92 Michigan opinions name it 2 courts 1968–2026 6 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Michigan courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Andersongreen2 sentences2020The harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard “requires the beneficiary of the error to prove, and the court to determine, beyond a reasonable doubt that there is no reasonable possibility that the [error] complained of might have contributed to the conviction.” Anderson, 446 Mich at 406 (quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Carines, 460 Mich at 774 . 2004If, instead, the error were a preserved constitutional one, the burden would be on the prosecution to “ ‘prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.’ ” People v Anderson (After Remand), 446 Mich 392 , 406 n 36; 521 NW2d 538 (1994), quoting Chapman v California, 386 US 18, 23 ; 87 S Ct 824 ; 17 L Ed 2d 705 (1967). | 3 | 7 |
In Re WINSHIPgreen2 sentences2025This reasonable-doubt requirement was “developed to safeguard men from dubious and unjust convictions, with resulting forfeitures of life, liberty and property.” In re Winship, 397 US 358, 362 ; 90 S Ct 1068 ; 25 L Ed 2d 368 (1970). 2025This reasonable-doubt requirement was “developed to safeguard men from dubious and unjust convictions, with resulting forfeitures of life, liberty and property.” In re Winship, 397 US 358, 362 ; 90 S Ct 1068 ; 25 L Ed 2d 368 (1970). | 2 | 10 |
Sullivan v. Louisianagreen2 sentences2020When those statements are then considered with the reference to “moral certainty,” rather than evidentiary certainty, it becomes clear that a reasonable juror could have interpreted the instruction to allow a finding of guilt based on a degree of proof below that required by the Due Process Clause. [Cage, 498 US at 41 (cleaned up, emphasis added).] In Sullivan v Louisiana, 508 US 275, 277 ; 113 S Ct 2078 ; 124 L Ed 2d 182 (1993), the Supreme Court was faced with a reasonable doubt instruction “essentially identical to the one held unconstitutional in” Cage. 2020When those statements are then considered with the reference to “moral certainty,” rather than evidentiary certainty, it becomes clear that a reasonable juror could have interpreted the instruction to allow a finding of guilt based on a degree of proof below that required by the Due Process Clause. [Cage, 498 US at 41 (cleaned up, emphasis added).] In Sullivan v Louisiana, 508 US 275, 277 ; 113 S Ct 2078 ; 124 L Ed 2d 182 (1993), the Supreme Court was faced with a reasonable doubt instruction “essentially identical to the one held unconstitutional in” Cage. | 2 | 2 |
Kotteakos v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1996See, e.g., People v Peterson, 450 Mich 349, 377-378 ; 537 NW2d 857 (1995), amended 450 Mich 1212 (1995); People v Straight, supra at 427 ; People v Young (After Remand), 425 Mich 470, 505 ; 391 NW2d 270 (1986); see also, e.g., Kotteakos, supra at 764-765 ; Lane, supra at 455-460 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 14 n A The view that preserved nonconstitutional error should be reviewed under the harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard is incompatible with the history and purpose of the statute and court rules. 1996See, e.g., People v. Peterson, 450 Mich. 349, 377-378 , 537 N.W.2d 857 (1995), amended 450 Mich. 1212 , 548 N.W.2d 625 (1995); People v. Straight, supra at 427 , 424 N.W.2d 257 ; People v. Young (After Remand), 425 Mich. 470, 505 , 391 N.W.2d 270 (1986); see also, e.g., Kotteakos, supra at 764-765 , 66 S.Ct. at 1247-1248 ; Lane, supra at 455-460 , 106 S.Ct. at 735-738 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). [14] II A The view that preserved nonconstitutional error should be reviewed under the harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard is incompatible with the history and pur | 2 | 2 |
Chapman v. Californiared2 sentences2008Thus, it must be determined "whether the State has proved `beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.'" Id. at 258-259, 108 S.Ct. 1792 quoting Chapman, supra at 24 , 87 S.Ct. 824 . 2004If, instead, the error were a preserved constitutional one, the burden would be on the prosecution to “ ‘prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.’ ” People v Anderson (After Remand), 446 Mich 392 , 406 n 36; 521 NW2d 538 (1994), quoting Chapman v California, 386 US 18, 23 ; 87 S Ct 824 ; 17 L Ed 2d 705 (1967). | 1 | 11 |
People v. Carinesgreen2 sentences2020The harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard “requires the beneficiary of the error to prove, and the court to determine, beyond a reasonable doubt that there is no reasonable possibility that the [error] complained of might have contributed to the conviction.” Anderson, 446 Mich at 406 (quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Carines, 460 Mich at 774 . 2019Carines, 460 Mich at 774 . | 1 | 4 |
People v. Swaingreen2 sentences2020Thus, this Court finds it necessary to make a “holistic judgment about all the evidence and its likely effect on [a reasonable trier of fact] applying the reasonable-doubt standard.” People v Swain, 288 Mich App 609, 640 ; 794 NW2d 92 (2010). 2020Thus, this Court finds it necessary to make a “holistic judgment about all the evidence and its likely effect on [a reasonable trier of fact] applying the reasonable-doubt standard.” People v Swain, 288 Mich App 609, 640 ; 794 NW2d 92 (2010). | 1 | 3 |
Harrington v. Californiared2 sentences1971To conclude that admission of the improperly seized evidence was harmless error requires a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the defendants’ conviction, Harrington v. California (1969), 395 US 250 ( 89 S Ct 1726 , 23 L Ed 2d 284 ). 1971To conclude that admission of the improperly seized evidence was harmless error requires a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the defendants’ conviction, Harrington v. California (1969), 395 US 250 ( 89 S Ct 1726 , 23 L Ed 2d 284 ). | 1 | 3 |
Santosky v. Kramergreen2 sentences2009This is significant because it demonstrates that the "stringency of the `beyond a reasonable doubt' standard bespeaks the `weight and gravity' of the private interest affected, society's interest in avoiding erroneous convictions, and a judgment that those interests together require that `society impos[e] almost the entire risk of error upon itself.'" Santosky, 455 U.S. at 755 , 102 S.Ct. 1388 (internal citations omitted). 2009This is significant because it demonstrates that the “stringency of the ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ standard bespeaks the ‘weight and gravity’ of the private interest affected, society’s interest in avoiding erroneous convictions, and a judgment that those interests together require that ‘society impos[e] almost the entire risk of error upon itself.’ ” Santosky, 455 US at 755 (internal citations omitted). | 1 | 2 |
Beck v. Alabamagreen2 sentences2025We cannot say that the -5- availability of a third option—convicting the defendant of simple assault—could not have resulted in a different verdict. [Id. at 212-213.] In Beck v. Alabama, 447 US 625, 634 ; 100 S Ct 2382 ; 65 L Ed 2d 392 (1980), the Supreme Court also noted that “providing the jury with the ‘third option’ of convicting on a lesser included offense ensures that the jury will accord the defendant the full benefit of the reasonable-doubt standard[.]” In this case, defense counsel chose to focus on malice as the intent to kill or intent to cause great bodily harm, but ignored the ot 2025We cannot say that the -5- availability of a third option—convicting the defendant of simple assault—could not have resulted in a different verdict. [Id. at 212-213.] In Beck v. Alabama, 447 US 625, 634 ; 100 S Ct 2382 ; 65 L Ed 2d 392 (1980), the Supreme Court also noted that “providing the jury with the ‘third option’ of convicting on a lesser included offense ensures that the jury will accord the defendant the full benefit of the reasonable-doubt standard[.]” In this case, defense counsel chose to focus on malice as the intent to kill or intent to cause great bodily harm, but ignored the ot | 1 | 1 |
Cage v. Louisianagreen2 sentences2020When those statements are then considered with the reference to “moral certainty,” rather than evidentiary certainty, it becomes clear that a reasonable juror could have interpreted the instruction to allow a finding of guilt based on a degree of proof below that required by the Due Process Clause. [Cage, 498 US at 41 (cleaned up, emphasis added).] In Sullivan v Louisiana, 508 US 275, 277 ; 113 S Ct 2078 ; 124 L Ed 2d 182 (1993), the Supreme Court was faced with a reasonable doubt instruction “essentially identical to the one held unconstitutional in” Cage. 2020When those statements are then considered with the reference to “moral certainty,” rather than evidentiary certainty, it becomes clear that a reasonable juror could have interpreted the instruction to allow a finding of guilt based on a degree of proof below that required by the Due Process Clause. [Cage, 498 US at 41 (cleaned up, emphasis added).] In Sullivan v Louisiana, 508 US 275, 277 ; 113 S Ct 2078 ; 124 L Ed 2d 182 (1993), the Supreme Court was faced with a reasonable doubt instruction “essentially identical to the one held unconstitutional in” Cage. | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Kowalskigreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Willinggreen | 1 | 1 |
| House v. Bellgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Bearssgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Face Trading, Inc. v. Department of Consumer & Industry Servicesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Davisgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Petersongreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Lanegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Michigan. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Budzyn
green
2 sentences2020For claims that the jury was exposed to an extraneous influence, “[w]e examine the error to determine if it is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the error is constitutional in nature.” People v Budzyn, 456 Mich 77, 89 ; 566 NW2d 229 (1997). 2020For claims that the jury was exposed to an extraneous influence, “[w]e examine the error to determine if it is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the error is constitutional in nature.” People v Budzyn, 456 Mich 77, 89 ; 566 NW2d 229 (1997). | 3 | 2004–2025 |
Victor v. Nebraska
green
2 sentences2003This model instruction surpasses others I have seen in stating the reasonable doubt standard succinctly and comprehensibly. [Victor v Nebraska, 511 US 1, 26-27 ; 114 S Ct 1239 ; 127 L Ed 2d 583 (1994) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).] *151 Considering the absence of authority finding this instruction to be erroneous, and the weight of authority upholding and commending it, we find no basis for a determination of error. 2003This model instruction surpasses others I have seen in stating the reasonable doubt standard succinctly and comprehensibly. [Victor v Nebraska, 511 US 1, 26-27 ; 114 S Ct 1239 ; 127 L Ed 2d 583 (1994) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).] *151 Considering the absence of authority finding this instruction to be erroneous, and the weight of authority upholding and commending it, we find no basis for a determination of error. | 3 | 2003–2020 |
People v. Lockridge
green
2 sentences2017People v Lockridge, 498 Mich 358, 373 ; 870 NW2d 502 (2015). “[A] preserved, nonstructural error is subject to the harmless beyond a reasonable doubt test.” People v Terrell, 312 Mich App 450, 464 ; 879 NW2d 294 (2015), lv held in abeyance ___ Mich ___; 878 NW2d 480 (2016). 2017People v Lockridge, 498 Mich 358, 373 ; 870 NW2d 502 (2015). “[A] preserved, nonstructural error is subject to the harmless beyond a reasonable doubt test.” People v Terrell, 312 Mich App 450, 464 ; 879 NW2d 294 (2015), lv held in abeyance ___ Mich ___; 878 NW2d 480 (2016). | 3 | 2016–2017 |
Neder v. United States
green
2 sentences2014“A constitutional error is harmless if ‘[it is] clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the error.’” People v Mass, 464 Mich 615 , 640 n 29; 628 NW2d 540 (2001), quoting Neder v United States, 527 US 1, 19 ; 119 S Ct 1827 ; 144 L Ed 2d 540 (2001). 2014“A constitutional error is harmless if ‘[it is] clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the error.’” People v Mass, 464 Mich 615 , 640 n 29; 628 NW2d 540 (2001), quoting Neder v United States, 527 US 1, 19 ; 119 S Ct 1827 ; 144 L Ed 2d 540 (2001). | 3 | 2007–2014 |
Rose v. Clark
green
2 sentences1997Other constitutional violations are measured by the standard that requires a court to be convinced ‘beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.’ Chapman v California, 386 US 18, 24 ; 87 S Ct 824 ; 17 L Ed 2d 705 (1967) (commenting on defendant’s failure to testily at trial could be harmless error); Rose v Clark, 478 US [570]; 106 S Ct 3101 ; 92 L Ed 2d 460 (1986) (jury instruction shifting the burden of proof to the defend *540 ant can be harmless error). 1997Other constitutional violations are measured by the standard that requires a court to be convinced ‘beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.’ Chapman v California, 386 US 18, 24 ; 87 S Ct 824 ; 17 L Ed 2d 705 (1967) (commenting on defendant’s failure to testily at trial could be harmless error); Rose v Clark, 478 US [570]; 106 S Ct 3101 ; 92 L Ed 2d 460 (1986) (jury instruction shifting the burden of proof to the defend *540 ant can be harmless error). | 3 | 1986–1997 |
People v. Osantowski
green
2 sentences2018However, “the standard of proof applicable to the guidelines scoring process differs from the reasonable doubt standard underlying conviction of an offense.” People v Osantowski, 481 Mich 103, 111 ; 748 NW2d 799 (2008). 2018However, “the standard of proof applicable to the guidelines scoring process differs from the reasonable doubt standard underlying conviction of an offense.” People v Osantowski, 481 Mich 103, 111 ; 748 NW2d 799 (2008). | 2 | 2018–2018 |
People v. Terrell
green
2 sentences2017People v Lockridge, 498 Mich 358, 373 ; 870 NW2d 502 (2015). “[A] preserved, nonstructural error is subject to the harmless beyond a reasonable doubt test.” People v Terrell, 312 Mich App 450, 464 ; 879 NW2d 294 (2015), lv held in abeyance ___ Mich ___; 878 NW2d 480 (2016). 2017People v Lockridge, 498 Mich 358, 373 ; 870 NW2d 502 (2015). “[A] preserved, nonstructural error is subject to the harmless beyond a reasonable doubt test.” People v Terrell, 312 Mich App 450, 464 ; 879 NW2d 294 (2015), lv held in abeyance ___ Mich ___; 878 NW2d 480 (2016). | 2 | 2017–2017 |
People v. Zaid
neutral
2 sentences2017People v Lockridge, 498 Mich 358, 373 ; 870 NW2d 502 (2015). “[A] preserved, nonstructural error is subject to the harmless beyond a reasonable doubt test.” People v Terrell, 312 Mich App 450, 464 ; 879 NW2d 294 (2015), lv held in abeyance ___ Mich ___; 878 NW2d 480 (2016). 2017People v Lockridge, 498 Mich 358, 373 ; 870 NW2d 502 (2015). “[A] preserved, nonstructural error is subject to the harmless beyond a reasonable doubt test.” People v Terrell, 312 Mich App 450, 464 ; 879 NW2d 294 (2015), lv held in abeyance ___ Mich ___; 878 NW2d 480 (2016). | 2 | 2017–2017 |
People v. Fletcher
green
2 sentences2015The people may do so by proving that either the extraneous influence was duplicative of evidence produced at trial or the evidence of guilt was overwhelming. [People v Fletcher, 260 Mich App 531, 540 ; 679 NW2d 127 (2004) (citations omitted).] To the extent that defendant argues that he was denied the jury he selected, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in removing Juror #1 and Juror #4. 2015The people may do so by proving that either the extraneous influence was duplicative of evidence produced at trial or the evidence of guilt was overwhelming. [People v Fletcher, 260 Mich App 531, 540 ; 679 NW2d 127 (2004) (citations omitted).] To the extent that defendant argues that he was denied the jury he selected, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in removing Juror #1 and Juror #4. | 2 | 2015–2015 |
Addington v. Texas
green
2 sentences2006“The function of a standard of proof... is to ‘instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of adjudication.’ ” Addington v Texas, 441 US 418, 423 ; 99 S Ct 1804 ; 60 L Ed 2d 323 (1979), quoting In Re Winship, 397 US 358, 370 ; 90 S Ct 1068 ; 25 L Ed 2d 368 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). “[T]he ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ standard historically has been reserved for criminal cases.” Addington, supra at 428 . 2006“The function of a standard of proof... is to ‘instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of adjudication.’ ” Addington v Texas, 441 US 418, 423 ; 99 S Ct 1804 ; 60 L Ed 2d 323 (1979), quoting In Re Winship, 397 US 358, 370 ; 90 S Ct 1068 ; 25 L Ed 2d 368 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). “[T]he ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ standard historically has been reserved for criminal cases.” Addington, supra at 428 . | 2 | 1995–2006 |
Patterson v. New York
green
2 sentences2001However, our Court has also recognized that “a state may define the elements of an offense, and due process does not require the state to satisfy the reasonable-doubt standard as to facts not included in the statutory definition of an offense, so long as the definition does not offend a deeply rooted principle of justice.” Id., citing Patterson, supra. In Patterson, supra at 205 , the United States Supreme Court upheld a state statute that reduced murder to manslaughter if the defendant proved by a preponderance of the evidence the affirmative defense of acting under the influence of extreme e 2001However, our Court has also recognized that “a state may define the elements of an offense, and due process does not require the state to satisfy the reasonable-doubt standard as to facts not included in the statutory definition of an offense, so long as the definition does not offend a deeply rooted principle of justice.” Id., citing Patterson, supra. In Patterson, supra at 205 , the United States Supreme Court upheld a state statute that reduced murder to manslaughter if the defendant proved by a preponderance of the evidence the affirmative defense of acting under the influence of extreme e | 2 | 1990–2001 |
People v. Straight
green
2 sentences1996See, e.g., People v Peterson, 450 Mich 349, 377-378 ; 537 NW2d 857 (1995), amended 450 Mich 1212 (1995); People v Straight, supra at 427 ; People v Young (After Remand), 425 Mich 470, 505 ; 391 NW2d 270 (1986); see also, e.g., Kotteakos, supra at 764-765 ; Lane, supra at 455-460 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 14 n A The view that preserved nonconstitutional error should be reviewed under the harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard is incompatible with the history and purpose of the statute and court rules. 1996See, e.g., People v. Peterson, 450 Mich. 349, 377-378 , 537 N.W.2d 857 (1995), amended 450 Mich. 1212 , 548 N.W.2d 625 (1995); People v. Straight, supra at 427 , 424 N.W.2d 257 ; People v. Young (After Remand), 425 Mich. 470, 505 , 391 N.W.2d 270 (1986); see also, e.g., Kotteakos, supra at 764-765 , 66 S.Ct. at 1247-1248 ; Lane, supra at 455-460 , 106 S.Ct. at 735-738 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). [14] II A The view that preserved nonconstitutional error should be reviewed under the harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard is incompatible with the history and pur | 2 | 1994–1996 |
Fahy v. Connecticut
green
2 sentences1985An error of constitutional dimension is not harmless if "there is a reasonable possibility that [it] might have contributed to the conviction.” Fahy v Connecticut, 375 US 85, 86-87 ; 84 S Ct 229 ; 11 L Ed 2d 171 (1963). 1985An error of constitutional dimension is not harmless if "there is a reasonable possibility that [it] might have contributed to the conviction.” Fahy v Connecticut, 375 US 85, 86-87 ; 84 S Ct 229 ; 11 L Ed 2d 171 (1963). | 2 | 1973–1985 |
People v. Ginther
green
2 sentences2026They were asked about whether television shows affected their thoughts about criminal sexual conduct, what they imagine 3 People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436 ; 212 NW2d 922 (1973). -5- typical abusers looked like, how they would examine evidence, and whether they had any experience with children lying to them. 2026They were asked about whether television shows affected their thoughts about criminal sexual conduct, what they imagine 3 People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436 ; 212 NW2d 922 (1973). -5- typical abusers looked like, how they would examine evidence, and whether they had any experience with children lying to them. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
People of Michigan v. Henry Anderson
green
2 sentences2025To prove that a defendant committed AWIM, the following elements must be established: “(1) an assault, (2) with an actual intent to kill, (3) which, if successful, would make the killing murder.” People v Anderson, 322 Mich App 622, 632 ; 912 NW2d 607 (2018) (quotation marks and citation omitted). 2025To prove that a defendant committed AWIM, the following elements must be established: “(1) an assault, (2) with an actual intent to kill, (3) which, if successful, would make the killing murder.” People v Anderson, 322 Mich App 622, 632 ; 912 NW2d 607 (2018) (quotation marks and citation omitted). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Deck v. Missouri
green
1 sentence2024Deck, 544 US at 635 . | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| People v. Rose green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Weaver v. Massachusetts
green
2 sentences2020Id. at ___; 137 S Ct at 1908 . 2020Id. at ___; 137 S Ct at 1908 . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
People v. Dunigan
green
2 sentences2020We examine the error to determine if it is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the error is constitutional in nature. -12- The people may do so by proving that either the extraneous influence was duplicative of evidence produced at trial or the evidence of guilt was overwhelming. [Id. at 88-90 (citations and footnotes omitted).] “An allegation of juror misconduct, even if the alleged misconduct did actually occur, will not warrant a new trial unless the party seeking the new trial can show that the misconduct [was] such as to affect the impartiality of the jury or disqualify them from e 2020We examine the error to determine if it is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the error is constitutional in nature. -12- The people may do so by proving that either the extraneous influence was duplicative of evidence produced at trial or the evidence of guilt was overwhelming. [Id. at 88-90 (citations and footnotes omitted).] “An allegation of juror misconduct, even if the alleged misconduct did actually occur, will not warrant a new trial unless the party seeking the new trial can show that the misconduct [was] such as to affect the impartiality of the jury or disqualify them from e | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Schlup v. Delo
red
1 sentence2020Id.; Schlup, 513 US at 327 . [Swain, 288 Mich App at 638 (alteration in original).] In considering whether a defendant has satisfied the “actual innocence” standard, an appellate court defers to the trial court’s assessment of new evidence in the context of a holistic judgment about all of the evidence and its likely impact on the jury adhering to the reasonable doubt standard. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| People v. Malone green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| People v. Ericksen green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| People v. Bryant green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Theriault v. AL BOURDEAU INSURANCE SERVICE, INC. green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| People v. Henderson green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| People v. Hubbard green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| People v. Harris green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| People v. Stokes green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| People v. Abraham green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| People v. Buie green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| People v. Herron green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Alleyne v. United States green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| People v. Duncan green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Delaware v. Van Arsdall green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Olmstead v. L.C. green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| People v. Shepherd green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| People v. Mass green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Satterwhite v. Texas green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| In Re Dougherty green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| In Re Fried green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.