53 New Mexico opinions name it 2 courts 1947–2025 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Mexico courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Tollardogreen2 sentences2018The State has the burden on appeal to "establish[ ] beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury verdict was not tainted by the constitutional error." Gutierrez , 2007-NMSC-033 , ¶ 18, 142 N.M. 1 , 162 P.3d 156 ; see also Tollardo , 2012-NMSC-008 , ¶ 36, 275 P.3d 110 ("[T]he reasonable possibility standard continues to *540 resemble the reasonable doubt standard[.]" (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) ). 2018The State has the burden on appeal to "establish[ ] beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury verdict was not tainted by the constitutional error." Gutierrez , 2007-NMSC-033 , ¶ 18, 142 N.M. 1 , 162 P.3d 156 ; see also Tollardo , 2012-NMSC-008 , ¶ 36, 275 P.3d 110 ("[T]he reasonable possibility standard continues to *540 resemble the reasonable doubt standard[.]" (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) ). | 3 | 3 |
Apprendi v. New Jerseygreen2 sentences2009See State v. Bullcoming, 17 2008-NMCA-097, ¶¶ 25-27 , 144 N.M. 546 , 189 P.3d 679 (holding that neither 18 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), nor its progeny require prior 3 1 convictions to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt and concluding that the “beyond 2 a reasonable doubt standard does not apply to a finding of a prior DWI conviction for 3 purposes of DWI sentencing”), cert. granted, 2008-NMCERT-007 , 144 N.M. 594 , 4 189 P.3d 1216 . 5 For the reasons stated in this opinion and in the notice of proposed summary 6 disposition, we affirm. 7 IT IS SO ORDERED. 8 __________________ 2005As the Supreme Court held in Booker, Apprendi’s requirement of a jury finding beyond a reasonable doubt does not apply to a discretionary sentencing judgment between two statutory penalties that are available on the basis of an existing jury verdict, which in this case includes the verdict of guilt on the crime of first degree murder and the determination that an aggravating circumstance exists beyond a reasonable doubt. “[T]he federal constitution requires that eligibility for the death penalty be determined by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt, but it does not require that the decision whet | 2 | 4 |
State v. Alvarez-Lopezgreen2 sentences2009In Alvarez-Lopez, our Supreme Court noted Fulminante in which the United States Supreme Court “was faced with determining whether a criminal defendant’s involuntary confession, which was unconstitutionally admitted into evidence against him at his trial, contributed to his conviction.” Alvarez-Lopez, 2004-NMSC-030, ¶ 34 , 136 N.M. 309 , 98 P.3d 699 . 2009In Alvarez-Lopez, our Supreme Court noted Fulminante in which the United States Supreme Court “was faced with determining whether a criminal defendant’s involuntary confession, which was unconstitutionally admitted into evidence against him at his trial, contributed to his conviction.” Alvarez-Lopez, 2004-NMSC-030, ¶ 34 , 136 N.M. 309 , 98 P.3d 699 . | 2 | 3 |
State Ex Rel. CYFD v. Maisie Y.green2 sentences2022See Maisie Y., 2021-NMCA-023, ¶ 19 (“[W]e hold that Section 32A- 14 4-29(I) dictates the grounds supporting termination of parental rights in ICWA cases, 15 including the determination that a child has been abused or neglected under Section 16 32A-4-28(B)(2), must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”). 17 {15} In this case, the district court properly found neglect by Father under Section 18 32A-4-2(G)(2) at the adjudicatory hearing, applying the clear and convincing 19 evidence standard of proof, and in contrast, made its finding of neglect at the TPR 6 1 hearing by evidence beyond a reasona 2022See Maisie Y., 2021-NMCA-023, ¶ 19 (“[W]e hold that Section 32A-4-29(I) dictates the grounds supporting termination of parental rights in ICWA cases, including the determination that a child has been abused or neglected under Section 32A-4-28(B)(2), must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”). {15} In this case, the district court properly found neglect by Father under Section 32A-4-2(G)(2) at the adjudicatory hearing, applying the clear and convincing evidence standard of proof, and in contrast, made its finding of neglect at the TPR hearing by evidence beyond a reasonable doubt. 3 We do not | 2 | 2 |
State v. Raelgreen2 sentences2016Rael, 10 2008-NMCA-067, ¶ 22 (“[I]f a requirement of reasonable doubt were not read into 11 Rule 5-602(B)(2)(b), any defendant would be able to raise the issue of competency 12 and have the jury decide it even in the absence of the slightest bit of evidence that the 13 defendant was incompetent. 2015See Rael, 2008-NMCA-067, ¶ 22 (holding 2 that the reasonable doubt requirement “is implied” under Rule 5-602(B)(2)(b) when 3 the issue of competency is re-raised at trial). 4 Prosecutorial Misconduct 5 {18} Defendant next argues that prosecutorial misconduct at closing argument 6 requires reversal. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Garciagreen2 sentences2007State v. Garcia, 114 N.M. 269, 274 , 837 P.2d 862, 867 (1992) (noting that Jackson requires consideration of beyond a reasonable doubt standard in determining sufficiency of evidence in criminal case); see also 2A Charles Alan Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure: Criminal § 467 (3d. ed.2000) (noting minimal support for proposition that standard for sufficiency of evidence is same in civil and criminal cases and ultimate rejection of this view by Supreme Court in Jackson). 2007State v. Garcia, 114 N.M. 269, 274 , 837 P.2d 862, 867 (1992) (noting that Jackson requires consideration of beyond a reasonable doubt standard in determining sufficiency of evidence in criminal case); see also 2A Charles Alan Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure: Criminal § 467 (3d. ed.2000) (noting minimal support for proposition that standard for sufficiency of evidence is same in civil and criminal cases and ultimate rejection of this view by Supreme Court in Jackson). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Waltersgreen2 sentences2007Johnson, 2004-NMSC-029, ¶ 9 ; see also Alvarez-Lopez, 2004-NMSC-030, ¶ 25 . {20} “In determining whether the error was harmless, we must be able to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury verdict would have been the same in the absence of the error by looking to the effect that the constitutional error had upon the guilty verdict in this particular case.” See State v. Walters, 2006-NMCA-071, ¶ 39 , 139 N.M. 705 , 137 P.3d 645 , cert. granted, 2006-NMCERT-006 , 140 N.M. 226 , 141 P.3d 1280 . 2007Johnson, 2004-NMSC-029, ¶ 9 ; see also Alvarez-Lopez, 2004-NMSC-030, ¶ 25 . {20} “In determining whether the error was harmless, we must be able to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury verdict would have been the same in the absence of the error by looking to the effect that the constitutional error had upon the guilty verdict in this particular case.” See State v. Walters, 2006-NMCA-071, ¶ 39 , 139 N.M. 705 , 137 P.3d 645 , cert. granted, 2006-NMCERT-006 , 140 N.M. 226 , 141 P.3d 1280 . | 2 | 2 |
Oken v. Stategreen2 sentences2005As the Supreme Court held in Booker, Apprendi’s requirement of a jury finding beyond a reasonable doubt does not apply to a discretionary sentencing judgment between two statutory penalties that are available on the basis of an existing jury verdict, which in this case includes the verdict of guilt on the crime of first degree murder and the determination that an aggravating circumstance exists beyond a reasonable doubt. “[T]he federal constitution requires that eligibility for the death penalty be determined by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt, but it does not require that the decision whet 2005As the Supreme Court held in Booker, Apprendi's requirement of a jury finding beyond a reasonable doubt does not apply to a discretionary sentencing judgment between two statutory penalties that are available on the basis of an existing jury verdict, which in this case includes the verdict of guilt on the crime of first degree murder and the determination that an aggravating circumstance exists beyond a reasonable doubt. "[T]he federal constitution requires that eligibility for the death penalty be determined by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt, but it does not require that the decision whet | 2 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Roneygreen2 sentences2005As the Supreme Court held in Booker, Apprendi’s requirement of a jury finding beyond a reasonable doubt does not apply to a discretionary sentencing judgment between two statutory penalties that are available on the basis of an existing jury verdict, which in this case includes the verdict of guilt on the crime of first degree murder and the determination that an aggravating circumstance exists beyond a reasonable doubt. “[T]he federal constitution requires that eligibility for the death penalty be determined by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt, but it does not require that the decision whet 2005As the Supreme Court held in Booker, Apprendi’s requirement of a jury finding beyond a reasonable doubt does not apply to a discretionary sentencing judgment between two statutory penalties that are available on the basis of an existing jury verdict, which in this case includes the verdict of guilt on the crime of first degree murder and the determination that an aggravating circumstance exists beyond a reasonable doubt. “[T]he federal constitution requires that eligibility for the death penalty be determined by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt, but it does not require that the decision whet | 2 | 2 |
State v. Trujillogreen2 sentences1991See State v. Trujillo, 95 N.M. 535 , 624 P.2d 44 (1981); State v. Dobbs, 100 N.M. 60, 67 , 665 P.2d 1151, 1158 (Ct.App. 1983) (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S.Ct. *885 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967)); State v. Bell, 90 N.M. 160 , 560 P.2d 951 (Ct.App. 1977). 1991See State v. Trujillo, 95 N.M. 535 , 624 P.2d 44 (1981); State v. Dobbs, 100 N.M. 60, 67 , 665 P.2d 1151, 1158 (Ct.App. 1983) (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S.Ct. *885 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967)); State v. Bell, 90 N.M. 160 , 560 P.2d 951 (Ct.App. 1977). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Johnsongreen2 sentences2009See Johnson, 2004-NMSC-029, ¶ 11 , 136 N.M. 348 , 98 P.3d 998 (stating the central focus in determining whether constitutional error was harmless is “whether there is a reasonable possibility the erroneous evidence might have affected the jury’s verdict”). {77} In my independent examination of the record, I cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the error in admitting this evidence was harmless. 2009See Johnson, 2004-NMSC-029, ¶ 11 , 136 N.M. 348 , 98 P.3d 998 (stating the central focus in determining whether constitutional error was harmless is “whether there is a reasonable possibility the erroneous evidence might have affected the jury’s verdict”). {77} In my independent examination of the record, I cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the error in admitting this evidence was harmless. | 1 | 3 |
Blakely v. Washingtongreen2 sentences2005As the Supreme Court held in Booker, Apprendi’s requirement of a jury finding beyond a reasonable doubt does not apply to a discretionary sentencing judgment between two statutory penalties that are available on the basis of an existing jury verdict, which in this case includes the verdict of guilt on the crime of first degree murder and the determination that an aggravating circumstance exists beyond a reasonable doubt. “[T]he federal constitution requires that eligibility for the death penalty be determined by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt, but it does not require that the decision whet 2005As the Supreme Court held in Booker, Apprendi’s requirement of a jury finding beyond a reasonable doubt does not apply to a discretionary sentencing judgment between two statutory penalties that are available on the basis of an existing jury verdict, which in this case includes the verdict of guilt on the crime of first degree murder and the determination that an aggravating circumstance exists beyond a reasonable doubt. “[T]he federal constitution requires that eligibility for the death penalty be determined by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt, but it does not require that the decision whet | 1 | 3 |
State v. Stanleygreen2 sentences2020See, e.g., State v. Stanley, 2001-NMSC-037, ¶ 44 , 131 N.M. 368 , 37 P.3d 85 (“In light of the reversal of the evidentiary issues, we do not review [the d]efendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim or his issue dealing with the refusal of the trial court to hold a hearing on his motion for a new trial.”). 2020See, e.g., State v. Stanley, 2001-NMSC-037, ¶ 44 , 131 N.M. 368 , 37 P.3d 85 (“In light of the reversal of the evidentiary issues, we do not review [the d]efendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim or his issue dealing with the refusal of the trial court to hold a hearing on his motion for a new trial.”). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Garciagreen2 sentences2018See, e.g., State v. Reymundo Carlos 12 Garcia, 2005-NMSC-017, ¶ 20 , 138 N.M. 1 , 116 P.3d 72 ; State v. Graham, 2005- 13 NMSC-004, ¶ 9-10, 137 N.M. 197 , 109 P.3d 285 ; State v. Brown, 1984-NMSC-014 , 14 ¶ 7, 100 N.M. 726 , 676 P.2d 253 . 15 {23} It is settled law in New Mexico that instructions on circumstantial evidence are 16 not to be given. 2018See, e.g., State v. Reymundo Carlos 12 Garcia, 2005-NMSC-017, ¶ 20 , 138 N.M. 1 , 116 P.3d 72 ; State v. Graham, 2005- 13 NMSC-004, ¶ 9-10, 137 N.M. 197 , 109 P.3d 285 ; State v. Brown, 1984-NMSC-014 , 14 ¶ 7, 100 N.M. 726 , 676 P.2d 253 . 15 {23} It is settled law in New Mexico that instructions on circumstantial evidence are 16 not to be given. | 1 | 1 |
Kersey v. Hatchgreen2 sentences2018See, e.g., State v. 13 Ortega, 1991-NMSC-084 , ¶ 72, 112 N.M. 554 , 817 P.2d 1196 , abrogated on other 14 grounds as recognized by Kersey v. Hatch, 2010-NMSC-020, ¶ 17 , 148 N.M. 381 , 15 237 P.3d 683 ; State v. Haynes, 2000-NMCA-060 , ¶ 23, 129 N.M. 304 , 6 P.3d 16 1026 ; Gallegos, 1993-NMCA-046 , ¶ 11; see also UJI 14-5020 comm. cmt. (“This 17 instruction, together with the reasonable doubt instruction, UJI 14-5060, makes an 18 instruction on the dangers of eyewitness testimony unnecessary.”). 2018See, e.g., State v. 13 Ortega, 1991-NMSC-084 , ¶ 72, 112 N.M. 554 , 817 P.2d 1196 , abrogated on other 14 grounds as recognized by Kersey v. Hatch, 2010-NMSC-020, ¶ 17 , 148 N.M. 381 , 15 237 P.3d 683 ; State v. Haynes, 2000-NMCA-060 , ¶ 23, 129 N.M. 304 , 6 P.3d 16 1026 ; Gallegos, 1993-NMCA-046 , ¶ 11; see also UJI 14-5020 comm. cmt. (“This 17 instruction, together with the reasonable doubt instruction, UJI 14-5060, makes an 18 instruction on the dangers of eyewitness testimony unnecessary.”). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Gary Halbertgreen1 sentence2018Use of a Codefendant's Guilty Plea {14} "A codefendant's guilty plea may not be used as substantive evidence of a defendant's guilt." United States v. Woods , 764 F.3d 1242 , 1246 (10th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also United States v. Halbert , 640 F.2d 1000 , 1004 (9th Cir. 1981) (per curiam) ("As a principle of general acceptance, the guilty plea or conviction of a codefendant may not be offered by the government and received over objection as substantive evidence of the guilt of those on trial."); Clemmons v. State , 352 Md. 49 , 720 A.2d 1170 , 1173 (19 | 1 | 1 |
State v. Ortegagreen2 sentences2018See, e.g., State v. 13 Ortega, 1991-NMSC-084 , ¶ 72, 112 N.M. 554 , 817 P.2d 1196 , abrogated on other 14 grounds as recognized by Kersey v. Hatch, 2010-NMSC-020, ¶ 17 , 148 N.M. 381 , 15 237 P.3d 683 ; State v. Haynes, 2000-NMCA-060 , ¶ 23, 129 N.M. 304 , 6 P.3d 16 1026 ; Gallegos, 1993-NMCA-046 , ¶ 11; see also UJI 14-5020 comm. cmt. (“This 17 instruction, together with the reasonable doubt instruction, UJI 14-5060, makes an 18 instruction on the dangers of eyewitness testimony unnecessary.”). 2018See, e.g., State v. 13 Ortega, 1991-NMSC-084 , ¶ 72, 112 N.M. 554 , 817 P.2d 1196 , abrogated on other 14 grounds as recognized by Kersey v. Hatch, 2010-NMSC-020, ¶ 17 , 148 N.M. 381 , 15 237 P.3d 683 ; State v. Haynes, 2000-NMCA-060 , ¶ 23, 129 N.M. 304 , 6 P.3d 16 1026 ; Gallegos, 1993-NMCA-046 , ¶ 11; see also UJI 14-5020 comm. cmt. (“This 17 instruction, together with the reasonable doubt instruction, UJI 14-5060, makes an 18 instruction on the dangers of eyewitness testimony unnecessary.”). | 1 | 1 |
| Evans v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Williamsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Victor v. Nebraskagreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Hung Hao Nguyengreen | 1 | 1 |
| In re G.S.green | 1 | 1 |
| In Re GSgreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re the Welfare of M.S.S.green | 1 | 1 |
| Bullcoming v. New Mexicogreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Montoyagreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re GAULTgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Crosbygreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Warrengreen | 1 | 1 |
| REULE SUN CORP. v. Vallesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Bullcominggreen | 1 | 1 |
| Brown v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Andradegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Johnson v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Galloway v. Joseygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Carpenter v. Jamersongreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Sansomgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Dobbsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re John Ballay, A/K/A Figeret Hoxha, Patientgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Mexico. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Chapman v. California
red
2 sentences2004For this type of constitutional trial error, there is no dispute that Chapman sets forth the appropriate test for harmless error: the State must "prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained." Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24 , 87 S.Ct. 824 . 2004For this type of constitutional trial error, there is no dispute that Chapman sets forth the appropriate test for harmless error: the State must "prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained." Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24 , 87 S.Ct. 824 . | 6 | 1969–2004 |
State v. Rivera
green
2 sentences2025“Structural error exists only in a very limited class of cases, . . . includ[ing] such pervasive defects as racial discrimination in the selection of a grand jury, complete denial of the right to counsel, a significant defect in the reasonable-doubt instruction, and denial of the right to a public trial.” State v. Rivera, 2012- NMSC-003, ¶ 20, 268 P.3d 40 (text only) (citations omitted). 2025“Structural errors include such pervasive defects as racial discrimination in the selection of a grand jury, complete denial of the right to counsel, a significant defect in the reasonable-doubt instruction, and denial of the right to a public trial.” State v. Rivera, 2012-NMSC-003, ¶ 20 , 268 P.3d 40 . | 2 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Gutierrez
green
2 sentences2018The State has the burden on appeal to "establish[ ] beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury verdict was not tainted by the constitutional error." Gutierrez , 2007-NMSC-033 , ¶ 18, 142 N.M. 1 , 162 P.3d 156 ; see also Tollardo , 2012-NMSC-008 , ¶ 36, 275 P.3d 110 ("[T]he reasonable possibility standard continues to *540 resemble the reasonable doubt standard[.]" (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) ). 2018The State has the burden on appeal to "establish[ ] beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury verdict was not tainted by the constitutional error." Gutierrez , 2007-NMSC-033 , ¶ 18, 142 N.M. 1 , 162 P.3d 156 ; see also Tollardo , 2012-NMSC-008 , ¶ 36, 275 P.3d 110 ("[T]he reasonable possibility standard continues to *540 resemble the reasonable doubt standard[.]" (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) ). | 2 | 2018–2024 |
State v. Barr
green
2 sentences2013In applying the harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard of review “a 11 reviewing court should only conclude that an error is harmless when there is no 12 reasonable possibility [that] it affected the verdict.” State v. Barr, 2009-NMSC-024 , 13 ¶ 53, 146 N.M. 301 , 210 P.3d 198 , overruled on other grounds by Tollardo, 2012- 14 NMSC-008, ¶ 37; see Tollardo, 2012-NMSC-008, ¶ 34 . 15 {38} The present case presents a factual scenario that is very similar to that in 16 Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705 . 2013In applying the harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard of review “a 11 reviewing court should only conclude that an error is harmless when there is no 12 reasonable possibility [that] it affected the verdict.” State v. Barr, 2009-NMSC-024 , 13 ¶ 53, 146 N.M. 301 , 210 P.3d 198 , overruled on other grounds by Tollardo, 2012- 14 NMSC-008, ¶ 37; see Tollardo, 2012-NMSC-008, ¶ 34 . 15 {38} The present case presents a factual scenario that is very similar to that in 16 Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705 . | 2 | 2012–2013 |
In Re WINSHIP
green
2 sentences2010Kent set the minimum procedural requirements for waiver proceedings, 383 U.S. at 566-67 , 86 S.Ct. 1045 ; In re Gault extended to juveniles the right to notice of charges, to counsel, to confrontation and to cross-examination of witnesses, and to the privilege against self-incrimination, 387 U.S. at 33-34, 41, 55-56 , 87 S.Ct. 1428 ; In re Winship gave juveniles the protection of the reasonable doubt standard, 397 U.S. at 367 , 90 S.Ct. 1068 . {56} At the same time, the Court has repeatedly emphasized that it follows a more deferential approach to state decisions of how to administer their juv 2010Kent set the minimum procedural requirements for waiver proceedings, 383 U.S. at 566-67 , 86 S.Ct. 1045 ; In re Gault extended to juveniles the right to notice of charges, to counsel, to confrontation and to cross-examination of witnesses, and to the privilege against self-incrimination, 387 U.S. at 33-34, 41, 55-56 , 87 S.Ct. 1428 ; In re Winship gave juveniles the protection of the reasonable doubt standard, 397 U.S. at 367 , 90 S.Ct. 1068 . {56} At the same time, the Court has repeatedly emphasized that it follows a more deferential approach to state decisions of how to administer their juv | 2 | 2004–2010 |
Jackson v. Virginia
red
2 sentences2007To support a conviction under a beyond a reasonable doubt standard, the evidence and inferences drawn from that evidence must be sufficiently compelling so that a hypothetical reasonable factfinder could have reached “a subjective state of near certitude of the guilt of the accused.” See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 315 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 . 2007To support a conviction under a beyond a reasonable doubt standard, the evidence and inferences drawn from that evidence must be sufficiently compelling so that a hypothetical reasonable factfinder could have reached “a subjective state of near certitude of the guilt of the accused.” See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 315 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 . | 2 | 2001–2007 |
Williams v. New York
green
2 sentences2005As the Supreme Court held in Booker, Apprendi’s requirement of a jury finding beyond a reasonable doubt does not apply to a discretionary sentencing judgment between two statutory penalties that are available on the basis of an existing jury verdict, which in this case includes the verdict of guilt on the crime of first degree murder and the determination that an aggravating circumstance exists beyond a reasonable doubt. “[T]he federal constitution requires that eligibility for the death penalty be determined by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt, but it does not require that the decision whet 2005As the Supreme Court held in Booker, Apprendi’s requirement of a jury finding beyond a reasonable doubt does not apply to a discretionary sentencing judgment between two statutory penalties that are available on the basis of an existing jury verdict, which in this case includes the verdict of guilt on the crime of first degree murder and the determination that an aggravating circumstance exists beyond a reasonable doubt. “[T]he federal constitution requires that eligibility for the death penalty be determined by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt, but it does not require that the decision whet | 2 | 2005–2005 |
Ritchie v. State
green
2 sentences2005As the Supreme Court held in Booker, Apprendi’s requirement of a jury finding beyond a reasonable doubt does not apply to a discretionary sentencing judgment between two statutory penalties that are available on the basis of an existing jury verdict, which in this case includes the verdict of guilt on the crime of first degree murder and the determination that an aggravating circumstance exists beyond a reasonable doubt. “[T]he federal constitution requires that eligibility for the death penalty be determined by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt, but it does not require that the decision whet 2005As the Supreme Court held in Booker, Apprendi's requirement of a jury finding beyond a reasonable doubt does not apply to a discretionary sentencing judgment between two statutory penalties that are available on the basis of an existing jury verdict, which in this case includes the verdict of guilt on the crime of first degree murder and the determination that an aggravating circumstance exists beyond a reasonable doubt. "[T]he federal constitution requires that eligibility for the death penalty be determined by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt, but it does not require that the decision whet | 2 | 2005–2005 |
State v. Bell
green
2 sentences1991See State v. Trujillo, 95 N.M. 535 , 624 P.2d 44 (1981); State v. Dobbs, 100 N.M. 60, 67 , 665 P.2d 1151, 1158 (Ct.App. 1983) (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S.Ct. *885 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967)); State v. Bell, 90 N.M. 160 , 560 P.2d 951 (Ct.App. 1977). 1991See State v. Trujillo, 95 N.M. 535 , 624 P.2d 44 (1981); State v. Dobbs, 100 N.M. 60, 67 , 665 P.2d 1151, 1158 (Ct.App. 1983) (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S.Ct. *885 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967)); State v. Bell, 90 N.M. 160 , 560 P.2d 951 (Ct.App. 1977). | 2 | 1983–1991 |
State v. Jones
green
2 sentences1972(State v. Jones, 80 N.M. 753 , 461 P.2d 235 (1969) ). 1972(State v. Jones, 80 N.M. 753 , 461 P.2d 235 (1969) ). | 2 | 1971–1972 |
State v. Graham
green
2 sentences2018See, e.g., State v. Reymundo Carlos 12 Garcia, 2005-NMSC-017, ¶ 20 , 138 N.M. 1 , 116 P.3d 72 ; State v. Graham, 2005- 13 NMSC-004, ¶ 9-10, 137 N.M. 197 , 109 P.3d 285 ; State v. Brown, 1984-NMSC-014 , 14 ¶ 7, 100 N.M. 726 , 676 P.2d 253 . 15 {23} It is settled law in New Mexico that instructions on circumstantial evidence are 16 not to be given. 2018See, e.g., State v. Reymundo Carlos 12 Garcia, 2005-NMSC-017, ¶ 20 , 138 N.M. 1 , 116 P.3d 72 ; State v. Graham, 2005- 13 NMSC-004, ¶ 9-10, 137 N.M. 197 , 109 P.3d 285 ; State v. Brown, 1984-NMSC-014 , 14 ¶ 7, 100 N.M. 726 , 676 P.2d 253 . 15 {23} It is settled law in New Mexico that instructions on circumstantial evidence are 16 not to be given. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Clemmons v. State
green
2 sentences2018Use of a Codefendant's Guilty Plea {14} "A codefendant's guilty plea may not be used as substantive evidence of a defendant's guilt." United States v. Woods , 764 F.3d 1242 , 1246 (10th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also United States v. Halbert , 640 F.2d 1000 , 1004 (9th Cir. 1981) (per curiam) ("As a principle of general acceptance, the guilty plea or conviction of a codefendant may not be offered by the government and received over objection as substantive evidence of the guilt of those on trial."); Clemmons v. State , 352 Md. 49 , 720 A.2d 1170 , 1173 (19 2018Use of a Codefendant's Guilty Plea {14} "A codefendant's guilty plea may not be used as substantive evidence of a defendant's guilt." United States v. Woods , 764 F.3d 1242 , 1246 (10th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also United States v. Halbert , 640 F.2d 1000 , 1004 (9th Cir. 1981) (per curiam) ("As a principle of general acceptance, the guilty plea or conviction of a codefendant may not be offered by the government and received over objection as substantive evidence of the guilt of those on trial."); Clemmons v. State , 352 Md. 49 , 720 A.2d 1170 , 1173 (19 | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Haynes
green
1 sentence2018See, e.g., State v. 13 Ortega, 1991-NMSC-084 , ¶ 72, 112 N.M. 554 , 817 P.2d 1196 , abrogated on other 14 grounds as recognized by Kersey v. Hatch, 2010-NMSC-020, ¶ 17 , 148 N.M. 381 , 15 237 P.3d 683 ; State v. Haynes, 2000-NMCA-060 , ¶ 23, 129 N.M. 304 , 6 P.3d 16 1026 ; Gallegos, 1993-NMCA-046 , ¶ 11; see also UJI 14-5020 comm. cmt. (“This 17 instruction, together with the reasonable doubt instruction, UJI 14-5060, makes an 18 instruction on the dangers of eyewitness testimony unnecessary.”). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| State v. Brown green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| United States v. Woods green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| State v. Padilla green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| Kent v. United States green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| County Court of Ulster Cty. v. Allen green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| State v. Spearman green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| State v. Tave green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Neder v. United States green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Harrington v. California red | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Schneble v. Florida green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Beck v. Alabama green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Santosky v. Kramer green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Mathews v. Eldridge green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Sullivan v. Louisiana green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| State v. Doe green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Matter of Valdez green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Barnes v. United States green | 1 | 1976–1976 |
| Lessard v. Schmidt green | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| In Re Pickles'petition green | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| State v. Moore green | 1 | 1974–1974 |
| Finch v. State green | 1 | 1971–1971 |
| McAffee v. United States green | 1 | 1947–1947 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.