25 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1928–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Beasleygreen2 sentences2014Further, we need not reverse a conviction when a trial court fails to make an express finding that the danger of unfair prejudice did not substantially outweigh the probative value of the evidence so long as “the record sufficiently demonstrates that ‘the necessary factors were argued, considered, and balanced by the trial court as part of its ruling.’” Id. (quoting State v. Beasley, 205 Ariz. 334, 337, ¶ 15 , 70 P.3d 463, 466 (App. 2003)). ¶26 Here, although Leyba did argue the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighed the probative value of the evidence, the focus of his argument w 2014Further, we need not reverse a conviction when a trial court fails to make an express finding that the danger of unfair prejudice did not substantially outweigh the probative value of the evidence so long as “the record sufficiently demonstrates that ‘the necessary factors were argued, considered, and balanced by the trial court as part of its ruling.’” Id. (quoting State v. Beasley, 205 Ariz. 334, 337, ¶ 15 , 70 P.3d 463, 466 (App. 2003)). ¶26 Here, although Leyba did argue the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighed the probative value of the evidence, the focus of his argument w | 4 | 4 |
State Tax Commission v. United Verde Extension Mining Co.green2 sentences1985The court stated: [W]here the amount of damages or the value of property ... is concerned, and a large number of witnesses fix varying sums as the proper estimate of the value of such damages, [or] property ... the trial court ... [is] not bound to fix in ... judgment the exact sum testified to by any one of the witnesses, especially when their conclusions are based upon a large number of factors, but may take part of the necessary factors from the testimony of one witness, and part from that of another, and a result anywhere between the highest and lowest estimates which may be arrived at by 1985The court stated: [W]here the amount of damages or the value of property ... is concerned, and a large number of witnesses fix varying sums as the proper estimate of the value of such damages, [or] property ... the trial court ... [is] not bound to fix in ... judgment the exact sum testified to by any one of the witnesses, especially when their conclusions are based upon a large number of factors, but may take part of the necessary factors from the testimony of one witness, and part from that of another, and a result anywhere between the highest and lowest estimates which may be arrived at by | 2 | 2 |
Centocor, Inc. v. Hamiltongreen2 sentences2018Under those circumstances, the intermediary (often a treating physician) "assumes the duty to pass the necessary warnings on to the end users." Id. at 23 ¶ 10, 365 P.3d at 948 (quoting Centocor, Inc. v. Hamilton , 372 S.W.3d 140 , 154 (Tex. 2012) ). 2016“In certain contexts, however, the manufacturer’s or supplier’s duty to warn end users of the dangerous propensities of its product is limited to providing an adequate warning to an intermediary, who then assumes the duty to pass the necessary warnings on to the end users.” Centocor, Inc. v. Hamilton, 372 S.W.3d 140, 154 (Tex.2012). | 1 | 2 |
Pullen v. Pullengreen1 sentence2021See id. 6 ANDALORO v. ANDALORO Decision of the Court ¶16 The Decree reflects that the court engaged in the necessary inquiry, noting Father’s expenses (including his child support) were being paid by his live-in girlfriend (“who earns a substantial income”), and that Father, despite his current unemployment and mental health issues, was capable of reacquiring a high-paying job. | 1 | 1 |
Potter v. H. Kern Wisner, M.D., P.C.green1 sentence2020Kern Wisner, M.D., P.C., 170 Ariz. 331, 335 (App. 1991), this court indicated there appears to be “a split in authority in Arizona” whether “evidence of a practice by an individual doctor or a limited group of health care professionals is []sufficient to establish the necessary standard of care.” For example, in Bell v. Maricopa Med. | 1 | 1 |
Peacock v. Samaritan Health Servicegreen2 sentences2020Center, 157 Ariz. 192, 195 (App. 1988), this court reasoned that a jury could not conclude “that [a] hospital’s violation of its [own] protocols constituted evidence of negligence unless it first found that the protocols were not merely evidence of the applicable standard, but were synonymous with it.” But in Peacock v. Samaritan Health Serv., 159 Ariz. 123, 127 (App. 1988), decided just two months after Bell, this court held that, although “a policy adopted by a health care provider will [not] always equate with the standard of care to be applied by the jury in determining if the care and sup 2020Center, 157 Ariz. 192, 195 (App. 1988), this court reasoned that a jury could not conclude “that [a] hospital’s violation of its [own] protocols constituted evidence of negligence unless it first found that the protocols were not merely evidence of the applicable standard, but were synonymous with it.” But in Peacock v. Samaritan Health Serv., 159 Ariz. 123, 127 (App. 1988), decided just two months after Bell, this court held that, although “a policy adopted by a health care provider will [not] always equate with the standard of care to be applied by the jury in determining if the care and sup | 1 | 1 |
Bell v. Maricopa Medical Centergreen1 sentence2020Center, 157 Ariz. 192, 195 (App. 1988), this court reasoned that a jury could not conclude “that [a] hospital’s violation of its [own] protocols constituted evidence of negligence unless it first found that the protocols were not merely evidence of the applicable standard, but were synonymous with it.” But in Peacock v. Samaritan Health Serv., 159 Ariz. 123, 127 (App. 1988), decided just two months after Bell, this court held that, although “a policy adopted by a health care provider will [not] always equate with the standard of care to be applied by the jury in determining if the care and sup | 1 | 1 |
SALT RIVER PROJ. AGRIC. IMP. AND POWER DIST. v. Miller Park, LLCgreen1 sentence2014Improvement & Power Dist. v. Miller Park, L.L.C., 218 Ariz. 246, ¶¶ 17-18 , 183 P.3d 497, 501 (2008) (although record of Rule 403 determinations should be made, failure to do so not necessarily reversible error). | 1 | 1 |
Eaton Fruit Co. v. California Spray-Chemical Corp.green2 sentences2009Eaton Fruit Co. v. Cal. Spray-Chemical Corp., 102 Ariz. 129, 130 , 426 P.2d 397, 398 (1967) (holding that the court did not have jurisdiction to consider the appeal because the underlying minute entry order “was not signed by the judge and filed with the clerk of the court”). 2009Eaton Fruit Co. v. Cal. Spray-Chemical Corp., 102 Ariz. 129, 130 , 426 P.2d 397, 398 (1967) (holding that the court did not have jurisdiction to consider the appeal because the underlying minute entry order “was not signed by the judge and filed with the clerk of the court”). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Polandgreen2 sentences2003State v. Poland, 144 Ariz. 388, 400 , 698 P.2d 183, 195 (1985). 2003State v. Poland, 144 Ariz. 388, 400 , 698 P.2d 183, 195 (1985). | 1 | 1 |
Hanen v. Willisgreen1 sentence1999We have previously held that in assessing the validity of a defective notice of appeal, the necessary test is whether “sufficient notice of the appeal was conveyed to all of the appellees, neither misleading nor prejudicing them.” Id. at 10, 423 P.2d at 99 (overruling Pacific Motor). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Stanhopegreen2 sentences1992See also State v. Stanhope, 139 Ariz. 88, 91 , 676 P.2d 1146, 1148 (App.1984); Long v. Garrett, 22 Ariz.App. 397 , 527 P.2d 1240 (1974). 1992See also State v. Stanhope, 139 Ariz. 88, 91 , 676 P.2d 1146, 1148 (App.1984); Long v. Garrett, 22 Ariz.App. 397 , 527 P.2d 1240 (1974). | 1 | 1 |
Roy v. Roygreen2 sentences1981See Roy v. Roy, 110 Cal.App.2d 297 , 242 P.2d 388 (1952). 1981See Roy v. Roy, 110 Cal.App.2d 297 , 242 P.2d 388 (1952). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Grijalva
green
2 sentences1992In Grijalva , the Arizona Supreme Court held that under the statute, probable cause to believe that the suspect committed the crime is not a necessary requirement for the temporary detention of a person to obtain evidence of physical characteristics. 111 Ariz. at 479 , 533 P.2d at 536 . 1992In Grijalva , the Arizona Supreme Court held that under the statute, probable cause to believe that the suspect committed the crime is not a necessary requirement for the temporary detention of a person to obtain evidence of physical characteristics. 111 Ariz. at 479 , 533 P.2d at 536 . | 3 | 1984–1992 |
Wyatt v. Vanguard Health System, Inc.
green
2 sentences2014See id. ¶ 16; Estate of Wyatt, 232 Ariz. 506, ¶ 14 , 307 P.3d at 77 . 2014See id. ¶ 16; Estate of Wyatt, 232 Ariz. 506, ¶ 14 , 307 P.3d at 77 . | 2 | 2014–2014 |
Moore v. Norman
green
2 sentences1985When there is a bona fide dispute between a debtor and a creditor as to the amount due, we think the true rule is well and succinctly stated in the case of Moore v. Norman, 52 Minn. 83 , 53 N.W. 809 , in which the court says: ‘The debtor has no right to the benefit of a tender, as having the effect of a payment, when it is burdened with such a condition that the creditor cannot accept the money without compromising his legal right to recover the further sum which he claims to be due.’ (Italics ours.) The legal effect of a valid tender is to take the place of the necessity of proving payment of 1985When there is a bona fide dispute between a debtor and a creditor as to the amount due, we think the true rule is well and succinctly stated in the case of Moore v. Norman, 52 Minn. 83 , 53 N.W. 809 , in which the court says: ‘The debtor has no right to the benefit of a tender, as having the effect of a payment, when it is burdened with such a condition that the creditor cannot accept the money without compromising his legal right to recover the further sum which he claims to be due.’ (Italics ours.) The legal effect of a valid tender is to take the place of the necessity of proving payment of | 2 | 1928–1985 |
Vasquez v. California
green
2 sentences1984State v. Grijalva, 111 Ariz. 476 , 533 P.2d 533 (1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 873 , 96 S.Ct. 141 , 46 L.Ed.2d 104 (1975). 1984State v. Grijalva, 111 Ariz. 476 , 533 P.2d 533 (1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 873 , 96 S.Ct. 141 , 46 L.Ed.2d 104 (1975). | 2 | 1984–1984 |
Woods v. Henderson
green
2 sentences1984State v. Grijalva, 111 Ariz. 476 , 533 P.2d 533 (1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 873 , 96 S.Ct. 141 , 46 L.Ed.2d 104 (1975). 1984State v. Grijalva, 111 Ariz. 476 , 533 P.2d 533 (1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 873 , 96 S.Ct. 141 , 46 L.Ed.2d 104 (1975). | 2 | 1984–1984 |
Amanda Watts v. Medicis Pharmaceutical Corporation
green
2 sentences2018Under those circumstances, the intermediary (often a treating physician) "assumes the duty to pass the necessary warnings on to the end users." Id. at 23 ¶ 10, 365 P.3d at 948 (quoting Centocor, Inc. v. Hamilton , 372 S.W.3d 140 , 154 (Tex. 2012) ). 2018Under those circumstances, the intermediary (often a treating physician) "assumes the duty to pass the necessary warnings on to the end users." Id. at 23 ¶ 10, 365 P.3d at 948 (quoting Centocor, Inc. v. Hamilton , 372 S.W.3d 140 , 154 (Tex. 2012) ). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement & Power District v. Miller Park, L.L.C.
neutral
1 sentence2014Improvement & Power Dist. v. Miller Park, L.L.C., 218 Ariz. 246, ¶¶ 17-18 , 183 P.3d 497, 501 (2008) (although record of Rule 403 determinations should be made, failure to do so not necessarily reversible error). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
State v. Baldenegro
green
2 sentences2014For these reasons, we find no error, fundamental or 10 STATE v. LEYBA Decision of the Court otherwise, in the failure to make more specific, express findings pursuant to Rule 403. ¶27 Finally, within his argument, Leyba asserts State v. Baldenegro, 188 Ariz. 10 , 932 P.2d 275 (App. 1996), requires that at least two statutorily defined criteria for gang membership be present before evidence of gang affiliation may be admissible. 2014For these reasons, we find no error, fundamental or 10 STATE v. LEYBA Decision of the Court otherwise, in the failure to make more specific, express findings pursuant to Rule 403. ¶27 Finally, within his argument, Leyba asserts State v. Baldenegro, 188 Ariz. 10 , 932 P.2d 275 (App. 1996), requires that at least two statutorily defined criteria for gang membership be present before evidence of gang affiliation may be admissible. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
State v. Dunlap
green
1 sentence2014Therefore, “the record sufficiently demonstrates that the necessary factors were argued, considered, and balanced by the trial court as part of its ruling,” id., even though the court did not provide a detailed analysis pursuant to Rule 403. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
In Re the Commitment of Jaramillo
green
1 sentence2014Further, we need not reverse a conviction when a trial court fails to make an express finding that the danger of unfair prejudice did not substantially outweigh the probative value of the evidence so long as “the record sufficiently demonstrates that ‘the necessary factors were argued, considered, and balanced by the trial court as part of its ruling.’” Id. (quoting State v. Beasley, 205 Ariz. 334, 337, ¶ 15 , 70 P.3d 463, 466 (App. 2003)). ¶26 Here, although Leyba did argue the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighed the probative value of the evidence, the focus of his argument w | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Trantor v. Fredrikson
green
2 sentences2009Further, although we have no quarrel with the general proposition that, when a party fails to raise an issue before the trial court, the issue is waived on appeal, see, e.g., Trantor, 179 Ariz. at 300-01 , 878 P.2d at 658-59 , we observe that neither Trantor nor its progeny has created an unalterable rule of waiver. 2009Further, although we have no quarrel with the general proposition that, when a party fails to raise an issue before the trial court, the issue is waived on appeal, see, e.g., Trantor, 179 Ariz. at 300-01 , 878 P.2d at 658-59 , we observe that neither Trantor nor its progeny has created an unalterable rule of waiver. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
State v. Walton
green
2 sentences1996Id. at 587 , 769 P.2d at 1033 . 1996Id. at 587 , 769 P.2d at 1033 . | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Long v. Garrett
neutral
2 sentences1992See also State v. Stanhope, 139 Ariz. 88, 91 , 676 P.2d 1146, 1148 (App.1984); Long v. Garrett, 22 Ariz.App. 397 , 527 P.2d 1240 (1974). 1992See also State v. Stanhope, 139 Ariz. 88, 91 , 676 P.2d 1146, 1148 (App.1984); Long v. Garrett, 22 Ariz.App. 397 , 527 P.2d 1240 (1974). | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Morgan v. United States
green
2 sentences1982Chief Justice Hughes’ pronouncement in Morgan v. U.S., 298 U.S. 468, 481 , 56 S.Ct. 906, 912 , 80 L.Ed. 1288 (1936), that “the one who decides must hear,” was followed by the explanation: This necessary rule does not preclude practicable administrative procedure in obtaining the aid of assistants in the department. 1982Chief Justice Hughes’ pronouncement in Morgan v. U.S., 298 U.S. 468, 481 , 56 S.Ct. 906, 912 , 80 L.Ed. 1288 (1936), that “the one who decides must hear,” was followed by the explanation: This necessary rule does not preclude practicable administrative procedure in obtaining the aid of assistants in the department. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
State v. Ellerson
green
2 sentences1981Cf. State v. Ellerson, 125 Ariz. 249 , 609 P.2d 64 (1980) (held that although the court made no express findings, its actions and the record indicated that the court had considered the necessary factors). 1981Cf. State v. Ellerson, 125 Ariz. 249 , 609 P.2d 64 (1980) (held that although the court made no express findings, its actions and the record indicated that the court had considered the necessary factors). | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.