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36 Rhode Island opinions name it 2 courts 1971–2026 6 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Rhode Island courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Chapman v. Californiared2 sentences2025Nonetheless, I will conclude this dissent by indicating that, while I do not doubt their good faith, I am somewhat surprised that none of my colleagues shares my conviction that barring defense counsel from questioning Emily in the manner he proposed cannot be called harmless error—in view of the fact that the law requires that, in order to hold that a particular error was harmless, an appellate court must so determine “beyond a reasonable doubt.” Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24; see also Gonzalez, 136 A.3d at 1156 (“The harmless error principle specifically requires ‘the beneficiary of a constitution 2025Nonetheless, I will conclude this dissent by indicating that, while I do not doubt their good faith, I am somewhat surprised that none of my colleagues shares my conviction that barring defense counsel from questioning Emily in the manner he proposed cannot be called harmless error—in view of the fact that the law requires that, in order to hold that a particular error was harmless, an appellate court must so determine “beyond a reasonable doubt.” Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24; see also Gonzalez, 136 A.3d at 1156 (“The harmless error principle specifically requires ‘the beneficiary of a constitution | 7 | 13 |
State v. Thomas Mercuriogreen2 sentences2024“In order to meet the harmless-error test, there must be proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” White, 296 A.3d at 706 (quoting Mercurio, 89 A.3d at 822 ). 2024“In order to meet the harmless-error test, there must be proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” White, 296 A.3d at 706 (quoting Mercurio, 89 A.3d at 822 ). | 6 | 6 |
State v. Smithgreen2 sentences2023That issue we address in the next section of this opinion. - 28 - proof ‘beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.’” State v. Mercurio, 89 A.3d 813, 822 (R.I. 2014) (quoting State v. Smith, 446 A.2d 1035, 1036 (R.I. 1982)). 2023“In order to meet the harmless-error test, there must be proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” State v. Mercurio, 89 A.3d 813, 822 (R.I. 2014) (quoting State v. Smith, 446 A.2d 1035, 1036 (R.I. 1982)). | 6 | 6 |
State v. Bustamantegreen2 sentences2024This Court - 16 - has listed several factors to be considered in determining whether an error was harmless, “including the relative degree of importance of the witness testimony to the prosecution’s case, the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness on material points, the extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted, and the overall strength of the prosecution’s case.” Mercurio, 89 A.3d at 822-23 (deletions omitted) (quoting State v. Bustamante, 756 A.2d 758, 766 (R.I. 2000)). 2024This Court - 16 - has listed several factors to be considered in determining whether an error was harmless, “including the relative degree of importance of the witness testimony to the prosecution’s case, the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness on material points, the extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted, and the overall strength of the prosecution’s case.” Mercurio, 89 A.3d at 822-23 (deletions omitted) (quoting State v. Bustamante, 756 A.2d 758, 766 (R.I. 2000)). | 4 | 4 |
In Re WINSHIPgreen2 sentences2004XI Due Process Rights The defendant argues that his due process rights were violated because the trial justice did not adequately instruct the jury on the element of sexual gratification, and because the state failed to prove every element of the first-and second-degree sexual-assault counts beyond a reasonable doubt in violation of the United States Supreme Court standard set forth in In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 , 90 S.Ct. 1068 , 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970). 2004XI Due Process Rights The defendant argues that his due process rights were violated because the trial justice did not adequately instruct the jury on the element of sexual gratification, and because the state failed to prove every element of the first-and second-degree sexual-assault counts beyond a reasonable doubt in violation of the United States Supreme Court standard set forth in In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 , 90 S.Ct. 1068 , 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970). | 2 | 3 |
State v. Tony Gonzalezgreen2 sentences2025Nonetheless, I will conclude this dissent by indicating that, while I do not doubt their good faith, I am somewhat surprised that none of my colleagues shares my conviction that barring defense counsel from questioning Emily in the manner he proposed cannot be called harmless error—in view of the fact that the law requires that, in order to hold that a particular error was harmless, an appellate court must so determine “beyond a reasonable doubt.” Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24; see also Gonzalez, 136 A.3d at 1156 (“The harmless error principle specifically requires ‘the beneficiary of a constitution 2025Nonetheless, I will conclude this dissent by indicating that, while I do not doubt their good faith, I am somewhat surprised that none of my colleagues shares my conviction that barring defense counsel from questioning Emily in the manner he proposed cannot be called harmless error—in view of the fact that the law requires that, in order to hold that a particular error was harmless, an appellate court must so determine “beyond a reasonable doubt.” Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24 ; see also Gonzalez, 136 A.3d at 1156 (“The harmless error principle specifically requires ‘the beneficiary of a constitutio | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Sassogreen2 sentences2016United States v. Sasso, 695 F.3d 25, 29 (1st Cir. 2012); see United States v. Gray, 780 F.3d 458, 469 (1st Cir.2015). 2016United States v. Sasso, 695 F.3d 25, 29 (1st Cir. 2012); see United States v. Gray, 780 F.3d 458, 469 (1st Cir. 2015). | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Graygreen2 sentences2016United States v. Sasso, 695 F.3d 25, 29 (1st Cir. 2012); see United States v. Gray, 780 F.3d 458, 469 (1st Cir.2015). 2016United States v. Sasso, 695 F.3d 25, 29 (1st Cir. 2012); see United States v. Gray, 780 F.3d 458, 469 (1st Cir. 2015). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Thorpegreen2 sentences2009See Thorpe, 429 A.2d at 790 n. 4 (“Hereafter; trial justices, in discussing the reasonable-doubt doctrine, shall omit any reference to ‘substantial doubt.’” (Emphasis added.)). 1987In that case, we stated that “trial justices, in discussing the reasonable-doubt doctrine, shall omit any reference to ‘substantial doubt.’ ” Id. | 1 | 4 |
State v. Roger Watkinsgreen1 sentence2023Cumulative evidence is evidence that tends “to prove the same point to which other evidence has been offered.” Benitez, 266 A.3d at 1229 (quoting Lynch, 854 A.2d at 1032 ); see also Watkins, 92 A.3d at 189 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Tavaresgreen1 sentence2016Our longstanding rule prohibiting credibility testimony is “that no witness, expert or otherwise, may testify that another witness is lying or faking.” State v. Tavares, 590 A.2d 867, 870 (R.I.1991). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Adamsgreen2 sentences2014See United States v. McMath, 559 F.3d 657, 668 (7th Cir.2009) (holding that remark did not jeopardize the fairness or integrity of the trial); United States v. Torres-Galindo, 206 F.3d 136, 142-43 (1st Cir.2000) (holding that prosecutor’s comment was harmless); People v. Adams, 356 Ill.Dec. 725 , *1021 962 N.E.2d 410, 416 (2012) (holding that comments did not amount to plain error); Spain v. State, 386 Md. 145 , 872 A.2d 25, 34 (2005) (court was “convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the error in no way influenced the verdict”). 7 . 2014See United States v. McMath, 559 F.3d 657, 668 (7th Cir.2009) (holding that remark did not jeopardize the fairness or integrity of the trial); United States v. Torres-Galindo, 206 F.3d 136, 142-43 (1st Cir.2000) (holding that prosecutor’s comment was harmless); People v. Adams, 356 Ill.Dec. 725 , *1021 962 N.E.2d 410, 416 (2012) (holding that comments did not amount to plain error); Spain v. State, 386 Md. 145 , 872 A.2d 25, 34 (2005) (court was “convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the error in no way influenced the verdict”). 7 . | 1 | 1 |
Spain v. Stategreen2 sentences2014See United States v. McMath, 559 F.3d 657, 668 (7th Cir.2009) (holding that remark did not jeopardize the fairness or integrity of the trial); United States v. Torres-Galindo, 206 F.3d 136, 142-43 (1st Cir.2000) (holding that prosecutor’s comment was harmless); People v. Adams, 356 Ill.Dec. 725 , *1021 962 N.E.2d 410, 416 (2012) (holding that comments did not amount to plain error); Spain v. State, 386 Md. 145 , 872 A.2d 25, 34 (2005) (court was “convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the error in no way influenced the verdict”). 7 . 2014See United States v. McMath, 559 F.3d 657, 668 (7th Cir.2009) (holding that remark did not jeopardize the fairness or integrity of the trial); United States v. Torres-Galindo, 206 F.3d 136, 142-43 (1st Cir.2000) (holding that prosecutor’s comment was harmless); People v. Adams, 356 Ill.Dec. 725 , *1021 962 N.E.2d 410, 416 (2012) (holding that comments did not amount to plain error); Spain v. State, 386 Md. 145 , 872 A.2d 25, 34 (2005) (court was “convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the error in no way influenced the verdict”). 7 . | 1 | 1 |
United States v. McMathgreen1 sentence2014See United States v. McMath, 559 F.3d 657, 668 (7th Cir.2009) (holding that remark did not jeopardize the fairness or integrity of the trial); United States v. Torres-Galindo, 206 F.3d 136, 142-43 (1st Cir.2000) (holding that prosecutor’s comment was harmless); People v. Adams, 356 Ill.Dec. 725 , *1021 962 N.E.2d 410, 416 (2012) (holding that comments did not amount to plain error); Spain v. State, 386 Md. 145 , 872 A.2d 25, 34 (2005) (court was “convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the error in no way influenced the verdict”). 7 . | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Ricardo Torres-Galindo, A/K/A Ricky Silva, United States v. Ricardo L. Guilbe-Sanchez, A/K/A Richard La Sombragreen1 sentence2014See United States v. McMath, 559 F.3d 657, 668 (7th Cir.2009) (holding that remark did not jeopardize the fairness or integrity of the trial); United States v. Torres-Galindo, 206 F.3d 136, 142-43 (1st Cir.2000) (holding that prosecutor’s comment was harmless); People v. Adams, 356 Ill.Dec. 725 , *1021 962 N.E.2d 410, 416 (2012) (holding that comments did not amount to plain error); Spain v. State, 386 Md. 145 , 872 A.2d 25, 34 (2005) (court was “convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the error in no way influenced the verdict”). 7 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. McGuygreen1 sentence2009“It is incumbent upon a trial justice to instruct the jury on the law that applies to each issue that the parties raise at trial.” State v. Garcia, 883 A.2d 1131, 1137 (R.I.2005) (citing State v. McGuy, 841 A.2d 1109, 1112 (R.I.2003)). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Garciagreen1 sentence2009“It is incumbent upon a trial justice to instruct the jury on the law that applies to each issue that the parties raise at trial.” State v. Garcia, 883 A.2d 1131, 1137 (R.I.2005) (citing State v. McGuy, 841 A.2d 1109, 1112 (R.I.2003)). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Merciergreen2 sentences2002In proving its case under § 11—5— 2(b), the state may satisfy the “dangerous weapon” element by establishing either that the implement used in the assault was a dangerous weapon per se, such as a knife or loaded gun, State v. Mercier, 415 A.2d 465, 466 (R.I.1980), or that the implement, if not a dangerous weapon per se, “was used in such a way that it had the capability of producing serious bodily harm.” Id. at 467 . 2002In proving its case under § 11—5— 2(b), the state may satisfy the “dangerous weapon” element by establishing either that the implement used in the assault was a dangerous weapon per se, such as a knife or loaded gun, State v. Mercier, 415 A.2d 465, 466 (R.I.1980), or that the implement, if not a dangerous weapon per se, “was used in such a way that it had the capability of producing serious bodily harm.” Id. at 467 . | 1 | 1 |
Ogden v. Saundersgreen1 sentence2001The proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard for challenges to the constitutionality of a statute under the United States Constitution was stated by Justice Washington in Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. ,(12 Wheat.) 213, 270, 6 L.Ed. 606, 625 (1827). | 1 | 1 |
Jackson v. Virginiared2 sentences1998(Emphases added.) Nearly ten years after its pronouncement in Winship , the United States Supreme Court observed that the reasonable-doubt standard “impress[es] upon the factfinder the need to reach a subjective state of near certitude of guilt of the accused.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 315 , 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2787 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560, 571 (1979). 1998(Emphases added.) Nearly ten years after its pronouncement in Winship , the United States Supreme Court observed that the reasonable-doubt standard “impress[es] upon the factfinder the need to reach a subjective state of near certitude of guilt of the accused.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 315 , 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2787 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560, 571 (1979). | 1 | 1 |
Victor v. Nebraskagreen2 sentences1998Because our examination of the reasonable doubt instruction in its entirety convinces us that “‘taken as a whole, the instruction[] correctly conveyed the concept of reasonable doubt to the jury,’ ” State v. Firth, 708 A.2d 526, 533 (R.I.1998) (quoting Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 22 , 114 S.Ct. 1239, 1251 , 127 L.Ed.2d 583, 601 (1994)), we conclude that the reasonable doubt instruction was not erroneous. 1998Because our examination of the reasonable doubt instruction in its entirety convinces us that “‘taken as a whole, the instruction[] correctly conveyed the concept of reasonable doubt to the jury,’ ” State v. Firth, 708 A.2d 526, 533 (R.I.1998) (quoting Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 22 , 114 S.Ct. 1239, 1251 , 127 L.Ed.2d 583, 601 (1994)), we conclude that the reasonable doubt instruction was not erroneous. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Firthgreen1 sentence1998Because our examination of the reasonable doubt instruction in its entirety convinces us that “‘taken as a whole, the instruction[] correctly conveyed the concept of reasonable doubt to the jury,’ ” State v. Firth, 708 A.2d 526, 533 (R.I.1998) (quoting Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 22 , 114 S.Ct. 1239, 1251 , 127 L.Ed.2d 583, 601 (1994)), we conclude that the reasonable doubt instruction was not erroneous. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Myersgreen2 sentences1992State v. Myers, 158 Wis.2d 356, 363 , 461 N.W.2d 777, 780 (1990). 1992State v. Myers, 158 Wis.2d 356, 363 , 461 N.W.2d 777, 780 (1990). | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Ballardgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Getergreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Duffygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Connolly v. Commonwealthgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Nicholas A. Palmigiano v. Robert E. Houlegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Lego v. Twomeygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Rhode Island. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Neder v. United States
green
2 sentences2002Such an error will be deemed harmless if “it appears ‘beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.’ ” Id. at 15 , 119 S.Ct. at 1837 , 144 L.Ed.2d at 51 (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 , 87 S.Ct. 824, 828 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705, 710 (1967)). 2002Such an error will be deemed harmless if “it appears ‘beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.’ ” Id. at 15 , 119 S.Ct. at 1837 , 144 L.Ed.2d at 51 (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 , 87 S.Ct. 824, 828 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705, 710 (1967)). | 2 | 2002–2002 |
State v. Lynch
green
1 sentence2023Cumulative evidence is evidence that tends “to prove the same point to which other evidence has been offered.” Benitez, 266 A.3d at 1229 (quoting Lynch, 854 A.2d at 1032 ); see also Watkins, 92 A.3d at 189 . | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Arizona v. Fulminante
green
1 sentence2005Sullivan, supra, at 281-282 (citing Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 , 307-308 (1991)). | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Sullivan v. Louisiana
green
2 sentences2005In Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 (1993), the Supreme Court re-emphasized that a defective instruction relative to proof beyond a reasonable doubt was an error infecting the structure of the trial and thus could never be considered "harmless." In effect, such a structural fault within the trial — unlike errors that are not structural and "which may therefore be quantitatively assessed in the context of other evidence presented" — deprives the defendant of his right to trial by jury. 2005Sullivan, supra, at 281-282 (citing Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 , 307-308 (1991)). | 1 | 2005–2005 |
United States v. Richard Anglada
green
1 sentence2001Therefore, we hold that although the trial justice did not commit reversible error by adverting to the scale metaphor in defining reasonable doubt to the jury, his “characterization of the standard as quantitative rather than qualitative * * * might better have been omitted.” Anglada, 524 F.2d at 300 . | 1 | 2001–2001 |
French v. United States
green
1 sentence2001That burden never shifts to the defendant. * * * Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that leaves you firmly convinced of the defendant’s guilt.” Given these repeated references to the correct reasonable doubt standard throughout the trial, we hold that the charge, read as a whole, was “sufficient to dispel any possible confusion or misunderstanding arising from the reasonable doubt definition,” id., notwithstanding the court’s potentially misleading use of the “real possibility” phrasing at one point in the charge. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Cupp v. Naughten
green
2 sentences1998Always bear in mind that a defendant in a criminal case is not required to prove his innocence, nor is he required to offer evidence of any kind, nor to disprove or explain anything.” (Emphasis added.) Addressing a claim similar to that raised by defendant here, the First Circuit Court of Appeals concluded: “Although we think that the [‘real possibility of innocence’ language] might possibly engender some confusion as to the burden of proof if it stood by itself, it is clear that when the charge is read as a whole, there was no error. ‘[A] single instruction to a jury may not be judged in arti 1998Always bear in mind that a defendant in a criminal case is not required to prove his innocence, nor is he required to offer evidence of any kind, nor to disprove or explain anything.” (Emphasis added.) Addressing a claim similar to that raised by defendant here, the First Circuit Court of Appeals concluded: “Although we think that the [‘real possibility of innocence’ language] might possibly engender some confusion as to the burden of proof if it stood by itself, it is clear that when the charge is read as a whole, there was no error. ‘[A] single instruction to a jury may not be judged in arti | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Barnes v. United States green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Fahy v. Connecticut green | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.