reasonable doubt standard in Massachusetts

2025See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23-24 (1967), quoting Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86-87 (1963) ("There is little, if any, difference between [asking] 'whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction'" and asking whether government proved "beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained").

2019See Chapman , 386 U.S. at 24 , 87 S.Ct. 824 (burden is on "beneficiary of a constitutional error to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained").

2018Rather, we look to whether the reasonable doubt instruction adequately impressed on the jury 'the need to reach a subjective state of near certitude of the guilt of the accused.' Victor , supra at 15 , quoting Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307 , 315 (1979). 'In reviewing a reasonable doubt instruction, we consider whether there is a "reasonable likelihood" that the instruction led the jury to believe that they could convict the defendant on proof insufficient to dispel reasonable doubt.' Commonwealth v. Denis , [ 442 Mass. 617 ,] 621 [ (2004) ], quoting Pinckney , supra ." Commonwealth v. Fig

2014“In reviewing a reasonable doubt instruction, we consider whether there is a ‘reasonable likelihood’ that the instruction led the jury to believe that they could convict the defendant on proof insufficient to dispel reasonable doubt.” Denis, supra at 621 , quoting Pinckney, supra. We have cited but not indorsed Instruction 21, see Commonwealth v. Therrien, 428 Mass. 607 , 611 n.5 (1998), as an alternative to the “moral certainty” instruction that passes constitutional muster only where supplemented with another instruction that impresses on a jury “the need to reach a subjective state of near

2012Having carefully reviewed the record, we conclude “beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” Commonwealth v. Vasquez, 456 Mass. 350, 355 (2010), quoting Commonwealth v. Peixoto, 430 Mass. 654, 660 (2000). ii.

2011When undertaking this analysis the essential question is “whether the record establishes ‘beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.’ ” Commonwealth v. Peixoto, 430 Mass. 654, 660 (2000), quoting from Chapman, supra. “The inquiry cannot be merely whether there was enough [evidence] to support the result, apart from the phase affected by the error.” Commonwealth v. Peruzzi, 15 Mass. App. Ct. 437, 445-446 (1983), quoting from Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765 (1946). “[I]t is not enough for the Commonwealth to demonstrate that i

2023We admit to some difficulty in understanding Mahdi, a post-Miranda silence, first-degree murder case which purports to apply both the harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt standard and the substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice standard, see id. at 690, 696, 699 .

2011In answering this question, we consider the totality of the record and the various factors discussed by the Supreme Judicial Court in Commonwealth v. Mahdi, 388 Mass. 679, 696-697 (1983), including “the relationship between the evidence and the premise of the defense.” Id. at 696 .

2015When, as in this case, the error consists of a violation of a constitutional right, the Commonwealth bears the burden of demonstrating “beyond a reasonable doubt that the error com *784 plained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” Commonwealth v. Marini, 375 Mass. 510, 520 (1978), quoting from Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).

1980It is thus difficult for us to imagine how the defendant was prejudiced by the jury’s seeing the words “having sex” in the middle of a passage which would have otherwise read, “When all else failed I pulled a knife[.] I was going to scare her into [purported deletion] taking the next left.” This sentence was followed by the statement, “I asked her if she saw the knife.” In short, we are satisfied that the Commonwealth has “prove[d] beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict[s] obtained.” Commonwealth v. Marini, 375 Mass. 510, 520 (1978), quoting fr

1983There could be “no reasonable likelihood that the charge ... as a whole could have led the jury to ignore the reasonable doubt test.” Commonwealth v. Leaster, 362 Mass. 407, 416-417 (1972).

1982Because the trial judge in Williams reiterated the proper burden of proof standard numerous times during the charge, we were persuaded that there was “no reasonable likelihood that the charge taken as a whole could have led the jury to ignore the reasonable doubt test.” Id., quoting from Commonwealth v. Leaster, 362 Mass. 407, 416-417 (1972).

2018Rather, we look to whether the reasonable doubt instruction adequately impressed on the jury 'the need to reach a subjective state of near certitude of the guilt of the accused.' Victor , supra at 15 , quoting Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307 , 315 (1979). 'In reviewing a reasonable doubt instruction, we consider whether there is a "reasonable likelihood" that the instruction led the jury to believe that they could convict the defendant on proof insufficient to dispel reasonable doubt.' Commonwealth v. Denis , [ 442 Mass. 617 ,] 621 [ (2004) ], quoting Pinckney , supra ." Commonwealth v. Fig

2014Rather, we look to whether the reasonable doubt instruction adequately impressed on the jury “the need to reach a subjective state of near certitude of the guilt of the accused.” Victor, supra at 15 , quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 315 (1979).

2002The judge ruled that the reasonable doubt instruction was constitutionally defective because it lowered the Commonwealth’s burden of proof (1) by equating proof beyond a reasonable doubt with the degree of certitude needed to make important private decisions, see Commonwealth v. Ferreira, 373 Mass. 116, 128 (1977), and (2) by warning the jury against holding the Commonwealth to too high a burden.

2000With regard to waiver of the argument on the reasonable doubt instruction (see note 2, infra), see Commonwealth v. Burnett, 428 Mass. 469, 472-474 (1998), for a discussion of cases foreshadowing the holding in Commonwealth v. Ferreira, 373 Mass. 116, 128-130 (1977).

2018In determining whether an error is prejudicial "we examine various factors, including the importance of the evidence in the prosecution's case; the relationship between the evidence and the premise of the defense; who introduced the issue at trial; the frequency of the reference; whether the erroneously admitted evidence was merely cumulative of properly admitted evidence; the availability or effect of curative instructions; and the weight or quantum of evidence of guilt." Dagraca, supra at 553 .13 Here, the defense was based on casting doubt on the composition of the substance before Dookhan

2017Dagraca , supra at 552-553, 854 N.E.2d 1249 , applies the harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard, derived from Chapman v. California , 386 U.S. 18 , 24, 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), applicable to errors of constitutional dimension, while we apply the less stringent prejudicial error standard, derived from Kotteakos v. United States , 328 U.S. 750 , 764-765, 66 S.Ct. 1239 , 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946), used to evaluate evidentiary errors.

2012Having carefully reviewed the record, we conclude “beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” Commonwealth v. Vasquez, 456 Mass. 350, 355 (2010), quoting Commonwealth v. Peixoto, 430 Mass. 654, 660 (2000). ii.

2011This concession, the dissent reasons, was part of an “obvious trial strategy ... to give a little [the cocaine charge for which the defendant was facing a relatively short sentence] in the hope of gaining a lot [credibility in the eyes of the jury for his necessity defense on the more serious gun charge].” Even assuming this to be true, and although such a strategy might have been reasonable in the circumstances, our cases make clear that the “defendant’s theory of his case cannot relieve the Commonwealth of its burden of proving every element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Charles, su

2000The defendant incorrectly cites Commonwealth v. Gagliardi, 418 Mass. 562, 568 (1994), cert, denied, 513 U.S. 1091 (1995), for the proposition that we will not apply the waiver rule to the issue whether a reasonable doubt instruction is constitutionally deficient.

2000The defendant claims that the judge’s use of the phrase “moral certainty” in the instructions regarding proof beyond a reasonable doubt was in error because the instruction “failed to provide sufficient context to the term moral certainty.” The reasonable doubt charge given was almost identical to that approved in Commonwealth v. Gagliardi, 418 Mass. 562 , 568 n.3, 571-572 (1994), cert, denied, 513 U.S. 1091 (1995). 7.

2015The reasonable doubt standard “provides concrete substance for the presumption of innocence — that bedrock ‘axiomatic and elementary’ principle whose ‘enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal law.’ ” Winship, 397 U.S. at 363 , quoting Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895).

1978In reaching this difficult decision the judge must bear in mind that the reasonable doubt standard is founded on the value judgment "that it is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free.” Andrews, petitioner, supra at 488-489, quoting from In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 371-372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).

2010See id. at 281-282 (“deprivation of [the right to trial by jury], with consequences that are necessarily unquantifiable and indeterminate, unquestionably qualifies as ‘structural error’ ”).

2000See Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970); Commonwealth v. Pinckney, supra at 342 .

1980The language utilized by the judge in his instructions on the reasonable doubt standard is derived from Commonwealth v. Madeiros, 255 Mass. 304, 307-308 (1926).

1975Other portions of the charge emphasized the degree of certainty implied by the reasonable doubt standard in language similar to that approved in Commonwealth v. Ma-deiros, 255 Mass. 304, 307-308 (1926).

2025See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23-24 (1967), quoting Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86-87 (1963) ("There is little, if any, difference between [asking] 'whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction'" and asking whether government proved "beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained").

2009We review constitutional error under a harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard, to determine “whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction.” Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 (1967), quoting from Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86-87 (1963).

2015See Commonwealth v. Morales, 76 Mass. App. Ct. 663, 666-667 (2010).

2013See Commonwealth v. Morales, 76 Mass. App. Ct. 663, 665-667 (2010) (canvassing the Massachusetts cases on harmless error and concluding that “in determining whether a constitutional error was harmless, we ask whether the record establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained” [quotations and citations omitted]).

2007See Commonwealth v. Vinnie, 428 Mass. 161, 163-164 , cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1007 (1998).

2005See Commonwealth v. Vinnie, 428 Mass. 161, 163 , cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1007 (1998).

2025If such evidence is presented, however, the burden is on the prosecution to persuade the trier of facts beyond a reasonable doubt that the defense does not exist." Jones, 372 Mass. at 406 .

2013Commonwealth v. Jones, 372 Mass. 403, 406 (1977). “[T]he burden is on the defendant to come forward with evidence of the defense . . . [and if] such evidence is presented . . . the burden [shifts to] the prosecution to persuade the trier of facts beyond a reasonable doubt that the defense does not exist.” Id.

2018In determining whether an error is prejudicial "we examine various factors, including the importance of the evidence in the prosecution's case; the relationship between the evidence and the premise of the defense; who introduced the issue at trial; the frequency of the reference; whether the erroneously admitted evidence was merely cumulative of properly admitted evidence; the availability or effect of curative instructions; and the weight or quantum of evidence of guilt." Dagraca, supra at 553 .13 Here, the defense was based on casting doubt on the composition of the substance before Dookhan

2018In determining whether an error is prejudicial "we examine various factors, including the importance of the evidence in the prosecution's case; the relationship between the evidence and the premise of the defense; who introduced the issue at trial; the frequency of the reference; whether the erroneously admitted evidence was merely cumulative of properly admitted evidence; the availability or effect of curative instructions; and the weight or quantum of evidence of guilt." Dagraca, supra at 553 .13 Here, the defense was based on casting doubt on the composition of the substance before Dookhan

2018Rather, we look to whether the reasonable doubt instruction adequately impressed on the jury 'the need to reach a subjective state of near certitude of the guilt of the accused.' Victor , supra at 15 , quoting Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307 , 315 (1979). 'In reviewing a reasonable doubt instruction, we consider whether there is a "reasonable likelihood" that the instruction led the jury to believe that they could convict the defendant on proof insufficient to dispel reasonable doubt.' Commonwealth v. Denis , [ 442 Mass. 617 ,] 621 [ (2004) ], quoting Pinckney , supra ." Commonwealth v. Fig

2014“In reviewing a reasonable doubt instruction, we consider whether there is a ‘reasonable likelihood’ that the instruction led the jury to believe that they could convict the defendant on proof insufficient to dispel reasonable doubt.” Denis, supra at 621 , quoting Pinckney, supra. We have cited but not indorsed Instruction 21, see Commonwealth v. Therrien, 428 Mass. 607 , 611 n.5 (1998), as an alternative to the “moral certainty” instruction that passes constitutional muster only where supplemented with another instruction that impresses on a jury “the need to reach a subjective state of near

2014See, e.g., Birchall, petitioner, supra. The standard is less demanding than the proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard required to justify an involuntary civil commitment, either because the respondent poses a danger to himself or to others, see Superintendent of Worcester State Hosp. v. Hagberg, 374 Mass. 271, 275 (1978), or because of sexual dangerousness.

1996See Superintendent of Worcester State Hosp. v. Hagberg, 374 Mass. 271, 275-277 (1978) (requiring beyond a reasonable doubt standard to indefinite civil commitments).

2010See Commonwealth v. Marini, 375 Mass. 510, 520 (1978) (“[I]t would be hard to say that the [error] was without effect on the jury and did not contribute to the verdict”); Commonwealth v. Gilday, 382 Mass. 166, 178 (1980) (“We should set aside the conviction unless we are ‘sure that the error did not influence the jury, or had but very slight effect’ ”), quoting from United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112 (1976); Commonwealth v. Perrot, 407 Mass. 539, 549 (1990) (“The essential question is whether the error had, or might have had, an effect on the jury and whether the error contributed to or

2010See Commonwealth v. Perez, 411 Mass. 249 , 260 n.8 (1991), citing Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764-765 (1946).

2004Here, several aspects of the entire reasonable doubt instruction alleviate any concern that the jury were misled by the use of the phrase “reasonable certainty.” Most significantly, immediately after the judge used “reasonable certainty,” she defined the concept as that which “convinces your understanding and satisfies your reason and judgment as jurors who have been sworn to act conscientiously upon the evidence.” See Commonwealth v. Smith, 427 Mass. 245, 254 (1998) (instruction which, in part, equated reasonable doubt with satisfaction according to the jury’s conscience, upheld).

2001As on any challenge to the adequacy of a reasonable doubt instruction, “we examine the challenged language, in the context of the charge as a whole, in order to determine whether ‘a reasonable juror could have used the instruction incorrectly.’ ” Commonwealth v. LaBriola, 430 Mass. 569 , 570-571 n.3 (2000), quoting Commonwealth v. Smith, 427 Mass. 245 , 249-250 & n.6 (1998).

2002See, e.g., Custody of a Minor, 375 Mass. 733, 746 (1978) (double jeopardy does not apply); Petition of the Dept. of Social Servs. to Dispense with Consent to Adoption, 384 Mass. 707, 710-711 (1981) (exclusionary rule does not apply); Petition of Dept. of Social Servs. to Dispense with Consent to Adoption, 392 Mass. 696, 699 (1984) (beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof does not apply); Custody of Two Minors , 396 Mass, at 617 (privilege against self-incrimination does not apply); Adoption of Don, supra (right to face-to-face confrontation of child witness does not apply).

1986Welfare to Dispense with Consent to Adoption, 383 Mass. at 592-593 (beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof); Custody of a Minor, 375 Mass. 733, 746 (1978) (double jeopardy).

2000See Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1 (1994) (use of “moral certainty” language reversible error unless coupled with language that lends content and meaning to phrase); Cage v. Louisiana, supra at 41 (jury instructions which included “moral certainty” language suggested “higher degree of doubt than is required under the reasonable doubt standard”); Commonwealth v. Pinckney, 419 Mass. 341 (1995) (reversal of conviction of murder in first degree and rape based on flawed “moral certainty” instruction).

1998The United States Supreme Court held that the use of these statements could have suggested a “higher degree of doubt than is required for acquittal under the reasonable doubt standard.” Id. at 41 .

2011When undertaking this analysis the essential question is “whether the record establishes ‘beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.’ ” Commonwealth v. Peixoto, 430 Mass. 654, 660 (2000), quoting from Chapman, supra. “The inquiry cannot be merely whether there was enough [evidence] to support the result, apart from the phase affected by the error.” Commonwealth v. Peruzzi, 15 Mass. App. Ct. 437, 445-446 (1983), quoting from Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765 (1946). “[I]t is not enough for the Commonwealth to demonstrate that i

2011When undertaking this analysis, the essential question is “whether the record establishes ‘beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.’ ” Commonwealth v. Peixoto, 430 Mass. 654, 660 (2000), quoting from Chapman v. California, supra. “The inquiry cannot be merely whether there was enough [evidence] to support the result, apart from the phase affected by the error.” Commonwealth v. Peruzzi, 15 Mass. App. Ct. 437, 445-446 (1983), quoting from Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765 (1946). “[I]t is not enough for the Commonwealth to dem

2018Rather, we look to whether the reasonable doubt instruction adequately impressed on the jury 'the need to reach a subjective state of near certitude of the guilt of the accused.' Victor , supra at 15 , quoting Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307 , 315 (1979). 'In reviewing a reasonable doubt instruction, we consider whether there is a "reasonable likelihood" that the instruction led the jury to believe that they could convict the defendant on proof insufficient to dispel reasonable doubt.' Commonwealth v. Denis , [ 442 Mass. 617 ,] 621 [ (2004) ], quoting Pinckney , supra ." Commonwealth v. Fig

2014Rather, we look to whether the reasonable doubt instruction adequately impressed on the jury “the need to reach a subjective state of near certitude of the guilt of the accused.” Victor, supra at 15 , quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 315 (1979).