60 North Carolina opinions name it 2 courts 1884–2026 9 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by North Carolina courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Stylesgreen2 sentences2026“Reasonable suspicion is the necessary standard for traffic stops, regardless of whether the traffic violation was readily observed or merely suspected.” Id. at 415 (cleaned up). 2023“A traffic stop is a seizure even though the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention quite brief.” State v. Barnard, 362 N.C. 244, 246 , 658 S.E.2d 643, 645 (2008). “[R]easonable suspicion is the necessary standard for traffic stops.” State v. Styles, 362 N.C. 412, 415 , 665 S.E.2d 438, 440 (2008). | 21 | 27 |
State v. Watkinsgreen2 sentences2021The necessary standard for stops based on traffic violations is “based on specific and articulable facts, as well as the rational inferences from those facts, as viewed through the eyes of a reasonable, cautious officer, guided by his experience and training.” State v. Watkins, 337 N.C. 437, 441 , 446 S.E.2d 67, 70 (1994) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 , 20 L. 2021The necessary standard for stops based on traffic violations is “based on specific and articulable facts, as well as the rational inferences from those facts, as viewed through the eyes of a reasonable, cautious officer, guided by his experience and training.” State v. Watkins, 337 N.C. 437, 441 , 446 S.E.2d 67, 70 (1994) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 , 20 L. | 7 | 7 |
Terry v. Ohiogreen2 sentences2021The necessary standard for stops based on traffic violations is “based on specific and articulable facts, as well as the rational inferences from those facts, as viewed through the eyes of a reasonable, cautious officer, guided by his experience and training.” State v. Watkins, 337 N.C. 437, 441 , 446 S.E.2d 67, 70 (1994) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 , 20 L. 2021The necessary standard for stops based on traffic violations is “based on specific and articulable facts, as well as the rational inferences from those facts, as viewed through the eyes of a reasonable, cautious officer, guided by his experience and training.” State v. Watkins, 337 N.C. 437, 441 , 446 S.E.2d 67, 70 (1994) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 , 20 L. | 4 | 6 |
State v. Mareadygreen2 sentences2011In its order, the trial court concluded: "That there was insufficient evidence for *264 probable cause to stop and arrest [Defendant]." "This Court has recently confirmed that `reasonable suspicion is the necessary standard for traffic stops.'" State v. Maready, 362 N.C. 614, 618 , 669 S.E.2d 564, 567 (2008) (citation omitted). 2011In its order, the trial court concluded: "That there was insufficient evidence for *264 probable cause to stop and arrest [Defendant]." "This Court has recently confirmed that `reasonable suspicion is the necessary standard for traffic stops.'" State v. Maready, 362 N.C. 614, 618 , 669 S.E.2d 564, 567 (2008) (citation omitted). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Barnardgreen2 sentences2023“A traffic stop is a seizure even though the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention quite brief.” State v. Barnard, 362 N.C. 244, 246 , 658 S.E.2d 643, 645 (2008). “[R]easonable suspicion is the necessary standard for traffic stops.” State v. Styles, 362 N.C. 412, 415 , 665 S.E.2d 438, 440 (2008). 2023“A traffic stop is a seizure even though the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention quite brief.” State v. Barnard, 362 N.C. 244, 246 , 658 S.E.2d 643, 645 (2008). “[R]easonable suspicion is the necessary standard for traffic stops.” State v. Styles, 362 N.C. 412, 415 , 665 S.E.2d 438, 440 (2008). | 1 | 4 |
State v. Bullockgreen2 sentences2018A traffic stop is constitutional if the officer has a "reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot." Id. at 246, 658 S.E.2d at 645 (quoting Illinois v. Wardlow , 528 U.S. 119 , 123, 120 S.Ct. 673 , 675, 145 L.Ed.2d 570 , 576 (2000) ). "[R]easonable suspicion is the necessary standard for traffic stops, regardless of whether the traffic violation was readily observed or merely suspected." State v. Bullock , 370 N.C. 256 , 261, 805 S.E.2d 671 , 676 (2017) (citation and quotation marks omitted). 2018A traffic stop is constitutional if the officer has a "reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot." Id. at 246, 658 S.E.2d at 645 (quoting Illinois v. Wardlow , 528 U.S. 119 , 123, 120 S.Ct. 673 , 675, 145 L.Ed.2d 570 , 576 (2000) ). "[R]easonable suspicion is the necessary standard for traffic stops, regardless of whether the traffic violation was readily observed or merely suspected." State v. Bullock , 370 N.C. 256 , 261, 805 S.E.2d 671 , 676 (2017) (citation and quotation marks omitted). | 1 | 3 |
State v. Fieldsgreen2 sentences2018"If [an] investigatory seizure is invalid [due to a lack of reasonable suspicion], evidence resulting from the warrantless stop is inadmissible under the exclusionary rule in both our federal and state constitutions." State v. Fields , 195 N.C. 2011In State v. Fields , we held that there was no reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop a vehicle where defendant was stopped at 4:00 p.m. after an officer observed him weaving in his lane. 195 N.C.App. 740, 746 , 673 S.E.2d 765, 768 (2009). | 1 | 2 |
State v. Bishopgreen1 sentence2024The answer to this question is “yes,” and the trial court’s failure to give a peremptory 14 I do not read our caselaw to state as a per se rule that experts retained for trial or sentencing can never be “manifestly credible.” Cf. State v. Bishop, 343 N.C. 518, 557 (1996). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Williamsgreen1 sentence2023SCOTT Opinion of the Court N.C. 110, 117, 726 S.E.2d 161, 167 (2012)). | 1 | 1 |
Brown v. Texasgreen2 sentences2015Therefore, the investigatory stop of an automobile “must be justified by ‘a reasonable suspicion, based on objective facts, that the individual is involved in criminal activity.’” State v. Watkins, 337 N.C. 437, 441 , 446 S.E.2d 67, 70 (1994) (quoting Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 , 61 L.Ed.2d 357, 362 (1979)). 2015Therefore, the investigatory stop of an automobile “must be justified by ‘a reasonable suspicion, based on objective facts, that the individual is involved in criminal activity.’” State v. Watkins, 337 N.C. 437, 441 , 446 S.E.2d 67, 70 (1994) (quoting Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 , 61 L.Ed.2d 357, 362 (1979)). | 1 | 1 |
Whren v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2011See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 , 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1395-96 , 59 L.Ed.2d 660, 667 (1979); Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809 , 116 S.Ct. 1769, 1772 , 135 L.Ed.2d 89, 95 (1996). "[R]easonable suspicion is the necessary standard for traffic stops[.]" State v. Styles, 362 N.C. 412, 415 , 665 S.E.2d 438, 440 (2008). 2011See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 , 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1395-96 , 59 L.Ed.2d 660, 667 (1979); Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809 , 116 S.Ct. 1769, 1772 , 135 L.Ed.2d 89, 95 (1996). "[R]easonable suspicion is the necessary standard for traffic stops[.]" State v. Styles, 362 N.C. 412, 415 , 665 S.E.2d 438, 440 (2008). | 1 | 1 |
Delaware v. Prousegreen2 sentences2011See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 , 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1395-96 , 59 L.Ed.2d 660, 667 (1979); Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809 , 116 S.Ct. 1769, 1772 , 135 L.Ed.2d 89, 95 (1996). "[R]easonable suspicion is the necessary standard for traffic stops[.]" State v. Styles, 362 N.C. 412, 415 , 665 S.E.2d 438, 440 (2008). 2011See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 , 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1395-96 , 59 L.Ed.2d 660, 667 (1979); Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809 , 116 S.Ct. 1769, 1772 , 135 L.Ed.2d 89, 95 (1996). "[R]easonable suspicion is the necessary standard for traffic stops[.]" State v. Styles, 362 N.C. 412, 415 , 665 S.E.2d 438, 440 (2008). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Kincaidgreen1 sentence2010App. 94, 97 , 555 S.E.2d 294, 297 (2001). “[Reasonable suspicion is the necessary standard for traffic stops[.]” State v. Styles, 362 N.C. 412, 415 , 665 S.E.2d 438, 440 (2008). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Cortezgreen2 sentences2009"A court must consider `the totality of the circumstancesthe whole picture' in determining whether a reasonable suspicion to make an investigatory stop exists." State v. Watkins, 337 N.C. 437, 441 , 446 S.E.2d 67, 70 (1994) (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 , 66 L. 2009"A court must consider `the totality of the circumstancesthe whole picture' in determining whether a reasonable suspicion to make an investigatory stop exists." State v. Watkins, 337 N.C. 437, 441 , 446 S.E.2d 67, 70 (1994) (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 , 66 L. | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Chanthasouxatgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Ozbirngreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Ramstadgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States of America,plaintiff-Appellee v. Armando Lopez-Sotogreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States of America v. Curtis Dennis Callarmangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Holeman v. City of New Londongreen | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Mark Lamond Willisgreen2 sentences2008In accord with every federal circuit to consider this issue, we hold that reasonable suspicion is the necessary standard for traffic stops, regardless of whether the traffic violation was readily observed or merely suspected. 1 See id. at 396-97 (determining that reasonable suspicion is the appropriate standard for a traffic stop based on a readily observed traffic violation); Willis, 431 F.3d at 714-15 (applying reasonable suspicion standard to a traffic stop based on readily observed traffic violations); Holeman v. City of New London, 425 F.3d 184, 189 (2d Cir. 2005) (determining that either 2008In accord with every federal circuit to consider this issue, we hold that reasonable suspicion is the necessary standard for traffic stops, regardless of whether the traffic violation was readily observed or merely suspected. [1] See id. at 396-97 (determining that reasonable suspicion is the appropriate standard for a traffic stop based on a readily observed traffic violation); Willis, 431 F.3d at 714-15 (applying reasonable suspicion standard to a traffic stop based on readily observed traffic violations); Holeman v. City of New London, 425 F.3d 184, 189 (2d Cir.2005) (determining that eithe | 1 | 1 |
| Davis v. Sanford Construction Companygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Joyner v. Garrettgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in North Carolina. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. . Johnson
neutral
2 sentences1938Each right is recognized in the decisions of this Court. (a) In S. v. Johnson , 75 N.C. 174 , Bynum, J. , said: "The proposition is true that the wife has the right to fight in the necessary defense of the husband, the child in defense of his parent, the servant in defense of the master, and reciprocally; but the act of the assistant must have the same construction in such cases as the act of the assisted party *Page 282 should have had if it had been done by himself, for they are in a mutual relation one to another." S. v. Brittain , 89 N.C. 482 , at p. 504; S. v. Bullock , 91 N.C. 614 ; S. v 1938Each right is recognized in the decisions of this Court. (a) In S. v. Johnson, 75 N. C., 174 , Bynum, J., said: “The proposition is true that the wife has the right to fight in the necessary defense of the husband, the child in defense of his parent, the servant in defense of the master, and reciprocally; but the act of the assistant must have the same construction in such eases as the act of the assisted party should have bad if it bad been done by himself, for they are in a mutual relation one to another.” S. v. Brittain, 89 N. C., 482 , at p. 504; S. v. Bullock, 91 N. C., 614 ; S. v. Greer, | 5 | 1884–1938 |
State v. Otto
green
2 sentences2018Therefore, reasonable suspicion is the necessary standard for traffic stops." State v. Otto , 366 N.C. 134 , 137, 726 S.E.2d 824 , 827 (2012) (citation and quotation marks omitted). 2018Therefore, reasonable suspicion is the necessary standard for traffic stops." State v. Otto , 366 N.C. 134 , 137, 726 S.E.2d 824 , 827 (2012) (citation and quotation marks omitted). | 3 | 2013–2018 |
Illinois v. Wardlow
green
2 sentences2018A traffic stop is constitutional if the officer has a "reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot." Id. at 246, 658 S.E.2d at 645 (quoting Illinois v. Wardlow , 528 U.S. 119 , 123, 120 S.Ct. 673 , 675, 145 L.Ed.2d 570 , 576 (2000) ). "[R]easonable suspicion is the necessary standard for traffic stops, regardless of whether the traffic violation was readily observed or merely suspected." State v. Bullock , 370 N.C. 256 , 261, 805 S.E.2d 671 , 676 (2017) (citation and quotation marks omitted). 2018A traffic stop is constitutional if the officer has a "reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot." Id. at 246, 658 S.E.2d at 645 (quoting Illinois v. Wardlow , 528 U.S. 119 , 123, 120 S.Ct. 673 , 675, 145 L.Ed.2d 570 , 576 (2000) ). "[R]easonable suspicion is the necessary standard for traffic stops, regardless of whether the traffic violation was readily observed or merely suspected." State v. Bullock , 370 N.C. 256 , 261, 805 S.E.2d 671 , 676 (2017) (citation and quotation marks omitted). | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Roberson v. . Stokes
green
2 sentences1938Each right is recognized in the decisions of this Court. (a) In S. v. Johnson, 75 N. C., 174 , Bynum, J., said: “The proposition is true that the wife has the right to fight in the necessary defense of the husband, the child in defense of his parent, the servant in defense of the master, and reciprocally; but the act of the assistant must have the same construction in such eases as the act of the assisted party should have bad if it bad been done by himself, for they are in a mutual relation one to another.” S. v. Brittain, 89 N. C., 482 , at p. 504; S. v. Bullock, 91 N. C., 614 ; S. v. Greer, 1938Each right is recognized in the decisions of this Court. (a) In S. v. Johnson, 75 N. C., 174 , Bynum, J., said: “The proposition is true that the wife has the right to fight in the necessary defense of the husband, the child in defense of his parent, the servant in defense of the master, and reciprocally; but the act of the assistant must have the same construction in such eases as the act of the assisted party should have bad if it bad been done by himself, for they are in a mutual relation one to another.” S. v. Brittain, 89 N. C., 482 , at p. 504; S. v. Bullock, 91 N. C., 614 ; S. v. Greer, | 2 | 1938–1938 |
State v. . Maney
green
2 sentences1938Each right is recognized in the decisions of this Court. (a) In S. v. Johnson, 75 N. C., 174 , Bynum, J., said: “The proposition is true that the wife has the right to fight in the necessary defense of the husband, the child in defense of his parent, the servant in defense of the master, and reciprocally; but the act of the assistant must have the same construction in such eases as the act of the assisted party should have bad if it bad been done by himself, for they are in a mutual relation one to another.” S. v. Brittain, 89 N. C., 482 , at p. 504; S. v. Bullock, 91 N. C., 614 ; S. v. Greer, 1938Each right is recognized in the decisions of this Court. (a) In S. v. Johnson, 75 N. C., 174 , Bynum, J., said: “The proposition is true that the wife has the right to fight in the necessary defense of the husband, the child in defense of his parent, the servant in defense of the master, and reciprocally; but the act of the assistant must have the same construction in such eases as the act of the assisted party should have bad if it bad been done by himself, for they are in a mutual relation one to another.” S. v. Brittain, 89 N. C., 482 , at p. 504; S. v. Bullock, 91 N. C., 614 ; S. v. Greer, | 2 | 1938–1938 |
S. v. . Blackwell
green
2 sentences1938Each right is recognized in the decisions of this Court. (a) In S. v. Johnson , 75 N.C. 174 , Bynum, J. , said: "The proposition is true that the wife has the right to fight in the necessary defense of the husband, the child in defense of his parent, the servant in defense of the master, and reciprocally; but the act of the assistant must have the same construction in such cases as the act of the assisted party *Page 282 should have had if it had been done by himself, for they are in a mutual relation one to another." S. v. Brittain , 89 N.C. 482 , at p. 504; S. v. Bullock , 91 N.C. 614 ; S. v 1938Each right is recognized in the decisions of this Court. (a) In S. v. Johnson, 75 N. C., 174 , Bynum, J., said: “The proposition is true that the wife has the right to fight in the necessary defense of the husband, the child in defense of his parent, the servant in defense of the master, and reciprocally; but the act of the assistant must have the same construction in such eases as the act of the assisted party should have bad if it bad been done by himself, for they are in a mutual relation one to another.” S. v. Brittain, 89 N. C., 482 , at p. 504; S. v. Bullock, 91 N. C., 614 ; S. v. Greer, | 2 | 1938–1938 |
State v. . Dills
neutral
2 sentences1938In S. v. Dills, 196 N. C., 457 , 146 S. E., 1 , it is stated: “Allen Dills contends that he shot the deceased in self-defense and his wife contended that she was engaged in defending her husband. 1938In S. v. Dills, 196 N. C., 457 , 146 S. E., 1 , it is stated: “Allen Dills contends that he shot the deceased in self-defense and his wife contended that she was engaged in defending her husband. | 2 | 1938–1938 |
S. v. . Greer
neutral
2 sentences1938Each right is recognized in the decisions of this Court. (a) In S. v. Johnson , 75 N.C. 174 , Bynum, J. , said: "The proposition is true that the wife has the right to fight in the necessary defense of the husband, the child in defense of his parent, the servant in defense of the master, and reciprocally; but the act of the assistant must have the same construction in such cases as the act of the assisted party *Page 282 should have had if it had been done by himself, for they are in a mutual relation one to another." S. v. Brittain , 89 N.C. 482 , at p. 504; S. v. Bullock , 91 N.C. 614 ; S. v 1938Each right is recognized in the decisions of this Court. (a) In S. v. Johnson, 75 N. C., 174 , Bynum, J., said: “The proposition is true that the wife has the right to fight in the necessary defense of the husband, the child in defense of his parent, the servant in defense of the master, and reciprocally; but the act of the assistant must have the same construction in such eases as the act of the assisted party should have bad if it bad been done by himself, for they are in a mutual relation one to another.” S. v. Brittain, 89 N. C., 482 , at p. 504; S. v. Bullock, 91 N. C., 614 ; S. v. Greer, | 2 | 1938–1938 |
State v. . Bullock
neutral
2 sentences1938Each right is recognized in the decisions of this Court. (a) In S. v. Johnson , 75 N.C. 174 , Bynum, J. , said: "The proposition is true that the wife has the right to fight in the necessary defense of the husband, the child in defense of his parent, the servant in defense of the master, and reciprocally; but the act of the assistant must have the same construction in such cases as the act of the assisted party *Page 282 should have had if it had been done by himself, for they are in a mutual relation one to another." S. v. Brittain , 89 N.C. 482 , at p. 504; S. v. Bullock , 91 N.C. 614 ; S. v 1938Each right is recognized in the decisions of this Court. (a) In S. v. Johnson, 75 N. C., 174 , Bynum, J., said: “The proposition is true that the wife has the right to fight in the necessary defense of the husband, the child in defense of his parent, the servant in defense of the master, and reciprocally; but the act of the assistant must have the same construction in such eases as the act of the assisted party should have bad if it bad been done by himself, for they are in a mutual relation one to another.” S. v. Brittain, 89 N. C., 482 , at p. 504; S. v. Bullock, 91 N. C., 614 ; S. v. Greer, | 2 | 1938–1938 |
Leonard v. Wilkins
neutral
2 sentences1911Barrington v. Sumers, 3 Lev., 28; Leonard v. Wilkins, 9 John., 233 .” In the actual and necessary defense of property, it is not necessary to show that the owner of the dog knew of his vicious propensities, or that there was no other' mode of defending the things assailed. 1911Wilkins, 9 John., 233 ." In the actual and necessary defense of property, it is not necessary to show that the owner of the dog knew of his (634) vicious propensities, or that there was no other mode of defending the things assailed. | 2 | 1911–1911 |
Watlington v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. Rockingham Cty.
green
1 sentence2024DSS purports7 to challenge 39 of 139 findings of fact and 28 of 52 conclusions of law—several of which, in actuality, are findings of fact, see Watlington, 261 N.C. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
State v. Gay
green
1 sentence2024Notably, the State made no objection to Dr. James’s credibility when withdrawing its consent to the peremptory, nor was her testimony controverted by a single box checked in an extra-record document.14 Instead, by accepting the State’s inapposite objection, the trial court failed to conduct the necessary inquiry and ask whether “all of the evidence[,] . . . if believed, tends to show that [this] mitigating circumstance does exist.” Gay, 334 N.C. at 492 . | 1 | 2024–2024 |
State v. Oglesby
green
2 sentences2018In Oglesby , the Supreme Court did not simply reference "legal authority[,]" but rather narrowed the necessary inquiry into whether the relationship was one "established by legal process[.]" 361 N.C. at 555 -56 , 648 S.E.2d at 822 . 2018In Oglesby , the Supreme Court did not simply reference "legal authority[,]" but rather narrowed the necessary inquiry into whether the relationship was one "established by legal process[.]" 361 N.C. at 555 -56 , 648 S.E.2d at 822 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
United States v. Milton L. McCaskill
green
1 sentence2009As in Hames , the issue before us has not been preserved; however, we hold that the failure of the trial court to give the necessary instruction amounts to plain error since we find that “‘the instructional mistake had a probable impact on the jury’s finding that the defendant was guilty.’ ” Odom, 307 N.C. at 660 , 300 S.E.2d at 378 (quoting McCaskill, 676 F.2d at 1002 ). | 1 | 2009–2009 |
State v. Odom
green
2 sentences2009As in Hames , the issue before us has not been preserved; however, we hold that the failure of the trial court to give the necessary instruction amounts to plain error since we find that “‘the instructional mistake had a probable impact on the jury’s finding that the defendant was guilty.’ ” Odom, 307 N.C. at 660 , 300 S.E.2d at 378 (quoting McCaskill, 676 F.2d at 1002 ). 2009As in Hames , the issue before us has not been preserved; however, we hold that the failure of the trial court to give the necessary instruction amounts to plain error since we find that “‘the instructional mistake had a probable impact on the jury’s finding that the defendant was guilty.’ ” Odom, 307 N.C. at 660 , 300 S.E.2d at 378 (quoting McCaskill, 676 F.2d at 1002 ). | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Nelson v. United States green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| Callarman v. United States green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| State v. Ward green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Branti v. Finkel green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| State v. Pruitt green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Johnson County National Bank & Trust Co. v. Grainger green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Sharpe v. Park Newspapers of Lumberton, Inc. green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Fanelty v. Rogers Jewelers, Inc. green | 1 | 1967–1967 |
| State v. Campo neutral | 1 | 1960–1960 |
| West v. . Redmond neutral | 1 | 1960–1960 |
| Ray Ex Rel. Gudger v. Ray green | 1 | 1960–1960 |
| State v. Bowman neutral | 1 | 1960–1960 |
| Montgomery v. . Blades green | 1 | 1940–1940 |
| Burrell v. . Hughes neutral | 1 | 1926–1926 |
| Murphy v. Carolina Electric Co. neutral | 1 | 1926–1926 |
| Ward v. . Farmer Southerland green | 1 | 1892–1892 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.