necessary clause in Louisiana

1963Davis v. National Fire Insurance Co., 169 La. 63 , 124 So. 147 ; Stovall v. Sterling Fire Insurance Co., 163 La. 284 , 111 So. 707 ; Lucille Ladies’ Ready-to-Wear, Inc. v. Glens Falls Insurance Co., 168 La. 696 , 123 So. 295 ; Thompson v. State Assurance Co., Ltd., 160 La. 683 , 107 So. 489 ; Manuel v. Stuyvesant Ins.

1963Davis v. National Fire Insurance Co., 169 La. 63 , 124 So. 147 ; Stovall v. Sterling Fire Insurance Co., 163 La. 284 , 111 So. 707 ; Lucille Ladies’ Ready-to-Wear, Inc. v. Glens Falls Insurance Co., 168 La. 696 , 123 So. 295 ; Thompson v. State Assurance Co., Ltd., 160 La. 683 , 107 So. 489 ; Manuel v. Stuyvesant Ins.

1963Davis v. National Fire Insurance Co., 169 La. 63 , 124 So. 147 ; Stovall v. Sterling Fire Insurance Co., 163 La. 284 , 111 So. 707 ; Lucille Ladies’ Ready-to-Wear, Inc. v. Glens Falls Insurance Co., 168 La. 696 , 123 So. 295 ; Thompson v. State Assurance Co., Ltd., 160 La. 683 , 107 So. 489 ; Manuel v. Stuyvesant Ins.

1963Davis v. National Fire Insurance Co., 169 La. 63 , 124 So. 147 ; Stovall v. Sterling Fire Insurance Co., 163 La. 284 , 111 So. 707 ; Lucille Ladies’ Ready-to-Wear, Inc. v. Glens Falls Insurance Co., 168 La. 696 , 123 So. 295 ; Thompson v. State Assurance Co., Ltd., 160 La. 683 , 107 So. 489 ; Manuel v. Stuyvesant Ins.

1963Davis v. National Fire Insurance Co., 169 La. 63 , 124 So. 147 ; Stovall v. Sterling Fire Insurance Co., 163 La. 284 , 111 So. 707 ; Lucille Ladies’ Ready-to-Wear, Inc. v. Glens Falls Insurance Co., 168 La. 696 , 123 So. 295 ; Thompson v. State Assurance Co., Ltd., 160 La. 683 , 107 So. 489 ; Manuel v. Stuyvesant Ins.

1963Davis v. National Fire Insurance Co., 169 La. 63 , 124 So. 147 ; Stovall v. Sterling Fire Insurance Co., 163 La. 284 , 111 So. 707 ; Lucille Ladies’ Ready-to-Wear, Inc. v. Glens Falls Insurance Co., 168 La. 696 , 123 So. 295 ; Thompson v. State Assurance Co., Ltd., 160 La. 683 , 107 So. 489 ; Manuel v. Stuyvesant Ins.

1963Davis v. National Fire Insurance Co., 169 La. 63 , 124 So. 147 ; Stovall v. Sterling Fire Insurance Co., 163 La. 284 , 111 So. 707 ; Lucille Ladies’ Ready-to-Wear, Inc. v. Glens Falls Insurance Co., 168 La. 696 , 123 So. 295 ; Thompson v. State Assurance Co., Ltd., 160 La. 683 , 107 So. 489 ; Manuel v. Stuyvesant Ins.

1963Davis v. National Fire Insurance Co., 169 La. 63 , 124 So. 147 ; Stovall v. Sterling Fire Insurance Co., 163 La. 284 , 111 So. 707 ; Lucille Ladies’ Ready-to-Wear, Inc. v. Glens Falls Insurance Co., 168 La. 696 , 123 So. 295 ; Thompson v. State Assurance Co., Ltd., 160 La. 683 , 107 So. 489 ; Manuel v. Stuyvesant Ins.

2024Any person, including a corporation and the individual shareholders of such corporation, who is employed as an agent, servant, or employee may agree with his employer to refrain from carrying on or engaging in a business similar to that of the employer and/or from soliciting customers of the employer within a specified parish or parishes, municipality or municipalities, or parts thereof, so long as the employer carries on a like business therein, not to exceed a period of two years from termination of employment. ... to be a necessary requirement and therefore applicable to our analysis of Pro

2024Id. at 517 .

2014Id.

2011In support of his argument, the Defendant refers to Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 601 , 124 S.Ct. 2601, 2603 , 159 L.Ed.2d 643 (2004), wherein the Supreme Court held, “[I]t is likely that warnings withheld until after interrogation and confession will be ineffective in preparing a suspect for successive interrogation, close in time and similar in content.” The Defendant’s third recorded statement was taken on February 8, 2008, after he was transported to Ville Platte.

2011In support of his argument, the Defendant refers to Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 601 , 124 S.Ct. 2601, 2603 , 159 L.Ed.2d 643 (2004), wherein the Supreme Court held, “[I]t is likely that warnings withheld until after interrogation and confession will be ineffective in preparing a suspect for successive interrogation, close in time and similar in content.” The Defendant’s third recorded statement was taken on February 8, 2008, after he was transported to Ville Platte.

2008Olmstead, 277 U.S. 438, 485 , 48 S.Ct. 564, 575 , 72 L.Ed. 944 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). [52] The dissent (joined by three justices) defined "initiate" more narrowly to include only statements "about the subject matter of the criminal investigation." Bradshaw, 462 U.S. at 1053 , 103 S.Ct. at 2839 (Marshall, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens, JJ.). [53] This ellipsis is placed here to indicate when Detective Morse informed the defendant that he was under arrest. [54] See Bradshaw, 462 U.S. at 1045-46 , 103 S.Ct. 2830 ("[a]lthough ambiguous, the respondent's quest

2008Olmstead, 277 U.S. 438, 485 , 48 S.Ct. 564, 575 , 72 L.Ed. 944 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). [52] The dissent (joined by three justices) defined "initiate" more narrowly to include only statements "about the subject matter of the criminal investigation." Bradshaw, 462 U.S. at 1053 , 103 S.Ct. at 2839 (Marshall, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens, JJ.). [53] This ellipsis is placed here to indicate when Detective Morse informed the defendant that he was under arrest. [54] See Bradshaw, 462 U.S. at 1045-46 , 103 S.Ct. 2830 ("[a]lthough ambiguous, the respondent's quest

2003An appeal by Louisiana Title ensued, [1] wherein this Court reversed the judgment of the WCJ, stating that "the evidence which was relied upon by the WCJ simply was not sufficient to support the claims by Fite and certainly did not rise to the necessary standard of proof required to find an occupational disease existed." The Louisiana Supreme Court remanded the case with directions to this Court "to review the record under the manifest error standard *261 of appellate review." Fite v. Louisiana Title Co., 2002-2607 (La.06/27/03), 852 So.2d 983 ("Fite II").

2002In Darbonne v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 00-551 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/14/00) ; 774 So.2d 1022 , the defendant argued that prior to plaintiff's expert witness' testimony, the trial judge failed to conduct the necessary inquiry into his qualifications and expertise.

2000The issue presented is whether plaintiff meets all of the necessary factors enunciated in Giroir v. South Louisiana Medical Center, 475 So.2d 1040 , 1044 (La. 1985), particularly the third factor, which requires that the new plaintiff and the original plaintiff be sufficiently related so that the added plaintiff is not wholly new or unrelated.

1995Cf. McDonough v. Royal Sonesta, 626 So.2d 438 (La.App. 4th Cir.1993); Walker v. Babcock Industries Inc., 582 So.2d 258 (La.App. 1st Cir.1991).

1995Gunn v. Amica, supra. This is not a situation where the district court completely omitted a necessary instruction or gave a completely wrong charge; such cases usually result in de novo review.

1985Pickens, supra .

1981(Citations omitted) It is never appropriate for a Court of Appeal, having found that the trial court has abused its discretion, simply to decide what it considers an appropriate award on the basis of the evidence." The Supreme Court further refined the necessary inquiry in Reck v. Stevens, 373 So.2d 498 (La.1979), wherein it stated, at 501: "Thus, the initial inquiry must always be directed at whether the trier court's award for the particular injuries and their effects upon this particular injured person is, a clear abuse of the trier of fact's much discretion," La.Civ.C. art. 1934(3) in the

1976The "stop and frisk" law of the State of New York, as well as C.Cr.P. 215.1 of the State of Louisiana, with the necessary exception of the right of the police to protect themselves, "must be judged under the Reasonable Search and Seizure Clause of the Fourth Amendment." Sibron and Peters v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 62 , 88 S.Ct. 1889, 1902 , 20 L.Ed.2d 917 .

1976The "stop and frisk" law of the State of New York, as well as C.Cr.P. 215.1 of the State of Louisiana, with the necessary exception of the right of the police to protect themselves, "must be judged under the Reasonable Search and Seizure Clause of the Fourth Amendment." Sibron and Peters v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 62 , 88 S.Ct. 1889, 1902 , 20 L.Ed.2d 917 .

1940It is true that in Bosarge et ux. v. Spiess & Co., et al., 145 So. 21, 22 , we stated that “it was a direct violation of the above-quoted provision of the ordinance for the driver to make the attempt without giving the necessary warning”.

1938Tyler v. Lewis, 143 La. 229 , 78 So. 477 .

1938Tyler v. Lewis, 143 La. 229 , 78 So. 477 .

1934“While boys ten or eleven years of age of normal intelligence are presumed to know and appreciate the danger of riding bicycles or playing in city streets, they cannot be expected to exercise the same degree of prudence as would be exhibited by an adult, and a person driving such an automobile in close proximity to a child is negligent in not expecting that the child may do the unexpected and dart suddenly into danger.” In the case of Ziegler et al. v. Lamantia, 13 La.