reasonable doubt instruction in Nevada

2015The district court's error was not harmless An error is harmless if the court can determine "beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained." Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).

2014Because the exclusion of the defense evidence affected Coleman's constitutional right to a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense, the error is only considered harmless if the court can determine "beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained." Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).

2022However, even where a Confrontation Clause error occurs, "reversal is not required ‘if the State could show beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.'" Medina v. State, 122 Nev. 346, 355 , 143 P.3d 471, 477 (2006) (quoting Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993)); see also NRS 178.598 ("Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded.").

2022However, even where a Confrontation Clause error occurs, "reversal is not required ‘if the State could show beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.'" Medina v. State, 122 Nev. 346, 355 , 143 P.3d 471, 477 (2006) (quoting Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993)); see also NRS 178.598 ("Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded.").

1996First, Evans assigns error to the statutory reasonable doubt instruction, asserting that it is unconstitutional under the holding in Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39 , 111 S.Ct. 328 , 112 L.Ed.2d 339 (1990) (plurality opinion) ("substantial" and "grave" doubt based on a juror's "moral" certainty as opposed to the reasonable doubt standard based on evidentiary certainty violates Due Process Clause).

1996First, Evans assigns error to the statutory reasonable doubt instruction, asserting that it is unconstitutional under the holding in Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39 (1990) (plurality opinion) ("substantial" and "grave" doubt based on a juror's "moral" certainty as opposed to the reasonable doubt standard based on evidentiary certainty violates Due Process Clause).

2014In Rose, 123 Nev. at 205 , 163 P.3d at 415-16 , we held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to give an instruction on the particularity of a victim's testimony because the particularity of testimony "was sufficiently covered by other jury instructions regarding the State's burden of proof and the reasonable doubt standard." Here, Villegas does not challenge the burden of proof or reasonable doubt instructions.

2014In Rose, 123 Nev. at 205 , 163 P.3d at 415-16 , we held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to give an instruction on the particularity of a victim's testimony because the particularity of testimony "was sufficiently covered by other jury instructions regarding the State's burden of proof and the reasonable doubt standard." Here, Villegas does not challenge the burden of proof or reasonable doubt instructions.

2020Carter v. State, 121 Nev. 759, 765 , 121 P.3d 592, 596 (2005) (stating that a defendant is not entitled to "misleading, inaccurate[,] or duplicitoue jury instructions); Crawford v. State, 121 Nev. 744, 748 , 121 P.3d 582, 585 (2005) (reviewing the district court's rejection of a jury instruction for abuse of discretion or judicial error).

2020Carter v. State, 121 Nev. 759, 765 , 121 P.3d 592, 596 (2005) (stating that a defendant is not entitled to "misleading, inaccurate[,] or duplicitoue jury instructions); Crawford v. State, 121 Nev. 744, 748 , 121 P.3d 582, 585 (2005) (reviewing the district court's rejection of a jury instruction for abuse of discretion or judicial error).

2021State, 116 Nev. 215 , 236-37, 995 P.2d 700 , 714-15 (2000) (approving the premeditation and deliberation instruction given here); id. at 232, 995 P.2d at 712 (upholding the malice instruction where the jury is properly instructed on the presumption of innocence); Leonard v. State (Leonard I), 114 Nev. 1196, 1209 , 969 P.2d 288, 296 (1998) (providing that where the jury has been instructed that the defendant is presumed innocent and that the State bears the burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the equal-and-exact-justice instruction does not undermine the presumption of innocence

2021State, 116 Nev. 215 , 236-37, 995 P.2d 700 , 714-15 (2000) (approving the premeditation and deliberation instruction given here); id. at 232, 995 P.2d at 712 (upholding the malice instruction where the jury is properly instructed on the presumption of innocence); Leonard v. State (Leonard I), 114 Nev. 1196, 1209 , 969 P.2d 288, 296 (1998) (providing that where the jury has been instructed that the defendant is presumed innocent and that the State bears the burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the equal-and-exact-justice instruction does not undermine the presumption of innocence

2021State, 116 Nev. 215 , 236-37, 995 P.2d 700 , 714-15 (2000) (approving the premeditation and deliberation instruction given here); id. at 232, 995 P.2d at 712 (upholding the malice instruction where the jury is properly instructed on the presumption of innocence); Leonard v. State (Leonard I), 114 Nev. 1196, 1209 , 969 P.2d 288, 296 (1998) (providing that where the jury has been instructed that the defendant is presumed innocent and that the State bears the burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the equal-and-exact-justice instruction does not undermine the presumption of innocence

2021State, 116 Nev. 215 , 236-37, 995 P.2d 700 , 714-15 (2000) (approving the premeditation and deliberation instruction given here); id. at 232, 995 P.2d at 712 (upholding the malice instruction where the jury is properly instructed on the presumption of innocence); Leonard v. State (Leonard I), 114 Nev. 1196, 1209 , 969 P.2d 288, 296 (1998) (providing that where the jury has been instructed that the defendant is presumed innocent and that the State bears the burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the equal-and-exact-justice instruction does not undermine the presumption of innocence

2011See Randolph v. State, 117 Nev. 970, 982 , 36 P.3d 424, 432 (2001) (this court found that a prosecutor’s restatement of the reasonable doubt standard was sanctionable); Greene v. State, 113 Nev. 157, 170 , 931 P.2d 54, 62 (1997) (this court imposed a $250 sanction on the prosecutor for improper comments during the opening statement), overruled on other grounds by Byford v. State, 116 Nev. 215 , 235-36, 994 P.2d 700, 713-14 (2000); Williams v. State, 103 Nev. 106 , 112 n.6, 734 P.2d 700 , 704 n.6 (1987); McGuire v. State, 100 Nev. 153, 159-60 , 677 P.2d 1060, 1064-65 (1984) (this court ordered

2011See Randolph v. State, 117 Nev. 970, 982 , 36 P.3d 424, 432 (2001) (this court found that a prosecutor’s restatement of the reasonable doubt standard was sanctionable); Greene v. State, 113 Nev. 157, 170 , 931 P.2d 54, 62 (1997) (this court imposed a $250 sanction on the prosecutor for improper comments during the opening statement), overruled on other grounds by Byford v. State, 116 Nev. 215 , 235-36, 994 P.2d 700, 713-14 (2000); Williams v. State, 103 Nev. 106 , 112 n.6, 734 P.2d 700 , 704 n.6 (1987); McGuire v. State, 100 Nev. 153, 159-60 , 677 P.2d 1060, 1064-65 (1984) (this court ordered

2013Id. at 631-32 , 28 P.3d at 514 . 7 Here, the State referenced the reasonable doubt standard, Rogelio objected, and the district court sustained the objection.

2013Id. at 631-32 , 28 P.3d at 514 . 7 Here, the State referenced the reasonable doubt standard, Rogelio objected, and the district court sustained the objection.

2021See, e.g., Chambers v. State, 113 Nev. 974, 982-83, 944 P.2d 805, 810 (1997); Evans v. State, 112 Nev. 1172, 1190- 91, 926 P.2d 265, 277 (1996); Lord v. State, 107 Nev. 28, 40, 806 P.2d 548, 4 556 (1991), limited on other grounds by Summers v. State, 122 Nev. 1326, 1331, 148 P.3d 778, 782 (2006).

2021See, e.g., Chambers v. State, 113 Nev. 974, 982-83, 944 P.2d 805, 810 (1997); Evans v. State, 112 Nev. 1172, 1190- 91, 926 P.2d 265, 277 (1996); Lord v. State, 107 Nev. 28, 40, 806 P.2d 548, 4 556 (1991), limited on other grounds by Summers v. State, 122 Nev. 1326, 1331, 148 P.3d 778, 782 (2006).

2022However, even where a Confrontation Clause error occurs, "reversal is not required ‘if the State could show beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.'" Medina v. State, 122 Nev. 346, 355 , 143 P.3d 471, 477 (2006) (quoting Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993)); see also NRS 178.598 ("Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded.").

2022However, even where a Confrontation Clause error occurs, "reversal is not required ‘if the State could show beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.'" Medina v. State, 122 Nev. 346, 355, 143 P.3d 471, 477 (2006) (quoting Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993)); see also NRS 178.598 ("Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded.").

2019We conclude that Brock did not show deficient performance because the district court gave the instruction on premeditation and deliberation set forth in Byford v. State, 116 Nev. 215 , 236-37, 994 P.2d 700, 714-15 (2000), and the reasonable doubt instruction set forth in NRS 175.211(1), and counsel could not have successfully challenged the malice and equal-and-exact justice instructions.

2011See Randolph v. State, 117 Nev. 970, 982 , 36 P.3d 424, 432 (2001) (this court found that a prosecutor’s restatement of the reasonable doubt standard was sanctionable); Greene v. State, 113 Nev. 157, 170 , 931 P.2d 54, 62 (1997) (this court imposed a $250 sanction on the prosecutor for improper comments during the opening statement), overruled on other grounds by Byford v. State, 116 Nev. 215 , 235-36, 994 P.2d 700, 713-14 (2000); Williams v. State, 103 Nev. 106 , 112 n.6, 734 P.2d 700 , 704 n.6 (1987); McGuire v. State, 100 Nev. 153, 159-60 , 677 P.2d 1060, 1064-65 (1984) (this court ordered

2022See NRS 175.211(2) (providing that “(nJo other definition of reasonable doubt may be given by the court to juries in criminal actions in this State”); Batson v. State, 113 Nev. 669, 674-75 , 941 P.2d 478, 482 (1997) (rejecting a challenge to a jury instruction using the language required by NRS 175.211).

2022See NRS 175.211(2) (providing that “(nJo other definition of reasonable doubt may be given by the court to juries in criminal actions in this State”); Batson v. State, 113 Nev. 669, 674-75 , 941 P.2d 478, 482 (1997) (rejecting a challenge to a jury instruction using the language required by NRS 175.211).

2022Nevertheless, the error will not be reversible if "it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained." Cortinas v. State, 124 Nev. 1013, 1027, 195 P.3d 315, 324 (2008) (internal quotations omitted).

2022Nevertheless, the error will not be reversible if "it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained." Cortinas v. State, 124 Nev. 1013, 1027, 195 P.3d 315, 324 (2008) (internal quotations omitted).

2021See, e.g., Chambers v. State, 113 Nev. 974, 982-83, 944 P.2d 805, 810 (1997); Evans v. State, 112 Nev. 1172, 1190- 91, 926 P.2d 265, 277 (1996); Lord v. State, 107 Nev. 28, 40, 806 P.2d 548, 4 556 (1991), limited on other grounds by Summers v. State, 122 Nev. 1326, 1331, 148 P.3d 778, 782 (2006).

2021See, e.g., Chambers v. State, 113 Nev. 974, 982-83, 944 P.2d 805, 810 (1997); Evans v. State, 112 Nev. 1172, 1190- 91, 926 P.2d 265, 277 (1996); Lord v. State, 107 Nev. 28, 40, 806 P.2d 548, 4 556 (1991), limited on other grounds by Summers v. State, 122 Nev. 1326, 1331, 148 P.3d 778, 782 (2006).

2021See, e.g., Chambers v. State, 113 Nev. 974, 982-83, 944 P.2d 805, 810 (1997); Evans v. State, 112 Nev. 1172, 1190- 91, 926 P.2d 265, 277 (1996); Lord v. State, 107 Nev. 28, 40, 806 P.2d 548, 4 556 (1991), limited on other grounds by Summers v. State, 122 Nev. 1326, 1331, 148 P.3d 778, 782 (2006).

2021See, e.g., Chambers v. State, 113 Nev. 974, 982-83, 944 P.2d 805, 810 (1997); Evans v. State, 112 Nev. 1172, 1190- 91, 926 P.2d 265, 277 (1996); Lord v. State, 107 Nev. 28, 40, 806 P.2d 548, 4 556 (1991), limited on other grounds by Summers v. State, 122 Nev. 1326, 1331, 148 P.3d 778, 782 (2006).

2021See Valdez v. State, 124 Nev. 1172, 1190 , 196 P.3d 465, 477 (2008) (providing that unpreserved claims of prosecutorial misconduct are reviewed for plain error).

2021See Valdez v. State, 124 Nev. 1172, 1190 , 196 P.3d 465, 477 (2008) (providing that unpreserved claims of prosecutorial misconduct are reviewed for plain error).

2020See, e.g., Leonard v. State, 117 Nev. 53 , 78-79, 17 P.3d 397 , 413 (2001) (holding that the "abandoned and malignant heart" language is essential and informs the jury of the distinction between express and implied malice); Byford v. State, 116 Nev. 215 , 232, 995 P.2d 700 , 712 (2000) (upholding the malice instruction where the jury is properly instructed on the presumption of innocence); Leonard v. State, 114 Nev. 1196, 1209 , 969 P.2d 288, 296 (1998) (providing that where the jury has been instructed that the defendant is presumed innocent and that the State bears the burden of proving guil

2020See, e.g., Leonard v. State, 117 Nev. 53 , 78-79, 17 P.3d 397 , 413 (2001) (holding that the "abandoned and malignant heart" language is essential and informs the jury of the distinction between express and implied malice); Byford v. State, 116 Nev. 215 , 232, 995 P.2d 700 , 712 (2000) (upholding the malice instruction where the jury is properly instructed on the presumption of innocence); Leonard v. State, 114 Nev. 1196, 1209 , 969 P.2d 288, 296 (1998) (providing that where the jury has been instructed that the defendant is presumed innocent and that the State bears the burden of proving guil

2017Nunnery v. State, 127 Nev. 749, 775-76 , 263 P.3d 235, 253 (2011); accord Kansas v. Carr, U.S. , 136 S. Ct. 633, 642 (2016) (concluding that the weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances is not subject to the beyond a reasonable doubt standard).

2016Op. 69, 263 P.3d 235, 253 (2011), that the SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 19 (0) 1947A Re. weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances is not a factual determination and thus it is not subject to the proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard.

2017Prosecutorial misconduct exists if a "prosecutor's statements so infected the proceedings with unfairness as to make the results a denial of due process." Thomas v. State, 120 Nev. 37, 47 , 83 P.3d 818, 825 (2004).

2017Prosecutorial misconduct exists if a "prosecutor's statements so infected the proceedings with unfairness as to make the results a denial of due process." Thomas v. State, 120 Nev. 37, 47 , 83 P.3d 818, 825 (2004).

1998Moreover, because the reasonable doubt standard requires the jury to reach a “ ‘subjective state of near certitude’ on the facts in issue”, see id. at 75 , 657 P.2d at 1158 (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 315 (1979)), we have maintained that prosecutorial commentary analogizing reasonable doubt with major life decisions such as buying a house or changing jobs is improper because these decisions involve elements of uncertainty and risk-taking and are wholly unlike the kinds of decisions that jurors must make in criminal trials.

1983Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 315 (1979).

1991See Cutler v. State, 93 Nev. 329 , 566 P.2d 809 (1977).

1991See Cutler v. State, 93 Nev. 329 , 566 P.2d 809 (1977).

1994Moore, 105 Nev. at 383 , 776 P.2d at 1238 (quoting People v. Geiger, 35 Cal.3d 510 , 199 Cal.Rptr. 45, 50 , 674 P.2d 1303, 1307-08 (1984)).

1994Moore, 105 Nev. at 383 , 776 P.2d at 1238 (quoting People v. Geiger, 35 Cal.3d 510 , 199 Cal.Rptr. 45, 50 , 674 P.2d 1303, 1307-08 (1984)).

2026See Polk, 126 Nev. at 184 , 233 P.3d at 359 (explaining a Crawford violation will be harmless if the State can show beyond a reasonable doubt the error did not contribute to the verdict).

2026See Polk, 126 Nev. at 184 , 233 P.3d at 359 (explaining a Crawford violation will be harmless if the State can show beyond a reasonable doubt the error did not contribute to the verdict).

2022E.g., Johnson, 118 Nev. at 806 , 59 P.3d at 462 (rejecting argument that the reasonable-doubt instruction minimized the burden of proof, and noting the other instructions "on the presumption of innocence and the State's burden of proof").

2022E.g., Johnson, 118 Nev. at 806 , 59 P.3d at 462 (rejecting argument that the reasonable-doubt instruction minimized the burden of proof, and noting the other instructions "on the presumption of innocence and the State's burden of proof").

2021Prosecutorial misconduct Third, Williams argues for the first time on appeal that the prosecutor improperly quantified reasonable doubt during closing arguments by telling the jury that reasonable doubt is not "beyond all imaginary doube or "beyond a shadow of a doubt." While we have consistently cautioned prosecutors against quantifying reasonable doubt, see Wesley v. State, 112 Nev. 503, 514 , 916 P.2d 793, 801 (1996) ("[W]hen prosecutors attempt to rephrase the reasonable doubt standard, they venture into troubled waters."), the prosecutor's comments here do not rise to the level of plain e

2021Prosecutorial misconduct Third, Williams argues for the first time on appeal that the prosecutor improperly quantified reasonable doubt during closing arguments by telling the jury that reasonable doubt is not "beyond all imaginary doube or "beyond a shadow of a doubt." While we have consistently cautioned prosecutors against quantifying reasonable doubt, see Wesley v. State, 112 Nev. 503, 514 , 916 P.2d 793, 801 (1996) ("[W]hen prosecutors attempt to rephrase the reasonable doubt standard, they venture into troubled waters."), the prosecutor's comments here do not rise to the level of plain e

2020Carter v. State, 121 Nev. 759, 765 , 121 P.3d 592, 596 (2005) (stating that a defendant is not entitled to "misleading, inaccurate[,] or duplicitoue jury instructions); Crawford v. State, 121 Nev. 744, 748 , 121 P.3d 582, 585 (2005) (reviewing the district court's rejection of a jury instruction for abuse of discretion or judicial error).

2020Carter v. State, 121 Nev. 759, 765 , 121 P.3d 592, 596 (2005) (stating that a defendant is not entitled to "misleading, inaccurate[,] or duplicitoue jury instructions); Crawford v. State, 121 Nev. 744, 748 , 121 P.3d 582, 585 (2005) (reviewing the district court's rejection of a jury instruction for abuse of discretion or judicial error).

2017To the extent that Moxley argues that the State improperly quantified the reasonable doubt standard in related argument, we previously determined that the State's comment was not error, Moxley v. State, Docket No. 47497 (Order of Affirmance, September 28, 2009), and relitigation is barred by the law of the case, Hall v. State, 91 Nev. 314, 315 , 535 P.2d 797, 798 (1975).

2017To the extent that Moxley argues that the State improperly quantified the reasonable doubt standard in related argument, we previously determined that the State's comment was not error, Moxley v. State, Docket No. 47497 (Order of Affirmance, September 28, 2009), and relitigation is barred by the law of the case, Hall v. State, 91 Nev. 314, 315 , 535 P.2d 797, 798 (1975).

2017Nunnery v. State, 127 Nev. 749, 775-76 , 263 P.3d 235, 253 (2011); accord Kansas v. Carr, U.S. , 136 S. Ct. 633, 642 (2016) (concluding that the weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances is not subject to the beyond a reasonable doubt standard).