necessary inquiry in Oregon

1997With respect to Bradshaw’s first prong, defendant’s statements during his soliloquy, after his “If I need a lawyer, I want a lawyer” comment, were more than “a necessary inquiry arising out of the incidents of the custodial relationship.” Bradshaw, 462 US at 1046 .

1985In Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 US 1039 , 103 S Ct 2830 , 77 L Ed 2d 405 (1983), the Supreme Court described a reinitiation of interrogation by a defendant as a statement that “evinced a willingness and a desire for a generalized discussion about the investigation; [and] not merely a necessary inquiry arising out of the incidents of the custodial relationship.” 462 US at 1045-46 , ( 77 L Ed 2d at 412 ).

2025It explained that Daubert requires scientific testimony to be “reliable.” “In order to qualify as science, a proposition ‘must be derived by the scientific method.’ The expert’s assertion Cite as 340 Or App 661 (2025) 683 need not be verified as an objective certainty, but it must have been derived by a verified scientific process in order to meet the necessary standard of evidentiary reliability.” Adams, 444 F Supp 3d at 1257 (quoting Daubert, 509 US at 593-94 ; internal citation omitted).

2025Cite as 340 Or App 661 (2025) 683 It explained that Daubert requires scientific testimony to be “reliable.” “In order to qualify as science, a proposition ‘must be derived by the scientific method.’ The expert’s assertion need not be verified as an objective certainty, but it must have been derived by a verified scientific process in order to meet the necessary standard of evidentiary reliability.” Adams, 444 F Supp 3d at 1257 (quoting Daubert, 509 US at 593-94 ; internal citation omitted).

2025It explained that Daubert requires scientific testimony to be “reliable.” “In order to qualify as science, a proposition ‘must be derived by the scientific method.’ The expert’s assertion Cite as 340 Or App 661 (2025) 683 need not be verified as an objective certainty, but it must have been derived by a verified scientific process in order to meet the necessary standard of evidentiary reliability.” Adams, 444 F Supp 3d at 1257 (quoting Daubert, 509 US at 593-94 ; internal citation omitted).

2025Cite as 340 Or App 661 (2025) 683 It explained that Daubert requires scientific testimony to be “reliable.” “In order to qualify as science, a proposition ‘must be derived by the scientific method.’ The expert’s assertion need not be verified as an objective certainty, but it must have been derived by a verified scientific process in order to meet the necessary standard of evidentiary reliability.” Adams, 444 F Supp 3d at 1257 (quoting Daubert, 509 US at 593-94 ; internal citation omitted).

2025Even so, the Supreme Court acknowledged, the necessary analysis “will always require some degree of 340 Doumith v. Azar ‘entanglement’ with the merits.” Id.

2025Even so, the Supreme Court acknowledged, the necessary analysis “will always require some degree of 340 Doumith v. Azar ‘entanglement’ with the merits.” Id.

2025On that point, the court cited favorably to Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 US 517, 528 , 108 S Ct 1945 , 100 L Ed 2d 517 (1988), for the proposi- tion that courts “ ‘must scrutinize the substance of the dis- pute between the parties to evaluate what proof is required, and determine whether the pieces of evidence cited by the parties are critical, or even relevant, to the plaintiff’s cause of action and to any potential defenses to the action’ ” and “ ‘consider the locus of the alleged culpable conduct, often a disputed issue, and the connection of that conduct to the plaintiff’s chosen forum.’

2025On that point, the court cited favorably to Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 US 517, 528 , 108 S Ct 1945 , 100 L Ed 2d 517 (1988), for the proposi- tion that courts “ ‘must scrutinize the substance of the dis- pute between the parties to evaluate what proof is required, and determine whether the pieces of evidence cited by the parties are critical, or even relevant, to the plaintiff’s cause of action and to any potential defenses to the action’ ” and “ ‘consider the locus of the alleged culpable conduct, often a disputed issue, and the connection of that conduct to the plaintiff’s chosen forum.’

2025Joyce, 332 Or App at 583 .

2025Joyce, 332 Or App at 583 .

1973Defendant also contends that the default judgment in this case should be set aside because he has a “meritorious defense” in that plaintiff’s hospital lien was not filed within 15 days, as required by ORS 87.565, but filed at least one day late and in that defendant Oetinger, as the insurance agent, was neither an insurer nor a person “obligated to compensate the injured person on account of said injury,” so as to be subject to the hospital lien, even if timely filed. *611 In Burke v. Rachau, 262 Or 323 , 497 P2d 1154 (1972), we held that although the claim of a meritorious defense is a necess

1973Defendant also contends that the default judgment in this case should be set aside because he has a “meritorious defense” in that plaintiff’s hospital lien was not filed within 15 days, as required by ORS 87.565, but filed at least one day late and in that defendant Oetinger, as the insurance agent, was neither an insurer nor a person “obligated to compensate the injured person on account of said injury,” so as to be subject to the hospital lien, even if timely filed. *611 In Burke v. Rachau, 262 Or 323 , 497 P2d 1154 (1972), we held that although the claim of a meritorious defense is a necess

2022State v. Southard, 347 Or 127 (2009), does not apply.

2021Similarly, any error associated with admitting Cite as 312 Or App 411 (2021) 423 Veeder’s telephonic testimony, which focused on appellant’s diagnosis, treatment and prehearing behavior at Unity, is harmless when considered in light of other evidence on the same and related topics, particularly Springer’s testimony about appellant’s mental health, specific incidents of risky behavior linked to her mental disorder, and how appel- lant’s conduct and statements continued to reflect her men- tal disorder through the day of the hearing.

2014In support of that contention, defendant relies on a dissenting opinion in State v. Orueta, 343 Or 118, 128 , 164 P3d 267 (2007) (Walters, J., dissenting).

2014In support of that contention, defendant relies on a dissenting opinion in State v. Orueta, 343 Or 118, 128 , 164 P3d 267 (2007) (Walters, J., dissenting).

2009In Strubel , we said that, although a medical expert must take into account certain factors to determine their relative weight, a doctor’s statement that appeared to avoid that required evaluation would suffice where the context of the statement permitted the board to conclude that the doctor “understood the necessary analysis and applied it properly.” Id.

2008As we explained there, under Newport Church of the Nazarene v. Hensley, 335 Or 1, 17 , 56 P3d 386 (2002) (.Newport Church), interest may not be awarded against the state in the absence of an express legislative authorization waiving the state’s sovereign immunity, and “it is now clear that [ORS 82.010(1) 5 ] does not constitute the necessary waiver of sovereign immunity.” Young II, 195 Or App at 51 .

2008As we explained there, under Newport Church of the Nazarene v. Hensley, 335 Or 1, 17 , 56 P3d 386 (2002) (.Newport Church), interest may not be awarded against the state in the absence of an express legislative authorization waiving the state’s sovereign immunity, and “it is now clear that [ORS 82.010(1) 5 ] does not constitute the necessary waiver of sovereign immunity.” Young II, 195 Or App at 51 .

2008As we explained there, under Newport Church of the Nazarene v. Hensley, 335 Or 1, 17 , 56 P3d 386 (2002) (.Newport Church), interest may not be awarded against the state in the absence of an express legislative authorization waiving the state’s sovereign immunity, and “it is now clear that [ORS 82.010(1) 5 ] does not constitute the necessary waiver of sovereign immunity.” Young II, 195 Or App at 51 .

2003The court noted that the statutory text “plainly places a burden on the worker to make an effective request for the necessary hearing.” 166 Or App at 647 .

1985We recently applied Bradshaw in State v. Barmon, 67 Or App 369 , 679 P2d 888 , rev den 297 Or 227 (1984), which involved issues similar to those in the case at bar.

1985We recently applied Bradshaw in State v. Barmon, 67 Or App 369 , 679 P2d 888 , rev den 297 Or 227 (1984), which involved issues similar to those in the case at bar.

1984(Emphasis supplied.) The issue here, therefore, is whether defendant or Schultze initiated the exchange by conveying a “willingness and desire for a generalized discussion about the investigation.” We conclude that Schultze initiated the exchange when he said, “Harry, I’d like to help you if I can, but I’ve got to get your side of the story before I do.” That statement evinced Schultze’s “desire for a generalized discussion about the investigation.” The statement also constituted “words or actions on the part of police, other than those normally attendant on arrest and custody, that the police

1984(Emphasis supplied.) The issue here, therefore, is whether defendant or Schultze initiated the exchange by conveying a “willingness and desire for a generalized discussion about the investigation.” We conclude that Schultze initiated the exchange when he said, “Harry, I’d like to help you if I can, but I’ve got to get your side of the story before I do.” That statement evinced Schultze’s “desire for a generalized discussion about the investigation.” The statement also constituted “words or actions on the part of police, other than those normally attendant on arrest and custody, that the police

1984(Emphasis supplied.) The issue here, therefore, is whether defendant or Schultze initiated the exchange by conveying a “willingness and desire for a generalized discussion about the investigation.” We conclude that Schultze initiated the exchange when he said, “Harry, I’d like to help you if I can, but I’ve got to get your side of the story before I do.” That statement evinced Schultze’s “desire for a generalized discussion about the investigation.” The statement also constituted “words or actions on the part of police, other than those normally attendant on arrest and custody, that the police

1984(Emphasis supplied.) The issue here, therefore, is whether defendant or Schultze initiated the exchange by conveying a "willingness and desire for a generalized discussion about the investigation." We conclude that Schultze initiated the exchange when he said, "Harry, I'd like to help you if I can, but I've got to get your side of the story before I do." That statement evinced Schultze's "desire for a generalized discussion about the investigation." The statement also constituted "words or actions on the part of police, other than those normally attendant on arrest and custody, that the police

1978Bella v. Aurora Air, Inc., 279 Or 13 , 566 P2d 489 (1977); Burke v. Rachau, 262 Or 323 , 497 P2d 1154 (1972).

1978Bella v. Aurora Air, Inc., 279 Or 13 , 566 P2d 489 (1977); Burke v. Rachau, 262 Or 323 , 497 P2d 1154 (1972).