16 North Dakota opinions name it 1 courts 1976–2017 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by North Dakota courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Paulgreen2 sentences2011See, e.g., Paul, 2009 ND 120, ¶¶ 15-28 , 769 N.W.2d 416 ; Micko, 393 N.W.2d at 744-45 . 2011See, e.g., Paul, 2009 ND 120, ¶¶ 15-28 , 769 N.W.2d 416 ; Micko, 393 N.W.2d at 744-45 . | 2 | 2 |
State v. Gefrohgreen2 sentences2011We further explained the evidence could have been admitted under a N.D.R.Ev. 404(b) analysis and the district court appropriately analyzed the evidence under N.D.R.Ev. 403 to decide the evidence provided “a more complete story of the crime by putting it in context of happenings near in time and place.” Alvarado , at ¶¶ 13-19 (quoting State v. Gefroh, 495 N.W.2d 651, 654 (N.D.1993)). [¶ 15] A common thread in our cases discussing the admissibility of evidence of prior bad acts requires the district court to conduct the necessary analysis under N.D.R.Ev. 404(b) and 403 and to provide appropriate 2011We further explained the evidence could have been admitted under a N.D.R.Ev. 404(b) analysis and the district court appropriately analyzed the evidence under N.D.R.Ev. 403 to decide the evidence provided “a more complete story of the crime by putting it in context of happenings near in time and place.” Alvarado , at ¶¶ 13-19 (quoting State v. Gefroh , 495 N.W.2d 651, 654 (N.D. 1993)). [¶15] A common thread in our cases discussing the admissibility of evidence of prior bad acts requires the district court to conduct the necessary analysis under N.D.R.Ev. 404(b) and 403 and to provide appropriat | 2 | 2 |
State v. Mickogreen2 sentences2011See Paul, at ¶ 27; Micko , at 744. [¶ 16] Under the circumstances of this case, we conclude the district court misapplied the law in admitting the prior bad act evidence without the necessary analysis and without giving an instruction on the limited purpose of the evidence. 2011See Paul , at ¶ 27; Micko , at 744. [¶16] Under the circumstances of this case, we conclude the district court misapplied the law in admitting the prior bad act evidence without the necessary analysis and without giving an instruction on the limited purpose of the evidence. | 2 | 2 |
Bachmeier v. Wallwork Truck Centersgreen1 sentence2015“Inherent power sanctions require case-by-case analysis of all the circumstances presented in the case.” Bachmeier v. Wallwork Truck Ctrs., 507 N.W.2d 527, 534 (N.D.1993). | 1 | 1 |
Martin v. Sizemoregreen2 sentences2004However, in a physician disciplinary proceeding before a board like this one, having some members who are not medical experts and physician members who are medical professionals but may not be experts in the field of medicine practiced by the physician appearing before them, we believe requiring expert testimony in a case in which such testimony would be helpful will best protect "the fairness of the contested case proceedings, the integrity of the administrative record, and the right to meaningful judicial review." Martin v. Sizemore, 78 S.W.3d 249, 271 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001). [¶13] Expert tes 2004However, in a physician disciplinary proceeding before a board like this one, having some members who are not medical experts and physician members who are medical professionals but may not be experts in the field of medicine practiced by the physician appearing before them, we believe requiring expert testimony in a case in which such testimony would be helpful will best protect “the fairness of the contested case proceedings, the integrity of the administrative record, and the right to meaningful judicial review.” Martin v. Sizemore, 78 S.W.3d 249, 271 (Tenn.Ct.App.2001). [¶ 13] Expert testi | 1 | 1 |
Balian v. Board of Licensure in Medicinegreen2 sentences2004The Board also contends that, even if expert testimony is ordinarily required, it was not necessary in this instance because expert testimony would not have been helpful, the conduct was so egregious expert testimony was unnecessary or fell under an "egregious blunder" exception, or the requisite expert testimony was provided by Huff. [¶12] Like the court in Balian v. Board of Licensure in Med., 722 A.2d 364, 369 (Me. 1999), we agree that if an act is blatantly illegal or improper, or if a licensee admits to a violation, a disciplinary board need not introduce expert evidence to establish the 2004The Board also contends that, even if expert testimony is ordinarily required, it was not necessary in this instance because expert testimony would not have been helpful, the conduct was so egregious expert testimony was unnecessary or fell under an “egregious blunder” exception, or the requisite expert testimony was provided by Huff. [¶ 12] Like the court in Balian v. Board of Licensure in Med., 722 A.2d 364, 369 (Me.1999), we agree that if an act is blatantly illegal or improper, or if a licensee admits to a violation, a disciplinary board need not introduce expert evidence to establish the | 1 | 1 |
Matter of Adoption of VAJgreen1 sentence1984See, e.g., Matter of Adoption of V.A.J., 660 P.2d 139 (Okl.1983) [finding as to eligibility of child for adoption will not be disturbed on appeal unless it fails to rest on clear and convincing proof]. | 1 | 1 |
Zundel v. Zundelgreen1 sentence1983The requirement of clear and convincing evidence to establish the existence of an implied trust was explained in Zundel v. Zundel, 278 N.W.2d 123, 129-130 (N.D.1979): “The plain language of prior opinions of this court have stated a clear and convincing standard of proof is the necessary requirement to the establishment of an implied trust.... [Ujnder the clear and convincing standard, the evidence must be such that the trier of fact is reasonably satisfied with the facts the evidence tends to prove as to be led to a firm belief or conviction. [[Image here]] “... | 1 | 1 |
Municipal Airport Auth. of City of Fargo v. Stockmangreen2 sentences1976These cases illustrate that the fee should not be based on any one single factor and, in Municipal Airport Auth. of City of Fargo v. Stockman, 198 N.W.2d 212, 215 (N.D.1972), we itemized the necessary factors, standards, elements and guidelines as follows: “(1) Character of the services; “(2) The results obtained; “(3) The customary fee; “(4) The ability and skill; “(5) Careful, conscientious and capable manner—customary fee—contingent fee contract—ability and skill.” We find that guidelines for determination of reasonable attorney fees are contained in Disciplinary Rule DR 2-106 and in Ethica 1976These cases illustrate that the fee should not be based on any one single factor and, in Municipal Airport Auth. of City of Fargo v. Stockman, 198 N.W.2d 212, 215 (N.D. 1972), we itemized the necessary factors, standards, elements and guidelines as follows: "(1) Character of the services; "(2) The results obtained; "(3) The customary fee; "(4) The ability and skill; "(5) Careful, conscientious and capable mannercustomary feecontingent fee contractability and skill." We find that guidelines for determination of reasonable attorney fees are contained in Disciplinary Rule DR 2-106 and in Ethic | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in North Dakota. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Murchison
green
2 sentences2015Dopplerat ¶ 10 (alteration in original) (citations omitted). [¶ 10] In Murchison , we found error when a trial court admitted a prior conviction, and “[t]he trial court’s ruling did not mention the necessary factors, much less ‘expressly articulate’ how it balanced those factors.” 541 N.W.2d at 442 . 2013We explained, “The trial court’s ruling did not mention the necessary factors, much less ‘expressly articulate’ how it balanced those factors.” Id. [¶ 13] Like in Eugene and Murchison , the district court here failed to provide an adequate record explaining why it overruled Doppler’s objection. | 3 | 2013–2015 |
Dronen v. Dronen
green
2 sentences2015The district court provided no reasoning to explain why it awarded attorney’s fees and costs for the entire matter. [¶ 28] We are also unable to determine whether the district court relied on its inherent power to sanction because it did not reference its inherent power to sanction, nor did it conduct the necessary analysis. [¶29] “A district court has the inherent power to sanction a litigant for misconduct.” Dronen v. Dronen, 2009 ND 70, ¶ 51 , 764 N.W.2d 675 . 2015The district court provided no reasoning to explain why it awarded attorney’s fees and costs for the entire matter. [¶ 28] We are also unable to determine whether the district court relied on its inherent power to sanction because it did not reference its inherent power to sanction, nor did it conduct the necessary analysis. [¶29] “A district court has the inherent power to sanction a litigant for misconduct.” Dronen v. Dronen, 2009 ND 70, ¶ 51 , 764 N.W.2d 675 . | 2 | 2015–2016 |
State v. M.B.
neutral
2 sentences2011State v. M.B., 2010 ND 57, ¶ 4 , 780 N.W.2d 663 ; Riemers v. Grand Forks Herald, 2004 ND 192, ¶ 11 , 688 N.W.2d 167 . 2011State v. M.B., 2010 ND 57, ¶ 4 , 780 N.W.2d 663 ; Riemers v. Grand Forks Herald, 2004 ND 192, ¶ 11 , 688 N.W.2d 167 . | 2 | 2011–2011 |
Riemers v. Grand Forks Herald
green
2 sentences2011State v. M.B., 2010 ND 57, ¶ 4 , 780 N.W.2d 663 ; Riemers v. Grand Forks Herald, 2004 ND 192, ¶ 11 , 688 N.W.2d 167 . 2011State v. M.B., 2010 ND 57, ¶ 4 , 780 N.W.2d 663 ; Riemers v. Grand Forks Herald, 2004 ND 192, ¶ 11 , 688 N.W.2d 167 . | 2 | 2011–2011 |
Kansas v. Crane
green
2 sentences2017In addition to his high Static-99R and PCL-R scores, the fact that he committed sexual related offenses while on probation, in spite of the potential consequences, demonstrates that Mr. Nelson does have serious difficulty controlling his behavior, and that this difficulty differentiates him from the “dangerous but typical recidivist convicted in an ordinary criminal case” (Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407 , 122 S.Ct. 867 ). [¶ 15] For this evaluation, Dr. Krance administered the Static-99R, now “the gold standard in the field for sex offender risk assessment.” The Static-99R shows that Nelson’s c 2017In addition to his high Static-99R and PCL-R scores, the fact that he committed sexual related offenses while on probation, in spite of the potential consequences, demonstrates that Mr. Nelson does have serious difficulty controlling his behavior, and that this difficulty differentiates him from the “dangerous but typical recidivist convicted in an ordinary criminal case” (Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407 ). [¶15] For this evaluation, Dr. Krance administered the Static-99R, now “the gold standard in the field for sex offender risk assessment.” The Static-99R shows that Nelson’s current score plac | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Aabrekke
green
2 sentences2016The State offered this evidence to show Shaw had a plan, motive, and intent to return to the apartment building where the first burglary allegedly took place. [¶ 12] “A common thread in our cases discussing the admissibility of evidence of prior bad acts requires the district court to conduct the necessary analysis under N.D.R.Ev. 404(b) and 403 and to provide appropriate limiting instructions for the permissible purposes for prior bad acts evidence.” Aabrekke, 2011 ND 131, ¶ 15 , 800 N.W.2d 284 . 2016The State offered this evidence to show Shaw had a plan, motive, and intent to return to the apartment building where the first burglary allegedly took place. [¶12] “A common thread in our cases discussing the admissibility of evidence of prior bad acts requires the district court to conduct the necessary analysis under N.D.R.Ev. 404(b) and 403 and to provide appropriate limiting instructions for the permissible purposes for prior bad acts evidence.” Aabrekke , 2011 ND 131, ¶ 15 , 800 N.W.2d 284 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
State v. Aabrekke
green
2 sentences2016The State offered this evidence to show Shaw had a plan, motive, and intent to return to the apartment building where the first burglary allegedly took place. [¶ 12] “A common thread in our cases discussing the admissibility of evidence of prior bad acts requires the district court to conduct the necessary analysis under N.D.R.Ev. 404(b) and 403 and to provide appropriate limiting instructions for the permissible purposes for prior bad acts evidence.” Aabrekke, 2011 ND 131, ¶ 15 , 800 N.W.2d 284 . 2016The State offered this evidence to show Shaw had a plan, motive, and intent to return to the apartment building where the first burglary allegedly took place. [¶12] “A common thread in our cases discussing the admissibility of evidence of prior bad acts requires the district court to conduct the necessary analysis under N.D.R.Ev. 404(b) and 403 and to provide appropriate limiting instructions for the permissible purposes for prior bad acts evidence.” Aabrekke , 2011 ND 131, ¶ 15 , 800 N.W.2d 284 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
State v. Doppler
green
1 sentence2015Similarly, in Doppler, during trial, the judge discussed whether he would admit a prior conviction during a bench conference. 2013 ND 54 , ¶ 5, 828 N.W.2d 502 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Doppler
green
1 sentence2015Similarly, in Doppler, during trial, the judge discussed whether he would admit a prior conviction during a bench conference. 2013 ND 54 , ¶ 5, 828 N.W.2d 502 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Kobilansky v. Liffrig
green
2 sentences1986In Kobilansky v. Liffrig, supra, 358 N.W.2d at 787 , we quoted the necessary factors from Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1 , 99 S.Ct. 2612 , 61 L.Ed.2d 321 (1979), for determining what process is due in an administrative agency context: “ < “[p]irstj the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burde 1986In Kobilansky v. Liffrig, supra, 358 N.W.2d at 787 , we quoted the necessary factors from Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1 , 99 S.Ct. 2612 , 61 L.Ed.2d 321 (1979), for determining what process is due in an administrative agency context: “ < “[p]irstj the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burde | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Mathews v. Eldridge
green
2 sentences1986In Kobilansky v. Liffrig, supra, 358 N.W.2d at 787 , we quoted the necessary factors from Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1 , 99 S.Ct. 2612 , 61 L.Ed.2d 321 (1979), for determining what process is due in an administrative agency context: “ < “[p]irstj the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burde 1986In Kobilansky v. Liffrig, supra, 358 N.W.2d at 787 , we quoted the necessary factors from Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1 , 99 S.Ct. 2612 , 61 L.Ed.2d 321 (1979), for determining what process is due in an administrative agency context: “ < “[p]irstj the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burde | 1 | 1986–1986 |
MacKey v. Montrym
green
2 sentences1986In Kobilansky v. Liffrig, supra, 358 N.W.2d at 787 , we quoted the necessary factors from Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1 , 99 S.Ct. 2612 , 61 L.Ed.2d 321 (1979), for determining what process is due in an administrative agency context: “ < “[p]irstj the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burde 1986In Kobilansky v. Liffrig, supra, 358 N.W.2d at 787 , we quoted the necessary factors from Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1 , 99 S.Ct. 2612 , 61 L.Ed.2d 321 (1979), for determining what process is due in an administrative agency context: “ < “[p]irstj the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burde | 1 | 1986–1986 |
cluster 315529
green
2 sentences1976Because we believe them to be more readily applicable, we adopt the following guidelines from Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir.1974): (1) time and labor required (distinguishing between legal work in the strict sense, and investigation, clerical work, and compilation of facts and statistics); (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions (he should not be penalized for accepting a challenge which may result in making new law); (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance, 1976Because we believe them to be more readily applicable, we adopt the following guidelines from Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974): (1) time and labor required (distinguishing between legal work in the strict sense, and investigation, clerical work, and compilation of facts and statistics); (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions (he should not be penalized for accepting a challenge which may result in making new law); (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.