11 Nebraska opinions name it 2 courts 1930–2025 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Nebraska courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Oregon v. Bradshawgreen2 sentences2025The U.S. Supreme Court explained, “Although ambiguous, the respondent’s question in this case as to what was going to happen to him evinced a willingness and a desire for a gener- alized discussion about the investigation; it was not merely a necessary inquiry arising out of the incidents of the custodial relationship.” 56 The Court thereby determined there had been no violation of the “Edwards rule” respecting police initiation of a conversation following the invocation of the Miranda right to counsel. 57 The Court said the next inquiry was whether “the purported waiver was knowing and intell 2025The U.S. Supreme Court explained, “Although ambiguous, the respondent’s question in this case as to what was going to happen to him evinced a willingness and a desire for a gener- alized discussion about the investigation; it was not merely a necessary inquiry arising out of the incidents of the custodial relationship.” 56 The Court thereby determined there had been no violation of the “Edwards rule” respecting police initiation of a conversation following the invocation of the Miranda right to counsel. 57 The Court said the next inquiry was whether “the purported waiver was knowing and intell | 1 | 3 |
State v. Turnergreen2 sentences1986In State v. Turner, 186 Neb. 424, 427 , 183 N.W.2d 763, 766 (1971), in discussing the necessary standard for accepting a plea of guilty, we said: “ ‘The standard was and remains whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant.’ ” The record must show that a plea of guilty was made intelligently, voluntarily, and understandingly. 1986In State v. Turner, 186 Neb. 424, 427 , 183 N.W.2d 763, 766 (1971), in discussing the necessary standard for accepting a plea of guilty, we said: “ ‘The standard was and remains whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant.’ ” The record must show that a plea of guilty was made intelligently, voluntarily, and understandingly. | 1 | 1 |
Flory v. Holtzgreen2 sentences1980Automobiles §630 (1936): “Various factors, such as skid marks, distance traveled after impact, force of impact, etc. are pertinent in arriving at an estimate of the rate of speed of an automobile.” (Emphasis supplied.) We do not depart from what was said in Flory v. Holtz, 176 Neb. 531, 539 , 126 N.W.2d 686, 692 (1964): “There is a vast difference between permitting an expert to give an opinion when all of the factors necessary to base an estimate of minimum speed are present and in permitting an estimate of actual speed based on assumptions that have no adequate foundation in the evidence.” H 1980Automobiles §630 (1936): “Various factors, such as skid marks, distance traveled after impact, force of impact, etc. are pertinent in arriving at an estimate of the rate of speed of an automobile.” (Emphasis supplied.) We do not depart from what was said in Flory v. Holtz, 176 Neb. 531, 539 , 126 N.W.2d 686, 692 (1964): “There is a vast difference between permitting an expert to give an opinion when all of the factors necessary to base an estimate of minimum speed are present and in permitting an estimate of actual speed based on assumptions that have no adequate foundation in the evidence.” H | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Nebraska. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Trail
green
2 sentences2022TRAIL Cite as 312 Neb. 843 The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that the Eighth Amendment reaffirms the duty of the government to respect the dignity of all persons “‘[b]y protecting even those convicted of heinous crimes . . . .’” 151 “To enforce the Constitution’s protection of human dignity, this Court looks to the ‘evolv- ing standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.’” 152 This is necessary because the standard of extreme cruelty is not merely descriptive, but necessarily embodies a moral judgment, and what is considered cruel and unusual pun- ishment must change 2022TRAIL Cite as 312 Neb. 843 The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that the Eighth Amendment reaffirms the duty of the government to respect the dignity of all persons “‘[b]y protecting even those convicted of heinous crimes . . . .’” 151 “To enforce the Constitution’s protection of human dignity, this Court looks to the ‘evolv- ing standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.’” 152 This is necessary because the standard of extreme cruelty is not merely descriptive, but necessarily embodies a moral judgment, and what is considered cruel and unusual pun- ishment must change | 2 | 2022–2022 |
State v. Earnest
green
1 sentence2025And while the court did not expressly discuss all the relevant factors or the mitigating factors, the Nebraska Supreme Court has “rejected the notion that a sentencing court is required to articulate on the record that it has considered each sentencing factor and to make specific findings as to the facts that bear on each of those factors.” State v. Earnest, 315 Neb. 527, 534 , 997 N.W.2d 589 , 595 (2023). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Sutton
green
1 sentence2025SUTTON Cite as 319 Neb. 581 finding that the waiver was knowing and voluntary. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Williams
green
2 sentences1995State v. Williams, 234 Neb. 890 , 453 N.W.2d 399 (1990). 1995State v. Williams, 234 Neb. 890 , 453 N.W.2d 399 (1990). | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Ellsworth v. Municipal Officers
neutral
2 sentences1959Underlying all pen *63 sion legislation is the necessary principle that one who has been legally discharged prior to serving the prescribed term cannot share in the- pension or retirement benefits.” Ellsworth v. City of Portland, 142 Me. 200 , 49 A. 2d 169 , involved a situation resulting from the discharge of two police captains of the city on May 1, 1946, and the placing of them on the pension pay roll. 1959Underlying all pen *63 sion legislation is the necessary principle that one who has been legally discharged prior to serving the prescribed term cannot share in the- pension or retirement benefits.” Ellsworth v. City of Portland, 142 Me. 200 , 49 A. 2d 169 , involved a situation resulting from the discharge of two police captains of the city on May 1, 1946, and the placing of them on the pension pay roll. | 1 | 1959–1959 |
United States v. Celestine
green
1 sentence1930(U. S.) *515, *582, down to United States v. Celestine, 215 U. S. 278 , it has been the rule of all courts to construe doubtful legislation in favor of the Indian.” Rider v. LaClair, 77 Wash. 488 . | 1 | 1930–1930 |
Rider v. LaClair
neutral
1 sentence1930(U. S.) *515, *582, down to United States v. Celestine, 215 U. S. 278 , it has been the rule of all courts to construe doubtful legislation in favor of the Indian.” Rider v. LaClair, 77 Wash. 488 . | 1 | 1930–1930 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.