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24 North Dakota opinions name it 1 courts 1928–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by North Dakota courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Chapman v. Californiayellow2 sentences2001B [¶15] The United States Supreme Court in Chapman v. California , 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967), declined to rule that all federal constitutional errors require automatic reversal, and instead placed a heavy burden upon the beneficiary of a constitutional error to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained. 2001B [¶ 15] The United States Supreme Court in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), declined to rule that all federal constitutional errors require automatic reversal, and instead placed a heavy burden upon the beneficiary of a constitutional error to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained. | 3 | 8 |
State v. Carmodygreen2 sentences2001See State v. Carmody , 253 N.W.2d 415, 418 (N.D. 1977). 2001See State v. Carmody, 253 N.W.2d 415, 418 (N.D.1977). | 2 | 3 |
Zundel v. Zundelgreen2 sentences2004The “Bodding doctrine,” relied upon by Judge McGuire, was specifically- rejected by this Court in Zundel v. Zundel, 278 N.W.2d 123, 129 (N.D.1979), because it “would create a burden of proof upon a claimant equivalent to or greater than the ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ standard required in criminal cases.” Instead, this Court said, “under the clear and convincing standard, the evidence must be such that the trier of fact is reasonably satisfied with the facts the evidence tends to prove as to be led to a firm belief or conviction.” Id. at 130 . 2004The “Bodding doctrine,” relied upon by Judge McGuire, was specifically- rejected by this Court in Zundel v. Zundel, 278 N.W.2d 123, 129 (N.D.1979), because it “would create a burden of proof upon a claimant equivalent to or greater than the ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ standard required in criminal cases.” Instead, this Court said, “under the clear and convincing standard, the evidence must be such that the trier of fact is reasonably satisfied with the facts the evidence tends to prove as to be led to a firm belief or conviction.” Id. at 130 . | 2 | 2 |
State v. Schneidergreen2 sentences2010Jahner , at ¶ 13. [¶ 26] In Schneider , we thoroughly reviewed various constitutional challenges to the pattern jury instruction on reasonable doubt and concluded that, taken as a whole, the instruction “correctly conveyed the concept of reasonable doubt to the jury” and “informed the jury of the law, without misleading or confusing the jury.” Schneider, 550 N.W.2d at 410 (quoting Victor, 511 U.S. at 22 , 114 S.Ct. 1239 ). 2003State v. Schneider, 550 N.W.2d 405, 408 (N.D.1996). | 1 | 2 |
State v. Triebgreen2 sentences1992See also Langan, supra, 410 N.W.2d at 152 , State v. Gross, 351 N.W.2d 428, 431 (N.D.1984); State v. Skjonsby, 319 N.W.2d 764, 776-77 (N.D.1982); State v. Trieb, 315 N.W.2d 649, 656 (N.D.1982); Houser, supra, 261 N.W.2d at 385. 1983Accordingly, we conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that such error, if any, was harmless and therefore does not mandate a reversal. 1 Rule 52(a), N.D.R.Crim.P.; Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1966); State v. Trieb, 315 N.W.2d 649 (N.D.1982). | 1 | 2 |
State v. Faulgreen1 sentence2017Kruckenberg, at ¶ 15; State v. Faul, 300 N.W.2d 827, 833 (N.D. 1980). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Azuregreen1 sentence2016State *672 v. Azure, 525 N.W.2d 654, 659 (N.D.1994). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Marksgreen1 sentence2006Id. at ¶¶ 13-16 (discussing State v. Skorick, 2002 ND 190, ¶¶ 14-17 , 653 N.W.2d 698 ; State v. Marks, 452 N.W.2d 298, 299 (N.D.1990)). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Pipergreen2 sentences1992The ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ test also applies to the lesser included offense.” Piper, supra, 261 N.W.2d at 654. 1992The ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ test also applies to the lesser included offense.” Piper, supra, 261 N.W.2d at 654. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Housergreen2 sentences1992See also Langan, supra, 410 N.W.2d at 152 , State v. Gross, 351 N.W.2d 428, 431 (N.D.1984); State v. Skjonsby, 319 N.W.2d 764, 776-77 (N.D.1982); State v. Trieb, 315 N.W.2d 649, 656 (N.D.1982); Houser, supra, 261 N.W.2d at 385. 1992See also Langan, supra, 410 N.W.2d at 152 , State v. Gross, 351 N.W.2d 428, 431 (N.D.1984); State v. Skjonsby, 319 N.W.2d 764, 776-77 (N.D.1982); State v. Trieb, 315 N.W.2d 649, 656 (N.D.1982); Houser, supra, 261 N.W.2d at 385. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Grossgreen2 sentences1992See also Langan, supra, 410 N.W.2d at 152 , State v. Gross, 351 N.W.2d 428, 431 (N.D.1984); State v. Skjonsby, 319 N.W.2d 764, 776-77 (N.D.1982); State v. Trieb, 315 N.W.2d 649, 656 (N.D.1982); Houser, supra, 261 N.W.2d at 385. 1992See also Langan, supra, 410 N.W.2d at 152 , State v. Gross, 351 N.W.2d 428, 431 (N.D.1984); State v. Skjonsby, 319 N.W.2d 764, 776-77 (N.D.1982); State v. Trieb, 315 N.W.2d 649, 656 (N.D.1982); Houser, supra, 261 N.W.2d at 385. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Skjonsbygreen2 sentences1992See also Langan, supra, 410 N.W.2d at 152 , State v. Gross, 351 N.W.2d 428, 431 (N.D.1984); State v. Skjonsby, 319 N.W.2d 764, 776-77 (N.D.1982); State v. Trieb, 315 N.W.2d 649, 656 (N.D.1982); Houser, supra, 261 N.W.2d at 385. 1992See also Langan, supra, 410 N.W.2d at 152 , State v. Gross, 351 N.W.2d 428, 431 (N.D.1984); State v. Skjonsby, 319 N.W.2d 764, 776-77 (N.D.1982); State v. Trieb, 315 N.W.2d 649, 656 (N.D.1982); Houser, supra, 261 N.W.2d at 385. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Langangreen2 sentences1992See also Langan, supra, 410 N.W.2d at 152 , State v. Gross, 351 N.W.2d 428, 431 (N.D.1984); State v. Skjonsby, 319 N.W.2d 764, 776-77 (N.D.1982); State v. Trieb, 315 N.W.2d 649, 656 (N.D.1982); Houser, supra, 261 N.W.2d at 385. 1992See also Langan, supra, 410 N.W.2d at 152 , State v. Gross, 351 N.W.2d 428, 431 (N.D.1984); State v. Skjonsby, 319 N.W.2d 764, 776-77 (N.D.1982); State v. Trieb, 315 N.W.2d 649, 656 (N.D.1982); Houser, supra, 261 N.W.2d at 385. | 1 | 1 |
County Court of Ulster Cty. v. Allengreen2 sentences1989Because this permissive presumption leaves the trier of fact free to credit or reject the inference and does not shift the burden of proof, it affects the application of the ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ standard only if, under the facts of the case, there is no rational way the trier could make the connection permitted by the inference.” [Cites omitted.] County Court of Ulster Cty. v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 156-57 , 99 S.Ct. 2213, 2224-225 , 60 L.Ed.2d 777, 791-92 (1979). 1989Because this permissive presumption leaves the trier of fact free to credit or reject the inference and does not shift the burden of proof, it affects the application of the ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ standard only if, under the facts of the case, there is no rational way the trier could make the connection permitted by the inference.” [Cites omitted.] County Court of Ulster Cty. v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 156-57 , 99 S.Ct. 2213, 2224-225 , 60 L.Ed.2d 777, 791-92 (1979). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Patrick C. Remigio, A/K/A Joe Cuervogreen1 sentence1986Miller v. Greer, supra, 789 F.2d at 442 (“The circuits universally apply this ‘harmless beyond a reasonable doubt’ standard to Doyle violations [Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 , 96 S.Ct. 2240 , 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976)].”); Phelps v. Duckworth, 772 F.2d 1410, 1413 (7th Cir.1985) (“Impermissible prosecutorial comment regarding post-arrest silence does not require reversal if the court determines it is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”); See also United States v. Remigio, supra; Morgan v. Hall, 569 F.2d 1161 (1st Cir.1978). | 1 | 1 |
Gerald Wayne Phelps v. Jack R. Duckworth, Warden Indiana State Prison, and Linley E. Pearson, Attorney General of Indianagreen1 sentence1986Miller v. Greer, supra, 789 F.2d at 442 (“The circuits universally apply this ‘harmless beyond a reasonable doubt’ standard to Doyle violations [Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 , 96 S.Ct. 2240 , 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976)].”); Phelps v. Duckworth, 772 F.2d 1410, 1413 (7th Cir.1985) (“Impermissible prosecutorial comment regarding post-arrest silence does not require reversal if the court determines it is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”); See also United States v. Remigio, supra; Morgan v. Hall, 569 F.2d 1161 (1st Cir.1978). | 1 | 1 |
United States of America Ex Rel. Charles "Chuck" Miller v. James Greer, Warden, Menard Correctional Centerred1 sentence1986Miller v. Greer, supra, 789 F.2d at 442 (“The circuits universally apply this ‘harmless beyond a reasonable doubt’ standard to Doyle violations [Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 , 96 S.Ct. 2240 , 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976)].”); Phelps v. Duckworth, 772 F.2d 1410, 1413 (7th Cir.1985) (“Impermissible prosecutorial comment regarding post-arrest silence does not require reversal if the court determines it is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”); See also United States v. Remigio, supra; Morgan v. Hall, 569 F.2d 1161 (1st Cir.1978). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Dilgergreen2 sentences1984State v. Dilger, 338 N.W.2d 87, 96 (N.D.1983); State v. Olmstead, 261 N.W.2d 880 (N.D.1978). 1984State v. Dilger, 338 N.W.2d 87, 96 (N.D.1983); State v. Olmstead, 261 N.W.2d 880 (N.D.1978). | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Bragggreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in North Dakota. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Victor v. Nebraska
green
2 sentences2010We have also noted the United States Supreme Court has taken a similar approach: The United States Supreme Court has stated “[t]he beyond a reasonable doubt standard is a requirement of due process, but the Constitution neither prohibits trial courts from defining reasonable doubt nor requires them to do so as a matter of course.” Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 5 , 114 S.Ct. 1239 , 127 L.Ed.2d 583 (1994). “[S]o long as the court instructs the jury on the necessity that the defendant’s guilt be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, the Constitution does not require that any particular form of word 2010We have also noted the United States Supreme Court has taken a similar approach: The United States Supreme Court has stated “[t]he beyond a reasonable doubt standard is a requirement of due process, but the Constitution neither prohibits trial courts from defining reasonable doubt nor requires them to do so as a matter of course.” Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 5 , 114 S.Ct. 1239 , 127 L.Ed.2d 583 (1994). “[S]o long as the court instructs the jury on the necessity that the defendant’s guilt be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, the Constitution does not require that any particular form of word | 3 | 1994–2010 |
Zander v. Workforce Safety & Insurance
green
2 sentences2004In Zander v. Workforce Safety and Ins., 2003 ND 194, ¶ 11 , 672 N.W.2d 668 , we said: “Clear and convincing evidence” does not require a showing by “100 per cent certainty” or “absolute certainty.” This Court, in a long line of cases, has repeatedly held that clear and convincing evidence means evidence which leads to a firm belief or conviction that the allegations are true. 2004In Zander v. Workforce Safety and Ins., 2003 ND 194, ¶ 11 , 672 N.W.2d 668 , we said: “Clear and convincing evidence” does not require a showing by “100 per cent certainty” or “absolute certainty.” This Court, in a long line of cases, has repeatedly held that clear and convincing evidence means evidence which leads to a firm belief or conviction that the allegations are true. | 2 | 2004–2004 |
Dominguez v. State
green
1 sentence2021We have said “a conviction does not have to be set aside automatically if the jury is instructed on multiple theories of guilt and one of the theories is invalid.” Dominguez v. State, 2013 ND 249, ¶ 26 , 840 N.W.2d 8 596. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Clark v. State
green
1 sentence2021In addition, as I explained in my separate opinion in Pemberton, ¶¶ 30-35, I would remand the case to the district court to determine whether the error in this case is harmless. [¶23] Not all constitutional errors require automatic reversal; rather the State must “prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” Clark v. State, 2001 ND 9, ¶ 15 , 621 N.W.2d 576 . | 1 | 2021–2021 |
State v. Skorick
green
2 sentences2006Id. at ¶¶ 13-16 (discussing State v. Skorick, 2002 ND 190, ¶¶ 14-17 , 653 N.W.2d 698 ; State v. Marks, 452 N.W.2d 298, 299 (N.D.1990)). 2006Id. at ¶¶ 13-16 (discussing State v. Skorick, 2002 ND 190, ¶¶ 14-17 , 653 N.W.2d 698 ; State v. Marks, 452 N.W.2d 298, 299 (N.D.1990)). | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Commonwealth v. Martin
green
2 sentences1989We have no difficulty in concluding, especially in light of the previous discussion, that the inference here in question satisfies the reasonable doubt standard." [Cites and footnote omitted.] Martin, 446 A.2d at 968-69 . 1989We have no difficulty in concluding, especially in light of the previous discussion, that the inference here in question satisfies the reasonable doubt standard.” [Cites and footnote omitted.] Martin, 446 A.2d at 968-69 . | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Morris Morgan v. Frank A. Hall, Etc.
green
1 sentence1986Miller v. Greer, supra, 789 F.2d at 442 (“The circuits universally apply this ‘harmless beyond a reasonable doubt’ standard to Doyle violations [Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 , 96 S.Ct. 2240 , 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976)].”); Phelps v. Duckworth, 772 F.2d 1410, 1413 (7th Cir.1985) (“Impermissible prosecutorial comment regarding post-arrest silence does not require reversal if the court determines it is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”); See also United States v. Remigio, supra; Morgan v. Hall, 569 F.2d 1161 (1st Cir.1978). | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Doyle v. Ohio
green
2 sentences1986Miller v. Greer, supra, 789 F.2d at 442 (“The circuits universally apply this ‘harmless beyond a reasonable doubt’ standard to Doyle violations [Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 , 96 S.Ct. 2240 , 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976)].”); Phelps v. Duckworth, 772 F.2d 1410, 1413 (7th Cir.1985) (“Impermissible prosecutorial comment regarding post-arrest silence does not require reversal if the court determines it is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”); See also United States v. Remigio, supra; Morgan v. Hall, 569 F.2d 1161 (1st Cir.1978). 1986Miller v. Greer, supra, 789 F.2d at 442 (“The circuits universally apply this ‘harmless beyond a reasonable doubt’ standard to Doyle violations [Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 , 96 S.Ct. 2240 , 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976)].”); Phelps v. Duckworth, 772 F.2d 1410, 1413 (7th Cir.1985) (“Impermissible prosecutorial comment regarding post-arrest silence does not require reversal if the court determines it is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”); See also United States v. Remigio, supra; Morgan v. Hall, 569 F.2d 1161 (1st Cir.1978). | 1 | 1986–1986 |
State v. Olmstead
green
2 sentences1984State v. Dilger, 338 N.W.2d 87, 96 (N.D.1983); State v. Olmstead, 261 N.W.2d 880 (N.D.1978). 1984State v. Dilger, 338 N.W.2d 87, 96 (N.D.1983); State v. Olmstead, 261 N.W.2d 880 (N.D.1978). | 1 | 1984–1984 |
State v. Schneider
green
2 sentences1984Schneider, supra, 270 N.W.2d at 792 ; Carmody, supra, 253 N.W.2d at 418 . 1984Schneider, supra, 270 N.W.2d at 792 ; Carmody, supra, 253 N.W.2d at 418 . | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Lego v. Twomey
green
2 sentences1984The United States Supreme Court rejected that theory and said that without good cause, it was unwilling to expand the exclusionary rules “by erecting additional barriers to placing truthful and probative evidence before state juries and by revising the standards applicable in collateral proceedings.” Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. at 488-89 , 92 S.Ct. at 626-27 . 1984The United States Supreme Court rejected that theory and said that without good cause, it was unwilling to expand the exclusionary rules “by erecting additional barriers to placing truthful and probative evidence before state juries and by revising the standards applicable in collateral proceedings.” Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. at 488-89 , 92 S.Ct. at 626-27 . | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Johnson v. Louisiana
red
2 sentences1984A deadlocked jury, we consistently have recognized, does not result in an acquittal barring retrial under the Double Jeopardy Clause.” As the Supreme Court stated in Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 362 , 92 S.Ct. 1620, 1624 , 32 L.Ed.2d 152 (1972): “... that rational men disagree is not in itself equivalent to a failure of proof by the state, nor does it indicate infidelity to the reasonable doubt standard.” This court, too, has recognized that it is within the discretion of a trial court to grant a new trial if it concludes that a guilty verdict is against the weight of the evidence. 1984A deadlocked jury, we consistently have recognized, does not result in an acquittal barring retrial under the Double Jeopardy Clause.” As the Supreme Court stated in Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 362 , 92 S.Ct. 1620, 1624 , 32 L.Ed.2d 152 (1972): “... that rational men disagree is not in itself equivalent to a failure of proof by the state, nor does it indicate infidelity to the reasonable doubt standard.” This court, too, has recognized that it is within the discretion of a trial court to grant a new trial if it concludes that a guilty verdict is against the weight of the evidence. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Fahy v. Connecticut green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| State v. Sailor green | 1 | 1928–1928 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.