reasonable doubt standard in Connecticut

2006See, e.g., State v. Ferguson, 260 Conn. 339, 371 , 796 A.2d 1118 (2002) ([w]e consistently have held that the definition of reasonable doubt as a real doubt, an honest doubt, a doubt which has its foundation in the evidence or lack of evidence . . . and as a doubt which in the serious affairs which concern you in every *193 day life you would pay heed and attention to does not dilute the state’s burden of proof when such definitions are viewed in the context of an entire charge [internal quotation marks omitted]); State v. Griffin, 253 Conn. 195, 206-207 , 749 A.2d 1192 (2000) (our Supreme Cou

2006See, e.g., State v. Ferguson, 260 Conn. 339, 371 , 796 A.2d 1118 (2002) ([w]e consistently have held that the definition of reasonable doubt as a real doubt, an honest doubt, a doubt which has its foundation in the evidence or lack of evidence . . . and as a doubt which in the serious affairs which concern you in every *193 day life you would pay heed and attention to does not dilute the state’s burden of proof when such definitions are viewed in the context of an entire charge [internal quotation marks omitted]); State v. Griffin, 253 Conn. 195, 206-207 , 749 A.2d 1192 (2000) (our Supreme Cou

2001See, e.g., State v. Small, 242 Conn. 93, 114-15 , 114 n.17, 700 A.2d 617 (1997); State v. Dawkins, 42 Conn. App. 810, 821 , 681 A.2d 989 , cert. denied, 239 Conn. 932 , 683 A.2d 400 (1996); State v. Lopez, 37 Conn. App. 509, 513-15 , 657 A.2d 647 , cert. denied, 234 Conn. 902 , 660 A.2d 858 (1995).

2001See, e.g., State v. Small, 242 Conn. 93, 114-15 , 114 n.17, 700 A.2d 617 (1997); State v. Dawkins, 42 Conn. App. 810, 821 , 681 A.2d 989 , cert. denied, 239 Conn. 932 , 683 A.2d 400 (1996); State v. Lopez, 37 Conn. App. 509, 513-15 , 657 A.2d 647 , cert. denied, 234 Conn. 902 , 660 A.2d 858 (1995).

1990See, e.g., Kellems v. Brown, 163 Conn. 478, 486 , 313 A.2d 53 (1972), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1099 , 93 S. Ct. 911 , 34 L.

1988See, e.g., Kellems v. Brown, 163 Conn. 478, 486 , 313 A.2d 53 (1972), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1099 , 93 S. Ct. 911 , 34 L.

2009In connection with his challenge to the court’s instruction on reasonable doubt, the defendant also argues: “The majority of the reasonable doubt instruction in the present case has been upheld in recent appeals; see State v. Davis, 283 Conn. 280 , 929 A.2d 278 (2007); State v. Jackson, 283 Conn. 111 , 925 A.2d 1060 (2007); however, for the purposes of federal review, the defendant submits [that] those decisions were wrongly decided and that the challenged language infringes on his federal constitutional protections.” Absent any distinct analysis in connection with this part of the defendant’s

2009In connection with his challenge to the court’s instruction on reasonable doubt, the defendant also argues: “The majority of the reasonable doubt instruction in the present case has been upheld in recent appeals; see State v. Davis, 283 Conn. 280 , 929 A.2d 278 (2007); State v. Jackson, 283 Conn. 111 , 925 A.2d 1060 (2007); however, for the purposes of federal review, the defendant submits [that] those decisions were wrongly decided and that the challenged language infringes on his federal constitutional protections.” Absent any distinct analysis in connection with this part of the defendant’s

2015Having concluded that the instruction was deficient, we turn to the question of whether the state proved that the improper instruction was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. ‘‘[T]he test for determining whether a constitutional error is harmless . . . is whether it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the error com- plained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Fields, 302 Conn. 236 , 245–46, 24 A.3d 1243 (2011). ‘‘When a jury is misinstructed on an essential element of a crime and a reviewing court can find that the record developed a

2015Having concluded that the instruction was deficient, we turn to the question of whether the state proved that the improper instruction was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. ‘‘[T]he test for determining whether a constitutional error is harmless . . . is whether it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the error com- plained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Fields, 302 Conn. 236 , 245–46, 24 A.3d 1243 (2011). ‘‘When a jury is misinstructed on an essential element of a crime and a reviewing court can find that the record developed a

2006See, e.g., State v. Ferguson, 260 Conn. 339, 371 , 796 A.2d 1118 (2002) ([w]e consistently have held that the definition of reasonable doubt as a real doubt, an honest doubt, a doubt which has its foundation in the evidence or lack of evidence . . . and as a doubt which in the serious affairs which concern you in every *193 day life you would pay heed and attention to does not dilute the state’s burden of proof when such definitions are viewed in the context of an entire charge [internal quotation marks omitted]); State v. Griffin, 253 Conn. 195, 206-207 , 749 A.2d 1192 (2000) (our Supreme Cou

2006See, e.g., State v. Ferguson, 260 Conn. 339, 371 , 796 A.2d 1118 (2002) ([w]e consistently have held that the definition of reasonable doubt as a real doubt, an honest doubt, a doubt which has its foundation in the evidence or lack of evidence . . . and as a doubt which in the serious affairs which concern you in every *193 day life you would pay heed and attention to does not dilute the state’s burden of proof when such definitions are viewed in the context of an entire charge [internal quotation marks omitted]); State v. Griffin, 253 Conn. 195, 206-207 , 749 A.2d 1192 (2000) (our Supreme Cou

2006See, e.g., State v. Ferguson, 260 Conn. 339, 371 , 796 A.2d 1118 (2002) ([w]e consistently have held that the definition of reasonable doubt as a real doubt, an honest doubt, a doubt which has its foundation in the evidence or lack of evidence . . . and as a doubt which in the serious affairs which concern you in every *193 day life you would pay heed and attention to does not dilute the state’s burden of proof when such definitions are viewed in the context of an entire charge [internal quotation marks omitted]); State v. Griffin, 253 Conn. 195, 206-207 , 749 A.2d 1192 (2000) (our Supreme Cou

2005See, e.g., State v. Ferguson, 260 Conn. 339, 371 , 796 A.2d 1118 (2002) (“[w]e consistently have held that the definition of reasonable doubt as a real doubt, an honest doubt, a doubt which has its foundation in the evidence or lack of evidence . . . and as a doubt which in the serious affairs which concern you in every day life you would pay heed and attention to does not dilute the state’s burden of proof when such definitions are viewed in the context of an entire charge” [internal quotation marks omitted]); State v. Griffin, 253 Conn. 195 , 206- 207, 749 A.2d 1192 (2000) (our Supreme Court

2006See, e.g., State v. Ferguson, 260 Conn. 339, 371 , 796 A.2d 1118 (2002) ([w]e consistently have held that the definition of reasonable doubt as a real doubt, an honest doubt, a doubt which has its foundation in the evidence or lack of evidence . . . and as a doubt which in the serious affairs which concern you in every *193 day life you would pay heed and attention to does not dilute the state’s burden of proof when such definitions are viewed in the context of an entire charge [internal quotation marks omitted]); State v. Griffin, 253 Conn. 195, 206-207 , 749 A.2d 1192 (2000) (our Supreme Cou

2005See, e.g., State v. Ferguson, 260 Conn. 339, 371 , 796 A.2d 1118 (2002) (“[w]e consistently have held that the definition of reasonable doubt as a real doubt, an honest doubt, a doubt which has its foundation in the evidence or lack of evidence . . . and as a doubt which in the serious affairs which concern you in every day life you would pay heed and attention to does not dilute the state’s burden of proof when such definitions are viewed in the context of an entire charge” [internal quotation marks omitted]); State v. Griffin, 253 Conn. 195 , 206- 207, 749 A.2d 1192 (2000) (our Supreme Court

2006See, e.g., State v. Ferguson, 260 Conn. 339, 371 , 796 A.2d 1118 (2002) ([w]e consistently have held that the definition of reasonable doubt as a real doubt, an honest doubt, a doubt which has its foundation in the evidence or lack of evidence . . . and as a doubt which in the serious affairs which concern you in every *193 day life you would pay heed and attention to does not dilute the state’s burden of proof when such definitions are viewed in the context of an entire charge [internal quotation marks omitted]); State v. Griffin, 253 Conn. 195, 206-207 , 749 A.2d 1192 (2000) (our Supreme Cou

2005See, e.g., State v. Ferguson, 260 Conn. 339, 371 , 796 A.2d 1118 (2002) (“[w]e consistently have held that the definition of reasonable doubt as a real doubt, an honest doubt, a doubt which has its foundation in the evidence or lack of evidence . . . and as a doubt which in the serious affairs which concern you in every day life you would pay heed and attention to does not dilute the state’s burden of proof when such definitions are viewed in the context of an entire charge” [internal quotation marks omitted]); State v. Griffin, 253 Conn. 195 , 206- 207, 749 A.2d 1192 (2000) (our Supreme Court

1999See, e.g., Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39 , 111 S. Ct. 328 , 112 L.

1999See, e.g., Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39 , 111 S. Ct. 328 , 112 L.

2021Therefore, it is imperative that statements describing the reasonable doubt standard be accurate, ‘‘clear and unequivocal . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.

2006See, e.g., State v. Ferguson, 260 Conn. 339, 371 , 796 A.2d 1118 (2002) ([w]e consistently have held that the definition of reasonable doubt as a real doubt, an honest doubt, a doubt which has its foundation in the evidence or lack of evidence . . . and as a doubt which in the serious affairs which concern you in every *193 day life you would pay heed and attention to does not dilute the state’s burden of proof when such definitions are viewed in the context of an entire charge [internal quotation marks omitted]); State v. Griffin, 253 Conn. 195, 206-207 , 749 A.2d 1192 (2000) (our Supreme Cou

2017"Because our system entrusts the jury with the primary responsibility of implementing the substantive protections promised by the reasonable doubt standard, reasonable doubt jury instructions which appropriately convey [the reasonable doubt concept] are critical to the constitutionality of a conviction." United States v. Doyle, 130 F.3d 523 , 535 (2d Cir. 1997).

2000Ortiz argues that the trial court’s instruction that “the law is made to protect society, so that if and when the presumption of innocence has been overcome by evidence proving beyond a reasonable doubt that an accused person is guilty of a crime charged, then it is the sworn duty of the jury to enforce the law and to render a verdict of guilty” is so egregious that it “eviscerates the fundamental protections underlying the presumption of innocence and the reasonable doubt standard, requiring reversal of [his] convictions.” For this proposition, Ortiz relies on United States v. Doyle, 130 F.3d

2018Moreover, any alleged evidentiary error as to the in-court identification was harmless. "[T]he test for determining whether a constitutional error is harmless ... is whether it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Neder v. United States , 527 U.S. 1 , 15, 119 S.Ct. 1827 , 144 L.Ed. 2d 35 (1999) ; see also State v. Cook , 287 Conn. 237 , 252, 947 A.2d 307 , cert. denied, 555 U.S. 970 , 129 S.Ct. 464 , 172 L.Ed. 2d 328 (2008). "[W]hether an error is harmful depends on its impact on the trie

2018Moreover, any alleged evidentiary error as to the in-court identification was harmless. "[T]he test for determining whether a constitutional error is harmless ... is whether it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Neder v. United States , 527 U.S. 1 , 15, 119 S.Ct. 1827 , 144 L.Ed. 2d 35 (1999) ; see also State v. Cook , 287 Conn. 237 , 252, 947 A.2d 307 , cert. denied, 555 U.S. 970 , 129 S.Ct. 464 , 172 L.Ed. 2d 328 (2008). "[W]hether an error is harmful depends on its impact on the trie

2018Moreover, any alleged evidentiary error as to the in-court identification was harmless. "[T]he test for determining whether a constitutional error is harmless ... is whether it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Neder v. United States , 527 U.S. 1 , 15, 119 S.Ct. 1827 , 144 L.Ed. 2d 35 (1999) ; see also State v. Cook , 287 Conn. 237 , 252, 947 A.2d 307 , cert. denied, 555 U.S. 970 , 129 S.Ct. 464 , 172 L.Ed. 2d 328 (2008). "[W]hether an error is harmful depends on its impact on the trie

2012When an [evidentiary] impropriety is of constitutional proportions, the state bears the burden of proving that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Gonzalez, 302 Conn. 287, 306-307 , 25 A.3d 648 (2011). “[T]he test for determining whether a constitutional error is harmless ... is whether it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Cook, 287 Conn. 237, 252 , 947 A.2d 307 , cert. denied, 555 U.S. 970 , 129 S. Ct. 464 , 172 L.

1997The test of whether a constitutional violation is harmless error depends on whether it appears “ ‘beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.’ ” State v. Gerardi, 237 Conn. 348, 362 , 677 A.2d 937 (1996).

1997The test of whether a constitutional violation is harmless error depends on whether it appears “ ‘beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.’ ” State v. Gerardi, 237 Conn. 348, 362 , 677 A.2d 937 (1996).

2018Accordingly, we will employ the harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt standard as stated in Hinds v. Commissioner of Correction , supra, 321 Conn. at 56 , 136 A.3d 596 , and Luurtsema v. Commissioner of Correction , supra, 299 Conn. 740 , 12 A.3d 817 ; see generally Banks v. Commissioner of Correction , supra, 184 Conn. App. at 112-13 n.7, --- A.3d ----. 7 In response to questions during oral argument before this court, the respondent appeared to posit that a Salamon instruction was not required under the circumstances.

2018Accordingly, we will employ the harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt standard as stated in Hinds v. Commissioner of Correction , supra, 321 Conn. at 56 , 136 A.3d 596 , and Luurtsema v. Commissioner of Correction , supra, 299 Conn. 740 , 12 A.3d 817 ; see generally Banks v. Commissioner of Correction , supra, 184 Conn. App. at 112-13 n.7, --- A.3d ----. 7 In response to questions during oral argument before this court, the respondent appeared to posit that a Salamon instruction was not required under the circumstances.

2000This court recently has concluded that the Second Circuit’s holding in Doyle is sound, limited to the finding that “[b]ecause the guilty as well as the innocent are entitled to the protections afforded by the presumption of innocence and the reasonable doubt standard, the challenged portion of the charge [which is identical to that involved in Doyle\, when viewed in isolation, gives rise to a danger of juror misunderstanding.” State v. Schiappa, 248 Conn. 132, 175 , 728 A.2d 466 , cert. denied, 528 U.S. 862 , 120 S. Ct. 152 , 145 L.

2000This court recently has concluded that the Second Circuit’s holding in Doyle is sound, limited to the finding that “[b]ecause the guilty as well as the innocent are entitled to the protections afforded by the presumption of innocence and the reasonable doubt standard, the challenged portion of the charge [which is identical to that involved in Doyle\, when viewed in isolation, gives rise to a danger of juror misunderstanding.” State v. Schiappa, 248 Conn. 132, 175 , 728 A.2d 466 , cert. denied, 528 U.S. 862 , 120 S. Ct. 152 , 145 L.

2009Specifically, the defendant requested therein that the court omit any instruction related to the fact that the rules of law, the presumption of innocence and the state's burden to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt "`are made to protect the innocent and not the guilty.'" [12] The rationale of these decisions was followed, with the same result, in State v. Smith, 275 Conn. 205, 243-45 , 881 A.2d 160 (2005), State v. Watson, 251 Conn. 220, 225-28 , 740 A.2d 832 (1999), and State v. Delvalle, 250 Conn. 466, 471-73 , 736 A.2d 125 (1999). [13] In his written request to charge, the defendant s

2009Specifically, the defendant requested therein that the court omit any instruction related to the fact that the rules of law, the presumption of innocence and the state's burden to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt "`are made to protect the innocent and not the guilty.'" [12] The rationale of these decisions was followed, with the same result, in State v. Smith, 275 Conn. 205, 243-45 , 881 A.2d 160 (2005), State v. Watson, 251 Conn. 220, 225-28 , 740 A.2d 832 (1999), and State v. Delvalle, 250 Conn. 466, 471-73 , 736 A.2d 125 (1999). [13] In his written request to charge, the defendant s

2008Connecticut courts “are not receptive to quibbling attacks on the reasonable doubt instruction . . . .” State v. DelVecchio, 191 Conn. 412, 421 , 464 A.2d 813 (1983).

2008Connecticut courts “are not receptive to quibbling attacks on the reasonable doubt instruction . . . .” State v. DelVecchio, 191 Conn. 412, 421 , 464 A.2d 813 (1983).

1998Our Supreme Court has consistently approved jury instructions that provide that the presumption of innocence and the reasonable doubt standard are rules of law “designed to protect the innocent and not the guilty.” See, e.g., State v. Stanley, 223 Conn. 674, 695-96 , 613 A.2d 788 (1992); State v. Thomas, 214 Conn. 118, 119 , 570 A.2d 1123 (1990).

1998Our Supreme Court has consistently approved jury instructions that provide that the presumption of innocence and the reasonable doubt standard are rules of law “designed to protect the innocent and not the guilty.” See, e.g., State v. Stanley, 223 Conn. 674, 695-96 , 613 A.2d 788 (1992); State v. Thomas, 214 Conn. 118, 119 , 570 A.2d 1123 (1990).

1999Snellgrove v. State, 569 N.E.2d 337 (Ind. 1991); Bradley v. Commonwealth, 439 S.W.2d 61 (Ky. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 974 , 90 S. Ct. 1091 , 25 L.

1996The substantial majority 31 of states to have considered this issue have followed Lego v. Twomey, supra, 404 U.S. 477 , and have adopted the preponderance standard under state law. 32 Furthermore, of those states adopting the higher standard, a number have failed to make clear whether their decisions are constitutionally based; see Bradley v. Commonwealth, 439 S.W.2d 61, 64 (Ky. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 974 , 90 S. Ct. 1091 , 25 L.

1999Snellgrove v. State, 569 N.E.2d 337 (Ind. 1991); Bradley v. Commonwealth, 439 S.W.2d 61 (Ky. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 974 , 90 S. Ct. 1091 , 25 L.

1996The substantial majority 31 of states to have considered this issue have followed Lego v. Twomey, supra, 404 U.S. 477 , and have adopted the preponderance standard under state law. 32 Furthermore, of those states adopting the higher standard, a number have failed to make clear whether their decisions are constitutionally based; see Bradley v. Commonwealth, 439 S.W.2d 61, 64 (Ky. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 974 , 90 S. Ct. 1091 , 25 L.