necessary factors in Ohio

2018"However, there must be some indication on the record that all of the necessary factors were considered." Id. {¶ 32} Due to the nature of the factors set forth in R.C. 2151.414(E)(7) to (11), they will not apply in every case.

2007A trial court, however, "is not required to specifically enumerate each factor under R.C. 2151.414 (D) in its decision." In re C.C. , Franklin App. No. 04AP-883, 2005-Ohio-5163 , at ¶ 53 , appeal not allowed, 107 Ohio St.3d 1701 , 2005-Ohio-6763 , citing In re Heyman *Page 13 (Aug. 13, 1996), Franklin App. No. 96APF02-194. "[Still], there must be some indication on the record that all of the necessary factors were considered." In re C.C. , at ¶ 53, citing In re Heyman; In re Hershberger Smith , Allen App. No. 1-04-55, 2005-Ohio-429 , at ¶ 28 .

2024Typically, “[w]hen reviewing a trial court’s best interests analysis, we need only address two items: ‘(1) [whether] the trial court considered all of the necessary factors listed in R.C. 3109.04(F)(1); and (2) [whether] there is competent, credible evidence supporting the trial court’s conclusion that it was in the children’s best interest to designate [the other parent] as residential parent.’” Brammer, 2013-Ohio-2843, at ¶ 47 (3d Dist.), quoting Heiser v. Heiser, 2007-Ohio-5487, ¶ 27 (3d Dist.). {¶46} However, we are unable to review whether there is competent, credible evidence supporting

2024See Brammer, 2013-Ohio-2843, at ¶ 47 (3d Dist.) (“When reviewing a trial court’s best interests analysis, we need only address two items: ‘(1) [whether] the trial court considered all of the necessary factors listed in R.C. 3109.04(F)(1); and (2) [whether] there is competent, credible evidence supporting the trial court’s conclusion that it was in the children’s best interest to designate [the other parent] as residential parent.’”), quoting Heiser v. Heiser, 2007-Ohio-5487, ¶ 27 (3d Dist.).

2024Typically, “[w]hen reviewing a trial court’s best interests analysis, we need only address two items: ‘(1) [whether] the trial court considered all of the necessary factors listed in R.C. 3109.04(F)(1); and (2) [whether] there is competent, credible evidence supporting the trial court’s conclusion that it was in the children’s best interest to designate [the other parent] as residential parent.’” Brammer, 2013-Ohio-2843, at ¶ 47 (3d Dist.), quoting Heiser v. Heiser, 2007-Ohio-5487, ¶ 27 (3d Dist.). {¶46} However, we are unable to review whether there is competent, credible evidence supporting

2024See Brammer, 2013-Ohio-2843, at ¶ 47 (3d Dist.) (“When reviewing a trial court’s best interests analysis, we need only address two items: ‘(1) [whether] the trial court considered all of the necessary factors listed in R.C. 3109.04(F)(1); and (2) [whether] there is competent, credible evidence supporting the trial court’s conclusion that it was in the children’s best interest to designate [the other parent] as residential parent.’”), quoting Heiser v. Heiser, 2007-Ohio-5487, ¶ 27 (3d Dist.).

2020“We strongly encourage the juvenile court’s discussion of each factor, but we cannot find error in the juvenile court’s failure to discuss each factor if the record otherwise indicates that all of the necessary factors were considered.” In re K.T.1 II, 2018-Ohio-4312 , 121 N.E.3d 847, ¶ 46 (1st Dist.). {¶29} In In re A.M., the dissent took issue with “the magistrate and juvenile court’s collective failure to actually explain their decisions.” In re A.M. at ¶ 41.

2020“We strongly encourage the juvenile court’s discussion of each factor, but we cannot find error in the juvenile court’s failure to discuss each factor if the record otherwise indicates that all of the necessary factors were considered.” In re K.T.1 II, 2018-Ohio-4312 , 121 N.E.3d 847, ¶ 46 (1st Dist.). {¶29} In In re A.M., the dissent took issue with “the magistrate and juvenile court’s collective failure to actually explain their decisions.” In re A.M. at ¶ 41.

2015The necessary inquiry, therefore, was not whether there was a warrant or whether there was time to get one, but whether there was probable cause for the arrest. * * * Just last Term, while recognizing that maximum protection of individual rights could be assured by requiring a magistrate's review of the factual justification prior to any arrest, we stated that “such a requirement would -20- constitute an intolerable handicap for legitimate law enforcement” and noted that the Court “has never invalidated an arrest supported by probable cause solely because the officers failed to secure a warran

2015The necessary inquiry, therefore, was not whether there was a warrant or whether there was time to get one, but whether there was probable cause for the arrest. * * * Just last Term, while recognizing that maximum protection of individual rights could be assured by requiring a magistrate's review of the factual justification prior to any arrest, we stated that “such a requirement would -20- constitute an intolerable handicap for legitimate law enforcement” and noted that the Court “has never invalidated an arrest supported by probable cause solely because the officers failed to secure a warran

2025Id.

2024An abuse of discretion occurs when “a court exercis[es] its judgment, in an unwarranted way, in regard to a matter over which it has discretionary authority.” (Citations omitted.) State v. J.B., 2024-Ohio-1879, ¶ 13 (1st Dist.). {¶9} “The denial of an appellant’s application for expungement without a necessary hearing constitutes an abuse of the trial court’s discretion.” State v. Moulder, 2013-Ohio-1036, ¶ 9 (8th Dist.).

2026This is because, as it is now well established, "[t]his court cannot consider the transcripts and exhibits even if they were provided to this court because our review is limited to the evidence that was before the trial court." K.K.S. v. M.M.J., 2024-Ohio-70, ¶ 22 (8th Dist.); Younker v. Mook, 2022- Ohio-3699, ¶ 15 (11th Dist.). {¶ 19} Consequently, given the record properly before this court, we cannot say the domestic relations court erred by adopting the magistrate's order denying Father's petition for a DVCPO against Mother.

2025See E.J., 2024-Ohio-2421, at ¶ 22 (1st Dist.), citing J.P., 2016- Ohio-7574, at ¶ 31-33 (10th Dist.); accord In re C.C., 2024-Ohio-5012, ¶ 2, 5-13 (1st Dist.); In re A.C.1, 2024-Ohio-5185, ¶ 14-16 (1st Dist.). {¶10} Here, the juvenile court’s entry states that the court did not “rewrite” a separate analysis from the magistrate’s decision as the magistrate “appropriately considered and weighed the necessary factors.” Instead, the juvenile court provided only a “supplement” to the magistrate’s decision to address father’s objection. {¶11} In its “supplement” to the magistrate’s decision, the juv

2025Another federal circuit court explained: ‘The requirement that the victim be ‘directly and proximately harmed’ encompasses the traditional ‘but for’ and proximate cause analyses.’ In re Rendon Galvis, 564 F.3d 170, 175 (2d Cir.2009) (citing In re Antrobus, 519 F.3d 1123, 1126 (10th Cir.2008) (Tymkovich, J., concurring) (noting that “direct[ ]” harm encompasses a “but-for” causation notion that is different from proximate harm)). ‘The necessary inquiry is [ ] fact-specific[.]’ Id. (citations omitted).

2025Another federal circuit court explained: ‘The requirement that the victim be ‘directly and proximately harmed’ encompasses the traditional ‘but for’ and proximate cause analyses.’ In re Rendon Galvis, 564 F.3d 170, 175 (2d Cir.2009) (citing In re Antrobus, 519 F.3d 1123, 1126 (10th Cir.2008) (Tymkovich, J., concurring) (noting that “direct[ ]” harm encompasses a “but-for” causation notion that is different from proximate harm)). ‘The necessary inquiry is [ ] fact-specific[.]’ Id. (citations omitted).

2025Another federal circuit court explained: ‘The requirement that the victim be ‘directly and proximately harmed’ encompasses the traditional ‘but for’ and proximate cause analyses.’ In re Rendon Galvis, 564 F.3d 170, 175 (2d Cir.2009) (citing In re Antrobus, 519 F.3d 1123, 1126 (10th Cir.2008) (Tymkovich, J., concurring) (noting that “direct[ ]” harm encompasses a “but-for” causation notion that is different from proximate harm)). ‘The necessary inquiry is [ ] fact-specific[.]’ Id. (citations omitted).

2025In re McNulty, 597 F.3d 344, 350 (6th Cir. 2010).

2025See E.J., 2024-Ohio-2421, at ¶ 22 (1st Dist.), citing J.P., 2016- Ohio-7574, at ¶ 31-33 (10th Dist.); accord In re C.C., 2024-Ohio-5012, ¶ 2, 5-13 (1st Dist.); In re A.C.1, 2024-Ohio-5185, ¶ 14-16 (1st Dist.). {¶10} Here, the juvenile court’s entry states that the court did not “rewrite” a separate analysis from the magistrate’s decision as the magistrate “appropriately considered and weighed the necessary factors.” Instead, the juvenile court provided only a “supplement” to the magistrate’s decision to address father’s objection. {¶11} In its “supplement” to the magistrate’s decision, the juv

2025See E.J., 2024-Ohio-2421, at ¶ 22 (1st Dist.), citing J.P., 2016- Ohio-7574, at ¶ 31-33 (10th Dist.); accord In re C.C., 2024-Ohio-5012, ¶ 2, 5-13 (1st Dist.); In re A.C.1, 2024-Ohio-5185, ¶ 14-16 (1st Dist.). {¶10} Here, the juvenile court’s entry states that the court did not “rewrite” a separate analysis from the magistrate’s decision as the magistrate “appropriately considered and weighed the necessary factors.” Instead, the juvenile court provided only a “supplement” to the magistrate’s decision to address father’s objection. {¶11} In its “supplement” to the magistrate’s decision, the juv

2025Id. {¶ 22} Specifically, Crim.R. 11(C)(2) provides that, in felony cases, the trial court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty or a plea of no contest, and shall not accept a plea of guilty or no contest, without first addressing the defendant personally and doing the following: (a) Determining that the defendant is making the plea voluntarily, with understanding of the nature of the charges and of the maximum penalty involved, and if applicable, that the defendant is not eligible for probation or for the imposition of community control sanctions at the sentencing hearing. (b) Informing the d