reasonable doubt standard in New York

2024We reached the same conclusion in People v Knight , again noting that the better practice is to grant a request for an{**42 NY3d at 642} expanded identification charge but reaffirming that the refusal to do so is not reversible error where the charge given "was a correct statement of the law which sufficiently apprised the jury that the reasonable doubt standard applied to identification" ( 87 NY2d 873, 874 [1995]; see also id. at 876 [Titone, J., dissenting] [similarly describing an expanded identification charge as "a discretionary matter rather than a legal requirement" under Whalen ]; acco

2024We reached the same conclusion in People v Knight , again noting that the better practice is to grant a request for an{**42 NY3d at 642} expanded identification charge but reaffirming that the refusal to do so is not reversible error where the charge given "was a correct statement of the law which sufficiently apprised the jury that the reasonable doubt standard applied to identification" ( 87 NY2d 873, 874 [1995]; see also id. at 876 [Titone, J., dissenting] [similarly describing an expanded identification charge as "a discretionary matter rather than a legal requirement" under Whalen ]; acco

2024Under the particular circumstances of this case, we find that the error in admitting the report and supporting documents was harmless because the People have proven "beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained" ( Chapman v California , 386 US 18, 24 [1967]; see Ortega , 2023 NY Slip Op 05956 , * 4; see People v Crimmins , 36 NY2d 230 , 23 7 [1975]).

2023As an alternative holding, we find that the People have proven "beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained" ( Chapman v California , 386 US 18, 24 [1967]).

2024Under the particular circumstances of this case, we find that the error in admitting the report and supporting documents was harmless because the People have proven "beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained" ( Chapman v California , 386 US 18, 24 [1967]; see Ortega , 2023 NY Slip Op 05956 , * 4; see People v Crimmins , 36 NY2d 230 , 23 7 [1975]).

2023Any error in the court's denial of defendant's motion to controvert a warrant to search his phone was harmless, because the People have proven "beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained" ( Chapman v California , 386 US 18, 24 [1967]; see also People v Crimmins , 36 NY2d 230, 237 [1975]).

2016Although the court erred in failing to provide a “ ‘particularized reason for [restraining petitioner] on the record’ ” (People v Ashline, 124 AD3d 1258, 1259 [2015]), we conclude that the error is “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the error did not contribute” to the determination herein (People v Campbell, 106 AD3d 1507, 1509 [2013], lv denied 21 NY3d 1002 [2013] [internal quotation marks omitted]).

2016Although the court erred in failing to provide a “ ‘particularized reason for [restraining petitioner] on the record’ ” (People v Ashline, 124 AD3d 1258, 1259 [2015]), we conclude that the error is “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the error did not contribute” to the determination herein (People v Campbell, 106 AD3d 1507, 1509 [2013], lv denied 21 NY3d 1002 [2013] [internal quotation marks omitted]).

2018The instruction given sufficiently apprised the jury that the reasonable doubt standard applied to identification ( see People v Knight , 87 NY2d 873, 874 ; People v Whalen , 59 NY2d 273, 279 ; People v Patrick , 102 AD3d at 892 ; People v Cox , 54 AD3d 684, 685 ), and the charge as a whole was otherwise adequate to apprise the jury of the correct legal principles to be applied to the case ( see People v Davis , 250 AD2d 776 ).

2016The instruction given “sufficiently apprised the jury that the reasonable doubt standard applied to identification” (People v Knight, 87 NY2d 873, 874 [1995]; see People v Whalen, 59 NY2d 273, 279 [1983]; People v Patrick, 102 AD3d at 892 ; People v Cox, 54 AD3d 684, 685 [2008]), and the charge as a whole was otherwise adequate to apprise the jury of the correct legal principles to be applied to the case (see People v Davis, 250 AD2d 776 [1998]).

2015Although the court’s response was error, inasmuch as a court “must state a particularized reason for [restraining defendant] on the record” even at a bench trial (People v Best, 19 NY3d 739, 743 [2012]), we nevertheless conclude that the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the error “did not contribute to the [court’s decision]” on the suppression issue (People v Clyde, 18 NY3d 145, 153 [2011], cert denied 566 US —, 132 S Ct 1921 [2012] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v Campbell, 106 AD3d 1507, 1509 [2013], lv denied 21 NY3d 1002 [2013] ).

2015Although the court’s response was error, inasmuch as a court “must state a particularized reason for [restraining defendant] on the record” even at a bench trial (People v Best, 19 NY3d 739, 743 [2012]), we nevertheless conclude that the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the error “did not contribute to the [court’s decision]” on the suppression issue (People v Clyde, 18 NY3d 145, 153 [2011], cert denied 566 US —, 132 S Ct 1921 [2012] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v Campbell, 106 AD3d 1507, 1509 [2013], lv denied 21 NY3d 1002 [2013] ).

2015Although the court’s response was error, inasmuch as a court “must state a particularized reason for [restraining defendant] on the record” even at a bench trial (People v Best, 19 NY3d 739, 743 [2012]), we nevertheless conclude that the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the error “did not contribute to the [court’s decision]” on the suppression issue (People v Clyde, 18 NY3d 145, 153 [2011], cert denied 566 US —, 132 S Ct 1921 [2012] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v Campbell, 106 AD3d 1507, 1509 [2013], lv denied 21 NY3d 1002 [2013] ).

2015Although the court’s response was error, inasmuch as a court “must state a particularized reason for [restraining defendant] on the record” even at a bench trial (People v Best, 19 NY3d 739, 743 [2012]), we nevertheless conclude that the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the error “did not contribute to the [court’s decision]” on the suppression issue (People v Clyde, 18 NY3d 145, 153 [2011], cert denied 566 US —, 132 S Ct 1921 [2012] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v Campbell, 106 AD3d 1507, 1509 [2013], lv denied 21 NY3d 1002 [2013] ).

2011Since the court’s reasonable doubt instruction cannot be viewed as expressly shifting the burden of proof, normal preservation requirements apply (see People v Thomas, 50 NY2d 467, 471-472 [1980]), and we decline to review defendant’s unpreserved challenge to that instruction in the interest of justice.

2008Since the court’s reasonable doubt instruction cannot be viewed as expressly shifting the burden of proof, the narrow exception to the preservation requirement does not apply (People v Thomas, 50 NY2d 467, 471-472 [1980]), and we decline to review defendant’s unpreserved challenge to that instruction in the interest of justice.

2003The court’s reasonable doubt instruction conveyed the appropriate legal principles and nothing in that instruction, or in any other part of the court’s charge, imposed an affirmative obligation on the jurors to articulate a reason for having a doubt (see People v Antommarchi, 80 NY2d 247, 251-252 [1992]).

1994Memorandum: We reject defendant’s contention that the court’s reasonable doubt instruction diminished the People’s burden of proof (see, People v Antommarchi, 80 NY2d 247, 251-252 ).

2015Since the defendant's constitutional right to due process was violated by the improper showup, "a reversal and a new trial is required unless it can be said beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the conviction" ( People v G ., 45 NY2d 962, 964 ; People v Crimmins , 36 NY2d 230 ).

2015Since the defendant’s constitutional right to due process was violated by the improper showup, “a reversal and a new trial is required unless it can be said beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the conviction” (People v G., 45 NY2d 962, 964 [1978]; People v Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230 [1975]).

1988In changing the amount of evidence required to satisfy the reasonable doubt standard, they impaired defendant’s right to require the People to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, a right which is unquestionably substantial (see, In re Winship, 397 US 358 [due process requires proof of criminal charge beyond a reasonable doubt]).

1986The United States Supreme Court has ruled, in In re Winship ( 397 US 358, 361-363 [1970]), that: "The requirement that guilt of a criminal charge be established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt dates at least from our early years as a Nation * * * "The reasonable-doubt standard plays a vital role in the American scheme of criminal procedure.

1998Where, as here, however, the unadorned phrase “to a moral certainty” is used when defining reasonable doubt, no error has been found (see, People v Fox, 72 AD2d 146 ).

1992(See, People v Fox, 72 AD2d 146, 147-148 ; People v Cohen, 61 AD2d 929 .) The concern with such a charge is that the jury might believe that it could convict on something less than the reasonable doubt standard, such as by preponderance of the evidence.

2018The instruction given sufficiently apprised the jury that the reasonable doubt standard applied to identification ( see People v Knight , 87 NY2d 873, 874 ; People v Whalen , 59 NY2d 273, 279 ; People v Patrick , 102 AD3d at 892 ; People v Cox , 54 AD3d 684, 685 ), and the charge as a whole was otherwise adequate to apprise the jury of the correct legal principles to be applied to the case ( see People v Davis , 250 AD2d 776 ).

2016The instruction given “sufficiently apprised the jury that the reasonable doubt standard applied to identification” (People v Knight, 87 NY2d 873, 874 [1995]; see People v Whalen, 59 NY2d 273, 279 [1983]; People v Patrick, 102 AD3d at 892 ; People v Cox, 54 AD3d 684, 685 [2008]), and the charge as a whole was otherwise adequate to apprise the jury of the correct legal principles to be applied to the case (see People v Davis, 250 AD2d 776 [1998]).

2016Although the court erred in failing to provide a “ ‘particularized reason for [restraining petitioner] on the record’ ” (People v Ashline, 124 AD3d 1258, 1259 [2015]), we conclude that the error is “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the error did not contribute” to the determination herein (People v Campbell, 106 AD3d 1507, 1509 [2013], lv denied 21 NY3d 1002 [2013] [internal quotation marks omitted]).

2016Although the court erred in failing to provide a “ ‘particularized reason for [restraining petitioner] on the record’ ” (People v Ashline, 124 AD3d 1258, 1259 [2015]), we conclude that the error is “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the error did not contribute” to the determination herein (People v Campbell, 106 AD3d 1507, 1509 [2013], lv denied 21 NY3d 1002 [2013] [internal quotation marks omitted]).

2015With respect to the stun belt, we note that the requirement to wear the stun belt is not a mode of proceedings error and, therefore, such an error may be waived (see generally People v Schrock, 108 AD3d 1221, 1224-1225 [2013], Iv denied 22 NY3d 998 [2013]).

2015With respect to the stun belt, we note that the requirement to wear the stun belt is not a mode of proceedings error and, therefore, such an error may be waived (see generally People v Schrock, 108 AD3d 1221, 1224-1225 [2013], Iv denied 22 NY3d 998 [2013]).

2013Even assuming, arguendo, that defendant correctly contends that he had the right to be free of wrist shackles in this postconviction hearing (cf. People v Best, 19 NY3d 739, 743 [2012]), we nevertheless conclude that the court’s error in failing to articulate a finding of necessity to free only one of defendant’s wrists from the shackles is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the error “ ‘did not contribute to the [decision] obtained’ ” (People v Clyde, 18 NY3d 145, 153 [2011], quoting Deck v Missouri, 544 US 622, 635 [2005]).

2013Even assuming, arguendo, that defendant correctly contends that he had the right to be free of wrist shackles in this postconviction hearing (cf. People v Best, 19 NY3d 739, 743 [2012]), we nevertheless conclude that the court’s error in failing to articulate a finding of necessity to free only one of defendant’s wrists from the shackles is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the error “ ‘did not contribute to the [decision] obtained’ ” (People v Clyde, 18 NY3d 145, 153 [2011], quoting Deck v Missouri, 544 US 622, 635 [2005]).

2013We reject defendant’s contention that the trial prosecutor was disqualified from testifying at the hearing based on the advocate-witness rule inasmuch as that prosecutor did not represent the People at the hearing (see generally People v Paperno, 54 NY2d 294, 299-300 [1981]).

2013We reject defendant’s contention that the trial prosecutor was disqualified from testifying at the hearing based on the advocate-witness rule inasmuch as that prosecutor did not represent the People at the hearing (see generally People v Paperno, 54 NY2d 294, 299-300 [1981]).

2013Additionally, the record demonstrates that the trial court erred in failing to give the jury the requisite preliminary instructions found in CPL 270.40 (see People v Cotterell, 7 AD3d 807 [2004]; People v Nunez-Ramos, 160 AD2d 1029 [1990]; People v Hepburn, 52 AD2d 958 [1976]), committed numerous errors and omissions in its instructions regarding the burden of proof and the reasonable doubt standard (see People v Newman, 46 NY2d 126 [1978]; People v Johnson, 11 AD3d 224 [2004]; People v Cotterell, 7 AD3d 807 [2004]; People v Rosario, 300 AD2d 512, 513 [2002]; People v Livingston, 128 AD2d 645

2013Additionally, the record demonstrates that the trial court erred in failing to give the jury the requisite preliminary instructions found in CPL 270.40 (see People v Cotterell, 7 AD3d 807 [2004]; People v Nunez-Ramos, 160 AD2d 1029 [1990]; People v Hepburn, 52 AD2d 958 [1976]), committed numerous errors and omissions in its instructions regarding the burden of proof and the reasonable doubt standard (see People v Newman, 46 NY2d 126 [1978]; People v Johnson, 11 AD3d 224 [2004]; People v Cotterell, 7 AD3d 807 [2004]; People v Rosario, 300 AD2d 512, 513 [2002]; People v Livingston, 128 AD2d 645