necessary factors in Pennsylvania

1985“In determining whether to grant a request, the necessary inquiry is whether the alleged occurrence was prejudicial to the defendant, ‘that is [whether] it is such a nature ... that it may reasonably be said to have deprived the defendant of a fair and impartial trial.’ ” Commonwealth v. Farrell, supra, 265 Pa.Super., at 53, 401 A.2d at 796 , quoting Commonwealth v. Phillips, 183 Pa.Super. 377, 382 , 132 A.2d 733, 736 (1957).

1985“In determining whether to grant a request, the necessary inquiry is whether the alleged occurrence was prejudicial to the defendant, ‘that is [whether] it is such a nature ... that it may reasonably be said to have deprived the defendant of a fair and impartial trial.’ ” Commonwealth v. Farrell, supra, 265 Pa.Super., at 53, 401 A.2d at 796 , quoting Commonwealth v. Phillips, 183 Pa.Super. 377, 382 , 132 A.2d 733, 736 (1957).

2019Nevertheless, Appellants contend that the court did not truly apply the alter ego theory because its opinion did not discuss the necessary factors set forth in Lumax Indus. v. Aultman, 669 A.2d 893 (Pa. 1995) (“Lumax”).

2019Nevertheless, Appellants contend that the court did not truly apply the alter ego theory because its opinion did not discuss the necessary factors set forth in Lumax Indus. v. Aultman, 669 A.2d 893 (Pa. 1995) (“Lumax”).

1988Fowler, supra. *91 Most recently in Commonwealth v. James, 506 Pa. 526 , 486 A.2d 376 (1985), we reiterated the necessary factors in determining whether a victim had an independent basis for an in-court identification: ... the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, the witness’ degree of attention, the accuracy of the witness’ prior description of the criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation, and the length of time between the crime and the confrontation, (citing Commonwealth v. Slaughter, 482 Pa. 538, 546 , 394 A.2d 4

1988Fowler, supra. *91 Most recently in Commonwealth v. James, 506 Pa. 526 , 486 A.2d 376 (1985), we reiterated the necessary factors in determining whether a victim had an independent basis for an in-court identification: ... the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, the witness’ degree of attention, the accuracy of the witness’ prior description of the criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation, and the length of time between the crime and the confrontation, (citing Commonwealth v. Slaughter, 482 Pa. 538, 546 , 394 A.2d 4

2023Dist., 788 A.2d 363, 367-68 (Pa. 2002) (citation omitted).

2022Gaeta, 788 A.2d at 367-68 (internal citations omitted). 11 In Gaeta, our Supreme Court determined that the above “formulation represents an apt synthesis of prevailing Pennsylvania precedent on the assessment of the availability of waiver and cure in the public works setting,” and it adopted such test as the basis for determining whether a proposal is fatally defective or, in other words, “non-responsive.” Id. at 368 .

1985“In determining whether to grant a request, the necessary inquiry is whether the alleged occurrence was prejudicial to the defendant, ‘that is [whether] it is such a nature ... that it may reasonably be said to have deprived the defendant of a fair and impartial trial.’ ” Commonwealth v. Farrell, supra, 265 Pa.Super., at 53, 401 A.2d at 796 , quoting Commonwealth v. Phillips, 183 Pa.Super. 377, 382 , 132 A.2d 733, 736 (1957).

1984In Commonwealth v. Fields, 317 Pa.Super. 387 , 464 A.2d 375 (1983), the court reiterated the standard set forth in Commonwealth v. Farrell, 265 Pa.Super. 41, 52-53 , 401 A.2d 790, 796 (1979) (quoting, Commonwealth v. Phillips, 183 Pa.Super. 377, 382 , 132 A.2d 733, 736 (1957)): “In determining whether to grant the request, the necessary inquiry is whether the alleged occurrence was prejudicial to the defendant, ‘that is, [whether] it is of such a nature ... that it may reasonably be said to have deprived the defendant of a fair and impartial trial.” Id., 317 Pa.Super. at 400 , 464 A.2d at 382

2022In Kennedy House, this Court agreed: Federal courts have interpreted the necessary requirement of the FHA[A] as “meaning that, without the accommodation, the [complainant] will be denied an equal opportunity to obtain the housing of her choice.” Wis[.] Cmty. Servs. [v. City of Milwaukee], 465 F.3d [737,] 749 [(7th Cir. 2006)]; see also Smith & Lee Assoc[s]., Inc. v. City of Taylor, Mich., 102 F.3d 781, 795 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that complainants “must show that, but for the accommodation, they likely will be denied an equal 25 opportunity to enjoy the housing of their choice”).

2016Federal courts have interpreted the necessary requirement of the FHA as "meaning that, without the accommodation, the [complainant] will be denied an equal opportunity to obtain the housing of her choice." Wisconsin Cmty. Servs., 465 F.3d at 749 ; see also Smith & Lee Assoc., Inc. v. City of Taylor, Mich., 102 F.3d 781 , 795 (6th Cir.1996) (holding that complainants "must show that, but for the accommodation, they likely will be denied an equal opportunity to enjoy the housing of their choice").

2019In re L.Z., 111 A.3d 1164, 1174 (Pa. 2015).

2019In re L.Z., 111 A.3d 1164, 1174 (Pa. 2015).

2017See E.D. [v. M.P., 33 A.3d 73, 79-80 (Pa.Super. 2011)].

2012See E.D., 33 A.3d at 79-80 .

1992Most recently, in Commonwealth v. James, 506 Pa. 526 , 486 A.2d 376 (1985), we reiterated the necessary factors in determining whether a victim had an independent basis for an in-court identification: ... the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, the witness’ degree of attention, the accuracy of the witness’ prior description of the criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation, and the length of time between the crime and the confrontation.

1992Most recently, in Commonwealth v. James, 506 Pa. 526 , 486 A.2d 376 (1985), we reiterated the necessary factors in determining whether a victim had an independent basis for an in-court identification: ... the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, the witness’ degree of attention, the accuracy of the witness’ prior description of the criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation, and the length of time between the crime and the confrontation.

2022In other words, in order to satisfy the necessary element of the FHA[A], a complainant must demonstrate “a direct linkage between the proposed accommodation and the ‘equal opportunity’ to be provided. . . . ” Bryant Woods Inn, 124 F.3d at 604. “[I]f the proposed accommodation provides no direct amelioration of a disability’s effect, it cannot be said to be ‘necessary.’” Id.

2022In other words, in order to satisfy the necessary element of the FHA[A], a complainant must demonstrate “a direct linkage between the proposed accommodation and the ‘equal opportunity’ to be provided. . . . ” Bryant Woods Inn, 124 F.3d at 604. “[I]f the proposed accommodation provides no direct amelioration of a disability’s effect, it cannot be said to be ‘necessary.’” Id.

2017In keeping with its framing of the necessary inquiry as whether the defendant had an opportunity to cross-examine the witness, rather than whether the witness was, in fact, cross-examined, the Crawford Court espoused that “when the declarant appears for cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause places no constraints at all on the use of his prior testimonial statements.” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59 … (citation omitted).

2014In keeping with its framing of the necessary inquiry as whether the defendant had an opportunity to cross-examine the witness, rather than whether the witness was, in fact, cross-examined, the Crawford Court espoused that “when the declarant appears for cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause places no constraints at all on the use of his prior testimonial statements.” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59 , 124 S.Ct. at 1369 (citation omitted).

2004Because the risk of error and the concomitant danger to individual liberties inherent in such a determination is greater than in an objective determination, the Williams I Court found that “requiring the prosecutor to affirmatively convince the court of the important facts can be expected to materially reduce the risk of error.” Id. at 608 (citing E.B. v. Verniero, 119 F.3d 1077 (3rd Cir.1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1109 , 1110, 118 S.Ct. 1039 , 140 L.Ed.2d 105 (1998)).

2003See, e.g., Williams I, 557 Pa. at 306-12, 733 A.2d at 604-07; Commonwealth v. Wright, 508 Pa. 25, 36-42 , 494 A.2d 354, 359-362 (1985), aff'd sub nom McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 , 106 S.Ct. 2411 , 91 L.Ed.2d 67 (1986); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 754-70 , 102 S.Ct. 1388, 1395-1403 , 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423-33 , 99 S.Ct. 1804, 1808-13 , 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979); E.B. v. Verniero, 119 F.3d 1077, 1106-10 (3d Cir.1997); Doe v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 428 Mass. 90 , 697 N.E.2d 512, 518-20 (1998).

2026See M.J.M., 63 A.3d at 336 . - 31 - J-S45031-25 to school saying he’s got scratches[,] and it’s because [K.A.F.] hit him.”); id. at 58 (GAL testifying and agreeing that “[Mother] had indicated to the [trial c]ourt that none of this ever happens in [her] house[,] and it only happens when [Father’s] visits are coming up”); id. at 58-61 (GAL testifying that N.C.F.’s behavioral issues require significant attention and specific accommodations such that, inter alia, N.C.F. must depart school prior to end of school day every day because only person who can control him departs at that time and, furthe

2025Thus, since each prong of the necessary test was not met, compulsory joinder does not apply.12 Fithian, supra. Accordingly, we conclude the trial court erred in granting Faison’s omnibus pre-trial motion to dismiss pursuant to the compulsory joinder rule. ____________________________________________ intent to exercise that control.” Commonwealth v. Parrish, 191 A.3d 31, 36 (Pa.Super. 2018) (citation omitted).

2025See Commonwealth v. Heidler, 741 A.2d 213 (Pa.Super. 1999) (en banc) (holding the evidence was insufficient to show the defendant had joint constructive possession of a handgun in his girlfriend’s purse while sitting in a car since there was no evidence demonstrating the defendant’s power or intent to control the handgun). 12 Given our holding, we need not address the Commonwealth’s argument that the trial court erred in concluding “the current prosecution is based upon the same criminal conduct or arose from the same criminal episode as the former prosecution[.]” Perfetto, supra, 207 A.3d at

2025Commonwealth v. Raymond, 233 A.3d 809, 816 (Pa. Super. 2020).

2025To invoke this Court’s jurisdiction, an appellant must satisfy the following four-pronged test by demonstrating that he: “(1) timely ____________________________________________ 2 Appellant stated his claim for our review as follows: Whether the lower court abused its discretion in imposing manifestly excessive and unreasonable sentences for rape and involuntary deviant sexual intercourse which are both at the statutory maximum limit when the court failed to consider any significant mitigating factors, failed to apply and review any of the necessary factors set forth in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b)

2025See Commonwealth v. Heidler, 741 A.2d 213 (Pa.Super. 1999) (en banc) (holding the evidence was insufficient to show the defendant had joint constructive possession of a handgun in his girlfriend’s purse while sitting in a car since there was no evidence demonstrating the defendant’s power or intent to control the handgun). 12 Given our holding, we need not address the Commonwealth’s argument that the trial court erred in concluding “the current prosecution is based upon the same criminal conduct or arose from the same criminal episode as the former prosecution[.]” Perfetto, supra, 207 A.3d at

2024On April 26, 2021, Appellants filed a “Motion for Leave to Conduct Discovery Related to the Identities of Unknown Defendants” (“Appellants’ ____________________________________________ to disclose his identity and a reasonable opportunity to contest the petition;” 2) “[e]very plaintiff who petitions the court to disclose the identity of an anonymous or pseudonymous communicator must present sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case for all elements of a defamation claim, within the plaintiff's control, such as would survive a motion for summary judgment;” 3) “[a] petitioner must subm