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24 Utah opinions name it 2 courts 1938–2026 7 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Utah courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Johnsongreen1 sentence2022Nevertheless, because we find that it was sufficient for just the district courts in Weber County to have jurisdiction over the offenses to bar the subsequent prosecution of Sisneros, we do not need to consider whether venue is a necessary requirement under the Single Criminal Episode Statute. 12 Cite as: 2022 UT 7 Opinion of the Court charged with misdemeanor and felony offenses because, under the law in effect at the time, the misdemeanor offenses had to be separated from the felony offense and brought in the justice courts.8 See id. at 344–45; see also State v. Johnson, 114 P.2d 1034, 1042 | 1 | 1 |
Salt Lake City v. Kiddgreen2 sentences2022See Salt Lake City v. Kidd, 2019 UT 4, ¶ 35 , 435 P.3d 248 (“A party may not simply point toward a pile of sand and expect the court to build a castle. 2022See Salt Lake City v. Kidd, 2019 UT 4, ¶ 35 , 435 P.3d 248 (“A party may not simply point toward a pile of sand and expect the court to build a castle. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Robertsongreen1 sentence2022Further, even putting the district court’s decision aside, Hebeishy has not articulated a reasoned basis for us to conclude that double jeopardy applies where the offense for which he was convicted (riot) and the offense charged here (pattern of unlawful activity) “each require[] proof of a fact which the other does not.” See Robertson, 2017 UT 27, ¶ 16 (cleaned up). ¶44 Similarly, regarding his argument based on the single criminal episode statute, Hebeishy defends the absence of reasoned analysis on the point by attempting to shift his burden to the State. | 1 | 1 |
Smith v. Smithgreen1 sentence2016Moreover, "the factors relied on by the trial judge in awarding custody must be articulable and articulated in the judge's written findings and conclusions." - Smith v. Smith, 726 P.2d 423, 426 (Utah 1986). 4 $388 Mother argues that Father failed to preserve his claim that the district court failed to consider all the necessary factors. | 1 | 1 |
Kramer v. Kramergreen1 sentence2011Kramer, 738 P.2d at 628 (Stewart, Associate C.J., concurring in the result). 126 On the morning of the second day of trial in this case, the trial court made a "preliminary" finding of changed cireum-stances. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Shicklesgreen1 sentence2010State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 291, 295-96 (Utah 1988) (internal quotation marks omitted). 137 Defendant does not argue that the trial court failed to weigh the necessary factors but argues instead that the trial court erred in several of its conclusions. | 1 | 1 |
Nelson v. Nelsongreen2 sentences2007Because the trial court considered all of the necessary factors for determining an attorney fees award, we conclude that the trial court was within its discretion in awarding attorney fees to Mrs. Wall. 126 Finally, we note that "[in divoree proceedings, when the trial court has awarded attorney fees below to the party who then prevails on the main issues on appeal, we generally award fees on appeal." Childs v. Childs, 967 P.2d 942, 947 (Utah Ct.App.1998); see also Nelson v. Nelson, 2004 UT App 254, ¶ 9 , 97 P.3d 722 . 2007Because the trial court considered all of the necessary factors for determining an attorney fees award, we conclude that the trial court was within its discretion in awarding attorney fees to Mrs. Wall. 126 Finally, we note that "[in divoree proceedings, when the trial court has awarded attorney fees below to the party who then prevails on the main issues on appeal, we generally award fees on appeal." Childs v. Childs, 967 P.2d 942, 947 (Utah Ct.App.1998); see also Nelson v. Nelson, 2004 UT App 254, ¶ 9 , 97 P.3d 722 . | 1 | 1 |
Childs v. Childsgreen1 sentence2007Because the trial court considered all of the necessary factors for determining an attorney fees award, we conclude that the trial court was within its discretion in awarding attorney fees to Mrs. Wall. 126 Finally, we note that "[in divoree proceedings, when the trial court has awarded attorney fees below to the party who then prevails on the main issues on appeal, we generally award fees on appeal." Childs v. Childs, 967 P.2d 942, 947 (Utah Ct.App.1998); see also Nelson v. Nelson, 2004 UT App 254, ¶ 9 , 97 P.3d 722 . | 1 | 1 |
Jones v. Jonesgreen1 sentence1999Once it has concluded there has been a substantial material change of circumstances justifying modification, the court must then consider the three factors set out in Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 1985), to support a modification of an alimony award. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Smathersgreen1 sentence1997See Smothers, 602 P.2d at 710 . | 1 | 1 |
Hansen v. Heathgreen1 sentence1994See Hansen v. Heath, 852 P.2d 977, 978 (Utah 1993). | 1 | 1 |
Kinkella v. Baughgreen2 sentences1991I think a safer course is steered by rather strict adherence to the requirement that adequate findings be made by the trial court, where required under Utah R.Civ.P. 52, with the only exception being where the failure to make findings is harmless, i.e., where “the facts in the record are ‘clear, uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only findings in favor of the judgment.’ ” Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987) (emphasis added) (quoting Kinkella v. Baugh, 660 P.2d 233, 236 (Utah 1983)). 1991I think a safer course is steered by rather strict adherence to the requirement that adequate findings be made by the trial court, where required under Utah R.Civ.P. 52, with the only exception being where the failure to make findings is harmless, i.e., where "the facts in the record are `clear, uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only findings in favor of the judgment.'" Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987) (emphasis added) (quoting Kinkella v. Baugh, 660 P.2d 233, 236 (Utah 1983)). | 1 | 1 |
Acton v. Delirangreen2 sentences1991I think a safer course is steered by rather strict adherence to the requirement that adequate findings be made by the trial court, where required under Utah R.Civ.P. 52, with the only exception being where the failure to make findings is harmless, i.e., where “the facts in the record are ‘clear, uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only findings in favor of the judgment.’ ” Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987) (emphasis added) (quoting Kinkella v. Baugh, 660 P.2d 233, 236 (Utah 1983)). 1991I think a safer course is steered by rather strict adherence to the requirement that adequate findings be made by the trial court, where required under Utah R.Civ.P. 52, with the only exception being where the failure to make findings is harmless, i.e., where "the facts in the record are `clear, uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only findings in favor of the judgment.'" Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987) (emphasis added) (quoting Kinkella v. Baugh, 660 P.2d 233, 236 (Utah 1983)). | 1 | 1 |
Burns v. Wheelergreen2 sentences1970See Burns v. Wheeler, 103 Ariz. 525 , 446 P.2d 925 (1968) ; Dawson v. Hoffman, 43 Ill.App.2d 17 , 192 N.E.2d 695 (1963) ; and see annotation, “Age of Minor Operator of Automobile or Other Craft as Affecting His Primary or Contributory Negligence,” 97 A.L.R.2d 872 . 4 . 1970See Burns v. Wheeler, 103 Ariz. 525 , 446 P.2d 925 (1968) ; Dawson v. Hoffman, 43 Ill.App.2d 17 , 192 N.E.2d 695 (1963) ; and see annotation, “Age of Minor Operator of Automobile or Other Craft as Affecting His Primary or Contributory Negligence,” 97 A.L.R.2d 872 . 4 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Utah. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Berriel
green
2 sentences2026“It is assault and not self-defense when a defendant fights back with a level of violence that is out of proportion to the provocation.” Id. ¶ 20; see also UTAH CODE § 76-2-402(2); State v. Berriel, 2013 UT 19, ¶ 14 , 299 P.3d 1133 (“The necessary requirement distinguishes wanton violence from force that is crucial to averting an unlawful attack.”).3 ¶54 Yet, the evidence Jennings presented did not suggest that he subjectively believed he was in danger, let alone that he believed the force he used was necessary to stave off that danger. 2026“It is assault and not self-defense when a defendant fights back with a level of violence that is out of proportion to the provocation.” Id. ¶ 20; see also UTAH CODE § 76-2-402(2); State v. Berriel, 2013 UT 19, ¶ 14 , 299 P.3d 1133 (“The necessary requirement distinguishes wanton violence from force that is crucial to averting an unlawful attack.”).3 ¶54 Yet, the evidence Jennings presented did not suggest that he subjectively believed he was in danger, let alone that he believed the force he used was necessary to stave off that danger. | 3 | 2019–2026 |
State v. Bakalov
green
2 sentences2024The waiver must be made “clearly and unequivocally” to ensure that the defendant did “not unthinkingly waive the right to counsel through sporadic musings or, on appeal, mischaracterize statements he made in the trial court and claim . . . he was denied the right to self-representation if he was represented by counsel.” State v. Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, ¶ 16 , 979 P.2d 799 (quotation simplified). 2024The waiver must be made “clearly and unequivocally” to ensure that the defendant did “not unthinkingly waive the right to counsel through sporadic musings or, on appeal, mischaracterize statements he made in the trial court and claim . . . he was denied the right to self-representation if he was represented by counsel.” State v. Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, ¶ 16 , 979 P.2d 799 (quotation simplified). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
State v. Sisneros
green
2 sentences2022Nevertheless, because we find that it was sufficient for just the district courts in Weber County to have jurisdiction over the offenses to bar the subsequent prosecution of Sisneros, we do not need to consider whether venue is a necessary requirement under the Single Criminal Episode Statute. 12 Cite as: 2022 UT 7 Opinion of the Court charged with misdemeanor and felony offenses because, under the law in effect at the time, the misdemeanor offenses had to be separated from the felony offense and brought in the justice courts.8 See id. at 344–45; see also State v. Johnson, 114 P.2d 1034, 1042 2022Nevertheless, because we find that it was sufficient for just the district courts in Weber County to have jurisdiction over the offenses to bar the subsequent prosecution of Sisneros, we do not need to consider whether venue is a necessary requirement under the Single Criminal Episode Statute. 12 Cite as: 2022 UT 7 Opinion of the Court charged with misdemeanor and felony offenses because, under the law in effect at the time, the misdemeanor offenses had to be separated from the felony offense and brought in the justice courts.8 See id. at 344–45; see also State v. Johnson, 114 P.2d 1034, 1042 | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Diversified Concepts v. Koford
green
1 sentence2021However, for the reasons that follow, we believe that it is a necessary requirement. 20191071-CA 18 2021 UT App 71 Diversified Concepts v. Koford (3) the existence of evidence relevant to the claim; and (4) reasonable opportunity to inspect that evidence.” 2009 WI 81, ¶ 28 . | 1 | 2021–2021 |
American Family Mutual Insurance v. Golke
green
1 sentence2021However, for the reasons that follow, we believe that it is a necessary requirement. 20191071-CA 18 2021 UT App 71 Diversified Concepts v. Koford (3) the existence of evidence relevant to the claim; and (4) reasonable opportunity to inspect that evidence.” 2009 WI 81, ¶ 28 . | 1 | 2021–2021 |
State v. Ruiz
green
1 sentence2013Utah Code Ann. § 77‐38a‐302(5)(c)(i)–(iv). ¶13 Here, while the amount of complete restitution may or may not have been appropriate, it appears that the trial court adequately considered the necessary factors with respect to court‐ordered 3. (...continued) as a matter of law and where commission of the crime clearly establishes causality of the injury or damages.”). 20110796‐CA 7 2013 UT App 166 State v. Ruiz restitution. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Perez v. South Jordan City
green
2 sentences2013As the court of appeals' majority suggested, the provision for certification may simply be the specification of a deadline and not "an additional requirement for issuance to be complete." Perez v. S. Jordan City, 2011 UT App 430, 15 , 268 P.3d 877 . 2013As the court of appeals' majority suggested, the provision for certification may simply be the specification of a deadline and not "an additional requirement for issuance to be complete." Perez v. S. Jordan City, 2011 UT App 430, 15 , 268 P.3d 877 . | 1 | 2013–2013 |
State v. Spence
green
1 sentence2013Under these principles, it is generally a jury question whether the parties’ actions give rise to an implied-in-fact contract transferring the sole right of possession to the spouse who remains in the home. 1 Id. at 110 . ¶ 15 Utah Code section 30-2-10 confirms that any relinquishment of a spouse’s possessory right to the marital home must be voluntary: “Neither the husband nor wife can remove the other or their children from the homestead without the consent of the other, unless the owner of the property shall in good faith provide another homestead suitable to the condition in life of the fa | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Johnson v. Hermes Associates, Ltd.
green
2 sentences2011P. 65A, or the necessary factors that a party must demonstrate before receiving a temporary or permanent injunction, see Johnson v. Hermes Assocs., Ltd., 2005 UT 82, ¶ 13 , 128 P.3d 1151 . 2011P. 65A, or the necessary factors that a party must demonstrate before receiving a temporary or permanent injunction, see Johnson v. Hermes Assocs., Ltd., 2005 UT 82, ¶ 13 , 128 P.3d 1151 . | 1 | 2011–2011 |
State v. Mabe
green
2 sentences1995From this review, we must conclude, based on the totality of circumstances,... [whether defendant] rendered his confession voluntarily." Id. 1995From this review, we must conclude, based on the totality of circumstances, ... [whether defendant] rendered his confession voluntarily.” Id. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Friederwitzer v. Friederwitzer
green
2 sentences1989Second, and more important, the requirement is intended to ensure sufficient stability in children's lives to enable them to develop relationships and a sense of familiarity with their surroundings that enhance their sense of security and self-identity, enabling them to find appropriate role models after which to pattern their lives and to develop the ability to give and receive love, a necessary requirement for achieving full potential as human beings. [2] In Friederwitzer, 55 N.Y.2d at 94-95 , 432 N.E.2d at 768 , 447 N.Y.S.2d at 896 , the court stated: The priority which is accorded the firs 1989Second, and more important, the requirement is intended to ensure sufficient stability in children's lives to enable them to develop relationships and a sense of familiarity with their surroundings that enhance their sense of security and self-identity, enabling them to find appropriate role models after which to pattern their lives and to develop the ability to give and receive love, a necessary requirement for achieving full potential as human beings. [2] In Friederwitzer, 55 N.Y.2d at 94-95 , 432 N.E.2d at 768 , 447 N.Y.S.2d at 896 , the court stated: The priority which is accorded the firs | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Dawson v. Hoffmann
neutral
2 sentences1970See Burns v. Wheeler, 103 Ariz. 525 , 446 P.2d 925 (1968) ; Dawson v. Hoffman, 43 Ill.App.2d 17 , 192 N.E.2d 695 (1963) ; and see annotation, “Age of Minor Operator of Automobile or Other Craft as Affecting His Primary or Contributory Negligence,” 97 A.L.R.2d 872 . 4 . 1970See Burns v. Wheeler, 103 Ariz. 525 , 446 P.2d 925 (1968) ; Dawson v. Hoffman, 43 Ill.App.2d 17 , 192 N.E.2d 695 (1963) ; and see annotation, “Age of Minor Operator of Automobile or Other Craft as Affecting His Primary or Contributory Negligence,” 97 A.L.R.2d 872 . 4 . | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Oregon-Washington Railroad & Navigation Co. v. Thurston County
neutral
1 sentence1938Co. v. Thurston County, 98 Wash. 218 , 167 P. 930 , the court said (page 935) : “It is, of course, a necessary rule that, in valuing a railroad, the first iniquiry is as to its actual cost. | 1 | 1938–1938 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.