reasonable doubt standard in Maryland

2026B An error in admitting evidence does not require reversal if the State demonstrates beyond a reasonable doubt that the error “in no way influenced the verdict[.]” Dorsey v. State, 276 Md. 638, 655 (1976); see also Gross v. State, 481 Md. 233, 259 (2022) (reaffirming the Dorsey standard).

2019Consistent with the Dorsey standard, unless we determine beyond a reasonable doubt that the error in no way influenced the verdict, the error cannot be deemed harmless and a reversal is mandated. 8 276 Md. at 659 , 350 A.2d at 678 .

2025Similarly, in Ruffin v. State, 394 Md. 355, 373 (2006), the Court held that, “in every criminal jury trial, the trial court is required to instruct the jury on the presumption of innocence and the reasonable doubt standard of proof which closely adheres to MPJI-CR 2:02,” the pattern jury instructions on those subjects. 26 Green v. State, 119 Md.

2013See also Ruffin v. State, 394 Md. 355, 373 , 906 A.2d 360, 371 (2006) (“We hold that in every criminal jury trial, the trial court is required to instruct the jury on the presumption of innocence and the reasonable doubt standard of proof which closely adheres to MPJI-Cr 2:02.

2012The Reasonable Doubt Instructions Petitioner contends that the jury instructions, other than the instruction on the charge of conspiracy, do not satisfy the requirements of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and its counterpart provision in Maryland, Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. 2 Petitioner argues that, because the jury was not expressly advised that the reasonable doubt standard must be applied to each element of each offense, there was a “reasonable likelihood” that the jury convicted him based on less than what is mandated by In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358

2012The Reasonable Doubt Instructions Petitioner contends that the jury instructions, other than the instruction on the charge of conspiracy, do not satisfy the requirements of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and its counterpart provision in Maryland, Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. 2 Petitioner argues that, because the jury was not expressly advised that the reasonable doubt standard must be applied to each element of each offense, there was a “reasonable likelihood” that the jury convicted him based on less than what is mandated by In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358

2011See Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 280 , 113 S.Ct. 2078 ; Merzbacher, 346 Md. at 398 , 697 A.2d at 436 ("The reasonable doubt standard is such an indispensable and necessary part of any criminal proceeding that, with respect to a case tried before a jury, the trial court's failure to inform the jury of that standard constitutes reversible error."); Wills, 329 Md. at 376 , 620 A.2d at 298 (stating that inclusion of a reasonable doubt instruction "is so indispensable that the Supreme Court has indicated that failure to instruct the jury of the requirement of the reasonable doubt standard is never harmles

2011See Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 280 , 113 S.Ct. 2078 ; Merzbacher, 346 Md. at 398 , 697 A.2d at 436 ("The reasonable doubt standard is such an indispensable and necessary part of any criminal proceeding that, with respect to a case tried before a jury, the trial court's failure to inform the jury of that standard constitutes reversible error."); Wills, 329 Md. at 376 , 620 A.2d at 298 (stating that inclusion of a reasonable doubt instruction "is so indispensable that the Supreme Court has indicated that failure to instruct the jury of the requirement of the reasonable doubt standard is never harmles

2011Rule 16-757(b); 4 Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Siskind, 401 Md. 41, 54 , 930 A.2d 328, 335 (2007). “ ‘The clear and convincing standard of proof lies somewhere between a preponderance of evidence standard, which is generally applied to civil cases, and beyond a reasonable doubt standard, which is applied to most crimes.’ ” Id., 930 A.2d at 335 (citations omitted). “ “We accept a hearing judge’s findings of fact unless we determine that they are clearly erroneous.’ ” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Edib, 415 Md. 696, 706 , 4 A.3d 957, 964 (2010) (citation omitted).

2011Rule 16-757(b); 4 Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Siskind, 401 Md. 41, 54 , 930 A.2d 328, 335 (2007). “ ‘The clear and convincing standard of proof lies somewhere between a preponderance of evidence standard, which is generally applied to civil cases, and beyond a reasonable doubt standard, which is applied to most crimes.’ ” Id., 930 A.2d at 335 (citations omitted). “ “We accept a hearing judge’s findings of fact unless we determine that they are clearly erroneous.’ ” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Edib, 415 Md. 696, 706 , 4 A.3d 957, 964 (2010) (citation omitted).

2003Moreover, the reasonable doubt standard is “more than simply a trial ritual.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 316-17 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 .

2003Moreover, the reasonable doubt standard is “more than simply a trial ritual.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 316-17 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 .

2012Montgomery v. State, 292 Md. 84, 91 , 437 A.2d 654, 658 (1981). 7 The trial court is required to adhere “closely” to Maryland Criminal Pattern Jury Instruction 2:02 when instructing the jury on the reasonable doubt standard.

2012Montgomery v. State, 292 Md. 84, 91 , 437 A.2d 654, 658 (1981). 7 The trial court is required to adhere “closely” to Maryland Criminal Pattern Jury Instruction 2:02 when instructing the jury on the reasonable doubt standard.

2011Accord Merzbacher v. State, 346 Md. 391, 404 , 697 A.2d 432 (1997) (“[W]e strongly recommend that trial courts closely adhere to the reasonable doubt instruction ... articulated in [MPJIJ-CR 2:02.”).

2011Accord Merzbacher v. State, 346 Md. 391, 404 , 697 A.2d 432 (1997) (“[W]e strongly recommend that trial courts closely adhere to the reasonable doubt instruction ... articulated in [MPJIJ-CR 2:02.”).

2026Critical to this inquiry is whether the evidence presented in error was merely “cumulative evidence.” Dove v. State, 415 Md. 727, 743 (2010).

2021See Dove v. State, 415 Md. 727, 743 (2010) (holding that error is harmless where “there is no reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of . . . may have contributed to the rendition of the guilty verdict”).

2011The two doctrines are distinct, and we have made clear that "[t]he `knowing and intelligent' waiver concept is not applicable to the failure to object to an erroneous jury instruction." Hunt v. State, 345 Md. 122, 150 , 691 A.2d 1255, 1268 (1997) (rejecting that argument in the context of a post conviction challenge to the constitutional adequacy of a reasonable doubt instruction) (citing Davis v. State, 285 Md. 19, 35 , 400 A.2d 406, 414 (1979)).

2011The two doctrines are distinct, and we have made clear that "[t]he `knowing and intelligent' waiver concept is not applicable to the failure to object to an erroneous jury instruction." Hunt v. State, 345 Md. 122, 150 , 691 A.2d 1255, 1268 (1997) (rejecting that argument in the context of a post conviction challenge to the constitutional adequacy of a reasonable doubt instruction) (citing Davis v. State, 285 Md. 19, 35 , 400 A.2d 406, 414 (1979)).

2005Compare Ark.Code Ann. § 5-4-603(a)(2) (1987); Conn. Gen.Stat. § 53a-46a (2005) (beyond a reasonable doubt standard not directly in statute, but interpreted as such in Connecticut v. Rizzo, 266 Conn. 171 , 833 A.2d 363, 410-11 (2003)); N.J.

2005Compare Ark.Code Ann. § 5-4-603(a)(2) (1987); Conn. Gen.Stat. § 53a-46a (2005) (beyond a reasonable doubt standard not directly in statute, but interpreted as such in Connecticut v. Rizzo, 266 Conn. 171 , 833 A.2d 363, 410-11 (2003)); N.J.

2026It stated that the knowing and voluntary waiver standard does not apply “to ‘the vast array of trial decisions, strategic and tactical, which 10 Subsequently, in Savoy v. State, 420 Md. 232 (2011), which involved a belated direct appeal, the Court rejected a defendant’s contention “that preservation by contemporaneous objection is not required to preserve an appellate challenge to a reasonable doubt instruction that lowers the constitutional standard of proof, because ‘waiver’ of such error requires that it be a Zerbst-type ‘intelligent and knowing’ waiver.” Id. at 240 .

2026It stated that the knowing and voluntary waiver standard does not apply “to ‘the vast array of trial decisions, strategic and tactical, which 10 Subsequently, in Savoy v. State, 420 Md. 232 (2011), which involved a belated direct appeal, the Court rejected a defendant’s contention “that preservation by contemporaneous objection is not required to preserve an appellate challenge to a reasonable doubt instruction that lowers the constitutional standard of proof, because ‘waiver’ of such error requires that it be a Zerbst-type ‘intelligent and knowing’ waiver.” Id. at 240 .

2022Thus, the Chapman inquiry of “whether the same verdict of guilty- beyond-a-reasonable-doubt would have been rendered absent the constitutional error is utterly meaningless.” Id. 5 As this Court has previously noted, “not all errors in a reasonable doubt instruction are of constitutional magnitude.” Savoy, 420 Md. at 238 . 19 The case of United States v. Hasting is also instructive. 461 U.S. 499 (1983).

2022Thus, the Chapman inquiry of “whether the same verdict of guilty- beyond-a-reasonable-doubt would have been rendered absent the constitutional error is utterly meaningless.” Id. 5 As this Court has previously noted, “not all errors in a reasonable doubt instruction are of constitutional magnitude.” Savoy, 420 Md. at 238 . 19 The case of United States v. Hasting is also instructive. 461 U.S. 499 (1983).

2019Specifically, Sherman applied the Dorsey standard and the Court was unable to "upon its own independent review of the record, declare beyond a reasonable doubt that the error in no way influenced the verdict." Sherman , 288 Md. at 641 , 421 A.2d at 82 .

2019Specifically, Sherman applied the Dorsey standard and the Court was unable to "upon its own independent review of the record, declare beyond a reasonable doubt that the error in no way influenced the verdict." Sherman , 288 Md. at 641 , 421 A.2d at 82 .

2011The Court of Special Appeals also recognized that, under Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1 , 114 S.Ct. 1239 , 127 L.Ed.2d 583 (1994), not all errors in a reasonable doubt instruction are of constitutional magnitude.

2011The Court of Special Appeals also recognized that, under Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1 , 114 S.Ct. 1239 , 127 L.Ed.2d 583 (1994), not all errors in a reasonable doubt instruction are of constitutional magnitude.

2004As to the two burdens, Justice Stewart of the Utah Supreme Court observed: “The ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ standard may, of course, be considered similar in its function to proof by a preponderance of evidence, i. e., both standards are used to resolve factual disputes.” State v. Brown, 607 P.2d 261, 275 (Utah 1980) (emphasis added).

2004As to the two burdens, Justice Stewart of the Utah Supreme Court observed: "The `beyond a reasonable doubt' standard may, of course, be considered similar in its function to proof by a preponderance of evidence, i.e., both standards are used to resolve factual disputes." State v. Brown, 607 P.2d 261, 275 (Utah 1980) (emphasis added).

2005"A constitutional error is harmless when 'it appears "beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” ’ " Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 17 , 124 S.Ct. 7 , 157 L.Ed.2d 263 (2003) (per curiam) quoting Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 15 , 119 S.Ct. 1827 , 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999) (in turn quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967)). 6 .

2005"A constitutional error is harmless when 'it appears "beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” ’ " Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 17 , 124 S.Ct. 7 , 157 L.Ed.2d 263 (2003) (per curiam) quoting Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 15 , 119 S.Ct. 1827 , 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999) (in turn quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967)). 6 .

2021However, the court cautioned that “such an instruction will run afoul of the prohibition against relieving the State of its burden [of proof beyond a reasonable doubt] where the instruction is predominant in the overall instructions and its relation to the reasonable doubt standard unclear.” Id. at 570-71 .

2021And the Evans court cautioned that “such an instruction will run afoul of the prohibition against relieving the State of its burden [of proof beyond a reasonable doubt] where the instruction is predominant in the overall instructions and its relation to the reasonable doubt standard unclear.” Id. at 570-71 .

2009We have omitted from our recitation of Judge Souder's conclusions of law the text of the various rule violations. 14 . " ‘The clear and convincing standard of proof lies somewhere between a preponderance of evidence standard, which is generally applied to civil cases, and beyond a reasonable doubt standard, which is applied to most crimes.’ ” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Siskind, 401 Md. 41, 54 , 930 A.2d 328, 335 (2007) (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Ward, 394 Md. 1,16 , 904 A.2d 477, 486 (2006)). 15 .

2009We have omitted from our recitation of Judge Souder's conclusions of law the text of the various rule violations. 14 . " ‘The clear and convincing standard of proof lies somewhere between a preponderance of evidence standard, which is generally applied to civil cases, and beyond a reasonable doubt standard, which is applied to most crimes.’ ” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Siskind, 401 Md. 41, 54 , 930 A.2d 328, 335 (2007) (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Ward, 394 Md. 1,16 , 904 A.2d 477, 486 (2006)). 15 .

1983You argue the hesitation point but I think I have covered it in the instruction.” *158 Bowers claims that this instruction “conveys not the reasonable doubt standard but rather the ‘preponderance of evidence’ standard.” In Lambert v. State, 193 Md. 551 , 69 A.2d 461 (1949), there was contention relative to the propriety of a reasonable doubt instruction.

1983You argue the hesitation point but I think I have covered it in the instruction.” *158 Bowers claims that this instruction “conveys not the reasonable doubt standard but rather the ‘preponderance of evidence’ standard.” In Lambert v. State, 193 Md. 551 , 69 A.2d 461 (1949), there was contention relative to the propriety of a reasonable doubt instruction.

2026The Court rejected that contention because its decision in Wills “did not alter existing case law with respect to the criteria under which a challenge to a reasonable doubt instruction is to be presented.” Id. at 152. 18 CP § 7-106(b)(2); Rose, 345 Md. at 244 ; Curtis, 284 Md. at 148-49 ).

2003In a second post conviction petition, however, Rose argued for the first time that “the reasonable doubt instruction given at his trial was constitutionally deficient, depriving him of his constitutional right not to be convicted by less than proof ‘beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” 345 Md. at 241 , 691 A.2d 1314 .

2011To our knowledge, there is but one case, Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39 , 111 S.Ct. 328 , 112 L.Ed.2d 339 (1990) (per curiam), in which the Supreme Court found a reasonable doubt instruction constitutionally deficient.

2011To our knowledge, there is but one case, Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39 , 111 S.Ct. 328 , 112 L.Ed.2d 339 (1990) (per curiam), in which the Supreme Court found a reasonable doubt instruction constitutionally deficient.

2011Himple, 101 Md.App. 579 , 647 A.2d 1240 , involved a reasonable doubt instruction virtually identical to the one given in Petitioner’s case. 9 Of additional interest, for our purposes, is that the Court of Special Appeals exercised its discretion in that case to take cognizance of plain error in the reasonable doubt instruction (as there had been no contemporaneous objection to it), and ordered a new trial on the basis of that instructional error.

2011App. 579 , 647 A.2d 1240 , involved a reasonable doubt instruction virtually identical to the one given in Petitioner's case. [9] Of additional interest, for our purposes, is that the Court of Special Appeals exercised its discretion in that case to take cognizance of plain error in the reasonable doubt instruction (as there had been no contemporaneous objection to it), and ordered a new trial on the basis of that instructional error.

2009Quoting Wadlow v. State, 335 Md. 122, 129 , 642 A.2d 213 (1994), discussed infra, appellant asserts: “ ‘[Wjhere the 'legislature has prescribed different sentences for the same offense, depending upon a particular circumstance of the offense, [the courts] have held that the presence of that circumstance must be alleged in the charging document, and must be determined by the trier of fact applying the reasonable doubt standard.’ ” In appellant’s view, the court erred by failing to instruct the jury as to its duty to determine “the facts necessary to establish the sentencing enhancement,” as req

2009Quoting Wadlow v. State, 335 Md. 122, 129 , 642 A.2d 213 (1994), discussed infra, appellant asserts: “ ‘[Wjhere the 'legislature has prescribed different sentences for the same offense, depending upon a particular circumstance of the offense, [the courts] have held that the presence of that circumstance must be alleged in the charging document, and must be determined by the trier of fact applying the reasonable doubt standard.’ ” In appellant’s view, the court erred by failing to instruct the jury as to its duty to determine “the facts necessary to establish the sentencing enhancement,” as req