76 Kentucky opinions name it 3 courts 1922–2026 12 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Kentucky courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Chapman v. Californiared2 sentences2025This requires “prov[ing] beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24 . 2025Because this would be a constitutional error, the harmlessness threshold is much higher than for non-constitutional errors; the standard here is whether we are convinced “beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967); see also Taylor v. Commonwealth, 175 S.W.3d 68, 72 (Ky. 2005) (applying constitutional- harmless-error analysis to Crawford violation). | 6 | 18 |
Timmons v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2025Under the reasonable doubt standard, “that which a jury may reasonably believe to have been probable is enough to support a finding of guilt.” Timmons v. Commonwealth, 555 S.W.2d 234, 237-38 (Ky. 1977). 2024Under the reasonable doubt standard, “that which a jury may reasonably believe to have been probable is enough to support a finding of guilt.” Timmons v. Commonwealth, 555 S.W.2d 234, 237-38 (Ky. 1977). | 4 | 4 |
Franklin v. Lynaughgreen2 sentences2010See Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164 , 108 S.Ct. 2320 , 101 L.Ed.2d 155 (1988), accord Tamme v. Commonwealth, supra. A finding of guilt as to aggravating circumstances in a death penalty case is considered under the reasonable doubt standard. 2010See Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164 , 108 S.Ct. 2320 , 101 L.Ed.2d 155 (1988), accord Tamme v. Commonwealth, supra. A finding of guilt as to aggravating circumstances in a death penalty case is considered under the reasonable doubt standard. | 3 | 3 |
Staples v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2025As this Court has explained, the analysis “involves considering the improper evidence in the context of the entire trial and asking whether there is a ‘reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction.’” Staples v. Commonwealth, 454 S.W.3d 803 , 826–27 (Ky. 2014) (quoting Talbott v. Commonwealth, 968 S.W.2d 76, 84 (Ky. 1998)). 2016Because this was a constitutional error, the harmlessness threshold is much higher than for non-constitutional errors; the standard here is whether we are convinced “beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967); see also Taylor v. Commonwealth, 175 S.W.3d 68, 72 (Ky.2005) (applying constitutional-harmless-error analysis to Crawford violation). ' As this Court has explained, the analysis “involves considering the improper evidence in the context of the entire tria | 2 | 3 |
Taylor v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2025Because this would be a constitutional error, the harmlessness threshold is much higher than for non-constitutional errors; the standard here is whether we are convinced “beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967); see also Taylor v. Commonwealth, 175 S.W.3d 68, 72 (Ky. 2005) (applying constitutional- harmless-error analysis to Crawford violation). 2016Because this was a constitutional error, the harmlessness threshold is much higher than for non-constitutional errors; the standard here is whether we are convinced “beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967); see also Taylor v. Commonwealth, 175 S.W.3d 68, 72 (Ky.2005) (applying constitutional-harmless-error analysis to Crawford violation). ' As this Court has explained, the analysis “involves considering the improper evidence in the context of the entire tria | 2 | 2 |
Talbott v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2025As this Court has explained, the analysis “involves considering the improper evidence in the context of the entire trial and asking whether there is a ‘reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction.’” Staples v. Commonwealth, 454 S.W.3d 803 , 826–27 (Ky. 2014) (quoting Talbott v. Commonwealth, 968 S.W.2d 76, 84 (Ky. 1998)). 2016Because this was a constitutional error, the harmlessness threshold is much higher than for non-constitutional errors; the standard here is whether we are convinced “beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967); see also Taylor v. Commonwealth, 175 S.W.3d 68, 72 (Ky.2005) (applying constitutional-harmless-error analysis to Crawford violation). ' As this Court has explained, the analysis “involves considering the improper evidence in the context of the entire tria | 2 | 2 |
Soto v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2008Here, the evidence presented was sufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt so as to meet the legal standards and constitutional requirements."). [14] Chapman admits this issue is unpreserved. [15] See KRS 532.025(3) ("In all cases unless at least one (1) of the statutory aggravating circumstances enumerated in subsection (2) of this section is so found, the death penalty, or imprisonment for life without benefit of probation or parole, or the sentence to imprisonment for life without benefit of probation or parole until the defendant has served a minimum of twenty-five (25) years 2008Holt v. Commonwealth, 219 S.W.3d 731, 738 (Ky.2007) (using harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard when attorney violated, inter alia, the prohibition against hearsay evidence set forth in KRE 802); Soto v. Commonwealth, 139 S.W.3d 827, 862 (Ky.2004) (utilizing harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard in regards to improperly admitted hearsay). | 2 | 2 |
Brecht v. Abrahamsongreen2 sentences2025And “[t]he State bears the burden of proving that an error passes muster under this standard.” Brecht, 507 U.S. at 630 . 2017"And, '[t]he State bears the burden of proving that an error passes muster under this standard." Id. (citing Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 630 (1993)). | 1 | 4 |
Neder v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2018The test for harmless error “is whether it appears ‘beyond a reasonable doubt that the error . . . did not contribute to the verdict obtained.’” Stewart v. Commonwealth, 306 S.W.3d 502, 508 (Ky. 2010) (quoting Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 2 (1999)). 2013The test, then, “is whether it appears ‘beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.’ ” Neder, 527 U.S. at 15 , 119 S.Ct. 1827 (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967)). | 1 | 4 |
Commonwealth v. Callahangreen2 sentences2010RCr 9.56 states that the jury should not be instructed as to the definition of "reasonable doubt." In Commonwealth v. Callahan, 675 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Ky.1984), we extended the well-settled prohibition of defining reasonable doubt to all points in a trial's proceedings, stating "trial courts shall prohibit counsel from any definition of reasonable doubt at any point in the trial[.]" We have held that, subject to appropriate limits, [2] the rule is not offended by stating what reasonable doubt is not. 2010RCr 9.56 states that the jury should not be instructed as to the definition of “reasonable doubt.” In Commonwealth v. Callahan, 675 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Ky.1984), we extended the well-settled prohibition of defining reasonable doubt to all points in a trial’s proceedings, stating “trial courts shall prohibit counsel from any definition of reasonable doubt at any point in the trial[.]” We have held that, subject to appropriate limits, 2 the rule is not offended by stating what reasonable doubt is not. | 1 | 2 |
Reynolds v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences1954Reynolds v. Com., Ky., 257 S.W.2d 514 ; Blevins v. Com., Ky., 258 S.W.2d 501 . 1953See, Reynolds v. Commonwealth, Ky., 257 S.W.2d 514 . | 1 | 2 |
Baumia v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence2024The harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard requires us to ask “whether, ‘absent [the impermissible testimony], is it clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have returned a verdict of guilty?’” Jones, 641 S.W.3d at 172 (quoting Baumia v. Commonwealth, 402 S.W.3d 530, 539 (Ky. 2013)). | 1 | 1 |
Quist v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence2023Before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the reviewing court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”17 An error is considered 17 See, e.g., Quist v. Commonwealth, 338 S.W.3d 778, 782 (Ky. App. 2010) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). 25 harmless if it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict obtained.18 While I ultimately assert that there was insufficient evidence of serious physical injury, assuming arguendo that the evidence was sufficient, Dr. Tucker’s testimony was cumulati | 1 | 1 |
Miller v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence2021Miller v. Commonwealth, 77 S.W.3d 566, 576 (Ky. 2002) (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 , 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1073 , 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970)). | 1 | 1 |
Stewart v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence2018The test for harmless error “is whether it appears ‘beyond a reasonable doubt that the error . . . did not contribute to the verdict obtained.’” Stewart v. Commonwealth, 306 S.W.3d 502, 508 (Ky. 2010) (quoting Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 2 (1999)). | 1 | 1 |
Thacker v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence2017Our standard for finding that a constitutional error -- was harmless "is whether we are convinced· 'beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.'" Dickerson v. Commonwealth, 485 S.W.3d 310, 327 (Ky. 2016) (quoting .Chapman v. California, 386'U.S. 18, 24 (1967)). 6 Put another way, we consider. the itnproper evidence in the context of the entire trial and ask, "whether there is any substantial possibility that the outcome of the case would have been different without the presence of that error." Thacker v. Commonwealth, 194 S.W.3d 287, 291 ( | 1 | 1 |
Jason Dickerson v. Commonwealth of Kentuckygreen2 sentences2017Our standard for finding that a constitutional error -- was harmless "is whether we are convinced· 'beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.'" Dickerson v. Commonwealth, 485 S.W.3d 310, 327 (Ky. 2016) (quoting .Chapman v. California, 386'U.S. 18, 24 (1967)). 6 Put another way, we consider. the itnproper evidence in the context of the entire trial and ask, "whether there is any substantial possibility that the outcome of the case would have been different without the presence of that error." Thacker v. Commonwealth, 194 S.W.3d 287, 291 ( 2017"With this standard in mind, examining the nature of the constitutionally offensive evidence in the context of the entire trial, and in light of the overwhelming ·evidence of [his] guilt," pickerson, 485 S.W.3d at 327 , we conclude that the improperly-introduced evidence was harmless beyond a r~asonable doubt. | 1 | 1 |
Berryman v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence2017See Berryman v. Commonwealth , 237 S.W.3d 175 , 178 (Ky. 2007). | 1 | 1 |
| Winstead v. Commonwealthgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Brown v. Commonwealthgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Woodgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Whorton v. Commonwealthgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Gabbard v. Commonwealthgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Harp v. Commonwealthgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Coy v. Iowagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hill v. Commonwealthgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Ernst v. Commonwealthgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Greene v. Commonwealthgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Holt v. Commonwealthgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Carl Pettijohn v. Frank Hallgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Perdue v. Commonwealthgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Taylor v. Commonwealthgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Breeden v. Commonwealthgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Kentucky. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Parrish v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences2010To the extent Parrish v. Commonwealth, 121 S.W.3d 198 (2003) suggests otherwise, it is hereby overruled. [3] As noted in footnote 2, a majority of the Court concludes the reasonable doubt instruction appearing at § 12.08, Kentucky Instructions to Juries, Criminal, is not required by Kentucky law and should not be given in the future. [4] "To shortchange a defendant in this manner (failing to grant a proper for cause strike) is to effectively give the Commonwealth more peremptory challenges than the defendant." Shane, 243 S.W.3d at 339 . 2006Simmons challenges Section 4(B) of the reasonable doubt instruction, which stated that “if upon the whole case you have a reasonable doubt whether the defendant should be sentenced to death, you shall recommend a sentence of imprisonment instead.” The same instruction was found to be sufficient to allow the jury to fix a punishment of life imprisonment in Parrish v. Commonwealth, 121 S.W.3d 198 (Ky. 2003). | 3 | 2006–2010 |
In Re WINSHIP
green
2 sentences2021Miller v. Commonwealth, 77 S.W.3d 566, 576 (Ky. 2002) (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 , 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1073 , 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970)). 2021Miller v. Commonwealth, 77 S.W.3d 566, 576 (Ky. 2002) (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 , 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1073 , 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970)). | 2 | 2002–2021 |
Rogers v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences2017The history of our cases on the subject plainly demonstrates such concern from the prosecutor’s perspective, and we have consistently held their efforts to point out that *90 reasonable doubt is not ‘all doubt’ or a ‘shadow of a doubt’ were either proper or were, at most, harmless error. . 315 S.W.3d at 308 . 2017The history of our cases on the subject plainly demonstrates such concern from the prosecutor’s perspective, and we have consistently held their efforts to point out that reasonable doubt is not ‘all doubt’ or a ‘shadow of a doubt’ were either proper or were, at most, harmless error. 315 S.W.3d at 308 . | 2 | 2017–2017 |
Horn v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences1961Whitaker v. Commonwealth, Ky., 302 S.W.2d 601 ; Horn v. Commonwealth, Ky., 251 S.W.2d 864 . 1957The rule applicable to the instant case “is to the effect that where the instruction submitting the Commonwealth’s theory of the case is couched in such language the ordinary juror can easily understand, and its negative (raised by the usual reasonable doubt instruction) completely and adequately covers the defense of accused, if is not necessary to give an affirmative instruction embodying his theory.” Horn v. Commonwealth, Ky., 251 S.W.2d 864 . | 2 | 1957–1961 |
Abshire v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences1958Abshire v. Com., 281 Ky. 470 , 136 S.W.2d 567 . 1958Abshire v. Com., 281 Ky. 470 , 136 S.W.2d 567 . | 2 | 1953–1958 |
Wolff v. Commonwealth
neutral
2 sentences1942Gatliff v. Com., 107 S. W. 739 , 32 Ky. Law Rep. 1063 ; Minniard v. Com., 158 Ky. 210 , 164 S. W. 804 ; Wolff v. Com., 211 Ky. 62 , 276 S. W. 1067 ; Shrout v. Com., 226 Ky. 660 , 11 S. W. (2d) 726 . 1942Gatliff v. Com., 107 S. W. 739 , 32 Ky. Law Rep. 1063 ; Minniard v. Com., 158 Ky. 210 , 164 S. W. 804 ; Wolff v. Com., 211 Ky. 62 , 276 S. W. 1067 ; Shrout v. Com., 226 Ky. 660 , 11 S. W. (2d) 726 . | 2 | 1928–1942 |
Addington v. Texas
green
1 sentence2026Id. at 431 . | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Davis v. United States
green
1 sentence2024It is a prime instrument for reducing the risk of convictions resting on factual error.” Id. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Moore v. Commonwealth
green
1 sentence2020The Court emphasized that the reasonable doubt standard of proof applies to “all elements of a criminal offense, including the enhancement provisions of the PFO statutes[.]” Id. at 385 . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Schoenbachler v. Commonwealth
green
1 sentence2019Id. at 836-37 . | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Jones v. Commonwealth
green
1 sentence2017Jones , 382 S.W.3d at 32 . | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Apprendi v. New Jersey
green
2 sentences2015The United States Supreme Court in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 , 120 S.Ct. 2348 , 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000) holds that “[ojther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved, beyond a reasonable doubt” (emphasis added). 2015The United States Supreme Court in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 , 120 S.Ct. 2348 , 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000) holds that “[ojther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved, beyond a reasonable doubt” (emphasis added). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Wright v. Commonwealth green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Shane v. Commonwealth green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| People v. Rodriguez green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| Sherman Paul Arthur, Jr. v. Donald E. Bordenkircher, Superintendent, West Virginia Penitentiary green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| Kentucky v. Whorton green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| Taylor v. Kentucky green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| United States v. George Keith Williams green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| Commonwealth v. Hager green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| Gideon v. Wainwright green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| Beaty v. Commonwealth green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| State v. Hischke green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Smith v. Commonwealth green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Skaggs v. Commonwealth green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Bartrug v. Commonwealth red | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Cox v. Commonwealth green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Evans v. Commonwealth neutral | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Carroll v. Commonwealth neutral | 1 | 1971–1971 |
| Botkins v. Commonwealth neutral | 1 | 1967–1967 |
| Whitaker v. Commonwealth neutral | 1 | 1961–1961 |
| Hicks v. Commonwealth neutral | 1 | 1954–1954 |
| Blevins v. Commonwealth green | 1 | 1954–1954 |
| Davenport v. Commonwealth green | 1 | 1953–1953 |
| Duvall v. Commonwealth green | 1 | 1953–1953 |
| Cooksey v. Commonwealth neutral | 1 | 1953–1953 |
| Ball v. Commonwealth neutral | 1 | 1952–1952 |
| Shrout v. Commonwealth green | 1 | 1942–1942 |
| Minniard v. Commonwealth green | 1 | 1942–1942 |
| Scalf v. Commonwealth neutral | 1 | 1937–1937 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.