reasonable doubt standard in District of Columbia

2026See Morales, 248 A.3d at 181 (“We must therefore reverse Mr. Morales’ convictions unless the government has ‘prove[d] beyond a reasonable doubt that the error . . . did not contribute to the verdict obtained.’” (alterations in original) (quoting 26 Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967))).

2026See Morales, 248 A.3d at 181 (“We must therefore reverse Mr. Morales’ convictions unless the government has ‘prove[d] beyond a reasonable doubt that the error . . . did not contribute to the verdict obtained.’” (alterations in original) (quoting 26 Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967))).

2025“The reasonable doubt standard of proof requires the factfinder ‘to reach a subjective state of near certitude of the guilt of the accused.’” Rivas v. United States, 783 A.2d 125, 134 (D.C. 2001) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 315 (1979)).

2025We therefore abide by the reasonable-doubt standard of proof, in which the factfinder must “reach a subjective state of near certitude of the guilt of the accused.” Id. at 133 (internal quotation marks omitted).

2024Compare Carrell v. United States, 165 A.3d 314, 328 (D.C. 2017) (en banc) (explaining that a harmless-error analysis assesses whether we can say “beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained” (quoting Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993)), with Triumph Cap.

2024A constitutional error “is considered harmless if the government can ‘show beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.’” Carrell, 165 A.3d at 328 (quoting Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993)).

2016When reading this instruction, the judge omitted the entire first paragraph of the reasonable doubt instruction we adopted in Smith v. United States, 709 A.2d 78, 82 (D.C.1998) (en banc): 1 The government has the burden of proving the defendant guilty beyond a rear sonable doubt.[ 2 ] In civil cases, it is only necessary to prove that a fact is more likely true than not, or, in some cases, that its truth is highly probable.

2014See Rivas, supra, 783 A.2d at 133 (“The reasonable doubt standard of proof requires the fact-finder ‘to reach a subjective state of near certitude of the guilt of the accused.’ ” (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 315 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979))); Smith v. United States, 709 A.2d 78, 82 (D.C.1998) (en banc) (“Reasonable doubt is the kind of doubt that would cause a reasonable person, after careful and thoughtful reflection, to hesitate to act in the graver or more important matters in life.”); Criminal JURY Instructions, No. 2.108; see also Douglas, supra, 859 A.2d at 642

2012As the Supreme Court has explained, an unreasonable doubt is one that is “fanciful” in the sense that “everything is open to some possible or imaginary doubt,” Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 17 , 114 S.Ct. 1239 , 127 L.Ed.2d 583 (1994), and the use of certain words can “suggest a higher degree of doubt than is required for acquittal under the reasonable doubt standard.” Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39, 41 , 111 S.Ct. 328 , 112 L.Ed.2d 339 (1990) (per curiam) (criticizing instruction that told jurors that to be “reasonable,” doubt had to be “grave” and “substantial”).

2012As the Supreme Court has explained, an unreasonable doubt is one that is “fanciful” in the sense that “everything is open to some possible or imaginary doubt,” Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 17 , 114 S.Ct. 1239 , 127 L.Ed.2d 583 (1994), and the use of certain words can “suggest a higher degree of doubt than is required for acquittal under the reasonable doubt standard.” Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39, 41 , 111 S.Ct. 328 , 112 L.Ed.2d 339 (1990) (per curiam) (criticizing instruction that told jurors that to be “reasonable,” doubt had to be “grave” and “substantial”).

2022The failure to instruct the jury on an essential element, however, is harmless if “it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 15 (1999) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2009The relevant inquiry is whether the government can show “beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained,” Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24 , 87 S.Ct. 824 ; whether at trial the government presented “overwhelming evidence” of guilt, Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 254 , 89 S.Ct. 1726 , 23 L.Ed.2d 284 (1969); “whether the guilty verdict actually rendered ... was surely unattributable to the error,” Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 , 113 S.Ct. 2078 , 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993) 45 ; or whether-it is “clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a ratio

2011Parsons’s claim, therefore, “must [instead] be addressed in the context of constitutional harmless error,” Bishop v. United States, 983 A.2d 1029, 1037 (D.C.2009) (quotation marks omitted), which requires reversal “unless the government can show that the error was ‘harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” Id. (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967)); see also Zanders v. United States, 999 A.2d 149, 156 (D.C.2010) (“ 'Chapman instructs] courts to requir[e] the beneficiary of a constitutional error to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error com

2010Generally, “Chapman instructs] courts to ‘requir[e] the beneficiary of a constitutional error to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.’ ” Fields v. United States, 952 A.2d 859, 862 (2008) (second alteration original) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967)).

1996In Butler , notwithstanding timely defense objections to the trial judge’s departures from the Redbook, the court ruled that “firmly convinced” was an acceptable substitute for “abiding conviction,” 646 A.2d at 336 , and that the omission of the “hesitate or pause” sentence from the reasonable doubt instruction was not prejudicial error.

1996In Butler , notwithstanding timely defense objections to the trial judge's departures from the Redbook, the court ruled that "firmly convinced" was an acceptable substitute for "abiding conviction," 646 A.2d at 336 , and that the omission of the "hesitate or pause" sentence from the reasonable doubt instruction was not prejudicial error.

2025“The reasonable doubt standard of proof requires the factfinder ‘to reach a subjective state of near certitude of the guilt of the accused.’” Rivas v. United States, 783 A.2d 125, 134 (D.C. 2001) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 315 (1979)).

2014See Rivas, supra, 783 A.2d at 133 (“The reasonable doubt standard of proof requires the fact-finder ‘to reach a subjective state of near certitude of the guilt of the accused.’ ” (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 315 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979))); Smith v. United States, 709 A.2d 78, 82 (D.C.1998) (en banc) (“Reasonable doubt is the kind of doubt that would cause a reasonable person, after careful and thoughtful reflection, to hesitate to act in the graver or more important matters in life.”); Criminal JURY Instructions, No. 2.108; see also Douglas, supra, 859 A.2d at 642

2014Morten v. United States, 856 A.2d 595, 601 (D.C.2004) (acknowledging that "the harmless 'beyond a reasonable doubt’ standard and the test of ‘[no] reasonable possibility' of an effect on the conviction” are equivalent) (citing United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 , 679 n. 9, 105 S.Ct. 3375 , 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985)). 34 .

2007Morten v. United States, 856 A.2d 595, 600-601 (D.C.2004).

1986In Delaware v. Van Arsdall, — U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 1431 , 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986), the Supreme Court held that a constitutionally impermissible denial of a defendant’s opportunity to impeach a witness for bias is subject to the harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard set out in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967).

1986In Delaware v. Van Arsdall, — U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 1431 , 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986), the Supreme Court held that a constitutionally impermissible denial of a defendant’s opportunity to impeach a witness for bias is subject to the harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard set out in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967).

2017Under Chapman, an error is considered harmless if the government can ―show beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.‖ Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993); see also Wilson-Bey, 903 A.2d at 844 (en banc). ―[T]he question . . . is not what effect the constitutional error might generally be expected to have upon a reasonable [factfinder], but rather what effect it had upon the guilty verdict in the case at hand.‖ Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 279 (emphasis added).

2017Under Chapman, an error is considered harmless if the government can “show beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 , 113 S.Ct. 2078 , 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993); see also Wilson-Bey, 903 A.2d at 844 (en banc). “[T]he question ... is not what effect the constitutional error might generally be expected to have upon a reasonable [factfinder], but rather what effect it had upon the guilty verdict in the case at hand.” Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 279 , 113 S.Ct. 2078 (emphasis added).

2012See (Karen N.) Thompson v. United States, 678 A.2d 24, 27 (D.C. 1996) (noting that actual distribution of drugs “necessarily showed an attempted distribution”).

2008The government contends, however, that the error was harmless with respect to the lesser-included offense of attempted possession, see D.C.Code § 48-904.09, because to prove that offense it need not “establish that the substance a defendant attempted to possess was the proscribed substance.” Seeney, 563 A.2d at 1083 (noting that “Congress intended that the common law defense of impossibility should not be available to one charged with the federal crime upon which our prohibition is patterned.”); Thompson v. United States, 678 A.2d 24, 27 (D.C.1996) (“[T]he government was not required to prove

2012We have described it as “ ‘perhaps the most important aspect of the closing instruction to the jury in a criminal trial.’ ” Smith, 709 A.2d at 79-80 (D.C.1998) (quoting Dunn v. Perrin, 570 F.2d 21, 25 (1st Cir.1978)).

1994See Dunn v. Perrin, 570 F.2d 21, 25 (1st Cir.) (reasonable doubt instruction is “most important aspect of closing instruction to the jury in a criminal trial”), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 910 , 98 S.Ct. 3102 , 57 L.Ed.2d 1141 (1978).

2011D.C. 401, 403, 984 F.2d 1239, 1241 (1993)) (quoting Estelle, supra note 30 , 502 U.S. at 72 , 112 S.Ct. 475 ); accord, Proctor v. United States, 685 A.2d 735, 741 (D.C.1996) ("the combined changes to the standard definition [of reasonable doubt] here created `a reasonable likelihood that the jury understood the instructions to allow conviction based on a lesser standard than proof beyond a reasonable doubt'" (citing Foreman and quoting Butler v. United States, 646 A.2d 331, 334 (D.C. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1009 , 115 S.Ct. 1326 , 131 L.Ed.2d 206 (1995))). [32] See, e.g., Victor, supra n

1994See Foreman v. United States, 633 A.2d 792, 793-94 (D.C.1993) (citing Redbook Instruction No. 2.09 with approval); Baptist v. United States, 466 A.2d 452, 459 (D.C.1983) (same); United States v. Merlos (Merlos I), 299 U.S.App.D.C. 401, 403 , 984 F.2d 1239, 1241 (same), vacated on other grounds, 303 U.S.App.D.C. 395 ; 8 F.3d 48 (1993); United States v. Baber, 145 U.S.App.D.C. 98 , 101, 447 F.2d 1267, 1270 (same), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 957 , 92 S.Ct. *335 324, 30 L.Ed.2d 274 (1971).

2011D.C. 401, 403, 984 F.2d 1239, 1241 (1993)) (quoting Estelle, supra note 30 , 502 U.S. at 72 , 112 S.Ct. 475 ); accord, Proctor v. United States, 685 A.2d 735, 741 (D.C.1996) ("the combined changes to the standard definition [of reasonable doubt] here created `a reasonable likelihood that the jury understood the instructions to allow conviction based on a lesser standard than proof beyond a reasonable doubt'" (citing Foreman and quoting Butler v. United States, 646 A.2d 331, 334 (D.C. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1009 , 115 S.Ct. 1326 , 131 L.Ed.2d 206 (1995))). [32] See, e.g., Victor, supra n

2011The Court then concluded that, in reviewing a challenge to a reasonable doubt instruction, the court must determine "whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury understood the instructions to allow conviction based on proof insufficient to meet the Winship standard." Id. at 6, 114 S.Ct. 1239 (citing Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72 , 112 S.Ct. 475 , 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991) ("in reviewing an ambiguous instruction such as the one at issue here [concerning admission of prior injury evidence in prosecution for murder of an infant child], we inquire `whether there is a reasonable likel

2006Blackmon v. United States, 835 A.2d 1070, 1074 (D.C. 2003) (citing United States v. Gordon, 173 F.3d 761, 766 (10th Cir.1999)).

2006Blackmon v. United States, 835 A.2d 1070, 1074 (D.C.2003) (citing United States v. Gordon, 173 F.3d 761, 766 (10th Cir.1999)).

2006Blackmon v. United States, 835 A.2d 1070, 1074 (D.C. 2003) (citing United States v. Gordon, 173 F.3d 761, 766 (10th Cir.1999)).

2006Blackmon v. United States, 835 A.2d 1070, 1074 (D.C.2003) (citing United States v. Gordon, 173 F.3d 761, 766 (10th Cir.1999)).

1996See Butler, supra, 646 A.2d at 335, 337 ; see also United States v. Velasquez, 980 F.2d 1275, 1278 (9th Cir.1992) (Omission of the “hesitate to act” language is not necessarily reversible error.); United States v. Barrera-Gonzales, 952 F.2d 1269, 1272 (10th Cir.1992) (Instructions which have “strayed from the ‘hesitate to act’ formula have been upheld.”).

1994See Victor, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 1253 (Ginsburg, J. concurring) (“This model instruction surpasses others I have seen in stating the reasonable doubt standard succinctly and comprehensibly.”); United States v. Williams, 20 F.3d 125, 131 (5th Cir.1994) (“the ‘firmly convinced’ language, read in the context of the charge as a whole, adequately apprises the jury of the requisite level of proof’); Taylor, 302 U.S.App.D.C. at 354 , 997 F.2d at 1556 (reasonable doubt instruction requiring that jurors be “firmly convinced” of defendant’s guilt did not lower government’s burden of proof); United

1976The Court declared ( 397 U.S. at 364 , 90 S.Ct. at 1073 ): Lest there remain any doubt about the constitutional statute of the reasonable-doubt standard, we explicitly hold that the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.

1976The Court declared ( 397 U.S. at 364 , 90 S.Ct. at 1073 ): Lest there remain any doubt about the constitutional statute of the reasonable-doubt standard, we explicitly hold that the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.

2024Compare Carrell v. United States, 165 A.3d 314, 328 (D.C. 2017) (en banc) (explaining that a harmless-error analysis assesses whether we can say “beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained” (quoting Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993)), with Triumph Cap.

2024A constitutional error “is considered harmless if the government can ‘show beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.’” Carrell, 165 A.3d at 328 (quoting Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993)).

2021Code § 21-545 (b)(2) (2012 Repl.); 11 Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425-26, 431-32 (1979) (holding that due to the liberty interests at stake, there must be clear and convincing evidence to order an involuntary civil commitment, which is a standard higher than the preponderance standard); Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310, 316 (1984) (defining clear and convincing as the truth of factual contentions to be “highly probable” or substantially more likely to be true than untrue); see In re Nelson, 408 A.2d 1233, 1238 (D.C. 1979) (replacing the District of Columbia’s proof beyond a reasonabl

1979We both are bound by and concur in the Supreme Court's unanimous rejection in Addington , of the beyond a reasonable doubt standard. [7] The Court stated: *1238 We have concluded that the reasonable doubt standard is inappropriate in civil commitment proceedings because, given the uncertainties of psychiatric diagnosis, it may impose a burden the state cannot meet and thereby erect an unreasonable barrier to needed medical treatment. [ 99 S.Ct. at 1812-13 .] Since a civil commitment proceeding focuses on the individual's psychiatric condition as well as on his past behavior, both the diagnosis

1998See Holland, supra, 348 U.S. at 140 , 75 S.Ct. at 137 ; see also Victor, supra, 511 U.S. at 20-21 , 114 S.Ct. at 1250-51 . 10 The first paragraph is taken from the FJC instruction, with modifications to dispel any claim that jurors will not grasp that the reasonable doubt standard is the highest burden of proof required in a court of law.

1998See Holland, supra, 348 U.S. at 140 , 75 S.Ct. at 137 ; see also Victor, supra, 511 U.S. at 20-21 , 114 S.Ct. at 1250-51 . 10 The first paragraph is taken from the FJC instruction, with modifications to dispel any claim that jurors will not grasp that the reasonable doubt standard is the highest burden of proof required in a court of law.