74 New Hampshire opinions name it 1 courts 1976–2025 8 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Hampshire courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Wentworthgreen2 sentences2024See, e.g., State v. Wentworth, 118 N.H. 832, 838-39 (1978) (establishing a model jury instruction regarding the reasonable doubt standard and cautioning “trial judges to avoid attempts at further defining reasonable doubt”); State v. Aubert, 120 N.H. 634, 635-38 (1980) (concluding that the trial court’s reasonable doubt charge, which added language to the charge set forth in Wentworth, was “improper,” and requesting “that trial judges not add to the model charge” established in Wentworth); State v. Saunders, 164 N.H. 342, 352 (2012) (“[I]n a criminal case that includes direct evidence, trial c 2013The reasonable doubt instruction included a sentence that is not part of the model reasonable doubt instruction set forth in State v. Wentworth, 118 N.H. 832, 838-39 (1978). | 6 | 6 |
State v. Petersgreen2 sentences2019"To establish that an error was harmless, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not affect the verdict." *946 State v. Peters , 162 N.H. 30 , 36, 27 A.3d 765 (2011). 2019"To establish that an error was harmless, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not affect the verdict." *946 State v. Peters , 162 N.H. 30 , 36, 27 A.3d 765 (2011). | 5 | 5 |
State v. Phinneygreen2 sentences2013See, e.g., State v. Veale, 158 N.H. 632, 638-39 (2009) (holding that reputation alone is a sufficient interest to require state due process protection and rejecting the federal “stigma-plus” approach); State v. Laurie, 139 N.H. 325, 330 (1995) (requiring State to demonstrate, beyond a reasonable doubt, that undisclosed exculpatory evidence would not have affected the verdict); State v. Phinney, 117 N.H. 145, 147 (1977) (adopting beyond a reasonable doubt standard in determining the voluntariness of confessions). 1992See State v. Sullivan, 130 N.H. 64, 68 , 534 A.2d 384, 386 (1987); State v. Phinney, 117 N.H. 145, 147 , 370 A.2d 1153, 1154 (1977) (explicitly rejecting United States Supreme Court’s “preponderance of the evidence” standard for determining voluntariness of confessions and adopting a proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard). | 3 | 6 |
State v. Aubertgreen2 sentences2024See, e.g., State v. Wentworth, 118 N.H. 832, 838-39 (1978) (establishing a model jury instruction regarding the reasonable doubt standard and cautioning “trial judges to avoid attempts at further defining reasonable doubt”); State v. Aubert, 120 N.H. 634, 635-38 (1980) (concluding that the trial court’s reasonable doubt charge, which added language to the charge set forth in Wentworth, was “improper,” and requesting “that trial judges not add to the model charge” established in Wentworth); State v. Saunders, 164 N.H. 342, 352 (2012) (“[I]n a criminal case that includes direct evidence, trial c 2013We observed that the United States Supreme Court has indicated that a reasonable doubt instruction should impress upon the jury “the need to reach a ‘subjective state of near certitude.’ ” Id. at 637 (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 315 ). | 3 | 4 |
State v. Etiennegreen2 sentences2011State v. Etienne, 146 N.H. 115, 118 (2001). 2006State v. Etienne, 146 N.H. 115, 118 (2001). | 3 | 3 |
State v. MacArthurgreen2 sentences2002“Where the trial court has erroneously admitted evidence, we must reverse unless the State can show beyond a reasonable doubt that such error did not affect the verdict.” State v. MacArthur, 138 N.H. 597, 599 (1994). 2000See State v. MacArthur, 138 N.H. 597, 599 , 644 A.2d 68, 69 (1994). | 3 | 3 |
State v. Ruelkegreen2 sentences1993Bailey, 127 N.H. at 421 , 503 A.2d at 767 ; State v. Ruelke, 116 N.H. 692, 694 , 366 A.2d 497, 498 (1976). 1993Bailey, 127 N.H. at 421 , 503 A.2d at 767 ; State v. Ruelke, 116 N.H. 692, 694 , 366 A.2d 497, 498 (1976). | 3 | 3 |
State v. William Edicgreen2 sentences2020“To establish that an error was harmless, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not affect the verdict.” State v. Edic, 169 N.H. 580, 588 (2017) (quotation omitted). 2019“To establish that an error was harmless, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not affect the verdict.” State v. Edic, 169 N.H. 580, 588 (2017) (quotation omitted). | 2 | 4 |
Proctor v. Butlergreen2 sentences2011Despite the Supreme Court’s 1979 ruling in Addington , we declined in 1982 to reexamine the reasonable doubt requirement recognized in Proctor v. Butler, 117 N.H. 927, 935 (1977), as applicable to civil commitment proceedings under RSA chapter 135-C (civil commitment of mentally ill). 1988Prior to the evidentiary hearing on the petition, the State moved for a determination that its burden to prove mental illness and dangerousness would be measured by the standard of clear and convincing evidence, as distinguished from the reasonable doubt standard imposed by Proctor v. Butler, 117 N.H. at 935 , 380 A.2d at 677-78 ; see In re Champagne, 128 N.H. 791, 792-93 , 519 A.2d 310, 311 (1986). | 2 | 3 |
Gibbs v. Helgemoegreen2 sentences1982Previously, in Gibbs v. Helgemoe, 116 N.H. 825, 828-29 , 367 A.2d 1041, 1043-44 (1976), we had held that a reasonable doubt standard of proof was constitutionally required in criminal recommitment hearings. 1982Previously, in Gibbs v. Helgemoe, 116 N.H. 825, 828-29 , 367 A.2d 1041, 1043-44 (1976), we had held that a reasonable doubt standard of proof was constitutionally required in criminal recommitment hearings. | 2 | 3 |
State v. Saundersgreen2 sentences2024See, e.g., State v. Wentworth, 118 N.H. 832, 838-39 (1978) (establishing a model jury instruction regarding the reasonable doubt standard and cautioning “trial judges to avoid attempts at further defining reasonable doubt”); State v. Aubert, 120 N.H. 634, 635-38 (1980) (concluding that the trial court’s reasonable doubt charge, which added language to the charge set forth in Wentworth, was “improper,” and requesting “that trial judges not add to the model charge” established in Wentworth); State v. Saunders, 164 N.H. 342, 352 (2012) (“[I]n a criminal case that includes direct evidence, trial c 2013Saunders, 164 N.H. at 353 (quotation and ellipsis omitted); Victor, 511 U.S. at 6 . “[T]he proper inquiry is not whether the instruction could have been applied in an unconstitutional manner, but whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury did so apply it.” Victor, 511 U.S. at 6 ; see Saunders, 164 N.H. at 352-53 . | 2 | 2 |
State of New Hampshire v. Vincent Coopergreen2 sentences2024See State v. Cooper, 168 N.H. 161, 165 (2015); State v. Ramsey, 166 N.H. 45, 47 (2014). [¶11] To establish harmless error, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not affect the verdict. 2023See State v. Woodbury, 124 N.H. 218 , 9 221 (1983) (“[W]e must also consider the State’s argument that the admission of his testimony, in light of all the existing circumstances, constituted harmless error.”); cf. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684 (1986) (“Whether such an error is harmless in a particular case depends upon a host of factors, all readily accessible to reviewing courts.”); State v. Cooper, 168 N.H. 161, 165 (2015) (citing Delaware, 475 U.S. at 684 ). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Dupontgreen2 sentences2019An error may be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt if the alternative evidence of the defendant’s guilt is of an overwhelming nature, quantity, or weight, and if the inadmissible evidence is merely cumulative or inconsequential in relation to the strength of the State’s evidence of guilt.” State v. Dupont, 149 N.H. 70, 75 (2003) (quotation and citation omitted). 2003“For us to hold that an error was harmless, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not affect the verdict.” State v. Dupont, 149 N.H. 70, 75 (2003). | 2 | 2 |
Opinion of the Justicesgreen2 sentences1984This is especially true in proceedings involving the commitment of mentally ill persons, “[bjecause the consequences of erroneous confinement are so serious, this court adopted a ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ standard.” Opinion of the Justices, 122 N.H. 199, 202 , 442 A.2d 594, 595 (1982). 1984This is especially true in proceedings involving the commitment of mentally ill persons, “[bjecause the consequences of erroneous confinement are so serious, this court adopted a ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ standard.” Opinion of the Justices, 122 N.H. 199, 202 , 442 A.2d 594, 595 (1982). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Favreaugreen2 sentences1994State v. Favreau, 134 N.H. 336, 342 , 592 A.2d 1136, 1140 (1991). 1994State v. Favreau, 134 N.H. 336, 342 , 592 A.2d 1136, 1140 (1991). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Zyskgreen2 sentences1985See State v. Zysk, 123 N.H. 481, 487 , 465 A.2d 480, 483 (1983) (although there was conflicting testimony, there was sufficient evidence to support the trial judge’s finding beyond a reasonable doubt that a waiver had occurred). 1985See State v. Zysk, 123 N.H. 481, 487 , 465 A.2d 480, 483 (1983) (although there was conflicting testimony, there was sufficient evidence to support the trial judge’s finding beyond a reasonable doubt that a waiver had occurred). | 2 | 2 |
Beck v. Alabamagreen2 sentences2020A lesser included instruction therefore “ensures that the jury will accord the defendant the full benefit of the reasonable-doubt standard.” Id. at 634 . 1983“Providing the jury with the ‘third option’ of convicting on a lesser included offense ensures that the jury will accord the defendant the full benefit of the reasonable doubt standard.” Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 634 (1980). | 1 | 2 |
Jackson v. Virginiared2 sentences2013We observed that the United States Supreme Court has indicated that a reasonable doubt instruction should impress upon the jury “the need to reach a ‘subjective state of near certitude.’ ” Id. at 637 (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 315 ). 2013We concluded that the trial court’s “repeated emphasis that the State need not establish guilt to a mathematical certainty, and need not establish guilt to a scientific certainty, and need not establish guilt beyond all doubt violated the spirit of that standard.” Id. | 1 | 2 |
Lego v. Twomeygreen2 sentences1982Compare State v. Phinney, 117 N.H. 145, 146 , 370 A.2d 1153, 1154 (1977) with Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1972). 1982Compare State v. Phinney, 117 N.H. 145, 146 , 370 A.2d 1153, 1154 (1977) with Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1972). | 1 | 2 |
State v. Gregoiregreen2 sentences1982The legislature’s attempt to reduce this standard to “a preponderance of the evidence” was struck down as unconstitutional in State v. Gregoire, 118 N.H. 140, 144 , 384 A.2d 132, 134 (1978). 1978The same reasonable doubt standard applied as “an essential requirement of due process in adjudicatory juvenile delinquency proceedings.” Gibbs, id. | 1 | 2 |
State v. Crossgreen1 sentence2025See State v. Cross, 128 N.H. 732, 737 (1986) (concluding that even when a prospective juror states that a criminal defendant must prove his innocence it is not an unsustainable exercise of discretion for the trial court to seat the juror if the prospective juror states she will apply the trial court’s reasonable doubt instruction). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Morehousegreen1 sentence2024See Morehouse, 120 N.H. at 744 . | 1 | 1 |
State of New Hampshire v. William Ramseygreen1 sentence2024See State v. Cooper, 168 N.H. 161, 165 (2015); State v. Ramsey, 166 N.H. 45, 47 (2014). [¶11] To establish harmless error, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not affect the verdict. | 1 | 1 |
Delaware v. Van Arsdallgreen2 sentences2023See State v. Woodbury, 124 N.H. 218 , 9 221 (1983) (“[W]e must also consider the State’s argument that the admission of his testimony, in light of all the existing circumstances, constituted harmless error.”); cf. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684 (1986) (“Whether such an error is harmless in a particular case depends upon a host of factors, all readily accessible to reviewing courts.”); State v. Cooper, 168 N.H. 161, 165 (2015) (citing Delaware, 475 U.S. at 684 ). 2023See State v. Woodbury, 124 N.H. 218 , 9 221 (1983) (“[W]e must also consider the State’s argument that the admission of his testimony, in light of all the existing circumstances, constituted harmless error.”); cf. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684 (1986) (“Whether such an error is harmless in a particular case depends upon a host of factors, all readily accessible to reviewing courts.”); State v. Cooper, 168 N.H. 161, 165 (2015) (citing Delaware, 475 U.S. at 684 ). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Woodburygreen1 sentence2023See State v. Woodbury, 124 N.H. 218 , 9 221 (1983) (“[W]e must also consider the State’s argument that the admission of his testimony, in light of all the existing circumstances, constituted harmless error.”); cf. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684 (1986) (“Whether such an error is harmless in a particular case depends upon a host of factors, all readily accessible to reviewing courts.”); State v. Cooper, 168 N.H. 161, 165 (2015) (citing Delaware, 475 U.S. at 684 ). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Souksamranegreen2 sentences2014State v. Souksamrane, 164 N.H. 425, 429 (2012). 2014State v. Souksamrane, 164 N.H. 425, 429 (2012). | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Lauriegreen | 1 | 1 |
| O'Laughlin v. O'Briengreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Derouchiegreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Vealegreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Reidgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Gabusigreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Foxgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Brodowskigreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Demerittgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Allisongreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Crosbygreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Skidmoregreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Bujnowskigreen | 1 | 1 |
| Chapman v. Californiared | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| State v. Squiresred | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Rouleau
green
2 sentences2025State v. Rouleau, 176 N.H. 400 , 407 (2024), 2024 N.H. 2, ¶20 . 2025Id. [¶24] The factors that we consider in assessing whether an error did not affect the verdict include, but are not limited to: (1) the strength of the State’s case; (2) whether the admitted or excluded evidence is cumulative or inconsequential in relation to the strength of the State’s case; (3) the frequency of the error; (4) the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the erroneously admitted or excluded evidence; (5) the nature of the defense; (6) the circumstances in which the evidence was introduced at trial; (7) whether the court took any curative steps; (8) whet | 4 | 2024–2025 |
Addington v. Texas
green
2 sentences2011The Court stated that while “the preponderance standard falls short of meeting the demands of due process ... the reasonable-doubt standard is not required.” Id. at 431 . 2011The Court found the reasonable doubt standard “inappropriate in civil commitment proceedings because, given the uncertainties of psychiatric diagnosis, it may impose a burden the state cannot meet and thereby erect an unreasonable barrier to needed medical treatment.” Id. at 432 . | 2 | 1982–2011 |
State v. Bailey
green
2 sentences1993A trial court’s failure to preserve a record of the discussion constitutes an error that requires reversal unless it “appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the error was harmless.” Bailey, 127 N.H. at 421 , 503 A.2d at 767 . 1993A trial court’s failure to preserve a record of the discussion constitutes an error that requires reversal unless it “appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the error was harmless.” Bailey, 127 N.H. at 421 , 503 A.2d at 767 . | 2 | 1993–1993 |
State of New Hampshire v. Ashley Hayward
green
1 sentence2015Id. at 584 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Victor v. Nebraska green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| State v. O'Leary green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| State v. Goodale green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Miranda v. Arizona green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| State v. Maloney green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| State v. Radziewicz green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Martineau v. Perrin green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Richard Dunn v. Everett I. Perrin, Jr., Laurence Black v. Edward Cox green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Perrin v. Dunn green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Lynch v. Overholser green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Kanteles v. Wheelock green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| In Re GAULT green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| In Re WINSHIP green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.