reasonable doubt error in West Virginia

2022Va. 724 , 735 S.E.2d 727 (2012)] that ‘[i]n a criminal case, the burden is upon the beneficiary of a constitutional error to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.’”).

2019Furthermore, "In a criminal case, the burden is upon the beneficiary of a constitutional error to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained." Syl. pt. 3 State v. Frazier , 229 W.

2018Petitioner’s remaining assertions concerning the creation of reasonable doubt due to the failure to recover the marked money and failure to capture the entire transaction on video are also unavailing because “[t]he beyond a reasonable doubt standard does not require the exclusion of every other hypothesis or, for that matter, every other reasonable hypothesis.” Id. at 670 , 461 S.E.2d at 176 .

2018Petitioner’s remaining assertions concerning the creation of reasonable doubt due to the failure to recover the marked money and failure to capture the entire transaction on video are also unavailing because “[t]he beyond a reasonable doubt standard does not require the exclusion of every other hypothesis or, for that matter, every other reasonable hypothesis.” Id. at 670 , 461 S.E.2d at 176 .

2017It is true that this Court has held that instructions which vary the reasonable doubt standard or attempt to explain it “are strongly discouraged, because they certainly confuse the jury as to the meaning of reasonable doubt and may by themselves be prejudicial to the defendant for the obvious reason that the jury is invited to convict on a lesser standard of proof.” Id. at 54 , 272 S.E.2d at 462 (quoting State v. Starr, 158 W.Va. 905 , 216 S.E.2d 242 (1975)).

2017It is true that this Court has held that instructions which vary the reasonable doubt standard or attempt to explain it “are strongly discouraged, because they certainly confuse the jury as to the meaning of reasonable doubt and may by themselves be prejudicial to the defendant for the obvious reason that the jury is invited to convict on a lesser standard of proof.” Id. at 54 , 272 S.E.2d at 462 (quoting State v. Starr, 158 W.Va. 905 , 216 S.E.2d 242 (1975)).

2017It is true that this Court has held that instructions which vary the reasonable doubt standard or attempt to explain it “are strongly discouraged, because they certainly confuse the jury as to the meaning of reasonable doubt and may by themselves be prejudicial to the defendant for the obvious reason that the jury is invited to convict on a lesser standard of proof.” Id. at 54 , 272 S.E.2d at 462 (quoting State v. Starr, 158 W.Va. 905 , 216 S.E.2d 242 (1975)).

2017It is true that this Court has held that instructions which vary the reasonable doubt standard or attempt to explain it “are strongly discouraged, because they certainly confuse the jury as to the meaning of reasonable doubt and may by themselves be prejudicial to the defendant for the obvious reason that the jury is invited to convict on a lesser standard of proof.” Id. at 54 , 272 S.E.2d at 462 (quoting State v. Starr, 158 W.Va. 905 , 216 S.E.2d 242 (1975)).

1982One of the State’s instructions in Keffer of which we disapproved is almost identical to State’s Instruction No. 5 in the present case. 15 We have repeatedly discouraged the giving of instructions which attempt to define the reasonable doubt standard beyond the traditional formulation. 16 State v. Keffer, supra; State v. Goff, 166 W.Va. 47 , 272 S.E.2d 457 (1980); State v. Starr, 158 W.Va. 905 , 216 S.E.2d 242 (1975); State v. Powers, 91 W.Va. 737 , 113 S.E. 912 (1922), overruled on other grounds, State v. Petry, 166 W.Va. 153 , 273 S.E.2d 346 (1980).

1982One of the State’s instructions in Keffer of which we disapproved is almost identical to State’s Instruction No. 5 in the present case. 15 We have repeatedly discouraged the giving of instructions which attempt to define the reasonable doubt standard beyond the traditional formulation. 16 State v. Keffer, supra; State v. Goff, 166 W.Va. 47 , 272 S.E.2d 457 (1980); State v. Starr, 158 W.Va. 905 , 216 S.E.2d 242 (1975); State v. Powers, 91 W.Va. 737 , 113 S.E. 912 (1922), overruled on other grounds, State v. Petry, 166 W.Va. 153 , 273 S.E.2d 346 (1980).

1978The Supreme Court reversed the North Carolina Court's limited, prospective application of the Mullaney rule, reasoning: In Mullaney v. Wilbur , as in In re Winship [ 397 U.S. 358 , 90 S.Ct. 1068 , 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970)], the Court held that due process requires the States in some circumstances to apply the reasonable-doubt standard of proof rather than some lesser standard under which an accused would more easily lose his liberty.

1978The Supreme Court reversed the North Carolina Court's limited, prospective application of the Mullaney rule, reasoning: In Mullaney v. Wilbur , as in In re Winship [ 397 U.S. 358 , 90 S.Ct. 1068 , 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970)], the Court held that due process requires the States in some circumstances to apply the reasonable-doubt standard of proof rather than some lesser standard under which an accused would more easily lose his liberty.

1982One of the State’s instructions in Keffer of which we disapproved is almost identical to State’s Instruction No. 5 in the present case. 15 We have repeatedly discouraged the giving of instructions which attempt to define the reasonable doubt standard beyond the traditional formulation. 16 State v. Keffer, supra; State v. Goff, 166 W.Va. 47 , 272 S.E.2d 457 (1980); State v. Starr, 158 W.Va. 905 , 216 S.E.2d 242 (1975); State v. Powers, 91 W.Va. 737 , 113 S.E. 912 (1922), overruled on other grounds, State v. Petry, 166 W.Va. 153 , 273 S.E.2d 346 (1980).

1982One of the State’s instructions in Keffer of which we disapproved is almost identical to State’s Instruction No. 5 in the present case. 15 We have repeatedly discouraged the giving of instructions which attempt to define the reasonable doubt standard beyond the traditional formulation. 16 State v. Keffer, supra; State v. Goff, 166 W.Va. 47 , 272 S.E.2d 457 (1980); State v. Starr, 158 W.Va. 905 , 216 S.E.2d 242 (1975); State v. Powers, 91 W.Va. 737 , 113 S.E. 912 (1922), overruled on other grounds, State v. Petry, 166 W.Va. 153 , 273 S.E.2d 346 (1980).

1979More frequently the defendant and his witnesses will inject the issue. [6] We believe that the rule requiring that there be competent evidence tending to show self-defense, as stated in State v. Green, W.Va., 206 S.E.2d 923 (1974), comports with the reasonable doubt standard, but is better expressed as evidence sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to the defense of self-defense.

1978We believe that the rule requiring that there be competent evidence tending to show self-defense, as stated in State v. Green, _ W.Va. _, 206 S.E.2d 923 (1974), comports with the reasonable doubt standard, but is better expressed as evidence sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to the defense of self-defense.

2023In his third assignment of error, petitioner again challenges the trial court’s denial of his request for a reasonable doubt jury instruction ending with the phrase, “the reasonable doubt requirement is met if the evidence is such that the finding of guilt is based on a moral certainty.” Petitioner cites to State v. Bailey, 151 W.

2023Va. 796 , 155 S.E.2d 850 (1967), which provides that “the reasonable doubt requirement is met if the evidence is such that the finding of guilt is based 3 on moral certainty. 30 Am.

2013Va. 724 , 735 S.E.2d 727 (2012). 8. “‘To constitute probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant, the affiant must set forth facts indicating the existence of criminal activities which would justify a search and further, if there is an unnamed informant, sufficient facts must be set forth iii demonstrating that the information obtained from the unnamed informant is reliable.’ Syllabus point 1, State v. Stone, 165 W.

2013Petitioner also argues that plain error exists because the circuit court failed to instruct the jury that they had to choose between the counts in the indictment even though counsel did not object at trial. 1 The State argues that petitioner failed to properly object to the circuit court’s jury instruction that the jury could find petitioner guilty on both counts pursuant to Rule 30 of the West Virginia Rules of Criminal Procedure and State v. LaRock, 196 W.Va. 294 , 470 S.E.2d 613 (1996).

2013Petitioner also argues that plain error exists because the circuit court failed to instruct the jury that they had to choose between the counts in the indictment even though counsel did not object at trial. 1 The State argues that petitioner failed to properly object to the circuit court’s jury instruction that the jury could find petitioner guilty on both counts pursuant to Rule 30 of the West Virginia Rules of Criminal Procedure and State v. LaRock, 196 W.Va. 294 , 470 S.E.2d 613 (1996).

2013Likewise, in Morrison v. Holland, 177 W.Va. 297 , 352 S.E.2d 46 (1986), this Court stated that "[u]nder the harmless constitutional error doctrine, the State's burden is to show ‘beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.' ” 177 W.Va. at 301, 352 S.E.2d at 51 (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967)).

2013Likewise, in Morrison v. Holland, 177 W.Va. 297 , 352 S.E.2d 46 (1986), this Court stated that "[u]nder the harmless constitutional error doctrine, the State's burden is to show ‘beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.' ” 177 W.Va. at 301, 352 S.E.2d at 51 (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967)).

1998In a subsequent case, Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 , 106 S.Ct. 1431 , 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986), the Supreme Court examined the harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt standard in the context of a defendant’s denial of an opportunity to impeach a prosecution witness for bias and stated that a number of factors were to be considered: the importance of the witness’ testimony, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of corroborating or contradicting testimony on material points, the extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted, and the overall strength of the prosec

1998In a subsequent case, Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 , 106 S.Ct. 1431 , 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986), the Supreme Court examined the harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt standard in the context of a defendant’s denial of an opportunity to impeach a prosecution witness for bias and stated that a number of factors were to be considered: the importance of the witness’ testimony, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of corroborating or contradicting testimony on material points, the extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted, and the overall strength of the prosec

1998Id. at 23-24, 87 S.Ct. 824 (quoting Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86-87 , 84 S.Ct. 229 , 11 L.Ed.2d 171 (1963)).

1998Id. at 23-24, 87 S.Ct. 824 (quoting Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86-87 , 84 S.Ct. 229 , 11 L.Ed.2d 171 (1963)).

1998In Syllabus Point 2 of State v. Romine, 166 W.Va. 135 , 272 S.E.2d 680 (1980), this Court stated: In a criminal trial, where it is clear that an erroneous instruction was given and this Court cannot confidently declare beyond a reasonable doubt that such instruction in no way contributed to the conviction or affected the outcome of the trial, the con *292 viction must be reversed and a new trial granted.

1998In Syllabus Point 2 of State v. Romine, 166 W.Va. 135 , 272 S.E.2d 680 (1980), this Court stated: In a criminal trial, where it is clear that an erroneous instruction was given and this Court cannot confidently declare beyond a reasonable doubt that such instruction in no way contributed to the conviction or affected the outcome of the trial, the con *292 viction must be reversed and a new trial granted.

1994It announced that federal habeas relief is required if the federal court finds `that upon the record evidence adduced at the trial no rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.' [ 443 U.S. at 324 , 99 S.Ct. at 2791-92 , 61 L.Ed.2d at 576-77 .

1994It announced that federal habeas relief is required if the federal court finds `that upon the record evidence adduced at the trial no rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.' [ 443 U.S. at 324 , 99 S.Ct. at 2791-92 , 61 L.Ed.2d at 576-77 .