necessary inquiry in Kansas

2019An accused may do so with statements that "evince 'a willingness and a desire for a generalized discussion about the investigation' " and are " 'not merely [ ] a necessary inquiry arising out of the incidents of the custodial relationship.' " Walker , 276 Kan. at 947 , 80 P.3d 1132 (quoting Oregon v. Bradshaw , 462 U.S. 1039 , 1045-46, 103 S. Ct. 2830 , 77 L.Ed. 2d 405 [1983] ).

2019An accused may do so with statements that "evince 'a willingness and a desire for a generalized discussion about the investigation' " and are " 'not merely [ ] a necessary inquiry arising out of the incidents of the custodial relationship.' " Walker , 276 Kan. at 947 , 80 P.3d 1132 (quoting Oregon v. Bradshaw , 462 U.S. 1039 , 1045-46, 103 S. Ct. 2830 , 77 L.Ed. 2d 405 [1983] ).

2019An accused may do so with statements that "evince 'a willingness and a desire for a generalized discussion about the investigation' " and are " 'not merely [ ] a necessary inquiry arising out of the incidents of the custodial relationship.' " Walker , 276 Kan. at 947 , 80 P.3d 1132 (quoting Oregon v. Bradshaw , 462 U.S. 1039 , 1045-46, 103 S. Ct. 2830 , 77 L.Ed. 2d 405 [1983] ).

2019An accused may do so with statements that "evince 'a willingness and a desire for a generalized discussion about the investigation' " and are " 'not merely [ ] a necessary inquiry arising out of the incidents of the custodial relationship.' " Walker , 276 Kan. at 947 , 80 P.3d 1132 (quoting Oregon v. Bradshaw , 462 U.S. 1039 , 1045-46, 103 S. Ct. 2830 , 77 L.Ed. 2d 405 [1983] ).

1979App. 2d 395, 398 , 580 P.2d 90 (1978), we find that: “The decision in the United States Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 (1966), makes it clear that the State must prove the necessary warnings were given a criminal defendant and the defendant waived those rights before a confession given during custodial interrogation may be admitted at trial.” The trial court should make a determination as to whether in fact Miranda warnings were given prior to the admissions in question.

1979App. 2d 395, 398 , 580 P.2d 90 (1978), we find that: “The decision in the United States Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 (1966), makes it clear that the State must prove the necessary warnings were given a criminal defendant and the defendant waived those rights before a confession given during custodial interrogation may be admitted at trial.” The trial court should make a determination as to whether in fact Miranda warnings were given prior to the admissions in question.

1937Co., v. Comm’rs of Miami County, 12 Kan. 482 , where it was held: “Mere inadequacy of price affords no ground to set aside a contract of sale, unless it be of so gross a nature and given under such circumstances as to afford a necessary presumption of fraud or imposition.” (Syl.

1916Co. v. Comm’rs of Miami County, 12 Kan. 482 , it was said: “Mere inadequacy of price affords no ground to set aside a contract of sale, unless it be of so gross a nature and given under such circumstances as to afford a necessary presumption of fraud or imposition.” (Syl. ¶ 6.) Trial courts frequently find it necessary to give judgments for damages for the breach of contracts which are harsh and inequitable, and this court is not permitted to reverse such judgments upon purely equitable considerations.

2018In other words, a valid waiver of a previously asserted right "cannot be established by showing only that [the accused] responded to further police-initiated custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of his rights ." (Emphasis added.) Edwards , 451 U.S. at 484 , 101 S.Ct. 1880 . 1.1 Additional Facts When Detective Mata arrested Thurber at about 9:45 p.m., Saturday, January 6, 2007, Mata did not read Thurber his Miranda rights.

2018In other words, a valid waiver of a previously asserted right "cannot be established by showing only that [the accused] responded to further police-initiated custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of his rights ." (Emphasis added.) Edwards , 451 U.S. at 484 , 101 S.Ct. 1880 . 1.1 Additional Facts When Detective Mata arrested Thurber at about 9:45 p.m., Saturday, January 6, 2007, Mata did not read Thurber his Miranda rights.

2012In Stith , the court held the Williams did not prove ownership of land by adverse possession where the evidence did not show the Williams’ use of the land was “exclusive” or “continuous.” In reaching this conclusion, the court noted the Williams “occasionally” used a cellar and shed located on the land and some neighbors used the land as a trash dump. 227 Kan. at 37 .

2009The results *112 of a second or subsequent test or request will be suppressible as the fruit of the poisonous tree if it can be shown those results are obtained “ ‘as a result’ ” of the first Intoxilyzer test “ ‘or any leads obtained therefrom.’ ” Shaw, 37 Kan.

2008In State v. Kleypas, 272 Kan. 894 , 40 P.3d 139 (2001), cert. denied 537 U.S. 834 , 123 S.Ct. 144 , 154 L.Ed.2d 53 (2002), a divided majority of this court held the weighing equation of K.S.A. 21-4624(e) was unconstitutional under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution because it mandates death when the aggravating and mitigating circumstances are in equipoise.

2008In State v. Kleypas, 272 Kan. 894 , 40 P.3d 139 (2001), cert. denied 537 U.S. 834 , 123 S.Ct. 144 , 154 L.Ed.2d 53 (2002), a divided majority of this court held the weighing equation of K.S.A. 21-4624(e) was unconstitutional under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution because it mandates death when the aggravating and mitigating circumstances are in equipoise.

2008In State v. Kleypas, 272 Kan. 894 , 40 P.3d 139 (2001), cert. denied 537 U.S. 834 (2002), a divided majority of this court held the weighing equation of K.S.A. 21-4624(e) was unconstitutional under die Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution because it mandates death when the aggravating and mitigating circumstances are in equipoise.

2008In State v. Kleypas, 272 Kan. 894 , 40 P.3d 139 (2001), cert. denied 537 U.S. 834 , 123 S.Ct. 144 , 154 L.Ed.2d 53 (2002), a divided majority of this court held the weighing equation of K.S.A. 21-4624(e) was unconstitutional under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution because it mandates death when the aggravating and mitigating circumstances are in equipoise.

2008In State v. Kleypas, 272 Kan. 894 , 40 P.3d 139 (2001), cert. denied 537 U.S. 834 , 123 S.Ct. 144 , 154 L.Ed.2d 53 (2002), a divided majority of this court held the weighing equation of K.S.A. 21-4624(e) was unconstitutional under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution because it mandates death when the aggravating and mitigating circumstances are in equipoise.

2008In State v. Kleypas, 272 Kan. 894 , 40 P.3d 139 (2001), cert. denied 537 U.S. 834 , 123 S.Ct. 144 , 154 L.Ed.2d 53 (2002), a divided majority of this court held the weighing equation of K.S.A. 21-4624(e) was unconstitutional under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution because it mandates death when the aggravating and mitigating circumstances are in equipoise.

1990In Johnson v. American Cyanamid Co., 239 Kan. 279 , 718 P.2d 1318 (1986), this court considered whether Orimune, which is a Sabin or live polio vaccine, was an "unavoidably unsafe product" that came within the protection of Comment k.

1990In Johnson v. American Cyanamid Co., 239 Kan. 279 , 718 P.2d 1318 (1986), this court considered whether Orimune, which is a Sabin or live polio vaccine, was an "unavoidably unsafe product" that came within the protection of Comment k.

1983Wirsing v. Krzeminski, 61 Wis. 2d 513 , 213 N.W.2d 37 (1973); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 132 (1965), comment a.

1983Wirsing v. Krzeminski, 61 Wis. 2d 513 , 213 N.W.2d 37 (1973); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 132 (1965), comment a.

1979App. 2d 395, 398 , 580 P.2d 90 (1978), we find that: “The decision in the United States Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 (1966), makes it clear that the State must prove the necessary warnings were given a criminal defendant and the defendant waived those rights before a confession given during custodial interrogation may be admitted at trial.” The trial court should make a determination as to whether in fact Miranda warnings were given prior to the admissions in question.

1979United States v. Akin, 562 F.2d 459, 464 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied 435 U.S. 933 (1978); United States v. Parizo, 514 F.2d 52, 55 (2nd Cir. 1975).

1945Lorimer, 67 Kan. 864 , 74 Pac. 238 .

1945Lorimer, 67 Kan. 864 , 74 Pac. 238 .

1936Aside from the question of minors being involved, this was held not to be the necessary rule in Allen v. Allen, 28 Kan. 18 , where a joint will was so deposited for a term of nine years after the death of the testator, and in the opinion reference is made to section 30, chapter 117, Compiled Laws of 1879, which now appears as R.

1902In this case, as shown by the by-laws hereinbefore quoted, the secretary was such an organ of communication for the board of directors and was, therefore, an agent whose acts were binding, because, as remarked in Insurance Co. v. Stone, supra, “the giving of information in respect to the doing of a thing which, when done, the company would entrust to him to do, came within the scope of his authority.” The following decisions were on states of facts somewhat like those of this case : Durar v. Insurance Co., 24 N. J. 171; McCorkle v. Texas Benevolent Association, 71 Tex. 149 , 8 S. W. 516 ; Jone

1902In this case, as shown by the by-laws hereinbefore quoted, the secretary was such an organ of communication for the board of directors and was, therefore, an agent whose acts were binding, because, as remarked in Insurance Co. v. Stone, supra, “the giving of information in respect to the doing of a thing which, when done, the company would entrust to him to do, came within the scope of his authority.” The following decisions were on states of facts somewhat like those of this case : Durar v. Insurance Co., 24 N. J. 171; McCorkle v. Texas Benevolent Association, 71 Tex. 149 , 8 S. W. 516 ; Jone