prima facie presumption in Virginia

2007This Court has previously held that “[a]lthough a respondent may present evidence that tends to rebut or refute the prima facie presumption of law that [a conviction is] valid, nevertheless, that evidence must be weighed by the trier of fact to determine whether it overcomes the presumption.” Moffitt v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 983, 987 , 434 S.E.2d 684, 687 (1993).

2007This Court has previously held that “[a]lthough a respondent may present evidence that tends to rebut or refute the prima facie presumption of law that [a conviction is] valid, nevertheless, that evidence must be weighed by the trier of fact to determine whether it overcomes the presumption.” Moffitt v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 983, 987 , 434 S.E.2d 684, 687 (1993).

2026Whether Sinha voluntarily signed the Agreement and Waiver3 “Recitations in the agreement shall create a prima facie presumption that they are factually correct.” Sims v. Sims, 55 Va. App. 340, 348 (2009) (quoting Code § 20-151(B)).

2014Recitations in the agreement shall create a prima facie presumption that they are factually correct.’” Sims v. Sims, 55 Va. App. 340, 348 , 685 S.E.2d 869, 873 (2009) (quoting Code § 20-151(B)).

2025In Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 618 (1976), the Supreme Court of the United States found that “it would be fundamentally unfair and a deprivation of due process to allow the arrested person’s silence to be used to impeach an explanation subsequently offered at trial.” But “Doyle does not impose a prima facie bar against any mention whatsoever of a defendant’s right to request counsel [or remain silent].” Pulley, 31 Va. App. at 604 (alteration in original) (quoting Lindgren v. Lane, 925 F.2d 198, 201, 202 (7th Cir. 1991)).

2003It is not evidence before you, and you shall not draw any inferences from these comments.” -9- does not impose a prima facie bar against any mention whatsoever of a defendant’s right to request counsel [or remain silent], but instead guards against the exploitation of that constitutional right by the prosecutor.’” Id. at 604 , 525 S.E.2d at 53 (quoting Lindgren v. Lane, 925 F.2d 198, 201, 202 (7th Cir. 1991); see also Noland v. French, 134 F.3d 208, 216 (4th Cir. 1998).

1996"This shift in the burden of producing evidence occurs because of the presumption that the Commissioner of the Division of Motor Vehicles has kept accurate records and has made at least a tentative determination of conformity." Bouldin v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 166, 169 , 355 S.E.2d 352, 353 (1987) (citing Davis v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 808, 812-13 , 252 S.E.2d 299, 301 (1979)).

1996"This shift in the burden of producing evidence occurs because of the presumption that the Commissioner of the Division of Motor Vehicles has kept accurate records and has made at least a tentative determination of conformity." Bouldin v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 166, 169 , 355 S.E.2d 352, 353 (1987) (citing Davis v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 808, 812-13 , 252 S.E.2d 299, 301 (1979)).

1988In Giglio , the Supreme Court stated that "deliberate deception of a court and jurors by the presentation of known false evidence is incompatible with `rudimentary demands of justice' ... `[and] [t]he same result obtains when the State, although not soliciting false evidence, allows it to go uncorrected when it appears.'" 405 U.S. at 153 , 92 S.Ct. at 766 (citations omitted).

1988In Giglio , the Supreme Court stated that "deliberate deception of a court and jurors by the presentation of known false evidence is incompatible with `rudimentary demands of justice' ... `[and] [t]he same result obtains when the State, although not soliciting false evidence, allows it to go uncorrected when it appears.'" 405 U.S. at 153 , 92 S.Ct. at 766 (citations omitted).

2026Recitations in the agreement shall create a prima facie presumption that they are factually correct.” Code § 20-151(B); see Code § 20-155 (applying Code § 20-151 to marital agreements). “[M]arital property settlements entered into by competent parties upon valid consideration for lawful purposes are favored in the law and such will be enforced unless their illegality is clear and certain.” Derby v. Derby, 8 Va. App. 19, 25 (1989) (alteration in original) (quoting Cooley v. Cooley, 220 Va. 749, 752 (1980)).

2022Our case law establishes that an agreement is unconscionable if (1) there is a “gross disparity in the value exchanged” and (2) if “oppressive influences affected the agreement to the extent that the process was unfair and the terms of the resulting agreement unconscionable.” Derby v. Derby, 8 Va. App. 19, 28 (1989); Drewry v. Drewry, 8 Va. App. 460, 472 (1989) (quoting Derby, 8 Va. App. at 28 ).

2005Recitations in the agreement shall create a prima facie presumption that they are factually correct.” Code § 20-151(B) *92 (applied to post-marital/separation agreements through Code § 20-155). 4 To determine whether an agreement is unconscionable, a court must examine the “adequacy of price” or “quality of value.” Drewry, 8 Va.App. at 472 , 383 S.E.2d at 18 .

2005Recitations in the agreement shall create a prima facie presumption that they are factually correct.” Code § 20-151(B) *92 (applied to post-marital/separation agreements through Code § 20-155). 4 To determine whether an agreement is unconscionable, a court must examine the “adequacy of price” or “quality of value.” Drewry, 8 Va.App. at 472 , 383 S.E.2d at 18 .

2000See generally Dicker v. Commonwealth, 22 Va.App. 658, 661, 472 S.E.2d 655, 657 (1996) (Commonwealth establishes a prima facie presumption that driver's adjudication as habitual offender was valid by introducing certified DMV transcript indicating three or more drunk driving convictions within ten-year period); Code § 46.2-352.

2000See generally Dicker v. Commonwealth, 22 Va.App. 658, 661, 472 S.E.2d 655, 657 (1996) (Commonwealth establishes a prima facie presumption that driver's adjudication as habitual offender was valid by introducing certified DMV transcript indicating three or more drunk driving convictions within ten-year period); Code § 46.2-352.

2023“To establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement,” the “defendant must prove that: (1) a group qualifying as ‘distinctive’ (2) is not fairly and reasonably represented in jury venires, and (3) ‘systematic exclusion’ in the jury selection process accounts for the underrepresentation.” Prieto v. Commonwealth, 283 Va. 149 , 186 (2012) (emphasis added) (quoting Berghuis v. Smith, 559 U.S. 314, 327 (2010)).

2012"To establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross- section requirement," the Supreme Court of the United States has instructed, "a defendant must prove that: (1) a group qualifying as 'distinctive' (2) is not fairly and reasonably represented in jury venires, and (3) 'systematic exclusion' in the jury selection process accounts for the underrepresentation." Berghuis v. Smith, 559 U.S. ___ , ___, 130 S.Ct. 1382, 1392 (2010) (quoting Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979)).

2014Therefore, although there “is a prima facie presumption that the power and discretion of the Board of Zoning Appeals have been properly exercised,” a BZA decision may be disturbed if it “appears from the record transmitted to the court, together with any additional evidence taken and procedure had under the statute, that the decision of the [BZA] is plainly wrong.” Board of Zoning Appeals of the City of Alexandria v. Fowler, 201 Va. 942, 948 , 114 S.E.2d 753 (1960) (emphasis added); Hopkins, 197 Va. at 205 .

2014Therefore, although there “is a prima facie presumption that the power and discretion of the Board of Zoning Appeals have been properly exercised,” a BZA decision may be disturbed if it “appears from the record transmitted to the court, together with any additional evidence taken and procedure had under the statute, that the decision of the [BZA] is plainly wrong.” Board of Zoning Appeals of the City of Alexandria v. Fowler, 201 Va. 942, 948 , 114 S.E.2d 753 (1960) (emphasis added); Hopkins, 197 Va. at 205 .

2003It is not evidence before you, and you shall not draw any inferences from these comments.” -9- does not impose a prima facie bar against any mention whatsoever of a defendant’s right to request counsel [or remain silent], but instead guards against the exploitation of that constitutional right by the prosecutor.’” Id. at 604 , 525 S.E.2d at 53 (quoting Lindgren v. Lane, 925 F.2d 198, 201, 202 (7th Cir. 1991); see also Noland v. French, 134 F.3d 208, 216 (4th Cir. 1998).

2000Guided by the lesson of Greer that “it is the use of an accused’s silence against him at trial by way of specific inquiry or impeachment that forms the basis for a violation of [Doyle ],” numerous federal circuits have decided that “Doyle does not impose a prima facie bar against any mention whatsoever of a defendant’s right to request counsel [or remain silent], but, instead, guards against the exploitation of that constitutional right by the prosecutor.” Lindgren v. Lane, 925 F.2d 198, 201, 202 (7th Cir.1991); see also Noland v. French, 134 F.3d 208, 216 (4th Cir.1998); Jones v. Stotts, 59 F

2000To establish a prima facie claim for compensation for an "injury by accident" arising out of and in the course of the employment, the claimant must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, "(1) an identifiable incident; (2) that occurs at some reasonably definite time; (3) with an obvious sudden mechanical or structural change in the body; and (4) a causal connection between the incident and the bodily change." Chesterfield County v. Dunn, 9 Va. App. 475, 476 , 389 S.E.2d 180, 181 (1990).

2000To establish a prima facie claim for compensation for an "injury by accident" arising out of and in the course of the employment, the claimant must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, "(1) an identifiable incident; (2) that occurs at some reasonably definite time; (3) with an obvious sudden mechanical or structural change in the body; and (4) a causal connection between the incident and the bodily change." Chesterfield County v. Dunn, 9 Va. App. 475, 476 , 389 S.E.2d 180, 181 (1990).

1996"This shift in the burden of producing evidence occurs because of the presumption that the Commissioner of the Division of Motor Vehicles has kept accurate records and has made at least a tentative determination of conformity." Bouldin v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 166, 169 , 355 S.E.2d 352, 353 (1987) (citing Davis v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 808, 812-13 , 252 S.E.2d 299, 301 (1979)).

1996"This shift in the burden of producing evidence occurs because of the presumption that the Commissioner of the Division of Motor Vehicles has kept accurate records and has made at least a tentative determination of conformity." Bouldin v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 166, 169 , 355 S.E.2d 352, 353 (1987) (citing Davis v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 808, 812-13 , 252 S.E.2d 299, 301 (1979)).

2010Thus, “the evidence of accessibility to the public for free and unobstructed use [gives] rise to a prima facie presumption the streets . . . [are] highways within the definition of [ Va. Code Ann. § 46.2-100 ].” Kay Management v. Creason, 220 Va. 820, 832 (1980).

2009Kay Management controls here. “[E]vidence of accessibility to the public for free and unrestricted use g[i]ve[s] rise *413 to a prima facie presumption that the streets of [an apartment complex] [a]re highways[.]” Kay Management, 220 Va. at 832 , 263 S.E.2d at 402 .

2024Fauber argues that § 4.5 of the town’s charter is unconstitutional because it permits the mayor to simultaneously exercise the “duties and powers” of the town manager.4 “In the absence of evidence to the contrary, there is a prima facie presumption that the charter or an amendment thereof was enacted in the manner required by the Constitution, and that the rights and powers conferred are within the legislative power to grant.” Ransone v. Craft, 161 Va. 332, 341 (1933). 3 See Bray v. Brown, 258 Va. 618, 621 (1999) (holding that Article VII, § 6 did not prohibit a deputy sheriff of Prince Willia

1968In Ransone v. Craft, 161 Va. 332, 340 , 170 S.E. 610, 613 , we said: “* * * It has been repeatedly held by this court that charters of municipal corporations, or amendments thereto, conferring rights and powers different from, and in addition to, those conferred by general statutes are authorized by the Constitution when enacted in accordance with article 4 (sections 40-68) and section 117 of the Constitution. * * * “In the absence of evidence to the contrary, there is a prima facie presumption that the charter or amendment thereof was enacted in the manner required by the Constitution, and th

2025In Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 618 (1976), the Supreme Court of the United States found that “it would be fundamentally unfair and a deprivation of due process to allow the arrested person’s silence to be used to impeach an explanation subsequently offered at trial.” But “Doyle does not impose a prima facie bar against any mention whatsoever of a defendant’s right to request counsel [or remain silent].” Pulley, 31 Va. App. at 604 (alteration in original) (quoting Lindgren v. Lane, 925 F.2d 198, 201, 202 (7th Cir. 1991)).

2003It is not evidence before you, and you shall not draw any inferences from these comments.” -9- does not impose a prima facie bar against any mention whatsoever of a defendant’s right to request counsel [or remain silent], but instead guards against the exploitation of that constitutional right by the prosecutor.’” Id. at 604 , 525 S.E.2d at 53 (quoting Lindgren v. Lane, 925 F.2d 198, 201, 202 (7th Cir. 1991); see also Noland v. French, 134 F.3d 208, 216 (4th Cir. 1998).

2018However, according to its terms, the parties “made [a] complete, fair and accurate disclosure to each other on all financial matters reflected in this [a]greement.” “Recitations in the agreement shall create a prima facie presumption that they are factually correct.” Galloway, 47 Va. App. at 91-92 , 622 S.E.2d at 271 (quoting Code § 20-151(B)).

2018However, according to its terms, the parties “made [a] complete, fair and accurate disclosure to each other on all financial matters reflected in this [a]greement.” “Recitations in the agreement shall create a prima facie presumption that they are factually correct.” Galloway, 47 Va. App. at 91-92 , 622 S.E.2d at 271 (quoting Code § 20-151(B)).

2012"To establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross- section requirement," the Supreme Court of the United States has instructed, "a defendant must prove that: (1) a group qualifying as 'distinctive' (2) is not fairly and reasonably represented in jury venires, and (3) 'systematic exclusion' in the jury selection process accounts for the underrepresentation." Berghuis v. Smith, 559 U.S. ___ , ___, 130 S.Ct. 1382, 1392 (2010) (quoting Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979)).

1995Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 , 99 S.Ct. 664, 668 , 58 L.Ed.2d 579 (1979).

1997However, “knowledge of the existence of the custom must be brought home to the [contracting parties], unless the evidence shows that it is so uniform and notorious at the place where the parties to be affected by it reside, as to raise a prima facie presumption that they knew of it.” Bowles v. Rice, 107 Va. 51, 55 , 57 S.E. 575, 577 (1907).

1997However, “knowledge of the existence of the custom must be brought home to the [contracting parties], unless the evidence shows that it is so uniform and notorious at the place where the parties to be affected by it reside, as to raise a prima facie presumption that they knew of it.” Bowles v. Rice, 107 Va. 51, 55 , 57 S.E. 575, 577 (1907).

2026Recitations in the agreement shall create a prima facie presumption that they are factually correct.” Code § 20-151(B); see Code § 20-155 (applying Code § 20-151 to marital agreements). “[M]arital property settlements entered into by competent parties upon valid consideration for lawful purposes are favored in the law and such will be enforced unless their illegality is clear and certain.” Derby v. Derby, 8 Va. App. 19, 25 (1989) (alteration in original) (quoting Cooley v. Cooley, 220 Va. 749, 752 (1980)).

2025To assert a prima facie claim for retaliation under the FLSA, an employee “must show that (1) [s]he engaged in an activity protected by the FLSA; (2) [s]he suffered adverse action by the employer subsequent to or contemporaneous with such protected activity; and (3) a causal connection exists between the employee’s activity and the employer’s adverse action.” Darveau v. Detecon, Inc., 515 F.3d 334, 340 (4th Cir. 2008).

2025In Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 618 (1976), the Supreme Court of the United States found that “it would be fundamentally unfair and a deprivation of due process to allow the arrested person’s silence to be used to impeach an explanation subsequently offered at trial.” But “Doyle does not impose a prima facie bar against any mention whatsoever of a defendant’s right to request counsel [or remain silent].” Pulley, 31 Va. App. at 604 (alteration in original) (quoting Lindgren v. Lane, 925 F.2d 198, 201, 202 (7th Cir. 1991)).