necessary analysis in Maryland

1991Thus, if there is on the part of the trial judge a constant cognizance of the need for showing that the “evidence is probative of a material issue other than character,” Id. at 686 , 108 S.Ct. at 1499 , coupled with an unremitting appreciation of the significant potential for unfair prejudice that is *500 likely to accompany the admission of other bad acts evidence, the necessary analysis and weighing functions are likely to produce an appropriate ruling.

1991Thus, if there is on the part of the trial judge a constant cognizance of the need for showing that the “evidence is probative of a material issue other than character,” Id. at 686 , 108 S.Ct. at 1499 , coupled with an unremitting appreciation of the significant potential for unfair prejudice that is *500 likely to accompany the admission of other bad acts evidence, the necessary analysis and weighing functions are likely to produce an appropriate ruling.

2010See Schloss v. Davis, 213 Md. 119, 123 , 131 A.2d 287 (1957) (a “contract may be so vague and uncertain as to price or amount as to be unenforceable”); see also Restatement (Second) op Contracts, § 33(1), at 92 (1981) (“Restatement”) (“Even though a manifestation of intention is intended to be understood as an offer, it cannot be accepted so as to form a contract unless the terms of the contract are reasonably certain.”) As Professor Williston’s treatise states: “It is a necessary requirement that an agreement, in order to be binding, must be sufficiently definite to enable the courts to give

2010See Schloss v. Davis, 213 Md. 119, 123 , 131 A.2d 287 (1957) (a “contract may be so vague and uncertain as to price or amount as to be unenforceable”); see also Restatement (Second) op Contracts, § 33(1), at 92 (1981) (“Restatement”) (“Even though a manifestation of intention is intended to be understood as an offer, it cannot be accepted so as to form a contract unless the terms of the contract are reasonably certain.”) As Professor Williston’s treatise states: “It is a necessary requirement that an agreement, in order to be binding, must be sufficiently definite to enable the courts to give

2022See Slate, 457 Md. at 646 .

2014Thus, disproving that fact was a necessary defense to each claim, and it formed the common factual core of the court’s fee award.” Id. at 20 , 989 A.2d at 1237-38 . 8 Critical to our resolution of this appeal, our doctrinal holding in Weichert was not as sweeping as the Ochses might wish.

2014Thus, disproving that fact was a necessary defense to each claim, and it formed the common factual core of the court’s fee award.” Id. at 20 , 989 A.2d at 1237-38 . 8 Critical to our resolution of this appeal, our doctrinal holding in Weichert was not as sweeping as the Ochses might wish.

2007Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Robertson, 400 Md. 618, 629 , 929 A.2d 576, 583 (2007) (“When the factual findings are not clearly erroneous and the conclusions drawn from them are supported by the facts found, exceptions to conclusions of law will be overruled”); Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Mba-Jonas, 397 Md. 690, 700 , 919 A.2d 669, 675 (2007); Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Guida, 391 Md. 33, 50 , 891 A.2d 1085, 1095 (2006).

2007Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Robertson, 400 Md. 618, 629 , 929 A.2d 576, 583 (2007) (“When the factual findings are not clearly erroneous and the conclusions drawn from them are supported by the facts found, exceptions to conclusions of law will be overruled”); Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Mba-Jonas, 397 Md. 690, 700 , 919 A.2d 669, 675 (2007); Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Guida, 391 Md. 33, 50 , 891 A.2d 1085, 1095 (2006).

2007Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Robertson, 400 Md. 618, 629 , 929 A.2d 576, 583 (2007) (“When the factual findings are not clearly erroneous and the conclusions drawn from them are supported by the facts found, exceptions to conclusions of law will be overruled”); Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Mba-Jonas, 397 Md. 690, 700 , 919 A.2d 669, 675 (2007); Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Guida, 391 Md. 33, 50 , 891 A.2d 1085, 1095 (2006).

2007Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Robertson, 400 Md. 618, 629 , 929 A.2d 576, 583 (2007) (“When the factual findings are not clearly erroneous and the conclusions drawn from them are supported by the facts found, exceptions to conclusions of law will be overruled”); Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Mba-Jonas, 397 Md. 690, 700 , 919 A.2d 669, 675 (2007); Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Guida, 391 Md. 33, 50 , 891 A.2d 1085, 1095 (2006).

2007Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Robertson, 400 Md. 618, 629 , 929 A.2d 576, 583 (2007) (“When the factual findings are not clearly erroneous and the conclusions drawn from them are supported by the facts found, exceptions to conclusions of law will be overruled”); Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Mba-Jonas, 397 Md. 690, 700 , 919 A.2d 669, 675 (2007); Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Guida, 391 Md. 33, 50 , 891 A.2d 1085, 1095 (2006).

2007Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Robertson, 400 Md. 618, 629 , 929 A.2d 576, 583 (2007) (“When the factual findings are not clearly erroneous and the conclusions drawn from them are supported by the facts found, exceptions to conclusions of law will be overruled”); Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Mba-Jonas, 397 Md. 690, 700 , 919 A.2d 669, 675 (2007); Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Guida, 391 Md. 33, 50 , 891 A.2d 1085, 1095 (2006).

2004The [chairperson’s] dismissal of ... [Counts II and III] exceeded her scope of authority in light of the language of ... [C.J.] § 3-2A-04(b); (b) Maryland law on informed consent, as set out in Sard v. Hardy, 281 Md. 432 , 379 A.2d 1014 (1977), does not impose a necessary requirement upon the [claimants] to present expert testimony in order to meet their burden of proof as to the materiality of the risk from [claimant] William Frew’s perspective.

2004The [chairperson’s] dismissal of ... [Counts II and III] exceeded her scope of authority in light of the language of ... [C.J.] § 3-2A-04(b); (b) Maryland law on informed consent, as set out in Sard v. Hardy, 281 Md. 432 , 379 A.2d 1014 (1977), does not impose a necessary requirement upon the [claimants] to present expert testimony in order to meet their burden of proof as to the materiality of the risk from [claimant] William Frew’s perspective.

2002Inst., 194 F.3d 547, 557 (4th Cir.1999) (noting the prosecutor acknowledged withholding evidence pertaining to inconsistent statements of its key identification witness to defendant's counsel) (quoting Agurs, 427 U.S. at 103 , 96 S.Ct. at 2397 , 49 L.Ed.2d 342 ); Ware, 348 Md. at 39 , 702 A.2d at 709 (stating that the necessary inquiry is "whether the defendant knew or should have known facts that would have allowed him to access the undisclosed evidence").

2002Inst., 194 F.3d 547, 557 (4th Cir.1999) (noting the prosecutor acknowledged withholding evidence pertaining to inconsistent statements of its key identification witness to defendant's counsel) (quoting Agurs, 427 U.S. at 103 , 96 S.Ct. at 2397 , 49 L.Ed.2d 342 ); Ware, 348 Md. at 39 , 702 A.2d at 709 (stating that the necessary inquiry is "whether the defendant knew or should have known facts that would have allowed him to access the undisclosed evidence").

2002Inst., 194 F.3d 547, 557 (4th Cir.1999) (noting the prosecutor acknowledged withholding evidence pertaining to inconsistent statements of its key identification witness to defendant’s counsel) (quoting Agurs, 427 U.S. at 103 , 96 S.Ct. at 2397 , 49 L.Ed.2d 342 ); Ware, 348 Md. at 39 , 702 A.2d at 709 (stating that the necessary inquiry is “whether the defendant knew or should have known facts that would have allowed him to access the undisclosed evidence”).

2002Inst., 194 F.3d 547, 557 (4th Cir.1999) (noting the prosecutor acknowledged withholding evidence pertaining to inconsistent statements of its key identification witness to defendant's counsel) (quoting Agurs, 427 U.S. at 103 , 96 S.Ct. at 2397 , 49 L.Ed.2d 342 ); Ware, 348 Md. at 39 , 702 A.2d at 709 (stating that the necessary inquiry is "whether the defendant knew or should have known facts that would have allowed him to access the undisclosed evidence").

1998See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 166 , 107 S.Ct. 515, 521 , 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986) (holding that governmental or state action is a necessary requirement to exclude evidence under the Due Process Clause); Reynolds v. State, 327 Md. 494, 504 , 610 A.2d 782, 786 (1992) (recognizing that “coercion by government agents is a necessary ingredient to a determination that a defendant’s confession should be suppressed because the defendant’s constitutional due process rights have been violated”).

1998See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 166 , 107 S.Ct. 515, 521 , 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986) (holding that governmental or state action is a necessary requirement to exclude evidence under the Due Process Clause); Reynolds v. State, 327 Md. 494, 504 , 610 A.2d 782, 786 (1992) (recognizing that “coercion by government agents is a necessary ingredient to a determination that a defendant’s confession should be suppressed because the defendant’s constitutional due process rights have been violated”).

1998See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 166 , 107 S.Ct. 515, 521 , 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986) (holding that governmental or state action is a necessary requirement to exclude evidence under the Due Process Clause); Reynolds v. State, 327 Md. 494, 504 , 610 A.2d 782, 786 (1992) (recognizing that “coercion by government agents is a necessary ingredient to a determination that a defendant’s confession should be suppressed because the defendant’s constitutional due process rights have been violated”).

1998See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 166 , 107 S.Ct. 515, 521 , 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986) (holding that governmental or state action is a necessary requirement to exclude evidence under the Due Process Clause); Reynolds v. State, 327 Md. 494, 504 , 610 A.2d 782, 786 (1992) (recognizing that “coercion by government agents is a necessary ingredient to a determination that a defendant’s confession should be suppressed because the defendant’s constitutional due process rights have been violated”).

1995See Gill v. State, 265 Md. 350, 357 , 289 A.2d 575, 579 (1972).

1995See Gill v. State, 265 Md. 350, 357 , 289 A.2d 575, 579 (1972).