reasonable doubt standard in Montana

1984Chapman v. State of California (1967), 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 ; State v. Sandstrom (1979), 184 Mont. 391 , 603 P.2d 244 .

1984Chapman v. State of California (1967), 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 ; State v. Sandstrom (1979), 184 Mont. 391 , 603 P.2d 244 .

2017The standard of proof in a civil commitment proceeding is clear and convincing evidence. ¶25 In consideration of the foregoing, we do not accept the proposition in K.G.F. that Strickland “simply does not go far enough to protect the liberty interests of individuals” who may be involuntarily committed, K.G.F., ¶ 33, when the Strickland standard is sufficient to protect the interests of a criminal defendant which “are of such magnitude that historically and without any explicit constitutional requirement they have been protected by standards of proof designed to exclude as nearly as possible the

2017The standard of proof in a civil commitment proceeding is clear and convincing evidence. ¶25 In consideration of the foregoing, we do not accept the proposition in K.G.F. that Strickland “simply does not go far enough to protect the liberty interests of individuals” who may be involuntarily committed, K.G.F., ¶ 33, when the Strickland standard is sufficient to protect the interests of a criminal defendant which “are of such magnitude that historically and without any explicit constitutional requirement they have been protected by standards of proof designed to exclude as nearly as possible the

2002Moreover, this Court has recognized the importance of preserving Indian culture, noting that the reasonable doubt standard of proof applied in ICWA "was intended by Congress to stop the all-too-common removal of Indian children from their Indian families, and thus tribal culture, `by non-tribal government authorities who have no basis for intelligently evaluating the cultural and social premises underlying Indian home life and childrearing.'" In re K.H., 1999 MT 128, ¶¶ 20-21 , 294 Mont. 466, ¶¶ 20-21 , 981 P.2d 1190, ¶¶ 20-21 (quoting Mississippi Choctaw Indian Band v. Holyfield (1989), 490 U

2002Moreover, this Court has recognized the importance of preserving Indian culture, noting that the reasonable doubt standard of proof applied in ICWA “was intended by Congress to stop the all-too-common removal of Indian children from their Indian families, and thus tribal culture, “by non-tribal government authorities who have no basis for intelligently evaluating the cultural and social premises underlying Indian home life and childrearing.’ ” In re K.H., 1999 MT 128, ¶¶ 20-21 , 294 Mont. 466, ¶¶ 20-21 , 981 P.2d 1190, ¶¶ 20-21 (quoting Mississippi Choctaw Indian Band v. Holy field (1989), 490

2002Moreover, this Court has recognized the importance of preserving Indian culture, noting that the reasonable doubt standard of proof applied in ICWA “was intended by Congress to stop the all-too-common removal of Indian children from their Indian families, and thus tribal culture, “by non-tribal government authorities who have no basis for intelligently evaluating the cultural and social premises underlying Indian home life and childrearing.’ ” In re K.H., 1999 MT 128, ¶¶ 20-21 , 294 Mont. 466, ¶¶ 20-21 , 981 P.2d 1190, ¶¶ 20-21 (quoting Mississippi Choctaw Indian Band v. Holy field (1989), 490

2002Moreover, this Court has recognized the importance of preserving Indian culture, noting that the reasonable doubt standard of proof applied in ICWA “was intended by Congress to stop the all-too-common removal of Indian children from their Indian families, and thus tribal culture, “by non-tribal government authorities who have no basis for intelligently evaluating the cultural and social premises underlying Indian home life and childrearing.’ ” In re K.H., 1999 MT 128, ¶¶ 20-21 , 294 Mont. 466, ¶¶ 20-21 , 981 P.2d 1190, ¶¶ 20-21 (quoting Mississippi Choctaw Indian Band v. Holy field (1989), 490

1996State v. Rothacre (1995), 272 Mont. 303,312-13 , 901 P.2d 82,88 ; Chapman v. California (1967), 386 U.S. 18, 24 , 87 S.Ct. 824, 828 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705, 710-11 .

1996State v. Rothacre (1995), 272 Mont. 303,312-13 , 901 P.2d 82,88 ; Chapman v. California (1967), 386 U.S. 18, 24 , 87 S.Ct. 824, 828 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705, 710-11 .

1996Ed. 2d 705, 711 , reh’g denied (1967), 386 U.S. 987 , 87 S. Ct. 1283 , 18 L.

1994State v. Daniels (1984), 210 Mont. 1, 12 , 682 P.2d 173, 179 , (citing Chapman v. California (1967), 386 U.S. 18, 26 , 87 S.Ct. 824, 829 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705, 711 (reh’g denied 386 U.S. 987 , 87 S.Ct. 1283 , 18 L.Ed.2d 241 )).

1996Ed. 2d 705, 711 , reh’g denied (1967), 386 U.S. 987 , 87 S. Ct. 1283 , 18 L.

1994State v. Daniels (1984), 210 Mont. 1, 12 , 682 P.2d 173, 179 , (citing Chapman v. California (1967), 386 U.S. 18, 26 , 87 S.Ct. 824, 829 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705, 711 (reh’g denied 386 U.S. 987 , 87 S.Ct. 1283 , 18 L.Ed.2d 241 )).

2024See §§ 45-2-302(3) and -303, MCA; In re B.W., ¶¶ 19-21; Doyle, ¶ 55; Gollehon, 262 Mont. at 21-22 , 864 P.2d at 261-62 ; Lantis, ¶ 33. ¶37 When, as here, the State charges an accused with personally committing an offense or, in the alternative, that she is at least legally accountable for it by aiding or abetting another in the commission of that offense, the trial court must distinctly, fully, and fairly instruct the jury regarding the essential elements of required proof, and the State’s corresponding burden of proof, for each of those alternative theories of criminal liability and guilt.

2024See §§ 45-2-302(3) and -303, MCA; In re B.W., ¶¶ 19-21; Doyle, ¶ 55; Gollehon, 262 Mont. at 21-22 , 864 P.2d at 261-62 ; Lantis, ¶ 33. ¶37 When, as here, the State charges an accused with personally committing an offense or, in the alternative, that she is at least legally accountable for it by aiding or abetting another in the commission of that offense, the trial court must distinctly, fully, and fairly instruct the jury regarding the essential elements of required proof, and the State’s corresponding burden of proof, for each of those alternative theories of criminal liability and guilt.

2007The test for determining whether such a constitutional error is harmless is “whether it appears TDeyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.’ ” Neder, 527 U.S. at 15 , 119 S. Ct. at 1837 (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S. Ct. 824, 828 (1967)).

2007The test for determining whether such a constitutional error is harmless is “whether it appears TDeyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.’ ” Neder, 527 U.S. at 15 , 119 S. Ct. at 1837 (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S. Ct. 824, 828 (1967)).

2002For example, we have held susceptible to harmless-error analysis the failure to instruct the jury on the presumption of innocence, Kentucky v. Whorton, 441 U.S. 786 , 99 S.Ct. 2088 , 60 L.Ed.2d 640 (1979), while finding it impossible to analyze in terms of harmless error the failure to instruct a jury on the reasonable doubt standard, Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 320, n. 14 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 2790 n. 14, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).

2002For example, we have held susceptible to harmless-error analysis the failure to instruct the jury on the presumption of innocence, Kentucky v. Whorton, 441 U.S. 786 , 99 S.Ct. 2088 , 60 L.Ed.2d 640 (1979), while finding it impossible to analyze in terms of harmless error the failure to instruct a jury on the reasonable doubt standard, Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 320, n. 14 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 2790 n. 14, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).

1998Keyes v. Thirteenth Judicial District, 1998 MT 34, ¶¶ 15-24 , 55 St.

1998We have held that “[t]he test of prejudicial error is whether ‘beyond a reasonable doubt the error did not affect the outcome of the trial.’” Stuit, 277 Mont. at 232 , 921 P.2d at 869 -70 (quoting State v. Alexander (1994), 265 Mont. 192, 198 , 875 P.2d 345, 349 ). ¶51 In the present case, we cannot say, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the District Court’s error in admitting evidence of the drugs did not affect the outcome of Ingraham’s trial.

1998We have held that “[t]he test of prejudicial error is whether ‘beyond a reasonable doubt the error did not affect the outcome of the trial.’” Stuit, 277 Mont. at 232 , 921 P.2d at 869 -70 (quoting State v. Alexander (1994), 265 Mont. 192, 198 , 875 P.2d 345, 349 ). ¶51 In the present case, we cannot say, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the District Court’s error in admitting evidence of the drugs did not affect the outcome of Ingraham’s trial.

1998Keyes v. Thirteenth Judicial District, 1998 MT 34, ¶¶ 15-24 , 55 St.

1996State v. Rothacre (1995), 272 Mont. 303, 312-13 , 901 P.2d 82, 88 ; State v. McKenzie (1980), 186 Mont. 481, 532 , 608 P.2d 428, 458 .

1996State v. Rothacre (1995), 272 Mont. 303, 312-13 , 901 P.2d 82, 88 ; State v. McKenzie (1980), 186 Mont. 481, 532 , 608 P.2d 428, 458 .

1994State v. Daniels (1984), 210 Mont. 1, 12 , 682 P.2d 173, 179 , (citing Chapman v. California (1967), 386 U.S. 18, 26 , 87 S.Ct. 824, 829 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705, 711 (reh’g denied 386 U.S. 987 , 87 S.Ct. 1283 , 18 L.Ed.2d 241 )).

1994State v. Daniels (1984), 210 Mont. 1, 12 , 682 P.2d 173, 179 , (citing Chapman v. California (1967), 386 U.S. 18, 26 , 87 S.Ct. 824, 829 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705, 711 (reh’g denied 386 U.S. 987 , 87 S.Ct. 1283 , 18 L.Ed.2d 241 )).

1992He also cites Beck v. Alabama (1980), 447 U.S. 625, 634 , 100 S.Ct. 2382, 2388 , 65 L.Ed.2d 392, 400 , in which the Supreme Court stated that “[plroviding the jury with the “third option” of convicting on a lesser included offense ensures that the jury will accord the defendant the full benefit of the reasonable-doubt standard.

1992He also cites Beck v. Alabama (1980), 447 U.S. 625, 634 , 100 S.Ct. 2382, 2388 , 65 L.Ed.2d 392, 400 , in which the Supreme Court stated that “[plroviding the jury with the “third option” of convicting on a lesser included offense ensures that the jury will accord the defendant the full benefit of the reasonable-doubt standard.