reasonable doubt standard in California

2022(Chandler, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 525 , citing Neder v. United States (1999) 527 U.S. 1 , 8–15 [applying harmless-error test for federal constitutional error—whether it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained— to trial court’s failure to instruct on an element of a crime]; Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 , partially overruled by Brecht v. Abrahamson (1993) 507 U.S. 619 , 622–623 [holding that the standard “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt” is not applicable in habeas cases].) C.

2021(Chandler, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 525 , citing Neder v. United States (1999) 527 U.S. 1 , 8–15 [applying harmless-error test for federal constitutional error—whether it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained— to trial court’s failure to instruct on an element of a crime]; Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 , partially overruled by Brecht v. Abrahamson (1993) 507 U.S. 619 , 622–623 [holding that the standard “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt” is not applicable in habeas cases].) C.

2026(People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 .) We also conclude admission of the evidence would be harmless under the federal standard because the overwhelming evidence of Fite’s guilt “prove[s] beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 .) Aggravating factor Fite contends the record did not support the trial court’s finding that he engaged in violent conduct indicating a serious 9 danger to society (rule 4.421(b)(1)).

2026The court 6 right to be present are reviewed under the [People v.] Watson [(1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 (Watson)] reasonable probability standard: the matter is reversible only if it is reasonably probable the result would have been more favorable to the defendant absent the error.” (People v. Whitmore (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 116 , 127.) “A criminal defendant has a due process right to be present in the courtroom only to the extent his absence would thwart the fairness of the hearing.” (Id. at p. 125.) We review constitutional violations of the right to personally appear under the harmless beyond a

2026Rather, where the trial court fails to instruct on necessary elements, generally this error “is subject to harmless-error 12 analysis” under the test of Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 (Chapman), that is, “whether it appears ‘beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.’ ” (Neder v. U.S. (1999) 527 U.S. 1, 15 (Neder); accord, Merritt, at pp. 825-826, 831; Mil, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 409 .) “ ‘[O]verwhelming’ ” evidence, “other properly given jury instructions,” or a defendant’s concession of elements for which an instruction was o

2026(Neder v. United States (1999) 527 U.S. 1, 4 ; People v. Mil (2012) 53 Cal.4th 400, 409 .) Under this standard, we may affirm the jury’s verdict despite the error “if it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the particular verdict at issue.” (People v. Sakarias (2000) 22 Cal.4th 596, 625 .) In conducting this review, we thoroughly examine the entire record to determine whether it “contains evidence that could rationally lead to a contrary finding with respect to the omitted element.” (Neder v. United States, supra, 527 U.S. at p. 19 .) We also consider “what th

2023The prosecution bears the burden of proving all elements of the offense charged [citations], and must persuade the factfinder ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ of the facts necessary to establish each of those elements . . . .” ( Sullivan, supra, 508 U.S. at pp. 277-278.) Accordingly, we review prejudice from prosecutorial error in misstating the reasonable doubt standard under Chapman.

2023Prejudice “An instruction that omits or misdescribes an element of a charged offense violates the right to jury trial guaranteed by our federal Constitution, and the effect of this violation is measured against the harmless error test of Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [(Chapman)].” (People v. Samaniego (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1148, 1165 .) Chapman requires reversal unless the state can show “beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” ( Chapman, supra, at p. 24 .) Under Chapman, the question “is not what effect the constituti

2023Errors that violate federal constitutional rights are prejudicial unless the People “prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 .) “To say that an error did not contribute to the verdict is … to find that error unimportant in relation to everything else the jury considered on the issue in question, as revealed in the record.” (Yates v. Evatt (1991) 500 U.S. 391, 403 .) Errors under California law are prejudicial when “it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appeali

2022The Error Was Harmless A jury instruction that misdescribes an element of an offense is harmless only if “it appears ‘beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.’ ” (People v. Harris (1994) 9 Cal.4th 407, 424 (Harris), quoting Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 .) “ ‘To say that an error did not contribute to the verdict is . . . to find that error unimportant in relation to everything else the jury considered on the issue in question, as revealed in the record.’ ” ( Harris at p. 426 , quoting Yates v. Evatt (1991) 500 U.S. 391,

2021We therefore hold that as a matter of fundamental fairness the jury must find that aggravating factors outweigh mitigating factors, and this balance must be found beyond a reasonable doubt.” (State v. Biegenwald (N.J. 1987) 524 A.2d 130, 156 ; see also People v. Tenneson (Colo. 1990) 788 P.2d 786, 797 [“[T]he jury still must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant should be sentenced to death.”]; State v. Wood (Utah 1982) 648 P.2d 71 , 83 [“Furthermore, in our view, the reasonable doubt standard also strikes the best balance between the 73 PEOPLE v. MCDANIEL Opinion of the Co

2021For present purposes, we assume without deciding that McDaniel’s foundational premise is correct — i.e., that the right to a reasonable doubt standard governing factfinding by a jury in criminal cases is secured by article I, section 16 and not solely grounded in due process (see In re Winship (1970) 397 U.S. 358, 364 ; People v. Flood (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 481 ).

2026(People v. Schuller (2023) 15 Cal.5th 237 , 251.) Under Chapman, we must reverse unless “it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to [the] jury’s verdict.” (People v. Flood (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 504 .) Before Senate Bill No. 1437 added subdivision (e) to section 189, the term “actual killer” already appeared in section 190.2, the special circumstance statute.

2023“When jury instructions are deficient for omitting an element of an offense, they implicate the defendant’s federal constitutional rights, and we review for harmless error under the strict standard of Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 .” (People v. Sek, supra, 74 Cal.App.5th at p. 668.) This standard applies “where the new element to the offense is introduced through the retroactive application of a new law.” (Ibid.) “Under the Chapman standard, reversal is required unless ‘it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to th[e] jury’s verdict.’ ” (Ibid., citing

2026The same beyond a reasonable doubt standard applies to all such misdescriptions, including alternative-theory error.” (Aledamat, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 9 .) “[A] reviewing court may hold the error harmless where it would be impossible, based on the evidence, for a jury to make the findings reflected in its verdict without also making the findings that would support a valid theory of liability.” (In re Lopez (2023) 14 Cal.5th 562 , 568.) “[T]he reviewing court has an obligation ‘to rigorously review the evidence to determine whether any rational juror who found the defendant guilty based on an

2025(People v. Aledamat (2019) 8 Cal.5th 1, 13 .) In other words, we must reverse unless we conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict.

2022(People v. Garcia (1975) 54 Cal.App.3d 61, 63 ; see People v. Paulsell (1896) 115 Cal. 6, 12 .) When a trial court instructs the jury with a misdescription of the burden of proof by suggesting a higher degree of doubt than is required for acquittal under the reasonable doubt standard, reversal is required. ( Sullivan, supra, 508 U.S. at pp. 277, 281; see Cage v. Louisiana (1990) 498 U.S. 39, 40-41 , disapproved on another ground in Estelle v. McGuire (1991) 502 U.S. 62, 72-73, fn. 4 .) Similarly, reversal is required when the trial court’s instructions lower the prosecution’s burden of proof b

2021He ignores the fact that the California Supreme Court long ago recognized that this is the applicable standard. ( Jackson, supra, 3 Cal.4th at pp. 597-598 & fn. 10.) We proceed to apply this standard. “[T]he beneficiary of a constitutional error [is required] to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 .) “To say that an error did not ‘contribute’ to the ensuing verdict is not, of course, to say that the jury was totally unaware of that feature of the trial later held to have been err

2025(People v. Neal (2003) 31 Cal.4th 63, 86 (Neal).) Thus, the prosecution is required to “ ‘prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained,’ ” meaning the error was “ ‘unimportant in relation to everything else the jury considered on the issue in question, as revealed in the record.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.) Under this standard, “ ‘confessions, “as a class,” “[a]lmost invariably” will provide persuasive evidence of a defendant’s guilt [citation] . . . .’ ” (Ibid.) “ ‘[S]uch confessions often operate “as a kind of evidentiary bombshell which sh

2025A structural error, like having a biased judge or being deprived of 6 criminal defense counsel, requires automatic reversal because it “affect[s] the framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial process.” (Arizona v. Fulminante (1991) 499 U.S. 279 , 309–310.) Pec alternatively argues since his federal constitutional rights were violated, we should apply the harmless error test set forth in Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 , which requires reversal unless the prosecution shows beyond a reasonable doubt the error was harmless.

2026(Aranda, at pp. 353-354.) Relatedly, “[t]he Due Process Clause requires the government to prove a criminal defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and trial courts must avoid [instructing in such a way] so as to lead the jury to convict on a lesser showing than due process requires.” (Victor v. Nebraska (1994) 511 U.S. 1, 22 .) Where a court has misdefined the reasonable doubt standard in a manner that improperly lowers the prosecution’s burden of proof, reversal is required.

2024It is that state of the case, which, after the entire comparison and consideration of all the evidence, leaves the minds of jurors in that condition that they cannot say they feel an abiding conviction of the truth of the charge.’ ” However, although the “beyond a reasonable doubt standard is a requirement of due process, . . . the Constitution neither prohibits trial courts from defining reasonable doubt nor requires them to do so as a matter of course. [Citation.] Indeed, so long as the court instructs the jury on the necessity that the defendant’s guilt be proved beyond a reasonable doubt,

2026While the trial judge must review all the relevant evidence, evaluate and resolve contradictions, and make determinations as to credibility, all under the reasonable doubt standard, our job is 9 to determine whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, to support a rational fact finder’s findings beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Clements (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 276 , 298; see Guiffreda, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at pp. 124-125.) “‘Substantial evidence includes circumstantial evidence and any reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence.’” (People v. Brooks (2017

2026In evaluating a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we ‘ “examine the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it contains substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value that would support a rational trier of fact in finding [the defendant guilty] beyond a reasonable doubt.” ’ (People v. San Nicolas (2004) 34 Cal.4th 614 , 657-658.) “ ‘Substantial evidence includes circumstantial evidence and any reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence.’ ” (People v. Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1, 57 .) The trier of fact “must rev

2026(People v. Neal, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 86 .) It is the People’s burden to establish “beyond a reasonable doubt that the error ... did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” (Chapman, at p. 24.) “ ‘To say that an error did not contribute to the ensuing verdict is ... to find that error unimportant in relation to everything else the jury considered on the issue in question, as 37. revealed in the record.’ [Citation.] Thus, the focus is what the jury actually decided and whether the error might have tainted its decision.” (Neal, at p. 86.) The evidence of defendant’s guilt was overwhelming wi

2025(People v. Neal (2003) 31 Cal.4th 63, 86 (Neal).) Thus, the prosecution is required to “ ‘prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained,’ ” meaning the error was “ ‘unimportant in relation to everything else the jury considered on the issue in question, as revealed in the record.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.) Under this standard, “ ‘confessions, “as a class,” “[a]lmost invariably” will provide persuasive evidence of a defendant’s guilt [citation] . . . .’ ” (Ibid.) “ ‘[S]uch confessions often operate “as a kind of evidentiary bombshell which sh

2026This type of argument falls well within the “significant leeway” given to prosecutors “in discussing the legal and factual merits of a case.” (Centeno, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 666 .) It is also readily distinguishable from the misconduct at issue in Centeno, supra, at pages 665–666, People v. Katzenberger (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 1260 , 1264–1265, and People v. Nguyen (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 28, 35 , which expressly commented on the reasonable doubt standard.

2026This type of argument falls well within the “significant leeway” given to prosecutors “in discussing the legal and factual merits of a case.” (Centeno, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 666 .) It is also readily distinguishable from the misconduct at issue in Centeno, supra, at pages 665–666, People v. Katzenberger (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 1260 , 1264–1265, and People v. Nguyen (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 28, 35 , which expressly commented on the reasonable doubt standard.

2026(Liteky, supra, 510 U.S. at p. 555-556 .) The trial court’s request that the standard reasonable doubt instruction be followed was appropriate because “varying from the standard is a ‘perilous exercise.’” (People v. Freeman (1994) 8 Cal.4th 450, 503-504 ; People v. Gottman (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 775, 784 [“trial courts would be well advised not to improvise on the traditional reasonable doubt instructions”].) Defense counsel’s adding the word “any” to the standard instruction could confuse jurors because “‘[t]he word “any” has a diversity of meanings . . . .’” (Donohue v. Zoning Board of Appeals

2024It is that state of the case, which, after the entire comparison and consideration of all the evidence, leaves the minds of jurors in that condition that they cannot say they feel an abiding conviction of the truth of the charge.’ ” However, although the “beyond a reasonable doubt standard is a requirement of due process, . . . the Constitution neither prohibits trial courts from defining reasonable doubt nor requires them to do so as a matter of course. [Citation.] Indeed, so long as the court instructs the jury on the necessity that the defendant’s guilt be proved beyond a reasonable doubt,

2026(Maj. opn., ante, at p. 123.) That standard “requires reversal unless it appears ‘ “beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” ’ ” (People v. Schuller (2023) 15 Cal.5th 237 , 261.) This is a substantial hurdle: “Unlike a sufficiency of the evidence claim, where we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and presume in support of the judgment the existence of any facts the jury might reasonably infer from the evidence,” a reviewing court’s task in analyzing prejudice under Chapman is markedly different: “ ‘whether

2026(People v. Mil, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 409 .) We must reverse unless “it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the jury’s verdict.” (Id. at p. 417.) “[I]nstructional error is harmless ‘where a reviewing court concludes beyond a reasonable doubt 2 The jury instructions did not give the option of the other means of violating Health and Safety Code section 7052, i.e., “willfully mutilates, disinters, removes from the place of interment, . . . or has sexual contact with” human remains. 8 that the omitted element was uncontested and supported by overwhelming eviden

2026The Applicable Law “California law imposes a duty on the trial court to instruct the jury in a criminal case on the presumption of innocence in favor of the defendant and the prosecution’s burden of proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt.” (People v. Aranda (2012) 55 Cal.4th 342, 352 .) Section 1096 sets forth the prosecution’s burden of proof in a criminal case and has been incorporated in the standard reasonable doubt instruction found in 3 CALCRIM No. 220.

2026“If conflicting instructions on the mental state element of an alleged offense can act to remove that element from the jury’s consideration, the instructions constitute a denial of federal due process and invoke the Chapman ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ standard for assessing prejudice.” (People v. Maurer (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1121, 1128 ; Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 .) “[S]uch an error is deemed harmless when a reviewing court, after conducting a thorough review of the record, ‘concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that the omitted element was uncontested and supported by overwhe

2025(See Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 .) In the context of instructional error, that standard “requires reversal of the judgment unless the reviewing court concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict.” (People v. Chun 9 (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1172, 1201 ; see also People v. Aledamat (2019) 8 Cal.5th 1, 12 .) “ ‘To say that an error did not “contribute” to the ensuing verdict is not, of course, to say that the jury was totally unaware of that feature of the trial later held to have been erroneous. “ ‘To say that an error did not contribute to the verd

2022The Error Was Harmless A jury instruction that misdescribes an element of an offense is harmless only if “it appears ‘beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.’ ” (People v. Harris (1994) 9 Cal.4th 407, 424 (Harris), quoting Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 .) “ ‘To say that an error did not contribute to the verdict is . . . to find that error unimportant in relation to everything else the jury considered on the issue in question, as revealed in the record.’ ” ( Harris at p. 426 , quoting Yates v. Evatt (1991) 500 U.S. 391,

2025(See Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 .) In the context of instructional error, that standard “requires reversal of the judgment unless the reviewing court concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict.” (People v. Chun 9 (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1172, 1201 ; see also People v. Aledamat (2019) 8 Cal.5th 1, 12 .) “ ‘To say that an error did not “contribute” to the ensuing verdict is not, of course, to say that the jury was totally unaware of that feature of the trial later held to have been erroneous. “ ‘To say that an error did not contribute to the verd

2025(People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1210 .) “Instructional error regarding the elements of the offense requires reversal of the judgment unless the reviewing court concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict.” (People v. Chun (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1172, 1201 .) More generally, 19 “we look to whether the defendant has shown a reasonable likelihood that the jury, considering the instruction complained of in the context of the instructions as a whole and not in isolation, understood that instruction in a manner that violated his constitutional rights. [Cit

2026This type of argument falls well within the “significant leeway” given to prosecutors “in discussing the legal and factual merits of a case.” (Centeno, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 666 .) It is also readily distinguishable from the misconduct at issue in Centeno, supra, at pages 665–666, People v. Katzenberger (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 1260 , 1264–1265, and People v. Nguyen (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 28, 35 , which expressly commented on the reasonable doubt standard.

2024It’s the standard in every single criminal case.’ ” (Id. at p. 35.) The appellate court held that this argument was misconduct because it “trivialize[d] the reasonable doubt standard.” (Nguyen, supra, 40 Cal.App.4th at p. 36 .) The court explained: “It is clear the almost reflexive decision to change lanes while driving is quite different from the reasonable doubt standard in a criminal case.

2025Nontestimonial statements are those whose primary purpose is to deal with an ongoing emergency or some other purpose unrelated to preserving facts for later use at trial.” (Sanchez, supra, 63 Cal.5th at p. 689.) 9 criminal defendant unless the prosecution can show ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ that the error was harmless.” (People v. Rutterschmidt (2012) 55 Cal.4th 650, 661 ; see Gonzalez, at p. 398 [confrontation clause error is harmless where “‘“it [is] clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the error”’”].) 3.

2025(People v. Ogaz (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 280 , 295.) “Violation of the Sixth Amendment’s confrontation right requires reversal of the judgment against a criminal defendant unless the prosecution can show ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ that the error was harmless.” (People v. Rutterschmidt (2012) 55 Cal.4th 650, 661 .) We “look[] to the ‘whole record’ to evaluate the error’s effect on the jury’s verdict.” (People v. Aranda (2012) 55 Cal.4th 342, 367 .) “When there is “‘a reasonable possibility”’ that the error might have contributed to the verdict, reversal is required.” (Ibid.) In determining whethe

2026(People v. Sims (1993) 5 Cal.4th 405, 447 [confession held inadmissible for being obtained in violation of Miranda is subject to harmless error standard under Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 ].) In light of P.M.’s testimony, Ariza’s properly admitted warned statements, and expert testimony concerning the psychological effects of sexual abuse by a family member on a victim, the record demonstrates “‘beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.’” (People v. Elizalde (2015) 61 Cal.4th 523, 542 .) 17 DISPOSITION The judgment is aff

2026That test requires the People . . . ‘to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.’ ” (People v. Elizalde (2015) 61 Cal.4th 523, 542 .) Another way to phrase the Chapman test is this: “ ‘Is it clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational 19 jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the error?’ ” (People v. Merritt (2017) 2 Cal.5th 819, 827 .) Here, the answer is yes.

2026That test requires the People . . . ‘to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.’ ” (People v. Elizalde (2015) 61 Cal.4th 523, 542 .) Another way to phrase the Chapman test is this: “ ‘Is it clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational 19 jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the error?’ ” (People v. Merritt (2017) 2 Cal.5th 819, 827 .) Here, the answer is yes.

2025(See People v. Young (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1165, 1171 .) “The beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of Chapman ‘requir[es] the beneficiary of a [federal] constitutional error to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Neal 14 (2003) 31 Cal.4th 63, 86 ; see People v. Elizalde (2015) 61 Cal.4th 523, 542 .) Another way to phrase the Chapman test is this: “ ‘Is it clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the error?’ ” (People v. Merritt (2017) 2 Cal.5th 8

2025The prosecutor’s rebuttal argument itself made this point 6 If a trial court’s instructional error violates the United States Constitution, the standard stated in Chapman v. California, supra, 386 U.S. 18 , requires the People to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict (People v. Pearson (2013) 56 Cal.4th 393, 463 ), and this court to decide “ ‘ “whether it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have reached the same verdict absent the error.” ’ ” (People v. Bryant (2014) 60 Cal.4th 335, 395 .) But if the court’s error violates on

2024The beyond-a-reasonable-doubt test in Chapman “requires the People here ‘to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.’ ” (People v. Elizalde (2015) 61 Cal.4th 523, 542 .) “ ‘ “To say that an 9 error did not contribute to the ensuing verdict is . . . to find that error unimportant in relation to everything else the jury considered on the issue in question, as revealed in the record.” ’ ” (People v. Pearson (2013) 56 Cal.4th 393, 463 .) “ ‘Thus, the focus is what the jury actually decided and whether the error might have tainted its

2026He notes that “[t]he same facts that allowed jurors to conclude that [he] committed the sexual assault offenses at guilt under a preponderance standard had to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt during the penalty phase when considered under Penal Code section 190.3, factor (b).” This instruction, however, “is not the first time jurors have been asked to apply a different standard of proof to a predicate fact or finding in a criminal trial. [Citations.] As we do in each of those circumstances, we will presume here that jurors can grasp their duty — as stated in the instructions — to apply the

2025(Id. at p. 1016 [“We do not find it reasonably likely a jury could interpret the instructions to authorize conviction of the charged offenses based on a lowered standard of proof.”].) In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court noted that in criminal trials jurors are frequently asked to apply a different standard of proof to predicate facts and findings. 7 (Reliford, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 1016 .) In addition, although the Court recognized that the uncharged misconduct instruction “could be improved,” it identified several reasons why the instruction was unlikely to create confusion over

2024Under the Chapman standard, reversal is required unless ‘it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to th[e] jury’s verdict.’ ” (People v. Sek (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 657 , 668; People v. Sengpadychith (2001) 26 Cal.4th 316, 326 [Chapman standard applies where failure to submit factual issue to jury results in increased sentence].) B.

2024Assuming, without deciding, the court committed instructional error by omitting the non-accomplice element, we conclude the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. “[A] trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on an element of a sentence enhancement provision (other than one based on a prior conviction), is federal constitutional error if the provision ‘increases the penalty for [the underlying] crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum.’ [Citation.] Such error is reversible under 13 Chapman [v. California (1967)] 386 U.S. [18] at page 24, unless it can be shown ‘beyond a reasonabl