20 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 1868–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Walker v. Nelsongreen2 sentences2017See Walker v. Nelson, 911 N.E.2d 124, 129 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it modified custody and noting that, although any one factor may not necessarily warrant a change of custody, consideration of all the factors is sufficient to establish that modification is in the best interests of the child and a substantial change had taken place in the interaction and interrelationship of the child with the child’s parents, adjustment to his home and community, and the health of all of the individuals involved); Barnett v. Barnett, 447 N.E.2d 1172, 2012Based upon the court’s findings set forth above and the remaining findings and conclusions, we cannot say, especially in light of our preference for granting latitude and deference to our trial court judges in family law matters, that the court abused its discretion in determining that Father demonstrated that custody modification is in the best interests of Et. and Er. and that there was a substantial change in one of the necessary factors or that the judgment granting Father’s petition to modify custody is clearly erroneous.7 See Walker v. Nelson, 911 N.E.2d 124, 129 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (ho | 2 | 2 |
Marriage of Barnett v. Barnettgreen2 sentences2017See Walker v. Nelson, 911 N.E.2d 124, 129 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it modified custody and noting that, although any one factor may not necessarily warrant a change of custody, consideration of all the factors is sufficient to establish that modification is in the best interests of the child and a substantial change had taken place in the interaction and interrelationship of the child with the child’s parents, adjustment to his home and community, and the health of all of the individuals involved); Barnett v. Barnett, 447 N.E.2d 1172, 2012Although the court found, in paragraph 46 of its order, that there “has been a substantial and continuing change,” the court set forth the current text of Ind. Code § 31-17-2-21 in paragraph 43 of its order and we cannot say that the court’s finding that there has been a substantial and continuing change constitutes an abuse of discretion or requires reversal under the circumstances. 18 the child with the child’s parents, adjustment to his home and community, and the health of all of the individuals involved); Barnett v. Barnett, 447 N.E.2d 1172, 1175 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that the tri | 2 | 2 |
Brown v. Stategreen2 sentences2015See also Schmidt v. Simmons, 137 Ind. 93 , 36 N.E. 516, 516 (1894) (defendant was refused bail after an indictment for murder even though “there were circumstances immediately preceding the fatal act ... to incite hot blood” and a “conflict in the evidence as to whether the deceased, at the time the fatal shot was fired, was making an effort to assault the appellant ”), abrogated on different grounds by Fry v. State, 990 N.E.2d 429 (Ind.2013); Brown et al. v. State, 147 Ind. 28 , 46 N.E. 34, 36 (1897) (“It is, however, in the absence of any countervailing facts, a necessary presumption that th 2015See also Schmidt v. Simmons, 36 N.E.516, 516 (Ind. 1894) (defendant was refused bail after an indictment for murder even though “there were circumstances immediately preceding the fatal act . . . to incite hot blood” and a “conflict in the evidence as to whether the Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion | 49A02-1409-CR-659 | April 16, 2015 Page 11 of 16 deceased, at the time the fatal shot was fired, was making an effort to assault the appellant”),abrogated on different grounds by Fry v. State, 990 N.E.2d 429 (Ind. 2013); Brown et al. v. State, 46 N.E. 34, 36 (Ind. 1897) (“It is, however, in t | 2 | 2 |
Loren Hamilton Fry v. State of Indianagreen2 sentences2015See also Schmidt v. Simmons, 36 N.E.516, 516 (Ind. 1894) (defendant was refused bail after an indictment for murder even though “there were circumstances immediately preceding the fatal act . . . to incite hot blood” and a “conflict in the evidence as to whether the Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion | 49A02-1409-CR-659 | April 16, 2015 Page 11 of 16 deceased, at the time the fatal shot was fired, was making an effort to assault the appellant”),abrogated on different grounds by Fry v. State, 990 N.E.2d 429 (Ind. 2013); Brown et al. v. State, 46 N.E. 34, 36 (Ind. 1897) (“It is, however, in t 2015See also Schmidt v. Simmons, 36 N.E.516, 516 (Ind. 1894) (defendant was refused bail after an indictment for murder even though “there were circumstances immediately preceding the fatal act . . . to incite hot blood” and a “conflict in the evidence as to whether the Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion | 49A02-1409-CR-659 | April 16, 2015 Page 11 of 16 deceased, at the time the fatal shot was fired, was making an effort to assault the appellant”),abrogated on different grounds by Fry v. State, 990 N.E.2d 429 (Ind. 2013); Brown et al. v. State, 46 N.E. 34, 36 (Ind. 1897) (“It is, however, in t | 2 | 2 |
Cynthia Bell v. State of Indianagreen2 sentences2019Bell v. State, 59 N.E.3d 959, 963-64 (Ind. 2016). 4 “[O]nce a defendant presents or the court elicits from defendant information demonstrating an inability to pay, the burden properly shifts to the State to rebut the evidence of defendant’s inability to pay.” Id. at 964 . “[W]ithout any evidence that the defendant can or will be able to pay, a restitution order cannot stand.” Id. [12] The gist of Robinson’s argument seems to be that no information was presented regarding her ability to pay and therefore the restitution order cannot stand. 2017We held that “where neither the defendant nor the State has provided any information or testimony regarding the defendant’s ability to pay, the trial court must make the necessary inquiry to- meet its statutory obligation.” Id. at 964 . | 1 | 2 |
Donnell v. Stategreen2 sentences1896See Donnell v. State, 2 Ind. 658 ; Hooper v. State, 56 Ind. 153 . 1895Donnell v. State, 2 Ind. 658 ; Nixon v. State, 76 Ind. 524 . | 1 | 2 |
F. John Rogers, as Personal Representative of Paul Michalik, and R. David Boyer, Trustee of the Bankruptcy Estate of Jerry Lee Chambers v. Angela Martin and Brian Paul Brothersgreen1 sentence2017See Rogers, 63 N.E.3d at 322-23 (distinguishing cases where injury results from “a condition on the land” from those cases in which invitees suffer injuries “due to activities on a landowner’s premises,” in which “foreseeability is a necessary inquiry in determining whether the landowner’s duty of reasonable care extends to the particular circumstances”). | 1 | 1 |
Schmidt v. Simmonsgreen2 sentences2015See also Schmidt v. Simmons, 137 Ind. 93 , 36 N.E. 516, 516 (1894) (defendant was refused bail after an indictment for murder even though “there were circumstances immediately preceding the fatal act ... to incite hot blood” and a “conflict in the evidence as to whether the deceased, at the time the fatal shot was fired, was making an effort to assault the appellant ”), abrogated on different grounds by Fry v. State, 990 N.E.2d 429 (Ind.2013); Brown et al. v. State, 147 Ind. 28 , 46 N.E. 34, 36 (1897) (“It is, however, in the absence of any countervailing facts, a necessary presumption that th 2015See also Schmidt v. Simmons, 137 Ind. 93 , 36 N.E. 516, 516 (1894) (defendant was refused bail after an indictment for murder even though “there were circumstances immediately preceding the fatal act ... to incite hot blood” and a “conflict in the evidence as to whether the deceased, at the time the fatal shot was fired, was making an effort to assault the appellant ”), abrogated on different grounds by Fry v. State, 990 N.E.2d 429 (Ind.2013); Brown et al. v. State, 147 Ind. 28 , 46 N.E. 34, 36 (1897) (“It is, however, in the absence of any countervailing facts, a necessary presumption that th | 1 | 1 |
Marriage of Hanks v. Arnoldgreen1 sentence2012Based upon the court’s findings set forth above and the remaining findings and conclusions, we cannot say, especially in light of our preference for granting latitude and deference to our trial court judges in family law matters, that the court abused its discretion in determining that Father demonstrated that custody modification is in the best interests of Et. and Er. and that there was a substantial change in one of the necessary factors or that the judgment granting Father’s petition to modify custody is clearly erroneous.7 See Walker v. Nelson, 911 N.E.2d 124, 129 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (ho | 1 | 1 |
Oregon v. Bradshawgreen2 sentences1991The Court concluded that "[a]lthough ambiguous, the respondent's question in this case as to what was going to happen to him evinced a willingness and a desire for a generalized discussion about the investigation; it was not merely a necessary inquiry arising out of the incidents of the custodial relationship." Id. at 1045-46 , 103 S.Ct. at 2834-35 (plurality opinion). 1991The Court concluded that "(allthough ambiguous, the respondent's question in this case as to what was going to happen to him evinced a willingness and a desire for a generalized discussion about the investigation; it was not merely a necessary inquiry arising out of the incidents of the custodial relationship." Id. at 1045-46, 103 S.Ct. at 2834-35 (plurality opinion). | 1 | 1 |
Case v. Bumsteadgreen1 sentence1868See, also, Case v. Bumstead, 24 Ind. 429 ; Bolles v. Chauncey, 8 Conn. 389 ; Lee v. Woodworth, 2 Green Ch. 36. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Hedges
green
2 sentences2015See also Schmidt v. Simmons, 137 Ind. 93 , 36 N.E. 516, 516 (1894) (defendant was refused bail after an indictment for murder even though “there were circumstances immediately preceding the fatal act ... to incite hot blood” and a “conflict in the evidence as to whether the deceased, at the time the fatal shot was fired, was making an effort to assault the appellant ”), abrogated on different grounds by Fry v. State, 990 N.E.2d 429 (Ind.2013); Brown et al. v. State, 147 Ind. 28 , 46 N.E. 34, 36 (1897) (“It is, however, in the absence of any countervailing facts, a necessary presumption that th 2015See also Schmidt v. Simmons, 36 N.E.516, 516 (Ind. 1894) (defendant was refused bail after an indictment for murder even though “there were circumstances immediately preceding the fatal act . . . to incite hot blood” and a “conflict in the evidence as to whether the Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion | 49A02-1409-CR-659 | April 16, 2015 Page 11 of 16 deceased, at the time the fatal shot was fired, was making an effort to assault the appellant”),abrogated on different grounds by Fry v. State, 990 N.E.2d 429 (Ind. 2013); Brown et al. v. State, 46 N.E. 34, 36 (Ind. 1897) (“It is, however, in t | 2 | 2015–2015 |
Addington v. Texas
green
2 sentences2023We do so because a civil commitment, regardless of purpose, has a “‘very significant impact on the individual’ and ‘constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection.’” Id. (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 , 425–26 (1979)). 2 Regarding mootness, the Stress Center “leaves to this court’s discretion whether or not J.F. has satisfied the necessary exception for review and takes no position with regard to the same.” Appellee’s Br. at 11 n.1. 2023Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MH-752 | October 30, 2023 Page 5 of 9 [9] Although this Court has “broad discretion” to decide whether the public interest exception to mootness applies, we must exercise this discretion “thoughtfully and thoroughly” and on a “case-by-case basis.” Id. at 465–67. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Wheat v. United States
green
1 sentence2020The Latta court agreed, indicating that “in evaluating whether the actual conflict or serious potential for conflict is sufficient to override the defendant’s express choice of counsel[,]” a trial court should make the necessary inquiry to assess “the defendant’s apprehension of the dangers of joint representation.” Id. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Pearson v. State
green
1 sentence2019Id. [15] Here, regardless of whether payment of restitution was a condition of Shope’s probation, the trial court conducted the necessary inquiry into Shope’s financial status. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Champlain v. State
green
2 sentences2016As noted above, this can include, among other things, information regarding “the defendant’s financial information, health, and employment history.” Champlain, 717 N.E.2d at 570 . 2016As noted above, this can include, among other things, information regarding “the defendant’s financial information, health, and employment history.” Champlain, 717 N.E.2d at 570 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Richardson v. State
green
1 sentence2012As to the “actual evidence test,” the necessary inquiry is “whether each offense was established by separate and distinct facts.” Id. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Davis v. State
green
2 sentences1999In Davis, 598 N.E.2d at 1047 , the prosecutor asked if a prospective juror could recommend the death penalty "[u]nder any circumstances that you can imagine uh, as have been described to you in this case[.]" The juror responded "No" and this Court upheld the removal for cause under Witt . 1999In Davis, 598 N.E.2d at 1047 , the prosecutor asked if a prospective juror could recommend the death penalty “[u]n-der any circumstances that you can imagine uh, as have been described to you in this case[.]” The juror responded “No” and this Court upheld the removal for cause under Witt . | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Growcock v. Hall
green
2 sentences1996As espoused by our Supreme Court in Growcock , it is a necessary requirement that a third party "act[] upon the belief that [the agency] relationship does in fact exist...." 82 Ind. at 203 . 1996As espoused by our Supreme Court in Growcock , it is a necessary requirement that a third party "act[] upon the belief that [the agency] relationship does in fact exist...." 82 Ind. at 203 . | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Holifield v. State
green
1 sentence1993Holifield v. State (1991), Ind., 572 N.E.2d 490, 493 , reh. denied. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Wilhoite v. State
neutral
2 sentences1971In Wilhoite v. State (1971), 255 Ind. 599, 601 , 266 N. E. 2d 23, 25 , this court stated: “To justify a new trial, the newly discovered evidence . . . must be material and decisive in nature and must be such as to raise a strong presumption that it would probably change the results of the trial.” The evidence presented at the P.C. 1 hearing failed to raise the necessary presumption that the results of the trial would probably be changed if a new trial were granted. 1971In Wilhoite v. State (1971), 255 Ind. 599, 601 , 266 N. E. 2d 23, 25 , this court stated: “To justify a new trial, the newly discovered evidence . . . must be material and decisive in nature and must be such as to raise a strong presumption that it would probably change the results of the trial.” The evidence presented at the P.C. 1 hearing failed to raise the necessary presumption that the results of the trial would probably be changed if a new trial were granted. | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Hooper v. State
neutral
1 sentence1896See Donnell v. State, 2 Ind. 658 ; Hooper v. State, 56 Ind. 153 . | 1 | 1896–1896 |
Nixon v. State
neutral
1 sentence1895Donnell v. State, 2 Ind. 658 ; Nixon v. State, 76 Ind. 524 . | 1 | 1895–1895 |
Fassett v. . Smith
green
1 sentence1868So, notice that the title-deeds are in another man’s possession may, under strong circumstances, be held to be notice of any equitable claim which he may have on the estate, and as a security for which he held the deeds.” The doctrine on the subject is very fully discussed, and many of the cases in reference to it, both English and American, collected and reviewed, in Williamson v. Brown, 15 N. Y. 354 , and the rule deduced therefrom stated to be, that, “where the information is sufficient to lead a party to a knowledge of a prior unrecorded conveyance, a neglect to make the necessary inquiry | 1 | 1868–1868 |
Williamson v. . Brown
green
1 sentence1868So, notice that the title-deeds are in another man’s possession may, under strong circumstances, be held to be notice of any equitable claim which he may have on the estate, and as a security for which he held the deeds.” The doctrine on the subject is very fully discussed, and many of the cases in reference to it, both English and American, collected and reviewed, in Williamson v. Brown, 15 N. Y. 354 , and the rule deduced therefrom stated to be, that, “where the information is sufficient to lead a party to a knowledge of a prior unrecorded conveyance, a neglect to make the necessary inquiry | 1 | 1868–1868 |
Bolles v. Chauncey
green
1 sentence1868See, also, Case v. Bumstead, 24 Ind. 429 ; Bolles v. Chauncey, 8 Conn. 389 ; Lee v. Woodworth, 2 Green Ch. 36. | 1 | 1868–1868 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.