reasonable doubt error in Florida

2026See State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129, 1135 (Fla. 1986) (“The harmless error test . . . places the burden on the state, as the beneficiary of the error, to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict or, alternatively 5 stated, that there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the conviction.”).

2026The State bears the burden of proving “beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict or, alternatively stated, that there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the conviction.” State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129, 1135 (Fla. 1986).

2026In DiGuilio, this Court explained that in order to demonstrate harmless error, “the beneficiary of the error [has the burden] to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict or, alternatively stated, that there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the conviction.” 491 So. 2d at 1135 , 1139 (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)).

2026In DiGuilio, this Court explained that in order to demonstrate harmless error, “the beneficiary of the error [has the burden] to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict or, alternatively stated, that there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the conviction.” 491 So. 2d at 1135 , 1139 (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)).

2024However, we do not find that the State can “prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict or, alternatively stated, that there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the conviction.” Goodwin v. State, 751 So. 2d 537, 541 (Fla. 1999) (quoting State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129, 1135 (Fla. 1986)).

2022See State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129, 1135 (Fla. 1986) (“The harmless error test … places the burden on the state, as the beneficiary of the error, to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict or, alternatively stated, that there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the conviction.”); Goodwin v. State, 751 So. 2d 537, 547 (Fla. 1999) (“[A] motion for mistrial should be granted only when it is necessary to ensure that the defendant receives a fair trial.”) (citation and 4 internal quotation marks omitted); Grushoff v.

2024Procedural prejudice means that "there is a reasonable possibility that the defendant's trial preparation or strategy would have been materially different had the violation not occurred." Id. "[O]nly if [we] can say beyond a reasonable doubt that the defense was not procedurally prejudiced" can we consider the error harmless.

2023Thus, “only if the appellate court can determine beyond a reasonable doubt that the defense was not procedurally prejudiced by the 9 discovery violation can the error be considered harmless.” Id. (citing Schopp, 653 So. 2d at 1021 ).

2025Under this test, the burden to show that the error was harmless is on the State; and if an “appellate court cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not affect the verdict, then the error is by definition harmful.” Id. (quoting DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d at 1138–39). 7 As part of its harmless error analysis, the court contextually observed that “[a] comment on the right to remain silent strikes at the heart of our criminal justice system,” that “[c]ommenting on a defendant’s failure to testify is a serious error,” and that “[c]omments on silence are high risk errors because there is a

2025The requisite harmless error analysis weighs heavily against the party that stands to benefit from a finding of harmlessness: "If the appellate court cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not affect the verdict, then the error is by definition harmful." Ventura v. State, 29 So. 3d 1086, 1090 (Fla. 2010) (quoting State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1136, 1139 (Fla. 1986)).

2018We also concluded that Hurst "error is capable of harmless error review," explaining: The harmless error test, as set forth in Chapman[ v. California , 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967),] and progeny, places the burden on the state, as the beneficiary of the error, to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict or, alternatively stated, that there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the conviction. 202 So.3d at 68 (quoting State v. DiGuilio , 491 So.2d 1129 , 1138 (Fla. 1986) ).

2018Accordingly, we must consider whether the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt: The harmless error test, as set forth in Chapman[v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967),] and progeny, places the burden on the state, as the beneficiary of the error, to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict or, alternatively stated, that there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the conviction. - 18 - Hurst, 202 So. 3d at 68 (quoting State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129, 1138 (Fla. 1986)).

2007The disputed testimony had the effect of improperly bolstering the victim's testimony. "'If the appellate court cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not affect the verdict, then the error is by definition harmful.'" Essex v. State, 917 So.2d 953, 958 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (quoting State v. Lee, 531 So.2d 133, 136 (Fla.1988)).

2005“If the appellate court cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not affect the verdict, then the error is by definition harmful.” State v. Lee, 531 So.2d 133, 136 (Fla.1988).

2025And it would be fundamental error if an instruction to the jury on reasonable doubt was “suggestive of a higher degree of doubt than that required under the reasonable doubt standard.” Murray v. State, 3 So. 3d 1108, 1123 (Fla. 2009) (citing Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39, 41 (1990)); see also Bove v. State, 670 So. 2d 1066, 1069 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996).

2009See Cage v. Lousiana, 498 U.S. 39, 41 , 111 S.Ct. 328 , 112 L.Ed.2d 339 (1990) (“It is plain to us that the words ‘substantial’ and ‘grave,’ as they are commonly understood, suggest a higher degree of doubt than is required for acquittal under the reasonable doubt standard.”).

2019This standard places “the burden on the state, as the beneficiary of the error, to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict or, alternatively stated, that there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the conviction.” Ibar v. State, 938 So. 2d 451, 466 (Fla. 2006) (quoting State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129, 1135 (Fla. 1986)).

2018This standard places “the burden on the state, as the beneficiary of the error, to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict or, alternatively stated, that there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the conviction.” Ibar v. State, 938 So. 2d 451, 466 (Fla. 2006) (quoting State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129, 1135 (Fla. 1986)). 7 Jackson contends that the prosecutor’s comments were a prohibited “golden rule” argument, impermissibly inviting the jurors to place themselves in the victim’s shoes and to imagine the pain and su

2016“The trial court’s failure to conduct a Richardson hearing is reversible error unless a reviewing court can say beyond a reasonable doubt that the defense was not procedurally prejudiced.” Moorer v. State, 133 So.3d 1242, 1242 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) (footnote omitted). “[T]he defense is procedurally prejudiced if there is a reasonable possibility that the defendant’s trial preparation or strategy would have been materially differed had the violation not occurred.” State v. Schopp, 653 So.2d 1016, 1020 (Fla.1995); see also Scipio v. State, 928 So.2d 1138, 1147 (Fla.2006).

2008Rather, "the inquiry is whether there is a reasonable possibility that the discovery violation `materially hindered the defendant's trial preparation or strategy.'" Id. at 1150 (quoting Schopp, 653 So.2d at 1020 ). "[O]nly if the appellate court can determine beyond a reasonable doubt that the defense was not procedurally prejudiced by the discovery violation can the error be considered harmless." Id. (citing Schopp, 653 So.2d at 1021 ).

1997(Crim.) 2.03 [p 23]; Brown v. State, 565 So.2d 304, 307 (Fla.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 992 , 111 S.Ct. 537 , 112 L.Ed.2d 547 (1990); Kearse v. State, 662 So.2d 677, 681 (Fla.1995)("[T]his court has previously considered and rejected similar constitutional challenges directed at the reasonable doubt instruction."); Esty v. State, 642 So.2d 1074, 1080 (Fla.1994) (taken as a whole, standard jury instructions' use of the words "possible doubt, a speculative, imaginary or forced doubt," correctly conveyed concept of reasonable doubt to jury.), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1027 , 115 S.Ct. 1380 , 131 L.Ed

1996As to the claim that the reasonable doubt instruction is deficient, see Spencer, 645 So.2d at 382 ; Esty v. State, 642 So.2d 1074, 1078-79 (Fla.1994), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 1380 , 131 L.Ed.2d 234 (1995); Brown v. State, 565 So.2d 304, 307 (Fla.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 992 , 111 S.Ct. 537 , 112 L.Ed.2d 547 (1990).

1997(Crim.) 2.03 [p 23]; Brown v. State, 565 So.2d 304, 307 (Fla.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 992 , 111 S.Ct. 537 , 112 L.Ed.2d 547 (1990); Kearse v. State, 662 So.2d 677, 681 (Fla.1995)("[T]his court has previously considered and rejected similar constitutional challenges directed at the reasonable doubt instruction."); Esty v. State, 642 So.2d 1074, 1080 (Fla.1994) (taken as a whole, standard jury instructions' use of the words "possible doubt, a speculative, imaginary or forced doubt," correctly conveyed concept of reasonable doubt to jury.), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1027 , 115 S.Ct. 1380 , 131 L.Ed

1996As to the claim that the reasonable doubt instruction is deficient, see Spencer, 645 So.2d at 382 ; Esty v. State, 642 So.2d 1074, 1078-79 (Fla.1994), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 1380 , 131 L.Ed.2d 234 (1995); Brown v. State, 565 So.2d 304, 307 (Fla.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 992 , 111 S.Ct. 537 , 112 L.Ed.2d 547 (1990).

1997(Crim.) 2.03 [p 23]; Brown v. State, 565 So.2d 304, 307 (Fla.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 992 , 111 S.Ct. 537 , 112 L.Ed.2d 547 (1990); Kearse v. State, 662 So.2d 677, 681 (Fla.1995)("[T]his court has previously considered and rejected similar constitutional challenges directed at the reasonable doubt instruction."); Esty v. State, 642 So.2d 1074, 1080 (Fla.1994) (taken as a whole, standard jury instructions' use of the words "possible doubt, a speculative, imaginary or forced doubt," correctly conveyed concept of reasonable doubt to jury.), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1027 , 115 S.Ct. 1380 , 131 L.Ed

1996As to the claim that the reasonable doubt instruction is deficient, see Spencer, 645 So.2d at 382 ; Esty v. State, 642 So.2d 1074, 1078-79 (Fla.1994), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 1380 , 131 L.Ed.2d 234 (1995); Brown v. State, 565 So.2d 304, 307 (Fla.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 992 , 111 S.Ct. 537 , 112 L.Ed.2d 547 (1990).

1997(Crim.) 2.03 [p 23]; Brown v. State, 565 So.2d 304, 307 (Fla.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 992 , 111 S.Ct. 537 , 112 L.Ed.2d 547 (1990); Kearse v. State, 662 So.2d 677, 681 (Fla.1995)("[T]his court has previously considered and rejected similar constitutional challenges directed at the reasonable doubt instruction."); Esty v. State, 642 So.2d 1074, 1080 (Fla.1994) (taken as a whole, standard jury instructions' use of the words "possible doubt, a speculative, imaginary or forced doubt," correctly conveyed concept of reasonable doubt to jury.), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1027 , 115 S.Ct. 1380 , 131 L.Ed

1996As to the claim that the reasonable doubt instruction is deficient, see Spencer, 645 So.2d at 382 ; Esty v. State, 642 So.2d 1074, 1078-79 (Fla.1994), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 1380 , 131 L.Ed.2d 234 (1995); Brown v. State, 565 So.2d 304, 307 (Fla.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 992 , 111 S.Ct. 537 , 112 L.Ed.2d 547 (1990).

2020Under this standard, we have found harmless error where the defendant suffered no prejudice from his absence, "the defendant would not have been able to assist his counsel in opposing adverse rulings," or "no adverse rulings were made outside the defendant's presence." Ault v. State, 53 So. 3d 175, 202 (Fla. 2010) (citing Pomeranz v. State, 703 So. 2d 465, 471 (Fla. 1997); Roberts v. State, 510 So. 2d 885 , 890– 91 (Fla. 1987); Garcia, 492 So. 2d at 363 ).

2006Then, in analyzing whether the discovery violation was harmless, this Court reiterated the procedural prejudice analysis of Schopp : "[O]nly if the appellate court can say beyond a reasonable doubt that the defense was not procedurally prejudiced by the discovery violation can the error be considered harmless." Id. (quoting Pomeranz v. State, 703 So.2d 465, 468 (Fla. 1997)); see also Irish v. State, 889 So.2d 979, 981 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) (holding that a prior statement made by the defendant to the police that was withheld from the defense attorney undermined the defense's theory and therefore

2020In short, for the reasons expressed below, the error was harmless. • Harmless Error “[U]nder the harmless error test, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict or, alternatively stated, that there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the conviction.” Vilseis v. State, 117 So. 3d 867, 871 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (quoting Symonette v. State, 100 So. 3d 180, 184 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012)).

2020In short, for the reasons expressed below, the error was harmless. • Issue Four: Harmless Error “[U]nder the harmless error test, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict or, alternatively stated, that there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the conviction.” Vilseis v. State, 117 So. 3d 867, 871 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (quoting Symonette v. State, 100 So. 3d 180, 184 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012)).

2020"In other words, when the defendant is involuntarily absent during a crucial stage of adversary proceedings contrary to rule 3.180(a), the burden is on the state to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the error (absence) was not prejudicial." Garcia v. State, 492 So. 2d 360, 364 (Fla. 1986). "[W]hile rule 3.180(a) determines that the involuntary absence of the defendant is error in certain enumerated circumstances, it is the constitutional question of whether fundamental fairness has been thwarted which determines whether the error is reversible." Id.

2020"In other words, when the defendant is involuntarily absent during a crucial stage of adversary proceedings contrary to rule 3.180(a), the burden is on the state to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the error (absence) was not prejudicial." Garcia v. State, 492 So. 2d 360, 364 (Fla. 1986). "[W]hile rule 3.180(a) determines that the involuntary absence of the defendant is error in certain enumerated circumstances, it is the constitutional question of whether fundamental fairness has been thwarted which determines whether the error is reversible." Id.

2018Diguilio , 491 So.2d at 1136-39 (citation omitted) (quoting People v. Ross , 67 Cal.2d 64 , 60 Cal.Rptr. 254 , 429 P.2d 606 , 621 (1967) (Traynor, C.J., dissenting), rev'd sub nom.

2018Diguilio , 491 So.2d at 1136-39 (citation omitted) (quoting People v. Ross , 67 Cal.2d 64 , 60 Cal.Rptr. 254 , 429 P.2d 606 , 621 (1967) (Traynor, C.J., dissenting), rev'd sub nom.

2024See Usry v. State, 284 So. 3d 1128 , 1129 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019) (finding fundamental error where the trial court failed to include the reasonable doubt instruction, or a similar instruction, in the final jury charge); Smith v. State, 260 So. 3d 578, 578 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019) (holding that “the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury as to Florida Standard Jury Instruction (Criminal) 3.7 . . . , or any similar instruction, constituted fundamental error”); Curry v. State, 169 So. 3d 1258 , 1259–60 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015) (“We can think of little more fundamental in a criminal trial than instructing the

2019See Curry v. State, 169 So. 3d 1258, 1259-60 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015) (reversing and remanding for new trial because the trial court's failure to instruct the jury as to reasonable doubt constituted fundamental error); Cavagnaro v. State, 117 So. 3d 1111, 1112 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012) ("We reverse the convictions because the failure to give the jury any reasonable doubt instruction at all, though unpreserved, is fundamental error."); see also Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 291 (1991) ("[I]t is impossible to assess the effect on the jury of the omission of the more fundamental instruction on reasona

1990“The state ... has the burden of proving ‘beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict or, alternatively stated, that there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the verdict.’ ” Ciccarelli v. State, 531 So.2d 129, 131 (Fla.1988) (quoting State v. DiGuilio, 491 So.2d 1129, 1135 (Fla.1986)).

1990This court is required to reverse appellant’s convictions “unless the state can prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error was harmless.” Ciccarelli, 531 So.2d at 131 .

2018See Smith v. State, 7 So. 3d 473, 505-06 (Fla. 2009) (noting that failure to conduct a Richardson hearing is not per se reversible error); State v. Schopp, 653 So. 2d 1016, 1020 (Fla. 1995) (“[T]here are cases . . . where a reviewing court can say beyond a reasonable doubt that the defense was not prejudiced . . . .”).

2018See Smith v. State , 7 So.3d 473 , 505-06 (Fla. 2009) (noting that failure to conduct a Richardson hearing is not per se reversible error); State v. Schopp , 653 So.2d 1016 , 1020 (Fla. 1995) ("[T]here are cases ... where a reviewing court can say beyond a reasonable doubt that the defense was not prejudiced ....").

2009Indeed, ‘only if the appellate court can say beyond a reasonable doubt that the defense was not procedurally prejudiced by the discovery violation can the error be considered harmless.’ Id." Cox, 819 So.2d at 712 .

2006Then, in analyzing whether the discovery violation was harmless, this Court reiterated the procedural prejudice analysis of Schopp : "[O]nly if the appellate court can say beyond a reasonable doubt that the defense was not procedurally prejudiced by the discovery violation can the error be considered harmless." Id. (quoting Pomeranz v. State, 703 So.2d 465, 468 (Fla. 1997)); see also Irish v. State, 889 So.2d 979, 981 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) (holding that a prior statement made by the defendant to the police that was withheld from the defense attorney undermined the defense's theory and therefore

2008While we know that the reasonable doubt standard is a judicially created constitutional due process prerequisite to guilt determinations, see In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 , 90 S.Ct. 1068 , 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970), no heightened standard of proof has been set for sentencing determinations.

2008While we know that the reasonable doubt standard is a judicially created constitutional due process prerequisite to guilt determinations, see In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 , 90 S.Ct. 1068 , 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970), no heightened standard of proof has been set for sentencing determinations.

1996This case is controlled by our recent decision in Jones v. State, 656 So.2d 489 (Fla. 4th DCA), reh’g en banc and certification denied, July 21, 1995, rev. denied, 663 So.2d 632 (Fla.1995), petition for cert. filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3561 (U.S. Feb. 5, 1996) (No. 95-1265), where we held that it was fundamental error to minimize the reasonable doubt standard by informing the jury that it could convict on a lesser standard of proof.

1996Jones, 656 So.2d at 490-491 .

2026“This standard involves placing the burden on the state, as the beneficiary of the error, to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict or, alternatively stated, that there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the conviction.” Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

2018“Where the comments were improper and the defense objected, but the trial court erroneously overruled defense counsel’s objection,” the harmless error standard of review applies, which places “‘the burden on the state, as the beneficiary of the error, to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict.’” Cardona v. State, 185 So. 3d 514, 520 (Fla. 2016) (quoting Ibar v. State, 938 So. 2d 451, 466 (Fla. 2006)).

2018See State v. Anderson, 905 So. 2d 111, 115 (Fla. 2005) ("[H]armful error [is] error about which an appellate court cannot say 'beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict.' The test focuses on the effect of the error on the verdict or the sentence." (citation omitted) (quoting State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129, 1135 (Fla. 1986))).

2018See State v. Anderson, 905 So. 2d 111, 115 (Fla. 2005) ("We defined harmful error as error about which an appellate court cannot say 'beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict.' " (quoting State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129, 1135 (Fla. 1986))).

2014Harmless Error Best evidence violations are subject to harmless error review. “[T]he state must show beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict, or, stated alternatively, that there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the conviction.” McKeehan, 838 So.2d at 1260 (citing State v. DiGuilio, 491 So.2d 1129, 1136 (Fla.1986); Stires v. State, 824 So.2d 943 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002)).

2007The remaining inquiry is whether the State has carried its burden of proving "beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict or, stated alternatively, that there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the conviction." Stires v. State, 824 So.2d 943, 946 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002) (quoting from State v. DiGuilio, 491 So.2d 1129, 1135 (Fla.1986)).