necessary requirement in Texas

2015See In re Palm Harbor Homes, Inc., 195 S.W.3d 672, 678 (Tex.2006) (rejecting a claim that an arbitration provision was substantively unconscionable where the challenged provision “effectively incorporate[d] established provisions of contract law”).

2014See In re Palm Harbor Homes, Inc., 195 S.W.3d 672, 678 (Tex.2006) (rejecting a claim that We agree that if the discovery limitations the arbitration an arbitration provision was substantively unconscionable agreement imposes operate to prevent effective presentation © 2014 Thomson Reuters.

2008See Murphy v. Russell, 167 S.W.3d 835, 838 (Tex.2005) (stating that even though the jury might not need the aid of expert testimony to determine the issues of the case involving lack of consent and battery during the treatment of a patient, the expert report is still a necessary requirement in pleading a health care liability claim under the statute).

2008See Murphy v. Russell, 167 S.W.3d 835, 838 (Tex. 2005) (stating that even though the jury might not need the aid of expert testimony to determine the issues of the case involving lack of consent and battery during the treatment of a patient, the expert report is still a necessary requirement in pleading a health care liability claim under the statute). 12 window, which as we stated above are similar to Ollie’s claim regarding the slippery, wet floor.

1995See Schlobohm, 784 S.W.2d at 358 . 4 .

1991See Schlobohm, 784 S.W.2d at 358 .

2025In Martinez, the Court held that “evidence of communication between officers is not always a necessary requirement to apply the collective knowledge doctrine.” Id. at 627.

2024Although here, unlike in Jackson, for example, there is no direct evidence that Detective Chavez communicated her reasons to believe the cell phones could constitute evidence of the offense to the arresting officer who seized the phones, “evidence of communication between officers is not always a necessary requirement to apply the collective knowledge doctrine.” State v. Martinez, 569 S.W.3d 621, 627 (Tex. Crim.

2009Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa. v. Valero Energy Corp. , 777 S.W.2d 501, 508 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1989, writ denied) ("The court should not be required to pick through appellant's own tendered issues to construct an instruction to conform to an issue actually submitted; this is the responsibility of the party complaining that a necessary instruction is missing from the court's charge."). 24.

2009Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa. v. Valero Energy Corp., 777 S.W.2d 501, 508 (Tex.App.Corpus Christi 1989, writ denied) ("The court should not be required to pick through appellant’s own tendered issues to construct an instruction to conform to an issue actually submitted; this is the responsibility of the party complaining that a necessary instruction is missing from the court’s charge.”). 24 .

2004See Jones , 8 S.W.3d at 638 .

2004See Jones, 8 S.W.3d at 638 .

2022A majority of the justices held the suspect in the case before it reinitiated contact where he asked a question that “evinced a willingness and a desire for a generalized discussion about the investigation,” and not merely “a necessary inquiry arising out of the incidents of the custodial relationship.” Id.

2004Bradshaw, 462 U.S. at 1045-46 , 103 S.Ct. 2830 ("[a]lthough ambiguous, the respondent's question in this case as to what was going to happen to him evinced a willingness and a desire for a generalized discussion about the investigation; it was not merely a necessary inquiry arising out of the incidents of the custodial relationship”). 20 .

2023P’ship, Ltd. v. Kent, 472 S.W.3d 341, 345 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, no pet.) (“Under the ordinary principles governing the formation of contracts in Texas, consideration is a necessary requirement for the formation of a contract.”). 1.

2022P’ship Ltd. v. Kent, 472 S.W.3d 341 , 344–45 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, no pet.) (“[C]onsideration is a necessary requirement for the formation of a contract.

2015Under the unambiguous language of title 28, section 1447(c) of the United States Code arid under precedent from' the Supreme Court of Texas and the Fourteenth Court of Appeals] a remand order from the remanding court is a necessary requirement for a remand to occur.' See 28 U.S.C. § 1447 (c) (West, Westlaw through P.L. 114-51) (providing that, after the federal court signs a remand order' and sends it to the clerk of the state court, “[t]h'e State ’court may thereupon proceed with such case”); Guilbot Serros de Gonzalez v. Gonzalez Guilbot, 315 S.W.3d 533, 537-38 (Tex.2010) (holding that “hand

2015See 28 U.S.C. §1447 (c) (West, Westlaw through P.L. 114-51) (providing that, after the federal court signs a remand order and sends it to the clerk of the state court, “[t]he State court may thereupon proceed with such case”); Guilbot Serros de Gonzalez v. Gonzalez Guilbot, 315 S.W.3d 533 , 537–38 (Tex. 2010) (holding that “hand delivery of the remand order in this case successfully effected the transfer of jurisdiction from federal court to state court,” allowing hand delivery rather than mailing of the order while still requiring a remand order, and stating that “what matters more is what th

2015Under the unambiguous language of title 28, section 1447(c) of the United States Code arid under precedent from' the Supreme Court of Texas and the Fourteenth Court of Appeals] a remand order from the remanding court is a necessary requirement for a remand to occur.' See 28 U.S.C. § 1447 (c) (West, Westlaw through P.L. 114-51) (providing that, after the federal court signs a remand order' and sends it to the clerk of the state court, “[t]h'e State ’court may thereupon proceed with such case”); Guilbot Serros de Gonzalez v. Gonzalez Guilbot, 315 S.W.3d 533, 537-38 (Tex.2010) (holding that “hand

2015See 28 U.S.C. §1447 (c) (West, Westlaw through P.L. 114-51) (providing that, after the federal court signs a remand order and sends it to the clerk of the state court, “[t]he State court may thereupon proceed with such case”); Guilbot Serros de Gonzalez v. Gonzalez Guilbot, 315 S.W.3d 533 , 537–38 (Tex. 2010) (holding that “hand delivery of the remand order in this case successfully effected the transfer of jurisdiction from federal court to state court,” allowing hand delivery rather than mailing of the order while still requiring a remand order, and stating that “what matters more is what th

2015Under the unambiguous language of title 28, section 1447(c) of the United States Code arid under precedent from' the Supreme Court of Texas and the Fourteenth Court of Appeals] a remand order from the remanding court is a necessary requirement for a remand to occur.' See 28 U.S.C. § 1447 (c) (West, Westlaw through P.L. 114-51) (providing that, after the federal court signs a remand order' and sends it to the clerk of the state court, “[t]h'e State ’court may thereupon proceed with such case”); Guilbot Serros de Gonzalez v. Gonzalez Guilbot, 315 S.W.3d 533, 537-38 (Tex.2010) (holding that “hand

2015Under the unambiguous language of title 28, section 1447(c) of the United States Code arid under precedent from' the Supreme Court of Texas and the Fourteenth Court of Appeals] a remand order from the remanding court is a necessary requirement for a remand to occur.' See 28 U.S.C. § 1447 (c) (West, Westlaw through P.L. 114-51) (providing that, after the federal court signs a remand order' and sends it to the clerk of the state court, “[t]h'e State ’court may thereupon proceed with such case”); Guilbot Serros de Gonzalez v. Gonzalez Guilbot, 315 S.W.3d 533, 537-38 (Tex.2010) (holding that “hand

1988Interestingly, in First State Bank of Bishop v. Grebe, 162 S.W.2d 165, 168 (San Antonio Court of Civil Appeals 1942, ref. w.o.m.), the predecessor to the San Antonio Court of Appeals stated the following: “[EJvery order of an appellate court reversing and remanding a cause ... carries with it the necessary instruction, whether expressed or not, that all further proceedings in the case ... must be ‘consistent with the opinion’ of the reversing court; that qualification is understood, is implied by necessity, so that, at least usually, it adds nothing to the result to write it into the opinion o

1988Interestingly, in First State Bank of Bishop v. Grebe, 162 S.W.2d 165, 168 (San Antonio Court of Civil Appeals 1942, ref. w.o.m.), the predecessor to the San Antonio Court of Appeals stated the following: "[E]very order of an appellate court reversing and remanding a cause ... carries with it the necessary instruction, whether expressed or not, that all further proceedings in the case ... must be `consistent with the opinion' of the reversing court; that qualification is understood, is implied by necessity, so that, at least usually, it adds nothing to the result to write it into the opinion o

2003Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85 (Tex.Cr.App.1997). *98 The Court in Bradshaw held that the defendant “initiated” further “conversations” when the defendant asked an officer: “Well, what is going to happen to me now?” When discussing the meaning of “initiate,” the Court said: Although ambiguous, the respondent’s question in this case as to what was going to happen to him evinced a willingness and a desire for a generalized discussion about the investigation; it was not merely a necessary inquiry arising out of the incidents of the custodial relationship.

1998See Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997); Ex parte Barnes, 959 S.W.2d at 316-17 .

2002“The necessary inquiry is whether [defense counsel] knew or should have known facts that would have allowed him to access the undisclosed evidence.” Id. (citing United States v. Payne, 63 F.3d 1200, 1208 (2nd Cir.1995)).

1998Payne, 63 F.3d at 1208 .

2023See Carpenter, 98 S.W.3d at 688 (the trial court did not err when it denied defendant’s motion for new trial, which was not accompanied by any supporting affidavits or other evidence, based upon trial counsel’s bare assertion, without explanation, that he had “mis-calendared” the due date for the response to the motion for summary judgment); Tex. Petroleum Land Mgmt., LLC v. McMillan, 641 S.W.3d 831 , 849 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2022, no pet.) (no explanation or evidence offered by the movant to demonstrate good cause for failing to timely respond).

2022Similarly, the Court of Criminal Appeals has held that a suspect burst the 8 Edwards bubble with a “re-initiation of communications about the investigation.” Cross, 144 S.W.3d at 525, 528 (finding the appellant did not want to talk to the patrol officer but he did want to talk with a detective about the assault).

2022Gunn v. McCoy, 554 S.W.3d 645, 668 (Tex. 2018); U-Haul Int’l, Inc. v. Waldrip, 380 S.W.3d 118, 136 (Tex. 2012).

2022Gunn v. McCoy, 554 S.W.3d 645, 668 (Tex. 2018); U-Haul Int’l, Inc. v. Waldrip, 380 S.W.3d 118, 136 (Tex. 2012).

2021Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 21 (1967) (“We have no hesitation in saying that the right of these petitioners not to be punished for exercising their Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment right to be silent—expressly created by the Federal Constitution itself—is a federal right which, in the absence of appropriate congressional action, it is our responsibility to protect by fashioning the necessary rule.”).33 33 In Kooteakos v. United States, the Supreme Court discussed the origin of the federal harmless error rule, noting 32 Yet, creating such a burden is one thing; defining how the burden wor

2020Found. v Dewhurst, 90 S.W.3d 268, 288 (Tex. 2002).