reasonable doubt error in Wisconsin

2023An error is harmless if the State proves "beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained." Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).

2023An error is harmless if the State proves "beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained." Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).

2023An error is harmless if “it appears ‘beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.’” State v. Harvey, 2002 WI 93, ¶44 , 254 Wis. 2d 442 , 647 N.W.2d 189 (citations and some quotation marks omitted).

2023An error is harmless if “it appears ‘beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.’” State v. Harvey, 2002 WI 93, ¶44 , 254 Wis. 2d 442 , 647 N.W.2d 189 (citations and some quotation marks omitted).

2014We have described the test as "whether it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained." Id. (quoting State v. Harvey, 2002 WI 93, ¶44 , 254 Wis. 2d 442 , 647 N.W.2d 189 , quoting in turn Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1999)).

2014We have described the test as "whether it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained." Id. (quoting State v. Harvey, 2002 WI 93, ¶ 44 , 254 Wis. 2d 442 , 647 N.W.2d 189 , quoting in turn Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1999)).

2026Under this rule, an error is harmless if the party that benefited from the error (here, 12 No. 2025AP495-CR the State) proves “beyond a reasonable doubt that the error … did not contribute to the verdict obtained,” and that the jury “would have found the defendant guilty absent the error.” State v. Hunt, 2014 WI 102, ¶26 , 360 Wis. 2d 576 , 851 N.W.2d 434 (citations omitted).

2026Under this rule, an error is harmless if the party that benefited from the error (here, 12 No. 2025AP495-CR the State) proves “beyond a reasonable doubt that the error … did not contribute to the verdict obtained,” and that the jury “would have found the defendant guilty absent the error.” State v. Hunt, 2014 WI 102, ¶26 , 360 Wis. 2d 576 , 851 N.W.2d 434 (citations omitted).

2014We have described the test as "whether it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained." Id. (quoting State v. Harvey, 2002 WI 93, ¶44 , 254 Wis. 2d 442 , 647 N.W.2d 189 , quoting in turn Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1999)).

2014We have described the test as "whether it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained." Id. (quoting State v. Harvey, 2002 WI 93, ¶ 44 , 254 Wis. 2d 442 , 647 N.W.2d 189 , quoting in turn Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1999)).

2025Accordingly, we must ask, under the harmless error analysis, whether it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that Williams would have entered the plea even if he had appeared in person.6 See Anderson, 374 Wis. 2d 372, ¶57 ; State v. Martin, 2012 WI 96, ¶45 , 343 Wis. 2d 278 , 816 N.W.2d 270 (stating that the burden is on the party who benefited from an error to demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that the error was harmless).

2025Accordingly, we must ask, under the harmless error analysis, whether it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that Williams would have entered the plea even if he had appeared in person.6 See Anderson, 374 Wis. 2d 372, ¶57 ; State v. Martin, 2012 WI 96, ¶45 , 343 Wis. 2d 278 , 816 N.W.2d 270 (stating that the burden is on the party who benefited from an error to demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that the error was harmless).

2021See Wis. Stat. § 805.18 (2) (directing the court to determine if the error "affected the substantial rights of the party"); Stietz, 375 Wis. 2d 572, ¶63 ("A defendant's substantial rights remain unaffected (that is, the error is harmless) if it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have come to the same conclusion absent the error or if it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained."). 18 No. 2018AP2318-CR § 904.04(2)(a).

2021See Wis. Stat. § 805.18 (2) (directing the court to determine if the error "affected the substantial rights of the party"); Stietz, 375 Wis. 2d 572, ¶63 ("A defendant's substantial rights remain unaffected (that is, the error is harmless) if it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have come to the same conclusion absent the error or if it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained."). 18 No. 2018AP2318-CR § 904.04(2)(a).

2022Id. ¶28 In the context of a discovery violation, our supreme court has stated that an error is harmless “if the beneficiary of the error proves ‘beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained’” or, alternatively, if “it is ‘clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the error.’” State v. Harris, 2008 WI 15, ¶¶41-44 , 307 Wis. 2d 555 , 745 N.W.2d 397 (citations omitted).

2022Id. ¶28 In the context of a discovery violation, our supreme court has stated that an error is harmless “if the beneficiary of the error proves ‘beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained’” or, alternatively, if “it is ‘clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the error.’” State v. Harris, 2008 WI 15, ¶¶41-44 , 307 Wis. 2d 555 , 745 N.W.2d 397 (citations omitted).

2022Thus, this argument fails. 7 Nos. 2021AP1917 2021AP1918 2021AP1919 of the error proves ‘beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.’” State v. Hale, 2005 WI 7, ¶60 , 277 Wis. 2d 593 , 691 N.W.2d 637 (citation omitted). ¶14 Sarah testified at the grounds phase that she had identified a therapist for her children and participated in therapy with them.

2022Thus, this argument fails. 7 Nos. 2021AP1917 2021AP1918 2021AP1919 of the error proves ‘beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.’” State v. Hale, 2005 WI 7, ¶60 , 277 Wis. 2d 593 , 691 N.W.2d 637 (citation omitted). ¶14 Sarah testified at the grounds phase that she had identified a therapist for her children and participated in therapy with them.

2025“Wisconsin’s harmless error rule … prohibits reversal in those [criminal] cases for errors that do not affect the substantial rights of a defendant.” Nelson, 355 Wis. 2d 722, ¶29 . 10 No. 2024AP440-CR As the beneficiary of the error, the State bears the burden of proving “beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” State v. Mayo, 2007 WI 78, ¶47 , 301 Wis. 2d 642 , 734 N.W.2d 115 (citations omitted). ¶21 As noted above, the State argues that the violation of Aiden’s right to be physically present at his competency hearing did not affect h

2025“Wisconsin’s harmless error rule … prohibits reversal in those [criminal] cases for errors that do not affect the substantial rights of a defendant.” Nelson, 355 Wis. 2d 722, ¶29 . 10 No. 2024AP440-CR As the beneficiary of the error, the State bears the burden of proving “beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” State v. Mayo, 2007 WI 78, ¶47 , 301 Wis. 2d 642 , 734 N.W.2d 115 (citations omitted). ¶21 As noted above, the State argues that the violation of Aiden’s right to be physically present at his competency hearing did not affect h

2019While the Due Process Clause of the *185 Fourteenth Amendment does not expressly address the application of the reasonable doubt standard in criminal proceedings, the United States Supreme Court in Winship held "that the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged." Winship , 397 U.S. at 364 , 90 S.Ct. 1068 .

2019While the Due Process Clause of the *185 Fourteenth Amendment does not expressly address the application of the reasonable doubt standard in criminal proceedings, the United States Supreme Court in Winship held "that the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged." Winship , 397 U.S. at 364 , 90 S.Ct. 1068 .

2017See State v. Seifert, 155 Wis. 2d 53, 70-71 , 454 N.W.2d 346 (1990) (concluding that it was proper for the circuit court to refuse to reinstruct the jury in the closing instructions that it may consider the defendant's psychiatric and personal history in determining his intent or state of mind at the time of the incident because that instruction was given during the general introductory instructions and they adequately covered the law); Moes v. State, 91 Wis. 2d 756, 768-69 , 284 N.W.2d 66 (1979) (holding that there was no error when the court did not repeat that the State had to prove beyond

2017See State v. Seifert, 155 Wis. 2d 53, 70-71 , 454 N.W.2d 346 (1990) (concluding that it was proper for the circuit court to refuse to reinstruct the jury in the closing instructions that it may consider the defendant's psychiatric and personal history in determining his intent or state of mind at the time of the incident because that instruction was given during the general introductory instructions and they adequately covered the law); Moes v. State, 91 Wis. 2d 756, 768-69 , 284 N.W.2d 66 (1979) (holding that there was no error when the court did not repeat that the State had to prove beyond

2018Strickland , 466 U.S. at 689 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 ; State v. Felton , 110 Wis. 2d 485 , 502-03, 329 N.W.2d 161 (1983). ¶ 65 The following facts were known to the defendant's trial counsel at the time counsel made the decision not to further investigate the defendant's frontal lobe injury *117 and instead pursue a reasonable doubt defense: • The defendant was interviewed by a detective four days after the defendant visited his daughter's classroom.

2018Strickland , 466 U.S. at 689 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 ; State v. Felton , 110 Wis. 2d 485 , 502-03, 329 N.W.2d 161 (1983). ¶ 65 The following facts were known to the defendant's trial counsel at the time counsel made the decision not to further investigate the defendant's frontal lobe injury *117 and instead pursue a reasonable doubt defense: • The defendant was interviewed by a detective four days after the defendant visited his daughter's classroom.

2020See Armstrong, 223 Wis. 2d 331, ¶60 (“no reasonable possibility that a different result would have been reached” (emphasis added)); Semrau, 233 Wis. 2d 508, ¶26 (“no reasonable probability that, but for the trial court’s failure to suppress the disputed evidence, Semrau would have refused to plead and would have insisted on going to trial” (emphasis added)); Rockette, 287 Wis. 2d 257, ¶26 (“An error is harmless if the beneficiary of the error proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the [result].” (emphasis added) (citing State v. Hale, 2005 WI 7, ¶60

2020Compare Armstrong, 223 Wis. 2d at 369 (articulating the standard as asking “whether there is a reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the conviction”) (emphasis added) with State v. Hale, 2005 WI 7, ¶60 , 277 Wis. 2d 593 , 691 N.W.2d 637 (articulating the standard as whether the State has “prove[n] beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained”) (emphasis added, internal quotations omitted).

2024An error is harmless if the party who benefited from the error “shows ‘beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.’” State v. Monahan, 2018 WI 80, ¶33 , 383 Wis. 2d 100 , 913 N.W.2d 894 (citation omitted). ¶28 For instance, on the charge of first-degree recklessly endangering safety with use of a dangerous weapon, multiple police officers, including the victim police officer, testified that Clark fired a gun toward the victim from close range.

2024An error is harmless if the party who benefited from the error “shows ‘beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.’” State v. Monahan, 2018 WI 80, ¶33 , 383 Wis. 2d 100 , 913 N.W.2d 894 (citation omitted). ¶28 For instance, on the charge of first-degree recklessly endangering safety with use of a dangerous weapon, multiple police officers, including the victim police officer, testified that Clark fired a gun toward the victim from close range.

2017Such a determination requires an inquiry into "whether it was beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained." State v. Moore, 2015 WI 54, ¶94 , 363 Wis. 2d 376, 412 , 864 N.W.2d 827, 844 (quoting State v. Magett, 2014 WI 67, ¶29 , 355 8 No. 2014AP1623-CR.awb Wis. 2d 617, 850 N.W.2d 42 ).

2017Such a determination requires an inquiry into "whether it was beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained." State v. Moore, 2015 WI 54, ¶94 , 363 Wis. 2d 376, 412 , 864 N.W.2d 827, 844 (quoting State v. Magett, 2014 WI 67, ¶29 , 355 8 No. 2014AP1623-CR.awb Wis. 2d 617, 850 N.W.2d 42 ).

1998We disagree, and conclude that there may be sufficient evidence that acts of sexual violence are substantially probable, even though the fact-finder chooses not to rely on an expert opinion to that effect. 15 Kienitz relies on a statement of the Supreme Court in Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 429 (1979), which held that due process requires a "clear and convincing" standard of proof in a state involuntary commitment proceeding, but does not require the "beyond a reasonable doubt standard." In that context, Addington discussed the difference between the inquiry in a civil commitment proceedi

1985Addington, 441 U.S. at 428 .

2022State v. Beamon, 2013 WI 47, ¶19 , 347 Wis. 2d 559 , 830 N.W.2d 681 . “[T]he standard for evaluating an error’s 4 No. 2021AP26-CR harmlessness is the same whether the error is constitutional, statutory, or otherwise.” State v. Harvey, 2002 WI 93, ¶40 , 254 Wis. 2d 442 , 647 N.W.2d 189 . ¶12 An error is harmless if the State proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict.

2022State v. Beamon, 2013 WI 47, ¶19 , 347 Wis. 2d 559 , 830 N.W.2d 681 . “[T]he standard for evaluating an error’s 4 No. 2021AP26-CR harmlessness is the same whether the error is constitutional, statutory, or otherwise.” State v. Harvey, 2002 WI 93, ¶40 , 254 Wis. 2d 442 , 647 N.W.2d 189 . ¶12 An error is harmless if the State proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict.

2021As Coleman argues in his reply brief, his argument challenges the lost opportunity to cross-examine S.B. on testimony that was not, but should have been, elicited from S.B. during the first trial and the State “entirely misses the point” when the State discusses what S.B. actually said in her testimony. ¶17 “A Confrontation Clause violation does not result in automatic reversal, but is subject to harmless error analysis.” State v. Deadwiller, 2013 WI 75, ¶41 , 350 Wis. 2d 138 , 834 N.W.2d 362 . “[A]n error is harmless if the beneficiary of the error proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the er

2021As Coleman argues in his reply brief, his argument challenges the lost opportunity to cross-examine S.B. on testimony that was not, but should have been, elicited from S.B. during the first trial and the State “entirely misses the point” when the State discusses what S.B. actually said in her testimony. ¶17 “A Confrontation Clause violation does not result in automatic reversal, but is subject to harmless error analysis.” State v. Deadwiller, 2013 WI 75, ¶41 , 350 Wis. 2d 138 , 834 N.W.2d 362 . “[A]n error is harmless if the beneficiary of the error proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the er

2020Williams recognizes that, in State v. Avila, 192 Wis. 2d 870 , 535 N.W.2d 440 (1995), our supreme court rejected the same challenge to the standard burden of proof instruction and held that it was not reasonably likely that the instruction reduced the burden of proof below the reasonable doubt standard.

2018He relies on two studies that, he argues "refute and empirically disprove" the Wisconsin Supreme Court's holding in State v. Avila , 192 Wis. 2d 870 , 888-89, 532 N.W.2d 423 (1995), overruled on other grounds , State v. Gordon , 2003 WI 69 , 262 Wis. 2d 380 , 663 N.W.2d 765 , which upheld the jury instruction against a due process challenge. 8 ¶41 The Avila decision is controlling law and holds that WIS JI-CRIMINAL 140 comports with due process because it is not reasonably likely that a jury would understand the instruction to allow conviction based on proof below the reasonable doubt standard

2020The supreme court has now issued a decision in Trammell, holding that the standard jury instruction “does not unconstitutionally reduce the State’s burden of proof below the reasonable doubt standard.” State v. Trammell, 2019 WI 59, ¶67 , 387 Wis. 2d 156 , 928 N.W.2d 564 .

2020The supreme court has now issued a decision in Trammell, holding that the standard jury instruction “does not unconstitutionally reduce the State’s burden of proof below the reasonable doubt standard.” State v. Trammell, 2019 WI 59, ¶67 , 387 Wis. 2d 156 , 928 N.W.2d 564 .