nature of risks inherent in a particular treatment, the probability of therapeutic success, the frequency of the occurrence of particular risks, and the nature of available alternatives to treatment.” Ray, 125 Hawai'i at 268 , 259 P.3d at 584 (citation and internal qu

2015Garcia contends that Robinson’s deposition testimony established the materiality of that risk because “[Robinson] admitted that he should have advised [Garcia] of the possibility that the surgery might not be beneficiai[.]” As noted supra, expert testimony is needed to prove the materiality of an alleged risk, which includes “the nature of risks inherent in a particular treatment, the probability of therapeutic success, the frequency of the occurrence of particular risks, and the nature of available alternatives to treatment.” Ray, 125 Hawai'i at 268 , 259 P.3d at 584 (citation and internal qu

11
Joan A. HAGANS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Cecil ANDRUS, Secretary of the Department of the Interior, Defendant-Appelleegreen
ca9 · 1981 · cited in 1 Hawaii opinions naming this issue, 1998–1998
1 sentence

1998Hagans v. Andrus, 651 F.2d 622, 624-26 (9th Cir.1981).

11
Frank J. Kozak v. Willard B. Wells, Administrator, Etc.green
ca8 · 1960 · cited in 1 Hawaii opinions naming this issue, 1972–1972
2 sentences

1972See Kozak v. Wells, 278 F.2d 104 (8th Cir. 1960); State ex rel.

1972Kozak v. Wells, 278 F.2d 104 (8th Cir. 1960); Wood v. Denver City Water Works Company, 20 Colo. 253 , 38 P.239 (1894).

11
Harry J. Stadin v. Union Electric Companygreen
ca8 · 1962 · cited in 1 Hawaii opinions naming this issue, 1972–1972
1 sentence

1972See Stadin v. Union Electric Company, 309 F.2d 912, 917 (8th Cir. 1962).

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Hawaii. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (6)

CaseCitedYears
Duren v. Missouri green
scotus · 1979
2 sentences

2023State v. Richie, 88 Hawaiʻi 19, 41, 960 P.2d 1227, 1249 (1998) (citing Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979)).

2002Richie, 88 Hawai`i at 41, 960 P.2d at 1249 (quoting Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 , 99 S.Ct. 664 , 58 L.Ed.2d 579 (1979)).

31998–2023
Shoppe v. Gucci America, Inc. green
haw · 2000
1 sentence

2001Because Plaintiff argues that Defendants intentionally discriminated against him on the basis of age, his claim may be characterized as “individual ‘disparate treatment’ discrimination[,]” that is, “intentional discrimination against an individual who belongs to a protected class.” 56 Shoppe, 94 Hawai'i at 377-78 , 14 P.3d at 1058-59 .

12001–2001
Wagatsuma v. Patch green
hawapp · 1994
1 sentence

1999To establish a prima facie claim for strict product liability, the plaintiff has the burden “to prove (1) a defect in the product which rendered it unreasonably dangerous for its intended or reasonably foreseeable use; and (2) a causal connection between the defect and [the] plaintiffs injuries.” Tabieros, 85 Hawai'i at 354 , 944 P.2d at 1297 (quoting Wagatsuma , 10 Haw.App. *17 at 566, 879 P.2d at 583 -84 (citing Ontai, 66 Haw. at 243 , 659 P.2d at 740 )).

11999–1999
Ontai v. Straub Clinic & Hospital Inc. green
haw · 1983
2 sentences

1999To establish a prima facie claim for strict product liability, the plaintiff has the burden “to prove (1) a defect in the product which rendered it unreasonably dangerous for its intended or reasonably foreseeable use; and (2) a causal connection between the defect and [the] plaintiffs injuries.” Tabieros, 85 Hawai'i at 354 , 944 P.2d at 1297 (quoting Wagatsuma , 10 Haw.App. *17 at 566, 879 P.2d at 583 -84 (citing Ontai, 66 Haw. at 243 , 659 P.2d at 740 )).

1999To establish a prima facie claim for strict product liability, the plaintiff has the burden “to prove (1) a defect in the product which rendered it unreasonably dangerous for its intended or reasonably foreseeable use; and (2) a causal connection between the defect and [the] plaintiffs injuries.” Tabieros, 85 Hawai'i at 354 , 944 P.2d at 1297 (quoting Wagatsuma , 10 Haw.App. *17 at 566, 879 P.2d at 583 -84 (citing Ontai, 66 Haw. at 243 , 659 P.2d at 740 )).

11999–1999
Tabieros v. Clark Equipment Co. green
haw · 1997
2 sentences

1999To establish a prima facie claim for strict product liability, the plaintiff has the burden “to prove (1) a defect in the product which rendered it unreasonably dangerous for its intended or reasonably foreseeable use; and (2) a causal connection between the defect and [the] plaintiffs injuries.” Tabieros, 85 Hawai'i at 354 , 944 P.2d at 1297 (quoting Wagatsuma , 10 Haw.App. *17 at 566, 879 P.2d at 583 -84 (citing Ontai, 66 Haw. at 243 , 659 P.2d at 740 )).

1999To establish a prima facie claim for strict product liability, the plaintiff has the burden “to prove (1) a defect in the product which rendered it unreasonably dangerous for its intended or reasonably foreseeable use; and (2) a causal connection between the defect and [the] plaintiffs injuries.” Tabieros, 85 Hawai'i at 354 , 944 P.2d at 1297 (quoting Wagatsuma , 10 Haw.App. *17 at 566, 879 P.2d at 583 -84 (citing Ontai, 66 Haw. at 243 , 659 P.2d at 740 )).

11999–1999
Wood v. Denver City Water Works Co. neutral
colo · 1894
1 sentence

1972Kozak v. Wells, 278 F.2d 104 (8th Cir. 1960); Wood v. Denver City Water Works Company, 20 Colo. 253 , 38 P.239 (1894).

11972–1972

Where else courts name it

CA 1066 (1887–2026) NJ 749 (1903–2026) TX 336 (1881–2026) NY 308 (1827–2026) PA 296 (1885–2026) AL 270 (1888–2026) MI 249 (1899–2026) WA 193 (1893–2026) IL 180 (1892–2026) OH 166 (1889–2026) NC 163 (1887–2026) IN 147 (1860–2026) MD 123 (1870–2026) TN 123 (1940–2025) WI 101 (1908–2025) IA 100 (1865–2026) LA 99 (1907–2025) VA 99 (1852–2026) FL 93 (1939–2025) GA 87 (1903–2021) MS 76 (1879–2023) MO 65 (1884–2023) NM 51 (1988–2025) KY 51 (1878–2025) WV 46 (1883–2025) MA 44 (1860–2025) ME 44 (1878–2023) CT 43 (1913–2021) OK 40 (1908–2014) AR 40 (1897–2024) CO 37 (1896–2025) AZ 36 (1935–2026) MN 35 (1901–2025) NV 33 (1936–2024) SC 31 (1907–2026) DC 31 (1976–2025) OR 29 (1901–2025) MT 28 (1901–2022) UT 26 (1897–2026) KS 26 (1918–2026) NH 22 (1860–2025) NE 22 (1882–2026) ID 18 (1912–2024) ND 18 (1907–2012) DE 18 (1947–2026) AK 16 (1971–2025) VT 16 (1849–2026) RI 15 (1977–2021) SD 13 (1928–2023) HI 13 (1972–2023) WY 9 (1961–2026) VI 4 (2009–2024) GU 3 (2021–2025)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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