reasonable doubt standard in Delaware

2025Harmless error is a case-specific, fact-intensive analysis.180 When the error complained of is constitutional in nature, we apply a “very exacting” test 181 that requires us to be convinced “beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.”182 The focus is “not whether the legally admitted evidence was sufficient to support the [verdict],”183 but whether there is “a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction.”184 178 Although the Majority points out that, unlike Weddington, the State advised

2024The State bears the burden of proving harmless error,142 and in this case the State must show that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the error violated Terreros’s constitutional rights.143 In order to conclude that the improper admission of evidence constituted harmless error, we must have no “reasonable fear that injustice occurred that might have influenced the trial.”144 If the unconstitutionally admitted evidence was “critical,” we cannot conclude that the State met its burden on harmless error.145 141 Taylor, 260 A.3d at 617–18 (“There is no room, however, for limit

2026The concept of reasonable belief is an objective test . . . .”55 Under Rule 23.1, a plaintiff must plead particularized facts sufficient to give rise to a reasonable doubt, but that does not mean that a plaintiff must “plead particularized facts sufficient to sustain ‘a judicial finding’” that a director would be disabled from considering a demand.56 That requirement would impose “an excessive 52 Grimes, 673 A.2d at 1217 (footnote omitted). 53 Id. 54 Id. 55 Id. at 1217 n.17. 56 Grobow, 539 A.2d at 183 . 39 criterion” for applying Rule 23.1.57 The operative standard is the reasonable doubt test

2026The concept of reasonable belief is an objective test . . . .”55 Under Rule 23.1, a plaintiff must plead particularized facts sufficient to give rise to a reasonable doubt, but that does not mean that a plaintiff must “plead particularized facts sufficient to sustain ‘a judicial finding’” that a director would be disabled from considering a demand.56 That requirement would impose “an excessive 52 Grimes, 673 A.2d at 1217 (footnote omitted). 53 Id. 54 Id. 55 Id. at 1217 n.17. 56 Grobow, 539 A.2d at 183 . 39 criterion” for applying Rule 23.1.57 The operative standard is the reasonable doubt test

2025Accordingly, we find that the present case falls into the category of constitutional 30 386 U.S. 18, 22 (1967) (fashioning “a harmless-constitutional-error rule” the application of which depends on the reviewing court’s satisfaction beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the defendant’s conviction). 31 Weddington, 545 A.2d at 614 . 32 Id. (quoting Chapman, 386 U.S. at 23 ). 17 violations to which, as Chapman recognizes, the harmless error rule does not apply. . . .

2025Accordingly, we find that the present case falls into the category of constitutional 30 386 U.S. 18, 22 (1967) (fashioning “a harmless-constitutional-error rule” the application of which depends on the reviewing court’s satisfaction beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the defendant’s conviction). 31 Weddington, 545 A.2d at 614 . 32 Id. (quoting Chapman, 386 U.S. at 23 ). 17 violations to which, as Chapman recognizes, the harmless error rule does not apply. . . .

2014I, §§ 6, 7, 8, 11, 12. 1 determination of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.5 Outside of the criminal arena, imposition of a guardianship represents the most significant deprivation of the right to self-determination a court can impose.6 This case represents a first chance to address the proper standard by which evidence of the need for a guardianship must be established.7 5 See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (“Lest there remain any doubt about the constitutional stature of the reasonable-doubt standard, we explicitly hold that the Due Process Clause protects the accused against

2002See In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 , 90 S.Ct. 1068 , 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970) ("Lest there be any doubt about the constitutional stature of the reasonable-doubt standard, we explicitly hold that the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged”). 18 . 509 A.2d 1106, 1112 (Del.1986). 19 . 522 A.2d at 858 . 20 . 437 A.2d 559, 571 (Del.1981) (quoting Dyson v. United States, 418 A.2d 127, 132 (D.C.1980)). 21 .

2025Pa. May 31, 2022) (commending the Commonwealth for conceding that the reasonable doubt instruction at issue in the case was unconstitutional and that the defendant suffered prejudice as a result); see also Hunter v. State, 815 A.2d 730, 735 (Del. 2002) (quoting Sexton v. State, 397 A.2d 540, 544 (Del. 1979)) (“The law in this area is well settled.

2019Seitz, Jr. Justice 17 Id. (quoting Wainwright v. State, 504 A.2d 1096, 1100 (Del. 1986)). 18 See Morales v. State, 133 A.3d 527, 532 (Del. 2016) (finding a statement that the defendant was “clearly guilty” was “not so clearly prejudicial as to jeopardize the fairness and integrity of the trial process” under plain error review). 19 See, e.g., Hunter v. State, 815 A.2d 730, 734-38 (Del. 2002) (reversing conviction when the prosecutor misrepresented the evidence, denigrated the defense counsel, vouched for a State witness, and downplayed the reasonable doubt standard). 20 Id. at 733 . 7

2024If on the other hand, you think there is a real possibility that he is not guilty, you must give him the benefit of the doubt and find him not guilty.150 Justice Ginsburg reasoned that the “firmly convinced” language is “further enhanced” by the juxtaposition with the “real possibility” language.151 But she also noted: [T]he test we properly apply in evaluating the constitutionality of a reasonable doubt instruction is not whether we find it exemplary; instead, we inquire only whether there is a [‘]reasonable likelihood that the jury understood the instructio[n] to allow conviction based on pr

2024If on the other hand, you think there is a real possibility that he is not guilty, you must give him the benefit of the doubt and find him not guilty.150 Justice Ginsburg reasoned that the “firmly convinced” language is “further enhanced” by the juxtaposition with the “real possibility” language.151 But she also noted: [T]he test we properly apply in evaluating the constitutionality of a reasonable doubt instruction is not whether we find it exemplary; instead, we inquire only whether there is a [‘]reasonable likelihood that the jury understood the instructio[n] to allow conviction based on pr

2025The prosecutor ‘represents all the people, including the defendant’ and must ‘seek justice, not merely convictions.’”); Seth v. State, 592 A.2d 436, 442 (Del. 1991) (quoting Hughes v. State, 437 A.2d 559, 566 (Del. 1981)) (“Defendant correctly notes that it is the responsibility of a prosecutor to ‘seek justice, not merely convictions.’”). 36 The jury did ask one question about the racketeering charge.

2002See In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 , 90 S.Ct. 1068 , 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970) ("Lest there be any doubt about the constitutional stature of the reasonable-doubt standard, we explicitly hold that the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged”). 18 . 509 A.2d 1106, 1112 (Del.1986). 19 . 522 A.2d at 858 . 20 . 437 A.2d 559, 571 (Del.1981) (quoting Dyson v. United States, 418 A.2d 127, 132 (D.C.1980)). 21 .

2022“Providing the jury with the ‘third option’ of convicting on a lesser included offense ensures that the jury will accord the defendant the full benefit of the reasonable doubt standard.”25 Defendant relies 24 447 U.S. 625 (1980). 25 Id. at 634 . 11 on Beck in arguing that without the option of a lesser-included offense, there may be a substantial risk that a jury will deviate from legal theory and not bestow the full benefit of reasonable doubt in cases where one element of a charge is in dispute, but think the Defendant is guilty of some crime.

2022“Providing the jury with the ‘third option’ of convicting on a lesser included offense ensures that the jury will accord the defendant the full benefit of the reasonable doubt standard.”25 Defendant relies 24 447 U.S. 625 (1980). 25 Id. at 634 . 11 on Beck in arguing that without the option of a lesser-included offense, there may be a substantial risk that a jury will deviate from legal theory and not bestow the full benefit of reasonable doubt in cases where one element of a charge is in dispute, but think the Defendant is guilty of some crime.

2016See, e.g., Keyset- v. State, 893 A.2d 956, 960 (Del.2006) (endorsing reasonable doubt instruction nearly identical to Goode’s); Mills, 732 A.2d at 852-53 (same); see also id. at 852 ("Justice Ginsberg [has stated of the relevant instruction that] 'this model instruction surpasses others I have seen in stating the reasonable doubt standard succinctly and comprehensively.’ " (quoting Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 27 , 114 S.Ct. 1239 , 127 L.Ed.2d 583 (1994) (Ginsburg, J., concurring))). 46 .

2016See, e.g., Keyset- v. State, 893 A.2d 956, 960 (Del.2006) (endorsing reasonable doubt instruction nearly identical to Goode’s); Mills, 732 A.2d at 852-53 (same); see also id. at 852 ("Justice Ginsberg [has stated of the relevant instruction that] 'this model instruction surpasses others I have seen in stating the reasonable doubt standard succinctly and comprehensively.’ " (quoting Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 27 , 114 S.Ct. 1239 , 127 L.Ed.2d 583 (1994) (Ginsburg, J., concurring))). 46 .

2019If we find error, we next examine whether the error was harmless. 9 A constitutional error is harmless only if the State has proven “beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.”10 We must reverse if we find that the error was not harmless.11 (23) “If double hearsay is being offered into evidence, each aspect must qualify independently as an exception to the hearsay rule.” 12 Section 3507 acts as such an exception, permitting the admission of out-of-court statements of a present witness available for cross-examination. 9 We automatically re

1987Van Arsdall v. State, 524 A.2d 3 .

2025Harmless error is a case-specific, fact-intensive analysis.180 When the error complained of is constitutional in nature, we apply a “very exacting” test 181 that requires us to be convinced “beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.”182 The focus is “not whether the legally admitted evidence was sufficient to support the [verdict],”183 but whether there is “a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction.”184 178 Although the Majority points out that, unlike Weddington, the State advised

2025Here, the instruction stated: “every person is inferred to intend the natural and probable consequences of his acts.” B322. 81 442 U.S. 510, 515 (1979), modified by Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370 (1990). 82 471 U.S. 307 , 329–30 (1985), modified by Boyde, 494 U.S. 370 . 20 consequences of his act.”83 To the extent that Ford’s argument on appeal can be viewed as raising the issue of mandatory rebuttable presumptions addressed in Plass, Sandstrom, and Francis, the Superior Court gave Ford’s jury a specific reasonable doubt instruction within the “State of Mind” section (along with a separate,

2025The court instructed the jury that the “[f]act that our law permits you to draw an inference about a Defendant’s state of mind in no way relieves the State of its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt every element of the case.”84 Because this Court has held that “infer” is different than “presume,”85 and because of the specific reasonable doubt instruction here—given within the State of Mind instruction—we find no plain error. 83 Ford asserts that the court “. . . commented, implicitly, on the conscious disregard on the part of the Defendant by indicating that not only is he reckless, b

2025When the error does not implicate constitutional rights, “[t]he well-established rule is that where the evidence exclusive of the improperly admitted evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction, error in admitting the evidence is harmless.” But when . . . the error violated the defendant’s constitutional rights, an error is harmless only if the 56 Buckham v. State, 185 A.3d 1, 13 (Del. 2018). 26 State proves “beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.”57 Here, the error is not of constitutional magnitude.

2025The prosecutor ‘represents all the people, including the defendant’ and must ‘seek justice, not merely convictions.’”); Seth v. State, 592 A.2d 436, 442 (Del. 1991) (quoting Hughes v. State, 437 A.2d 559, 566 (Del. 1981)) (“Defendant correctly notes that it is the responsibility of a prosecutor to ‘seek justice, not merely convictions.’”). 36 The jury did ask one question about the racketeering charge.

2025The court instructed the jury that the “[f]act that our law permits you to draw an inference about a Defendant’s state of mind in no way relieves the State of its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt every element of the case.”84 Because this Court has held that “infer” is different than “presume,”85 and because of the specific reasonable doubt instruction here—given within the State of Mind instruction—we find no plain error. 83 Ford asserts that the court “. . . commented, implicitly, on the conscious disregard on the part of the Defendant by indicating that not only is he reckless, b

2025The court instructed the jury that the “[f]act that our law permits you to draw an inference about a Defendant’s state of mind in no way relieves the State of its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt every element of the case.”84 Because this Court has held that “infer” is different than “presume,”85 and because of the specific reasonable doubt instruction here—given within the State of Mind instruction—we find no plain error. 83 Ford asserts that the court “. . . commented, implicitly, on the conscious disregard on the part of the Defendant by indicating that not only is he reckless, b

2025Pa. May 31, 2022) (commending the Commonwealth for conceding that the reasonable doubt instruction at issue in the case was unconstitutional and that the defendant suffered prejudice as a result); see also Hunter v. State, 815 A.2d 730, 735 (Del. 2002) (quoting Sexton v. State, 397 A.2d 540, 544 (Del. 1979)) (“The law in this area is well settled.

2024The State bears the burden of proving harmless error,142 and in this case the State must show that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the error violated Terreros’s constitutional rights.143 In order to conclude that the improper admission of evidence constituted harmless error, we must have no “reasonable fear that injustice occurred that might have influenced the trial.”144 If the unconstitutionally admitted evidence was “critical,” we cannot conclude that the State met its burden on harmless error.145 141 Taylor, 260 A.3d at 617–18 (“There is no room, however, for limit

2024The State bears the burden of proving harmless error,142 and in this case the State must show that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the error violated Terreros’s constitutional rights.143 In order to conclude that the improper admission of evidence constituted harmless error, we must have no “reasonable fear that injustice occurred that might have influenced the trial.”144 If the unconstitutionally admitted evidence was “critical,” we cannot conclude that the State met its burden on harmless error.145 141 Taylor, 260 A.3d at 617–18 (“There is no room, however, for limit

2024Bentley v. State, 930 A.2d 866, 875 (Del. 2007) (citing Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 634 (1980)). 66 Cseh, 947 A.2d at 1114 (citing Henry v. State, 805 A.2d 860, 864 (Del. 2002) and Bentley, 930 A.2d at 875 ). 67 Cseh, 947 A.2d at 1114 . 26 acquit El-Abbadi of MBAN, First Degree and MBAN, Second Degree, and instead, to convict him of Manslaughter or Criminally Negligent Homicide.

2024The State also contends that the “real possibility” language that Burrell asserts is necessary for the instruction to be complete is the very language that we described as potentially confusing in McNally v. State.142 139 Opening Br. at 40–44. 140 Id. at 40. 141 Id. at 40–44. 142 980 A.2d 364, 368 (Del. 2009), as amended (Sept. 28, 2009); Answering Br. at 37. 33 Claims of constitutional violations are reviewed de novo.143 “When counsel does not object to a jury instruction at trial, the appropriate standard of review is plain error.”144 But, when a reasonable doubt instruction is constitutiona