necessary inquiry in District of Columbia

2011Instead, we will remand to permit the agency to engage in the necessary analysis of the legislation it is charged with carrying out.” King v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Emp’t Sens., 742 A.2d 460, 466 (1999) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

2009Instead, we will remand to permit the agency to engage in the necessary analysis of the legislation it is charged with carrying out.” King v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Employment Servs., 742 A.2d 460, 466 (D.C.1999) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 2.

2014Cf., e.g., Brown, 83 A.3d at 752 (remanding case so that CRB could resolve matter in first instance, “engage in the necessary analysis,” and provide “clearer exposition” of its reasoning) (internal quotation marks omitted); Carpenters Indus.

2014Cf., e.g., Brown, 83 A.3d at 752 (remanding case so that CRB could resolve matter in first instance, “engage in the necessary analysis,” and provide “clearer exposition” of its reasoning) (internal quotation marks omitted); Carpenters Indus.

2014Council v. Salazar, 734 F.Supp.2d 126, 132 (D.D.C. 2010) (“courts retain the discretion to remand an agency decision when an agency has raised substantial and legitimate concerns in support of remand”) (internal quotation marks omitted; citing cases).

2014Council v. Salazar, 734 F. Supp. 2d 126, 132 (D.D.C. 2010) (“courts retain the discretion to remand an agency decision when an agency has raised substantial and legitimate concerns in support of remand”) (internal quotation marks omitted; citing cases).

2010In determining whether an individual is in custody, a necessary inquiry is whether, given the circumstances surrounding a police encounter, “a reasonable person [would] have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the [encounter] and leave.” In re I.J., 906 A.2d 249 , 256 (D.C.2006) (quoting Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 , 116 S.Ct. 457 , 133 L.Ed.2d 383 (1995)) The inquiry is an objective one, i.e., “how a reasonable person in the suspect’s situation would perceive [the] circumstances.” Moore v. United States, 927 A.2d 1040, 1059 (D.C. 2007) (citation omitted); Morales v. Unite

2010In determining whether an individual is in custody, a necessary inquiry is whether, given the circumstances surrounding a police encounter, "a reasonable person [would] have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the [encounter] and leave." In re I.J., 906 A.2d 249 , 256 (D.C.2006) (quoting Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 , 116 S.Ct. 457 , 133 L.Ed.2d 383 (1995)) The inquiry is an objective one, i.e., "how a reasonable person in the suspect's situation would perceive [the] circumstances." Moore v. United States, 927 A.2d 1040, 1059 (D.C. 2007) (citation omitted); Morales v. Unite

2010However, “this inquiry, though necessary, is not sufficient.” In re I.J., 906 A.2d at 256. “[T]he ultimate inquiry is simply whether there is a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest.” California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 , 103 S.Ct. 3517 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1275 (1983) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); In re J.H., 928 A.2d 643, 648 (D.C.2007) (per curiam); see also United States v. Newton, 369 F.3d 659, 672 (2d Cir.2004) (noting that “a free-to-leave inquiry reveals only whether the person questioned was seized” and is not

2010However, “this inquiry, though necessary, is not sufficient.” In re I.J., 906 A.2d at 256. “[T]he ultimate inquiry is simply whether there is a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest.” California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 , 103 S.Ct. 3517 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1275 (1983) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); In re J.H., 928 A.2d 643, 648 (D.C.2007) (per curiam); see also United States v. Newton, 369 F.3d 659, 672 (2d Cir.2004) (noting that “a free-to-leave inquiry reveals only whether the person questioned was seized” and is not

2010In determining whether an individual is in custody, a necessary inquiry is whether, given the circumstances surrounding a police encounter, “a reasonable person [would] have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the [encounter] and leave.” In re I.J., 906 A.2d 249 , 256 (D.C.2006) (quoting Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 , 116 S.Ct. 457 , 133 L.Ed.2d 383 (1995)) The inquiry is an objective one, i.e., “how a reasonable person in the suspect’s situation would perceive [the] circumstances.” Moore v. United States, 927 A.2d 1040, 1059 (D.C. 2007) (citation omitted); Morales v. Unite

2010In determining whether an individual is in custody, a necessary inquiry is whether, given the circumstances surrounding a police encounter, "a reasonable person [would] have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the [encounter] and leave." In re I.J., 906 A.2d 249 , 256 (D.C.2006) (quoting Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 , 116 S.Ct. 457 , 133 L.Ed.2d 383 (1995)) The inquiry is an objective one, i.e., "how a reasonable person in the suspect's situation would perceive [the] circumstances." Moore v. United States, 927 A.2d 1040, 1059 (D.C. 2007) (citation omitted); Morales v. Unite

2010However, “this inquiry, though necessary, is not sufficient.” In re I.J., 906 A.2d at 256. “[T]he ultimate inquiry is simply whether there is a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest.” California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 , 103 S.Ct. 3517 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1275 (1983) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); In re J.H., 928 A.2d 643, 648 (D.C.2007) (per curiam); see also United States v. Newton, 369 F.3d 659, 672 (2d Cir.2004) (noting that “a free-to-leave inquiry reveals only whether the person questioned was seized” and is not

2010However, "this inquiry, though necessary, is not sufficient." In re I.J., 906 A.2d at 256. "[T]he ultimate inquiry is simply whether there is a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest." California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 , 103 S.Ct. 3517 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1275 (1983) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); In re J.H., 928 A.2d 643, 648 (D.C.2007) (per curiam); see also United States v. Newton, 369 F.3d 659, 672 (2d Cir.2004) (noting that "a free-to-leave inquiry reveals only whether the person questioned was seized" and is not

2010In determining whether an individual is in custody, a necessary inquiry is whether, given the circumstances surrounding a police encounter, “a reasonable person [would] have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the [encounter] and leave.” In re I.J., 906 A.2d 249 , 256 (D.C.2006) (quoting Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 , 116 S.Ct. 457 , 133 L.Ed.2d 383 (1995)) The inquiry is an objective one, i.e., “how a reasonable person in the suspect’s situation would perceive [the] circumstances.” Moore v. United States, 927 A.2d 1040, 1059 (D.C. 2007) (citation omitted); Morales v. Unite

2010In determining whether an individual is in custody, a necessary inquiry is whether, given the circumstances surrounding a police encounter, "a reasonable person [would] have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the [encounter] and leave." In re I.J., 906 A.2d 249 , 256 (D.C.2006) (quoting Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 , 116 S.Ct. 457 , 133 L.Ed.2d 383 (1995)) The inquiry is an objective one, i.e., "how a reasonable person in the suspect's situation would perceive [the] circumstances." Moore v. United States, 927 A.2d 1040, 1059 (D.C. 2007) (citation omitted); Morales v. Unite

2009See Johnson v. Lustine Realty Co., Inc., 640 A.2d 708, 709 (D.C.1994) (holding that trial court abused its discretion by not making the necessary inquiry and in failing to address two factors that bore directly on the Rule 60(b) motion); see also Reid v. District of Columbia, 634 A.2d 423, 425 (D.C.1993) (“A review of the record indicates that in denying appellants’ motion ..., the trial court did not consider the factors enumerated in either Rule 60(b)(1) or in Starling.”).

2005See also Johnson v. Lustine Realty Co., 640 A.2d 708, 709 (D.C.1994) (holding that the trial court *657 abused its discretion by not making the necessary inquiry and in failing to address two factors that bore directly on the Rule 60(b) motion).

2008When the administrative agency does not “conduct an analysis of the language, structure, or purpose of the statutory provision, it would be incongruous to accord substantial weight to [the] agency’s determination.” Proctor v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Employment Servs., 737 A.2d 534, 538 (D.C.1999).

1999See id.; see also Proctor v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Employment Servs., 737 A.2d 534, 539, 541 (D.C.1999); Mushroom Transp. v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Employment Servs., 698 A.2d 430, 434 (D.C.1997).

2003And we have stated often that: “Ordinarily ... ‘this court will not attempt to interpret the agency’s statute until the agency itself has done so.’ Instead, we will remand to permit the agency to engage in the necessary analysis of the legislation it is charged with carrying out.” King v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Employment Servs., 742 A.2d 460, 466 (D.C.1999) (quoting Wahlne v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Employment Servs., 704 A.2d 1196, 1199 (D.C.1997)).

2002“Where an administrative agency is delegated broad authority to administer a statutory scheme, as here, we defer to a reasonable construction of the statute made by the agency.” Smith v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Employment Servs., 548 A.2d 95, 97 (D.C.1988) (citations omitted). “ ‘[Ojrdinarily’ ... ‘this court will not attempt to interpret the agency’s statute until the agency itself has done so.’ Instead, we will remand to permit the agency to engage in the necessary analysis of the legislation it is charged with carrying out.” King v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Employment Servs., 742

2021However, whether experts generally accept the science on the reliability of eyewitness testimony is only part of the necessary inquiry; the determinative question is whether expert testimony would “help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or determine a fact in issue.” Motorola, 147 A.3d at 756-57 ; see also Jackson, 210 A.3d at 805-06 (holding that expert testimony can be helpful where jurors are not “just as competent as the expert to consider and weigh the evidence and draw the necessary conclusions”) (citing Minor v. United States, 57 A.3d 406, 415 (D.C. 2012)) (emphasis omitted)

2021However, whether experts generally accept the science on the reliability of eyewitness testimony is only part of the necessary inquiry; the determinative question is whether expert testimony would “help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or determine a fact in issue.” Motorola, 147 A.3d at 756-57 ; see also Jackson, 210 A.3d at 805-06 (holding that expert testimony can be helpful where jurors are not “just as competent as the expert to consider and weigh the evidence and draw the necessary conclusions”) (citing Minor v. United States, 57 A.3d 406, 415 (D.C. 2012)) (emphasis omitted)

2021Although these findings are widely accepted by scientists and, to a lesser extent, recognized by judges and attorneys, 12 they remain 11 While Jackson v. United States, 210 A.3d at 805-06 , does not specifically reference this court’s recent adoption of Federal Rule of Evidence Rule 702, it stresses the importance of expert testimony needing to be helpful to the fact finder or jury, which may not be as competent as an expert, but which is what Rule 702 requires. 12 A few studies have assessed attorneys’ understanding of eyewitness reliability variables.

2021However, whether experts generally accept the science on the reliability of eyewitness testimony is only part of the necessary inquiry; the determinative question is whether expert testimony would “help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or determine a fact in issue.” Motorola, 147 A.3d at 756-57 ; see also Jackson, 210 A.3d at 805-06 (holding that expert testimony can be helpful where jurors are not “just as competent as the expert to consider and weigh the evidence and draw the necessary conclusions”) (citing Minor v. United States, 57 A.3d 406, 415 (D.C. 2012)) (emphasis omitted)

2009See Johnson v. Lustine Realty Co., Inc., 640 A.2d 708, 709 (D.C.1994) (holding that trial court abused its discretion by not making the necessary inquiry and in failing to address two factors that bore directly on the Rule 60(b) motion); see also Reid v. District of Columbia, 634 A.2d 423, 425 (D.C.1993) (“A review of the record indicates that in denying appellants’ motion ..., the trial court did not consider the factors enumerated in either Rule 60(b)(1) or in Starling.”).

2008App.1998) (concluding that insured’s purposeful tape-recording and broadcasting of a sexual encounter fell within insurance pokey’s intentional acts exclusion because injury was “reasonably foreseeable as a matter of law” even if insured did not “intend[] to injure”); see also Cotter, supra, 90 P.3d at 823 (“an insured’s expectation of damage [to the environment] is irrelevant, and the only necessary inquiry is whether the discharge [of contaminants] was unexpected and unintended”).

2008App.1998) (concluding that insured’s purposeful tape-recording and broadcasting of a sexual encounter fell within insurance pokey’s intentional acts exclusion because injury was “reasonably foreseeable as a matter of law” even if insured did not “intend[] to injure”); see also Cotter, supra, 90 P.3d at 823 (“an insured’s expectation of damage [to the environment] is irrelevant, and the only necessary inquiry is whether the discharge [of contaminants] was unexpected and unintended”).

2002“Where an administrative agency is delegated broad authority to administer a statutory scheme, as here, we defer to a reasonable construction of the statute made by the agency.” Smith v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Employment Servs., 548 A.2d 95, 97 (D.C.1988) (citations omitted). “ ‘[Ojrdinarily’ ... ‘this court will not attempt to interpret the agency’s statute until the agency itself has done so.’ Instead, we will remand to permit the agency to engage in the necessary analysis of the legislation it is charged with carrying out.” King v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Employment Servs., 742

1999See id.; see also Proctor v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Employment Servs., 737 A.2d 534, 539, 541 (D.C.1999); Mushroom Transp. v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Employment Servs., 698 A.2d 430, 434 (D.C.1997).

1982Consideration should be given to many factors, including the quality and nature of the services performed, the necessity for such services, the results obtained from the services, and the husband's ability to pay. [Quoting Ritz v. Ritz, D.C.App., 197 A.2d 155, 156-57 (1964) (construing D.C.Code 1961, § 16-410, predecessor statute to D.C.Code 1978 Supp., § 16-910).] It is apparent from the face of the October 24 order that the court carefully considered all of the necessary factors in determining the amount of the award.

1982Consideration should be given to many factors, including the quality and nature of the services performed, the necessity for such services, the results obtained from the services, and the husband’s ability to pay. [Quoting Ritz v. Ritz, D.C.App., 197 A.2d 155, 156-57 (1964) (construing D.C.Code 1961, § 16-410, predecessor statute to D.C.Code 1978 Supp., § 16-910).] It is apparent from the face of the October 24 order that the court carefully considered all of the necessary factors in determining the amount of the award.