necessary inquiry in Washington

2015We conclude that Piris's negligence allegations fall outside the narrow exception to the innocence 71054-1-1/2 requirement we recognized in Powell v. Associated Counsel for Accused, 125 Wn.

2015We conclude that Piris’s negligence allegations fall outside the narrow exception to the innocence requirement we recognized in Powell v. Associated Counsel for Accused, 125 Wn.

2014Cook, 73 Wn.2d at 396 .

2014Cook, 73 Wn.2d at 396 .

2008Sullivan, 60 Wn.2d at 220-21 . ¶26 The court’s order compelling Mr. White’s testimony, without seeking a waiver or making the necessary inquiry, placed defense counsel in a conflict position.

2008Sullivan, 60 Wash.2d at 220-21 , 373 P.2d 474 . ¶ 26 The court's order compelling Mr. White's testimony, without seeking a waiver or making the necessary inquiry, placed defense counsel in a conflict position.

2008Because LeMond failed to present any competent evidence in the DOL hearing tending to prove the precise issues that were decided in the prior municipal court action and the precise legal bases for the municipal court’s ruling, collateral estoppel could not properly be applied as to any of the issues presented in the subsequent administrative hearing. ¶11 Collateral estoppel “ ‘prevents relitigation of an issue after the party estopped has had a full and fair opportunity to present its case’.” Barr v. Day, 124 Wn.2d 318, 324-25 , 879 P.2d 912 (1994) (quoting Hanson v. City of Snohomish, 121 Wn.

2008Because LeMond failed to present any competent evidence in the DOL hearing tending to prove the precise issues that were decided in the prior municipal court action and the precise legal bases for the municipal court’s ruling, collateral estoppel could not properly be applied as to any of the issues presented in the subsequent administrative hearing. ¶11 Collateral estoppel “ ‘prevents relitigation of an issue after the party estopped has had a full and fair opportunity to present its case’.” Barr v. Day, 124 Wn.2d 318, 324-25 , 879 P.2d 912 (1994) (quoting Hanson v. City of Snohomish, 121 Wn.

2008Because LeMond failed to present any competent evidence in the DOL hearing tending to prove the precise issues that were decided in the prior municipal court action and the precise legal bases for the municipal court’s ruling, collateral estoppel could not properly be applied as to any of the issues presented in the subsequent administrative hearing. ¶11 Collateral estoppel “ ‘prevents relitigation of an issue after the party estopped has had a full and fair opportunity to present its case’.” Barr v. Day, 124 Wn.2d 318, 324-25 , 879 P.2d 912 (1994) (quoting Hanson v. City of Snohomish, 121 Wn.

2008Because LeMond failed to present any competent evidence in the DOL hearing tending to prove the precise issues that were decided in the prior municipal court action and the precise legal bases for the municipal court’s ruling, collateral estoppel could not properly be applied as to any of the issues presented in the subsequent administrative hearing. ¶11 Collateral estoppel “ ‘prevents relitigation of an issue after the party estopped has had a full and fair opportunity to present its case’.” Barr v. Day, 124 Wn.2d 318, 324-25 , 879 P.2d 912 (1994) (quoting Hanson v. City of Snohomish, 121 Wn.

2007Bone-Club, 128 Wash.2d at 258-60 , 906 P.2d 325 ; see also Seattle Times Co. v. Ishikawa, 97 Wash.2d 30, 36-39 , 640 P.2d 716 (1982) (setting forth five-part analysis under article I, section 10). ¶ 8 The court in Bone-Club set forth the necessary analysis: "1.

2007Bone-Club, 128 Wn.2d at 258-60 ; see also Seattle Times Co. v. Ishikawa, 97 Wn.2d 30, 36-39 , 640 P.2d 716 (1982) (setting forth five-part analysis under article I, section 10). ¶8 The court in Bone-Club set forth the necessary analysis: “1.

2002A fair trial is only likely to accomplish full justice within human limitations." See Box v. State, 74 Ark.App. 82, 88-89 , 45 S.W.3d 415 (2001) (quoting 88 C.J.S.

2002A fair trial is only likely to accomplish full justice within human limitations.” Box v. State, 74 Ark.

2001Id. at 460 , 869 P.2d 1114 ; Winbun, 97 Wash.App. at 608, 611 , 982 P.2d 1196 .

2001Id. at 460 ; Winbun, 97 Wn.

2026The necessary standard of proof depends on “the nature and importance of the interest subject to the potentially erroneous deprivation” and any relevant “important interests of the state.” Id. at 524-25 .

2026The lowest standard of proof, a “mere preponderance of the evidence,” applies in civil cases for monetary damages between private parties, in which “society has a minimal concern.” Addington, 441 U.S. at 423 .

2026Citing to our Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Luthi, Head argues that the trial court failed to engage in the necessary inquiry “to determine if ‘extraordinary circumstances’ require[d] that restraint for security reasons.” Opening Br. at 61 (quoting State v. Luthi, 3 Wn.3d 249, 257 , 549 P.3d 712 (2024)).

2026Citing to our Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Luthi, Head argues that the trial court failed to engage in the necessary inquiry “to determine if ‘extraordinary circumstances’ require[d] that restraint for security reasons.” Opening Br. at 61 (quoting State v. Luthi, 3 Wn.3d 249, 257 , 549 P.3d 712 (2024)).

2024Knight was decided in the absence of any statutory language regarding “the necessary standard of proof for a vulnerable adult protection order.” Id. at 938 .

2022State v. DeLeon, 11 Wn.

2021Winbun v. Moore, 143 Wn.2d at 219 .

2021Citing State v. Hutchinson,54 the City asserts suppression is an “extreme remedy,” so a trial court must weigh several factors before suppressing evidence as a discovery sanction.55 In Hutchinson, the court was considering whether the trial court abused its discretion when sanctioning the defendant pursuant to CrR 4.7 by excluding an expert witness who would be testifying in support of the defendant’s diminished capacity defense.56 The court explained the counterpart of CrRLJ 4.7(g)(7)(i), CrR 4.7(h)(7)(i) “allows the trial court to impose sanctions not specifically listed in 52 189 Wn.2d at 4

2021Id. at 201 .

2020“A suit for an injunction is an equitable proceeding addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, to be exercised according to the circumstances of each case.” Steury v. Johnson, 90 Wn.

2018Restraint of Morris, 176 Wn.2d 157, 167 , 288 P.3d 1140 (2012), where our Supreme Court held the defendant's attorney should have known about a case that had "without qualification" stated the necessary rule, as counsel "had but to look at this court's public trial jurisprudence" to find the rule.

2018Restraint of Morris, 176 Wn.2d 157, 167 , 288 P.3d 1140 (2012), where our Supreme Court held the defendant's attorney should have known about a case that had "without qualification" stated the necessary rule, as counsel "had but to look at this court's public trial jurisprudence" to find the rule.

2018State v. Thomas, 109 Wn.2d 222, 229 , 743 P.2d 816 (1987).

2018State v. Thomas, 109 Wn.2d 222, 229 , 743 P.2d 816 (1987).

2016Because the withdrawal of counsel implicates a defendant’s constitutional right to counsel, Garland must prove that 46 No. 74135-7-1/47 any error here resulted in actual and substantial prejudice. ~ Gomez, 180 Wn.2d at 347 .

2014Whether a purported waiver of the right to counsel or the right to remain silent is valid depends on the totality of the circumstances, "` including the necessary fact that the accused, not the police, reopened the dialogue with the authorities. ' Bradshaw, 462 U.S. at 1046 ( quoting Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U. S. 477 , 486 n. 9, 101 S. Ct. 1880 , 68 L.

2014Whether a purported waiver of the right to counsel or the right to remain silent is valid depends on the totality of the circumstances, "` including the necessary fact that the accused, not the police, reopened the dialogue with the authorities. ' Bradshaw, 462 U.S. at 1046 ( quoting Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U. S. 477 , 486 n. 9, 101 S. Ct. 1880 , 68 L.

2013State v. Jones, noted at 154 Wn.

2010"Prejudice is presumed, and the remedy is a new trial." Duckett, 141 Wash.App. at 809, 173 P.3d 948 .

2010“Prejudice is presumed, and the remedy is a new trial.” Duckett, 141 Wn.