reasonable doubt error in Iowa

2017See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967) (holding constitutional error is harmless if “the beneficiary of a constitutional error . . . prove[s] beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained”). b.

2016“To establish harmless error, the State must ‘prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.’” State v. Peterson, 663 N.W.2d 417, 431 (Iowa 2003) (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)).

2015“To establish harmless error, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict.” State v. Walls, 761 N.W.2d 683, 686 (Iowa 2009).

2012To establish harmless error for a constitutional violation, " 'the State must "prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained." ’ ” State v. Walls, 761 N.W.2d 683, 686 (Iowa 2009) (quoting State v. Peterson, 663 N.W.2d 417, 431 (Iowa 2003)).

2016“To establish harmless error, the State must ‘prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.’” State v. Peterson, 663 N.W.2d 417, 431 (Iowa 2003) (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)).

2016“To establish harmless error, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” State v. Miranda, 672 N.W.2d 753 , 761–62 (Iowa 2003) (quoting State v. Peterson, 663 N.W.2d 417, 431 (Iowa 2003)).

2010State v. Traywick, 468 N.W.2d 452, 455 (Iowa 1991).

2010State v. Traywick, 468 N.W.2d 452, 455 (Iowa 1991).

1995In order to declare admission of a statement obtained in violation of a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel harmless, the state must “prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24 , 87 S.Ct. at 828 , 17 L.Ed.2d at 710 ; Lanphear, 220 N.W.2d at 622 ; State v. Coy, 433 N.W.2d 714, 715 (Iowa 1988).

1994Coy, 433 N.W.2d at 715 ; Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24 , 87 S.Ct. at 828 , 17 L.Ed.2d at 710 ; c.

2013Frei contends the reasonable doubt instruction given by the district court in this case fell short of the applicable due process standard because it failed to “ ‘impress[] upon the factfinder the need to reach a subjective state of near certitude of the guilt of the accused.’ ” Id. at 15 , 114 S.Ct. at 1247 , 127 L.Ed.2d at 596 (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 315 , 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2786 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560, 571 (1979)).

2013Frei contends the reasonable doubt instruction given by the district court in this case fell short of the applicable due process standard because it failed to “ ‘impress[] upon the factfinder the need to reach a subjective state of near certitude of the guilt of the accused.’ ” Id. at 15 , 114 S.Ct. at 1247 , 127 L.Ed.2d at 596 (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 315 , 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2786 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560, 571 (1979)).

2008City of Des Moines v. Rosenberg, 243 Iowa 262, 272-73 , 51 N.W.2d 450, 456 (1952).

2008City of Des Moines v. Rosenberg, 243 Iowa 262, 272-73 , 51 N.W.2d 450, 456 (1952).

1999See State v. Baldwin, 396 N.W.2d 192, 197 (Iowa 1986).

1991State v. Boley, 456 N.W.2d 674, 678 (Iowa 1990); State v. Coy, 433 N.W.2d 714, 715 (Iowa 1988); State v. Baldwin, 396 N.W.2d 192, 197 (Iowa 1986); see Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23-24 , 87 S.Ct. 824, 827-28 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705, 710-11 (1967).

1998We conclude the record amply supports the court’s finding that, under the reasonable-doubt standard established in Phillips v. Iowa District Court, 380 N.W.2d 706, 709 (Iowa 1986), Andrew failed to abide by the visitation terms set out in the parties’ dissolution decree.

1990On the claim involving the sufficiency of the evidence, we conclude, based on our review of the record, that the evidence supported the defendant judge's finding that, under the reasonable doubt standard established in Phillips v. Iowa District Court, 380 N.W.2d 706, 709 (Iowa 1986), the defendant had willfully shirked his responsibilities under the dissolution decree.

1986The district court granted postconviction relief to Gering after finding that the court at his trial, in instructing the jury, failed to follow the mandate of State v. McGrana-han, 206 N.W.2d 88, 92 (Iowa 1973) by not referring to “evidence produced by the State” in the reasonable doubt instruction, and failed to instruct the jury that its verdict must be unanimous.

1976As we pointed out in State v. McGranahan, 206 N.W.2d 88, 91, 92 (Iowa 1973), no particular model or form is required in advising the jury concerning the meaning of reasonable doubt as long as a suitable standard is given.

1975The court did not use the language held noxious in State v. Hansen, 203 N.W.2d 216, 218 (Iowa).” We believe that same reasoning applies here.

1975The court did not use the language held nocuous in State v. Hansen, 203 N.W.2d 216, 218 (Iowa).

1986In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 , 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1073 , 25 L.Ed.2d 368, 375 (1970), squarely held that proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal proceeding *708 is a requirement of constitutional magnitude: Lest there remain any doubt about the constitutional stature of the reasonable-doubt standard, we explicitly hold that the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.

1986In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 , 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1073 , 25 L.Ed.2d 368, 375 (1970), squarely held that proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal proceeding *708 is a requirement of constitutional magnitude: Lest there remain any doubt about the constitutional stature of the reasonable-doubt standard, we explicitly hold that the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.

2022Guidance is appropriate to 23 reduce further appellate litigation and confusion in district court on which formulation for a jury instruction on reasonable doubt is most preferred.7 We believe the “firmly convinced” formulation as used in this case best captures reasonable doubt. “[T]he ‘firmly convinced’ standard has achieved extensive recognition and is likely the formulation of the reasonable doubt standard most widely approved by American jurists, academics, and litigants.” Frei, 831 N.W.2d at 78 (citing Lawrence M.

2014See State v. Frei, 831 N.W.2d 70 , 78–79 (Iowa 2013).

2009State v. Seiler, 342 N.W.2d 264 , 268 *300 (Iowa 1983).

2009State v. Seiler, 342 N.W.2d 264, 268 (Iowa 1983).

1995In order to declare admission of a statement obtained in violation of a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel harmless, the state must “prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24 , 87 S.Ct. at 828 , 17 L.Ed.2d at 710 ; Lanphear, 220 N.W.2d at 622 ; State v. Coy, 433 N.W.2d 714, 715 (Iowa 1988).

1981To the extent that the jury might draw any adverse inference from that evidence when compared with defendant’s trial testimony, we hold that any error in admitting O’Donnell’s testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under the standard delineated in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23-24 , 87 S.Ct. 824, 827-28 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705, 711 (1967); see State v. Lanphear, 220 N.W.2d 618, 622 (Iowa 1974).

2022See, e.g., United States v. Walton, 207 F.3d 694 , 697–99 (4th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (per curiam) (noting that any attempts to define reasonable doubt do not usually result in making it clearer and that only a jury can truly define reasonable doubt); United States v. Cassiere, 4 F.3d 1006, 1024 (1st Cir. 1993) (concluding that an instruction that requires a reasonable doubt standard “without [a] definition adequately apprises the jury of the proper burden of proof” (quoting United States v. Olmstead, 832 F.2d 642, 646 (1st Cir. 1987))); United States v. Taylor, 997 F.2d 1551, 1558 (D.C.

2022See, e.g., Gilday v. Callahan, 59 F.3d 257, 264 (1st Cir. 1995) (noting that “hesitate to act” language is arguably unhelpful); United States v. O’Brien, 972 F.2d 12 , 15–16 (1st Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (asserting that “hesitate to act” instruction undermines the constitutionally required burden of proof).

2022But, the United States Supreme Court in Holland v. United States declared that a reasonable doubt instruction “should have been in terms of the kind of doubt that would make a person hesitate to act.” 348 U.S. 121, 140 (1954).

2022See, e.g., United States v. Walton, 207 F.3d 694 , 697–99 (4th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (per curiam) (noting that any attempts to define reasonable doubt do not usually result in making it clearer and that only a jury can truly define reasonable doubt); United States v. Cassiere, 4 F.3d 1006, 1024 (1st Cir. 1993) (concluding that an instruction that requires a reasonable doubt standard “without [a] definition adequately apprises the jury of the proper burden of proof” (quoting United States v. Olmstead, 832 F.2d 642, 646 (1st Cir. 1987))); United States v. Taylor, 997 F.2d 1551, 1558 (D.C.

2022See, e.g., United States v. Walton, 207 F.3d 694 , 697–99 (4th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (per curiam) (noting that any attempts to define reasonable doubt do not usually result in making it clearer and that only a jury can truly define reasonable doubt); United States v. Cassiere, 4 F.3d 1006, 1024 (1st Cir. 1993) (concluding that an instruction that requires a reasonable doubt standard “without [a] definition adequately apprises the jury of the proper burden of proof” (quoting United States v. Olmstead, 832 F.2d 642, 646 (1st Cir. 1987))); United States v. Taylor, 997 F.2d 1551, 1558 (D.C.

2022See, e.g., United States v. Walton, 207 F.3d 694 , 697–99 (4th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (per curiam) (noting that any attempts to define reasonable doubt do not usually result in making it clearer and that only a jury can truly define reasonable doubt); United States v. Cassiere, 4 F.3d 1006, 1024 (1st Cir. 1993) (concluding that an instruction that requires a reasonable doubt standard “without [a] definition adequately apprises the jury of the proper burden of proof” (quoting United States v. Olmstead, 832 F.2d 642, 646 (1st Cir. 1987))); United States v. Taylor, 997 F.2d 1551, 1558 (D.C.