reasonable doubt error in North Carolina

1995Defendants rely on State v. Bryant, 334 N.C. 333 , 432 S.E.2d 291 (1993) (Bryant I), in which we found error in the reasonable doubt instruction based on Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39 , 112 L.

1995Defendants rely on State v. Bryant, 334 N.C. 333 , 432 S.E.2d 291 (1993) (Bryant I), in which we found error in the reasonable doubt instruction based on Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39 , 112 L.

1912Reviewing them and citing the cases of S. v. Norwood , 74 N.C. 247 , and S. v. Gee , 92 N.C. 761 , with approval, we said in S. v. Adams , 138 N.C. 688 : "The presiding judge may select, from the various phrases which have been used, any one that he may think will correctly inform the jury of the doctrine of reasonable doubt, or he may use his own form of expression for that purpose, provided, always, the jury are made to understand that they must be fully satisfied of the guilt of the defendant before they can convict him." And again: "If the judge charges the jury in substance that the law p

1912Reviewing them and citing the cases of S. v. Norwood, 74 N. C., 247 , and S. v. Gee, 92 N. C., 761 , with approval, we said in S. v. Adams, 138 N. C., 688 : “The presiding judge may select, from the various phrases which have been used, any one that he may think will correctly inform the jury of the doctrine of reasonable doubt, or he may use his own form of expression for that purpose, provided, always, the jury are made to understand that they’ must be fully satisfied of the guilt of the defendant before they can convict him.” And again: “If the judge charges the jury in substance that the l

1993Two members of the Court held that "the use of the terms `substantial misgiving' and `moral certainty' in combination in the trial court's reasonable doubt instruction violated the requirements of the Due Process Clause as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Cage." Id. at 572 , 417 S.E.2d at 749-50.

1993Two members of the Court held that “the use of the terms ‘substantial misgiving’ and ‘moral certainty’ in combination in the trial court’s reasonable doubt instruction violated the requirements of the' Due Process Clause as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Cage.” Id. at 572 , 417 S.E.2d at 749-50.

1994Rather, here we are concerned merely with the phrase “substantial misgiving.” Thus, like other courts that have considered this question, we conclude that the reasonable doubt instruction given here is not constitutionally unsound. *638 Hudson, 331 N.C. at 142-43 , 415 S.E.2d at 742-43 .

1994Rather, here we are concerned merely with the phrase “substantial misgiving.” Thus, like other courts that have considered this question, we conclude that the reasonable doubt instruction given here is not constitutionally unsound. *638 Hudson, 331 N.C. at 142-43 , 415 S.E.2d at 742-43 .

1995In Victor , the United States Supreme Court held that no particular formation of words is necessary to properly define reasonable doubt, but rather, the instructions, in their totality, must not indicate that the State’s burden is lower than “beyond a reasonable doubt.” Applying Victor , this Court, in State v. Bryant, 337 N.C. 298 , 446 S.E.2d 71 (1994) (Bryant II), reconsidered its earlier holding (Bryant I) and found no error in a reasonable doubt instruction that was nearly identical to the instruction in the instant case.

1995In Victor , the United States Supreme Court held that no particular formation of words is necessary to properly define reasonable doubt, but rather, the instructions, in their totality, must not indicate that the State’s burden is lower than “beyond a reasonable doubt.” Applying Victor , this Court, in State v. Bryant, 337 N.C. 298 , 446 S.E.2d 71 (1994) (Bryant II), reconsidered its earlier holding (Bryant I) and found no error in a reasonable doubt instruction that was nearly identical to the instruction in the instant case.

2017Defendant concedes the trial court properly instructed the jury on the reasonable doubt standard, and informed the jurors they could find reasonable doubt from the "lack or insufficiency of the evidence." The instructions would not have led the jury "to believe that a reasonable doubt must arise only from the evidence presented, and that a reasonable doubt could not arise from a lack of or insufficiency of the evidence." See State v. Hammonds , 241 N.C. 226 , 231, 85 S.E.2d 133 , 137-38 (1954) (" 'True it is, a reasonable doubt may grow out of the evidence in the case.

2017Defendant concedes the trial court properly instructed the jury on the reasonable doubt standard, and informed the jurors they could find reasonable doubt from the "lack or insufficiency of the evidence." The instructions would not have led the jury "to believe that a reasonable doubt must arise only from the evidence presented, and that a reasonable doubt could not arise from a lack of or insufficiency of the evidence." See State v. Hammonds , 241 N.C. 226 , 231, 85 S.E.2d 133 , 137-38 (1954) (" 'True it is, a reasonable doubt may grow out of the evidence in the case.

2010Where Apprendi eradicated the import of labels that attempt to distinguish “ ‘elements,’ ” required to be proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, from “ ‘sentencing factors,’ ” and emphasized that “the relevant inquiry is one not of form, but of [the] effect” of the factual finding on punishment, Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494 , 147 L. Ed. 2d at 457 , Blakely and Booker extended the reasonable doubt requirement to sentencing guidelines that impose fixed ranges within the statutory maximum.

2010Where Apprendi eradicated the import of labels that attempt to distinguish “ ‘elements,’ ” required to be proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, from “ ‘sentencing factors,’ ” and emphasized that “the relevant inquiry is one not of form, but of [the] effect” of the factual finding on punishment, Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494 , 147 L. Ed. 2d at 457 , Blakely and Booker extended the reasonable doubt requirement to sentencing guidelines that impose fixed ranges within the statutory maximum.

2008State v. Huff, 325 N.C. 1, 34-35 , 381 S.E.2d 635, 654 (1989), vacated on unrelated grounds, 497 U.S. 1021 , 110 S.Ct. 3266 , 111 L.Ed.2d 777 (1990).

2008State v. Huff, 325 N.C. 1, 34-35 , 381 S.E.2d 635, 654 (1989), vacated on unrelated grounds, 497 U.S. 1021 , 110 S.Ct. 3266 , 111 L.Ed.2d 777 (1990).

2008State v. Huff, 321 N.C. 1, 34-35 , 381 S.E.2d 635, 654 (1989), vacated on unrelated grounds, 497 U.S. 1021 , 111 L.

2008State v. Huff, 325 N.C. 1, 34-35 , 381 S.E.2d 635, 654 (1989), vacated on unrelated grounds, 497 U.S. 1021 , 110 S.Ct. 3266 , 111 L.Ed.2d 777 (1990).

2006Accordingly, defendant was not required by Rule 10(b)(1) to object during sentencing in order to properly “preserve this issue for appellate review.” Id. *693 Defendant initially contends that the trial court erred by increasing his sentences beyond the prescribed statutory maximum based upon its own finding of aggravating factors that were not alleged in the indictments or found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt in violation of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. —, 159 L.

2005Defendant initially contends that the trial court erred by increasing his sentences beyond the prescribed statutory maximum based upon its own finding of aggravating factors that were not alleged in the indictments or found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt in violation of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 , 124 S.Ct. 2531 , 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004).

1996In this case, the reasonable doubt instruction given by the trial court was substantially similar to that approved in State v. Brackett, 218 N.C. 369, 372 , 11 S.E.2d 146, 148 (1940). 1 The instruction also clearly passes the United States Supreme Court’s test established in Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1 , 127 L.

1996In this case, the reasonable doubt instruction given by the trial court was substantially similar to that approved in State v. Brackett, 218 N.C. 369, 372 , 11 S.E.2d 146, 148 (1940). 1 The instruction also clearly passes the United States Supreme Court’s test established in Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1 , 127 L.

1994See Parker v. Alabama, 587 So.2d 1072, 1085 (Ala.Crim.App.1991); South Carolina v. Johnson [ 306 S.C. 119 ] 410 S.E.2d 547, 554 (S.C.1991), petition for cert. filed [ ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 1691 , 118 L.Ed.2d 404 ] (26 February 1992) (U.S. No. 91-7474) [footnote omitted]. [3] Hudson, 331 N.C. at 142-43 , 415 S.E.2d at 742-43 .

1992See Parker v. Alabama, 587 So.2d 1072, 1085 (Ala.Crim.App.1991); South Carolina v. Johnson, 410 S.E.2d 547, 554 (S.C.1991), cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 1691 , ___ L.Ed.2d ___(26 February 1992) (U.S. No. 91-7474). [4] Further support for this view is found in our prior case law that has repeatedly held that a definition of reasonable doubt does not require exactitude.

1986In Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837 , 37 L.Ed. 2d 380 , 93 S.Ct. 2357 (1973), the Court summarized its holdings from prior cases dealing with statutory inferences as follows: [I]f a statutory inference submitted to the jury as sufficient to support conviction satisfies the reasonable-doubt standard (that is, the evidence necessary to invoke the inference is sufficient for a rational juror to find the inferred fact beyond a reasonable doubt) as well as the more-likely-than-not standard, then it clearly accords with due process.

1986In Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837 , 37 L.Ed. 2d 380 , 93 S.Ct. 2357 (1973), the Court summarized its holdings from prior cases dealing with statutory inferences as follows: [I]f a statutory inference submitted to the jury as sufficient to support conviction satisfies the reasonable-doubt standard (that is, the evidence necessary to invoke the inference is sufficient for a rational juror to find the inferred fact beyond a reasonable doubt) as well as the more-likely-than-not standard, then it clearly accords with due process.

1982See People v. Jimenez, 21 Cal. 3d 595 , 147 Cal. Rptr. 172 , 580 P. 2d 672 (1978); Magley v. State, 263 Ind. 618 , 335 N.E. 2d 811 (1975); State v. Johnson, 327 So. 2d 388 (La. 1976); State v. Tardiff, 374 A. 2d 598 (Me. 1977); Younger v. State, 301 So. 2d 300 (Miss. 1974); State v. Phinney, 117 N.H. 145 , 370 A. 2d 1153 (1977); State v. Whittington, 142 N.J.

1982See People v. Jimenez, 21 Cal. 3d 595 , 147 Cal. Rptr. 172 , 580 P. 2d 672 (1978); Magley v. State, 263 Ind. 618 , 335 N.E. 2d 811 (1975); State v. Johnson, 327 So. 2d 388 (La. 1976); State v. Tardiff, 374 A. 2d 598 (Me. 1977); Younger v. State, 301 So. 2d 300 (Miss. 1974); State v. Phinney, 117 N.H. 145 , 370 A. 2d 1153 (1977); State v. Whittington, 142 N.J.

1982See People v. Jimenez, 21 Cal.3d 595 , 147 Cal.Rptr. 172 , 580 P.2d 672 (1978); Magley v. State, 263 Ind. 618 , 335 N.E.2d 811 (1975); State v. Johnson, 327 So.2d 388 (La.1976); State v. Tardiff, 374 A.2d 598 (Me.1977); Younger v. State, 301 So.2d 300 (Miss.1974); State v. Phinney, 117 N.H. 145 , 370 A.2d 1153 (1977); State v. Whittington, 142 N.J.Super. 45 , 359 A.2d 881 (App.Div.1976); People v. Brown, 44 A.D.2d 769 , 354 N.Y.S.2d 263 (1974); State v. Aschmeller, 87 S.D. 367 , 209 N.W.2d 369 (1973); Valerio v. State, 494 S.W.2d 892 (Tex.Crim.App.1973); Blaszke v. State, 69 Wis.2d 81 , 230 N.

1982See People v. Jimenez, 21 Cal. 3d 595 , 147 Cal. Rptr. 172 , 580 P. 2d 672 (1978); Magley v. State, 263 Ind. 618 , 335 N.E. 2d 811 (1975); State v. Johnson, 327 So. 2d 388 (La. 1976); State v. Tardiff, 374 A. 2d 598 (Me. 1977); Younger v. State, 301 So. 2d 300 (Miss. 1974); State v. Phinney, 117 N.H. 145 , 370 A. 2d 1153 (1977); State v. Whittington, 142 N.J.

1982See People v. Jimenez, 21 Cal.3d 595 , 147 Cal.Rptr. 172 , 580 P.2d 672 (1978); Magley v. State, 263 Ind. 618 , 335 N.E.2d 811 (1975); State v. Johnson, 327 So.2d 388 (La.1976); State v. Tardiff, 374 A.2d 598 (Me.1977); Younger v. State, 301 So.2d 300 (Miss.1974); State v. Phinney, 117 N.H. 145 , 370 A.2d 1153 (1977); State v. Whittington, 142 N.J.Super. 45 , 359 A.2d 881 (App.Div.1976); People v. Brown, 44 A.D.2d 769 , 354 N.Y.S.2d 263 (1974); State v. Aschmeller, 87 S.D. 367 , 209 N.W.2d 369 (1973); Valerio v. State, 494 S.W.2d 892 (Tex.Crim.App.1973); Blaszke v. State, 69 Wis.2d 81 , 230 N.

1982See People v. Jimenez, 21 Cal. 3d 595 , 147 Cal. Rptr. 172 , 580 P. 2d 672 (1978); Magley v. State, 263 Ind. 618 , 335 N.E. 2d 811 (1975); State v. Johnson, 327 So. 2d 388 (La. 1976); State v. Tardiff, 374 A. 2d 598 (Me. 1977); Younger v. State, 301 So. 2d 300 (Miss. 1974); State v. Phinney, 117 N.H. 145 , 370 A. 2d 1153 (1977); State v. Whittington, 142 N.J.

1982See People v. Jimenez, 21 Cal. 3d 595 , 147 Cal. Rptr. 172 , 580 P. 2d 672 (1978); Magley v. State, 263 Ind. 618 , 335 N.E. 2d 811 (1975); State v. Johnson, 327 So. 2d 388 (La. 1976); State v. Tardiff, 374 A. 2d 598 (Me. 1977); Younger v. State, 301 So. 2d 300 (Miss. 1974); State v. Phinney, 117 N.H. 145 , 370 A. 2d 1153 (1977); State v. Whittington, 142 N.J.

1982See People v. Jimenez, 21 Cal. 3d 595 , 147 Cal. Rptr. 172 , 580 P. 2d 672 (1978); Magley v. State, 263 Ind. 618 , 335 N.E. 2d 811 (1975); State v. Johnson, 327 So. 2d 388 (La. 1976); State v. Tardiff, 374 A. 2d 598 (Me. 1977); Younger v. State, 301 So. 2d 300 (Miss. 1974); State v. Phinney, 117 N.H. 145 , 370 A. 2d 1153 (1977); State v. Whittington, 142 N.J.