necessary standard in Alabama

1971When such testimony is offered, preliminary proof should first be made, showing the circumstances under which the alleged confession was made; and when desired by either party, the court, before admitting the evidence, should hear the testimony offered on each side, and from it determine whether the testimony establishes the fact that the confession was voluntarily made. * * * ’ See also Duncan v. State, 278 Ala. 145 , 176 So.2d 840 ; Sanders v. State, 278 Ala. 453 , 179 So.2d 35 ; White v. State, 260 Ala. 328 , 70 So.2d 624 ; Logan v. State, 251 Ala. 441 , 37 So.2d 753 ; Taylor v. State, 42 A

1971When such testimony is offered, preliminary proof should first be made, showing the circumstances under which the alleged confession was made; and when desired by either party, the court, before admitting the evidence, should hear the testimony offered on each side, and from it determine whether the testimony establishes the fact that the confession was voluntarily made. * * * ’ See also Duncan v. State, 278 Ala. 145 , 176 So.2d 840 ; Sanders v. State, 278 Ala. 453 , 179 So.2d 35 ; White v. State, 260 Ala. 328 , 70 So.2d 624 ; Logan v. State, 251 Ala. 441 , 37 So.2d 753 ; Taylor v. State, 42 A

1971When such testimony is offered, preliminary proof should first be made, showing the circumstances under which the alleged confession was made; and when desired by either party, the court, before admitting the evidence, should hear the testimony offered on each side, and from it determine whether the testimony establishes the fact that the confession was voluntarily made. * * * ’ See also Duncan v. State, 278 Ala. 145 , 176 So.2d 840 ; Sanders v. State, 278 Ala. 453 , 179 So.2d 35 ; White v. State, 260 Ala. 328 , 70 So.2d 624 ; Logan v. State, 251 Ala. 441 , 37 So.2d 753 ; Taylor v. State, 42 A

1971When such testimony is offered, preliminary proof should first be made, showing the circumstances under which the alleged confession was made; and when desired by either party, the court, before admitting the evidence, should hear the testimony offered on each side, and from it determine whether the testimony establishes the fact that the confession was voluntarily made. * * * ’ See also Duncan v. State, 278 Ala. 145 , 176 So.2d 840 ; Sanders v. State, 278 Ala. 453 , 179 So.2d 35 ; White v. State, 260 Ala. 328 , 70 So.2d 624 ; Logan v. State, 251 Ala. 441 , 37 So.2d 753 ; Taylor v. State, 42 A

1971When such testimony is offered, preliminary proof should first be made, showing the circumstances under which the alleged confession was made; and when desired by either party, the court, before admitting the evidence, should hear the testimony offered on each side, and from it determine whether the testimony establishes the fact that the confession was voluntarily made. * * * ’ See also Duncan v. State, 278 Ala. 145 , 176 So.2d 840 ; Sanders v. State, 278 Ala. 453 , 179 So.2d 35 ; White v. State, 260 Ala. 328 , 70 So.2d 624 ; Logan v. State, 251 Ala. 441 , 37 So.2d 753 ; Taylor v. State, 42 A

1971When such testimony is offered, preliminary proof should first be made, showing the circumstances under which the alleged confession was made; and when desired by either party, the court, before admitting the evidence, should hear the testimony offered on each side, and from it determine whether the testimony establishes the fact that the confession was voluntarily made. * * * ’ See also Duncan v. State, 278 Ala. 145 , 176 So.2d 840 ; Sanders v. State, 278 Ala. 453 , 179 So.2d 35 ; White v. State, 260 Ala. 328 , 70 So.2d 624 ; Logan v. State, 251 Ala. 441 , 37 So.2d 753 ; Taylor v. State, 42 A

1971When such testimony is offered, preliminary proof should first be made, showing the circumstances under which the alleged confession was made; and when desired by either party, the court, before admitting the evidence, should hear the testimony offered on each side, and from it determine whether the testimony establishes the fact that the confession was voluntarily made. * * * ’ See also Duncan v. State, 278 Ala. 145 , 176 So.2d 840 ; Sanders v. State, 278 Ala. 453 , 179 So.2d 35 ; White v. State, 260 Ala. 328 , 70 So.2d 624 ; Logan v. State, 251 Ala. 441 , 37 So.2d 753 ; Taylor v. State, 42 A

1971When such testimony is offered, preliminary proof should first be made, showing the circumstances under which the alleged confession was made; and when desired by either party, the court, before admitting the evidence, should hear the testimony offered on each side, and from it determine whether the testimony establishes the fact that the confession was voluntarily made. * * * ’ See also Duncan v. State, 278 Ala. 145 , 176 So.2d 840 ; Sanders v. State, 278 Ala. 453 , 179 So.2d 35 ; White v. State, 260 Ala. 328 , 70 So.2d 624 ; Logan v. State, 251 Ala. 441 , 37 So.2d 753 ; Taylor v. State, 42 A

1971When such testimony is offered, preliminary proof should first be made, showing the circumstances under which the alleged confession was made; and when desired by either party, the court, before admitting the evidence, should hear the testimony offered on each side, and from it determine whether the testimony establishes the fact that the confession was voluntarily made. * * * ’ See also Duncan v. State, 278 Ala. 145 , 176 So.2d 840 ; Sanders v. State, 278 Ala. 453 , 179 So.2d 35 ; White v. State, 260 Ala. 328 , 70 So.2d 624 ; Logan v. State, 251 Ala. 441 , 37 So.2d 753 ; Taylor v. State, 42 A

1971When such testimony is offered, preliminary proof should first be made, showing the circumstances under which the alleged confession was made; and when desired by either party, the court, before admitting the evidence, should hear the testimony offered on each side, and from it determine whether the testimony establishes the fact that the confession was voluntarily made. * * * ’ See also Duncan v. State, 278 Ala. 145 , 176 So.2d 840 ; Sanders v. State, 278 Ala. 453 , 179 So.2d 35 ; White v. State, 260 Ala. 328 , 70 So.2d 624 ; Logan v. State, 251 Ala. 441 , 37 So.2d 753 ; Taylor v. State, 42 A

2025Ex parte BancorpSouth Bank, 109 So. 3d at 166 .

2015Justice Shaw, in a writing joined by Justice Stuart, also concurred in the result, finding former § 30-3-4.1 to be facially unconstitutional, noting that this court had made “laudable attempts” to save the constitutionality of the- act through statutory construction, see, e.g., E.H.G. v. E.R.G., 73 So.3d 614 (Ala.Civ.App.2010) (construing former § 30-3-4.1 as impliedly presuming parental decisions served best interests of child and requiring proof of harm to rebut that implied presumption), but that the legislature had unambiguously failed to incorporate the necessary presumption in favor of p

1995Supply, Inc. v. Lombus , 590 So.2d 142 , 146 (Ala. 1991).

1991Here, we believe a remand of the case for the trial court to conduct a hearing in accordance with Hammond v. City of Gadsden, 493 So.2d 1374 (Ala.1986), would be appropriate.

1987Furthermore, "when a right so fundamental as that to counsel at trial is involved, the question of waiver must be determined on 'the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.' " North Carolina v. Butler , 441 U.S. 369 , 374-75 , 99 S.Ct. 1755 , 1758 , 60 L.Ed.2d 286 (1979).

1987Furthermore, "when a right so fundamental as that to counsel at trial is involved, the question of waiver must be determined on 'the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.' " North Carolina v. Butler , 441 U.S. 369 , 374-75 , 99 S.Ct. 1755 , 1758 , 60 L.Ed.2d 286 (1979).

1986In Texas v. Brown , although the Court expressly found that the requirement was met on the facts of that specific case, the Court refused to discuss whether inadvertence was really a necessary requirement in establishing "plain view." 460 U.S. at 743 , 103 S.Ct. at 1544 .

1986In Texas v. Brown , although the Court expressly found that the requirement was met on the facts of that specific case, the Court refused to discuss whether inadvertence was really a necessary requirement in establishing "plain view." 460 U.S. at 743 , 103 S.Ct. at 1544.

1985Because `some of the most difficult and embarrassing questions which a judicial officer is called upon to consider and determine relate to his jurisdiction . . .,' Bradley, supra , [80 U.S.] at 352, the scope of the judge's jurisdiction must be construed broadly where the issue is the immunity of the judge.

1985Because `some of the most difficult and embarrassing questions which a judicial officer is called upon to consider and determine relate to his jurisdiction ...,' Bradley, supra, [80 U.S.] at 352, the scope of the judge's jurisdiction must be construed broadly where the issue is the immunity of the judge.

1948Wynn v. Simmons, 33 Ala. 272 ; Phillips v. Peteet, 35 Ala. 696 .

1948Wynn v. Simmons, 33 Ala. 272 ; Phillips v. Peteet, 35 Ala. 696 .

1941See also Israel v. Arthur, 6 Colo. 85 ; Id., 7 Colo. 12 , 1 P. 442 ; Shafer v. Shafer, 30 Mich. 163 (holding that an appeal may be prosecuted by the wife from a decree of divorce against her, after the death of her husband where the husband left estate which will be affected by the decree); Coffman v. Finney, 65 Ohio St. 61 , 61 N.E. 155 , 55 L.R.A. 794 ; Francis v. Francis, 31 Grat. (72 Va.) 283 (holding that where, in a suit for divorce, a decree has been rendered granting alimony to the wife, on the death of defendant pending an appeal from such decree the suit abates, but the decree may be

1941See also Israel v. Arthur, 6 Colo. 85 ; Id., 7 Colo. 12 , 1 P. 442 ; Shafer v. Shafer, 30 Mich. 163 (holding that an appeal may be prosecuted by the wife from a decree of divorce against her, after the death of her husband where the husband left estate which will be affected by the decree); Coffman v. Finney, 65 Ohio St. 61 , 61 N.E. 155 , 55 L.R.A. 794 ; Francis v. Francis, 31 Grat. (72 Va.) 283 (holding that where, in a suit for divorce, a decree has been rendered granting alimony to the wife, on the death of defendant pending an appeal from such decree the suit abates, but the decree may be

1941See also Israel v. Arthur, 6 Colo. 85 ; Id., 7 Colo. 12 , 1 P. 442 ; Shafer v. Shafer, 30 Mich. 163 (holding that an appeal may be prosecuted by the wife from a decree of divorce against her, after the death of her husband where the husband left estate which will be affected by the decree); Coffman v. Finney, 65 Ohio St. 61 , 61 N.E. 155 , 55 L.R.A. 794 ; Francis v. Francis, 31 Grat. (72 Va.) 283 (holding that where, in a suit for divorce, a decree has been rendered granting alimony to the wife, on the death of defendant pending an appeal from such decree the suit abates, but the decree may be

1941See also Israel v. Arthur, 6 Colo. 85 ; Id., 7 Colo. 12 , 1 P. 442 ; Shafer v. Shafer, 30 Mich. 163 (holding that an appeal may be prosecuted by the wife from a decree of divorce against her, after the death of her husband where the husband left estate which will be affected by the decree); Coffman v. Finney, 65 Ohio St. 61 , 61 N.E. 155 , 55 L.R.A. 794 ; Francis v. Francis, 31 Grat. (72 Va.) 283 (holding that where, in a suit for divorce, a decree has been rendered granting alimony to the wife, on the death of defendant pending an appeal from such decree the suit abates, but the decree may be

1941The note to the above necessary rule is as follows: “Nickerson v. Nickerson, 34 Or. 1 , 48 P. 423 , 54 P. 277 (holding that a suit, for divorce, the decree in which gave the wife one third of a husband’s property, did not abate on the death of the husband pending appeal, but survived to his heirs).

1941The note to the above necessary rule is as follows: “Nickerson v. Nickerson, 34 Or. 1 , 48 P. 423 , 54 P. 277 (holding that a suit, for divorce, the decree in which gave the wife one third of a husband’s property, did not abate on the death of the husband pending appeal, but survived to his heirs).

1941The note to the above necessary rule is as follows: “Nickerson v. Nickerson, 34 Or. 1 , 48 P. 423 , 54 P. 277 (holding that a suit, for divorce, the decree in which gave the wife one third of a husband’s property, did not abate on the death of the husband pending appeal, but survived to his heirs).

1921Corp. [5th Ed.] § 129, p. 231; Ghuoco Tiaco v. Forbes, 228 U. S. 549 , 33 Sup. Ct. 585, 57 L.

1921Corp. [5th Ed.] § 129, p. 231; Ghuoco Tiaco v. Forbes, 228 U. S. 549 , 33 Sup. Ct. 585, 57 L.

1918Co. v. Statham, 93 U. S. 24 , 23 L.

1918Co. v. Statham, 93 U. S. 24 , 23 L.

1914If, in order to give point to appellant’s argument against the charge, it be construed with special reference to section 5473 of the Code, which imposes certain duties on the operators of railroad trains at public road crossings, at regular stations and stopping places, or when entering into-, or while moving within, or passing through, any village, town, or city, and section 5476, which puts upon them the burden of showing a compliance with section 5473, and that there was no negligence, still, in view of the necessary principle upon which the courts proceed in every department of jurispruden