31 New Jersey opinions name it 2 courts 1989–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norrisgreen2 sentences2016In Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246, 266 , 114 S.Ct. 2239, 2251 , 129 L.Ed.2d 203, 220 (1994), the Court explained that “Lingle teaches that the issue to be decided in this action — whether the employer’s actions make out the element of discharge under Hawaii law — is a ‘purely factual question.’ ” With that, the Court rejected the employer’s argument that the state-law claim “require[d] a determination whether the [plaintiff employee’s] discharge, if any, was justified by [the plaintiffs] failure to sign the maintenance record, as the CBA required him to do.” Ibid. 2016In Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246, 266 , 114 S.Ct. 2239, 2251 , 129 L.Ed.2d 203, 220 (1994), the Court explained that “Lingle teaches that the issue to be decided in this action — whether the employer’s actions make out the element of discharge under Hawaii law — is a ‘purely factual question.’ ” With that, the Court rejected the employer’s argument that the state-law claim “require[d] a determination whether the [plaintiff employee’s] discharge, if any, was justified by [the plaintiffs] failure to sign the maintenance record, as the CBA required him to do.” Ibid. | 2 | 2 |
Labree v. Mobil Oil Corp.green2 sentences2014Labree v. Mobil Oil Corp., 300 N.J. 2014Labree v. Mobil Oil Corp., 300 N.J. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Herreragreen2 sentences2011ORDER This matter having come to the Court on a grant of certification, 195 N.J. 521 , 950 A.2d 907 , 908 (2008), to address whether evidence of eyewitness identification used against defendant was impermissibly suggestive and thus inadmissible under the two-part test applied in Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 , 97 S.Ct. 2243 , 53 L.Ed.2d 140 (1977), and followed as a state law standard in State v. Madison, 109 N.J. 223, 232-33 , 536 A.2d 254 (1988); And that test requiring inquiry into, first, whether the identification procedure was impermissibly suggestive, and second, whether the procedu 2011ORDER This matter having come to the Court on a grant of certification, 195 N.J. 521 , 950 A.2d 907 , 908 (2008), to address whether evidence of eyewitness identification used against defendant was impermissibly suggestive and thus inadmissible under the two-part test applied in Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 , 97 S.Ct. 2243 , 53 L.Ed.2d 140 (1977), and followed as a state law standard in State v. Madison, 109 N.J. 223, 232-33 , 536 A.2d 254 (1988); And that test requiring inquiry into, first, whether the identification procedure was impermissibly suggestive, and second, whether the procedu | 2 | 2 |
Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc.green2 sentences2017In such a case, federal law would govern the interpretation of the agreement, but the separate state-law analysis would not be thereby pre-empted. [Lingle, supra, 486 U.S. at 413 n.12, 108 S. Ct. at 1884 , 100 L. 2017In such a case, federal law would govern the interpretation of the agreement, but the separate state-law analysis would not be thereby pre-empted. [Lingle, supra, 486 U.S. at 413 n.12, 108 S. Ct. at 1884 , 100 L. | 1 | 3 |
State v. Deatoregreen2 sentences2020See, e.g., State v. Muhammad, 182 N.J. 551, 568-69 (2005) (holding that a suspect’s silence, while in custody, at or near time of arrest, cannot be used against him); State v. Strong, 110 N.J. 583, 593-595 (1988) (concluding that New Jersey law not only protects against improper conduct to obtain compelled testimony, but also protects against its improper use because such 33 use “is the difference between the constitutional right in not being compelled to incriminate oneself and the right in not having one’s privacy unreasonably invaded”); Hartley, 103 N.J. at 285-86 (recognizing that the stat 2005Id. at 115-16 , 358 A .2d 163 . | 1 | 2 |
State v. Hartleygreen2 sentences2020See, e.g., State v. Muhammad, 182 N.J. 551, 568-69 (2005) (holding that a suspect’s silence, while in custody, at or near time of arrest, cannot be used against him); State v. Strong, 110 N.J. 583, 593-595 (1988) (concluding that New Jersey law not only protects against improper conduct to obtain compelled testimony, but also protects against its improper use because such 33 use “is the difference between the constitutional right in not being compelled to incriminate oneself and the right in not having one’s privacy unreasonably invaded”); Hartley, 103 N.J. at 285-86 (recognizing that the stat 1990Such a disregard for concerns of judicial economy has been criticized. [ 103 N.J. 252, 285-86 , 511 A.2d 80 (1983) (citation omitted).] Under our federalist system, a state-law analysis manifests no disrespect for federal courts as partners in protecting fundamental rights. | 1 | 2 |
Feit v. Horizon Blue Cross & Blue Shieldgreen2 sentences2019"Specifically, the issue of '[w]hether a state law claim is preempted by ERISA is a question of law which is reviewed de novo.'" Id. at 454 (quoting Feit v. Horizon Blue Cross & Blue Shield of N.J., 385 N.J. 2013Specifically, the issue of “ ‘[wjhether a state law claim is preempted by ERISA is a question of law which is reviewed de novo.’ ” Feit v. Horizon Blue Cross & Blue Shield of N.J., 385 N.J.Super. 470, 482 , 897 A.2d 1075 (App.Div.2006) (quoting Finderne Mgmt. | 1 | 2 |
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohrgreen2 sentences2012In Lohr, supra, 518 U.S. at 480-81 , 116 S.Ct. at 2248 , 135 L.Ed. 2d at 712-13 , the plaintiff received a pacemaker that she alleged had a defective lead that caused the device to fail, which, in turn, caused a “complete heart block” requiring emergency surgery. 2012In Lohr, supra, 518 U.S. at 480-81 , 116 S.Ct. at 2248 , 135 L.Ed. 2d at 712-13 , the plaintiff received a pacemaker that she alleged had a defective lead that caused the device to fail, which, in turn, caused a “complete heart block” requiring emergency surgery. | 1 | 2 |
Brooklyn Trust Co. v. Podvingreen1 sentence2024"Whether a state law claim is preempted by ERISA is a question of law which is reviewed de novo." Feit v. Horizon Blue Cross & Blue Shield of N.J., 385 A-0486-22 14 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Muhammadgreen1 sentence2020See, e.g., State v. Muhammad, 182 N.J. 551, 568-69 (2005) (holding that a suspect’s silence, while in custody, at or near time of arrest, cannot be used against him); State v. Strong, 110 N.J. 583, 593-595 (1988) (concluding that New Jersey law not only protects against improper conduct to obtain compelled testimony, but also protects against its improper use because such 33 use “is the difference between the constitutional right in not being compelled to incriminate oneself and the right in not having one’s privacy unreasonably invaded”); Hartley, 103 N.J. at 285-86 (recognizing that the stat | 1 | 1 |
State v. Stronggreen1 sentence2020See, e.g., State v. Muhammad, 182 N.J. 551, 568-69 (2005) (holding that a suspect’s silence, while in custody, at or near time of arrest, cannot be used against him); State v. Strong, 110 N.J. 583, 593-595 (1988) (concluding that New Jersey law not only protects against improper conduct to obtain compelled testimony, but also protects against its improper use because such 33 use “is the difference between the constitutional right in not being compelled to incriminate oneself and the right in not having one’s privacy unreasonably invaded”); Hartley, 103 N.J. at 285-86 (recognizing that the stat | 1 | 1 |
Elizabeth and Clifford Kemp v. Medtronic, Inc.green1 sentence2020Cornett, 211 N.J. at 387 (citing Kemp v. Medtronic, Inc., 231 F.3d 216, 236-37 (6th Cir. 2000)). | 1 | 1 |
In Re Reglan Litigationgreen1 sentence2019Super. 470, 482 (App. Div. 2006)); see also In re Reglan Litig., 226 N.J. 315, 327-28 (2016). | 1 | 1 |
Nieves v. Individualized Shirtsgreen1 sentence2017By way of example, there is such substantial dependence when the state-law claim requires "interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement to determine the content and scope of the agreement, and what legal consequences were intended to flow from a breach of an agreement." Nieves v. Individualized Shirts, 961 F. Supp. 782, 792 (D.N.J. 1997) (citing Lucas Flour, supra, 369 U.S. at 103-04 , 82 S. Ct. at 577 , 7 L. | 1 | 1 |
Cerracchio v. Alden Leeds, Inc.green1 sentence2017The essential elements of a claim under N.J.S.A. 34:15-39.110 require similar proof: "(1) that [Hejda] made or attempted to make a claim for workers' compensation; and (2) that he was discharged in retaliation for making that claim." Cerracchio v. Alden Leeds, Inc., 223 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
Hunter v. Underwoodgreen1 sentence2017Ed. 2d 483, 488 (1962). 13 A-3502-14T1 A state-law claim that does not present a straightforward question of contract interpretation requires further examination. "[W]hen resolution of a state-law claim is substantially dependent upon analysis of the terms of an agreement made between the parties in a labor contract, that claim must either be treated as a § 301 claim or dismissed as pre-empted by federal labor-contract law." Id. at 220, 105 S. Ct. at 1916, 85 L. | 1 | 1 |
Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp.green1 sentence2016Some cases have touched on the extent to which a CBA-based defense can preempt a plaintiff’s state-law claim. *278 In Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 398-99 , 107 S.Ct. 2425, 2432-33 , 96 L.Ed.2d 318, 331 (1987), the Supreme Court held that a state-law employment contract claim could not be removed to federal court because the defendant attempted to use a CBA as a defense. | 1 | 1 |
California v. Superior Court of Cal., San Bernardino Cty.green2 sentences2016The Court stated that although a state court may have to interpret the CBA when a defense is based on the terms of that agreement in evaluating the state-law claim, “the presence of a federal question, even a [Section] 301 question, in a defensive argument does not *279 overcome the paramount policies embodied in the well-pleaded complaint rule.” Id. at 398, 107 S.Ct. at 2433, 96 L.Ed.2d at 331. 2016These are questions that must be addressed in the first instance by the state court in which [the plaintiffs] filed their claims.” Id. at 398 n. 13, 107 S.Ct. at 2433 n. 13, 96 L.Ed.2d at 331 n. 13. | 1 | 1 |
| LoBiondo v. Schwartzgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Lamorte Burns & Co., Inc. v. Waltersgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Jobes v. Evangelistagreen | 1 | 1 |
| United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbsred | 1 | 1 |
| Candace J. Wilson v. Wayne Zoellnergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Superturf, Inc. v. Monsanto Companygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Al-Kazemi v. General Acceptance & Investment Corp.green | 1 | 1 |
| Wildoner v. Borough of Ramseygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Peil v. Speisergreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Heislergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Basic Inc. v. Levinsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Ada M. Martin and Harold L. Martin v. Telectronics Pacing Systems, Inc. Tplc, Inc. D/B/A Telectronics Pacing Systems Telectronics Pty Limitedgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Berish v. Richards Medical Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Chmielewski v. Stryker Sales Corp.green | 1 | 1 |
| Oja v. Howmedicagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Niehoff v. Surgidev Corp.green | 1 | 1 |
| Quinn v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Gerard W. McCall v. Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Companygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Jackson v. Consolidated Rail Corp.green | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Jersey. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Finderne Mgmt. Co., Inc. v. Barrett
green
2 sentences2013Co. v. Barrett, 355 N.J.Super. 170, 185 , 809 A.2d 842 (App.Div.2002), certif. denied, 177 N.J. 219, 827 A.2d 287 (2003)). 2013Co. v. Barrett, 355 N.J.Super. 170, 185 , 809 A.2d 842 (App.Div.2002), certif. denied, 177 N.J. 219, 827 A.2d 287 (2003)). | 2 | 2006–2013 |
Dolan v. Sea Transfer Corp.
green
2 sentences2011ORDER This matter having come to the Court on a grant of certification, 195 N.J. 521 , 950 A.2d 907 , 908 (2008), to address whether evidence of eyewitness identification used against defendant was impermissibly suggestive and thus inadmissible under the two-part test applied in Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 , 97 S.Ct. 2243 , 53 L.Ed.2d 140 (1977), and followed as a state law standard in State v. Madison, 109 N.J. 223, 232-33 , 536 A.2d 254 (1988); And that test requiring inquiry into, first, whether the identification procedure was impermissibly suggestive, and second, whether the procedu 2009ORDER This matter having come to the Court on a grant of certification, 195 N.J. 521 , 950 A.2d 907 (2008), to address whether evidence of eyewitness identification used against defendant was impermissibly suggestive and thus inadmissible under the two-part test applied in Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 , 97 S.Ct. 2243 , 53 L.Ed.2d 140 (1977), and followed as a state law standard in State v. Madison, 109 N.J. 223, 232-33 , 536 A.2d 254 (1988); And that test requiring inquiry into, first, whether the identification procedure was impermissibly suggestive, and second, whether the procedure was | 2 | 2009–2011 |
State v. Madison
green
2 sentences2011ORDER This matter having come to the Court on a grant of certification, 195 N.J. 521 , 950 A.2d 907 , 908 (2008), to address whether evidence of eyewitness identification used against defendant was impermissibly suggestive and thus inadmissible under the two-part test applied in Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 , 97 S.Ct. 2243 , 53 L.Ed.2d 140 (1977), and followed as a state law standard in State v. Madison, 109 N.J. 223, 232-33 , 536 A.2d 254 (1988); And that test requiring inquiry into, first, whether the identification procedure was impermissibly suggestive, and second, whether the procedu 2011ORDER This matter having come to the Court on a grant of certification, 195 N.J. 521 , 950 A.2d 907 , 908 (2008), to address whether evidence of eyewitness identification used against defendant was impermissibly suggestive and thus inadmissible under the two-part test applied in Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 , 97 S.Ct. 2243 , 53 L.Ed.2d 140 (1977), and followed as a state law standard in State v. Madison, 109 N.J. 223, 232-33 , 536 A.2d 254 (1988); And that test requiring inquiry into, first, whether the identification procedure was impermissibly suggestive, and second, whether the procedu | 2 | 2009–2011 |
Manson v. Brathwaite
green
2 sentences2011ORDER This matter having come to the Court on a grant of certification, 195 N.J. 521 , 950 A.2d 907 , 908 (2008), to address whether evidence of eyewitness identification used against defendant was impermissibly suggestive and thus inadmissible under the two-part test applied in Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 , 97 S.Ct. 2243 , 53 L.Ed.2d 140 (1977), and followed as a state law standard in State v. Madison, 109 N.J. 223, 232-33 , 536 A.2d 254 (1988); And that test requiring inquiry into, first, whether the identification procedure was impermissibly suggestive, and second, whether the procedu 2011ORDER This matter having come to the Court on a grant of certification, 195 N.J. 521 , 950 A.2d 907 , 908 (2008), to address whether evidence of eyewitness identification used against defendant was impermissibly suggestive and thus inadmissible under the two-part test applied in Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 , 97 S.Ct. 2243 , 53 L.Ed.2d 140 (1977), and followed as a state law standard in State v. Madison, 109 N.J. 223, 232-33 , 536 A.2d 254 (1988); And that test requiring inquiry into, first, whether the identification procedure was impermissibly suggestive, and second, whether the procedu | 2 | 2009–2011 |
State v. Delgado
green
2 sentences2011ORDER This matter having come to the Court on a grant of certification, 195 N.J. 521 , 950 A.2d 907 , 908 (2008), to address whether evidence of eyewitness identification used against defendant was impermissibly suggestive and thus inadmissible under the two-part test applied in Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 , 97 S.Ct. 2243 , 53 L.Ed.2d 140 (1977), and followed as a state law standard in State v. Madison, 109 N.J. 223, 232-33 , 536 A.2d 254 (1988); And that test requiring inquiry into, first, whether the identification procedure was impermissibly suggestive, and second, whether the procedu 2011ORDER This matter having come to the Court on a grant of certification, 195 N.J. 521 , 950 A.2d 907 , 908 (2008), to address whether evidence of eyewitness identification used against defendant was impermissibly suggestive and thus inadmissible under the two-part test applied in Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 , 97 S.Ct. 2243 , 53 L.Ed.2d 140 (1977), and followed as a state law standard in State v. Madison, 109 N.J. 223, 232-33 , 536 A.2d 254 (1988); And that test requiring inquiry into, first, whether the identification procedure was impermissibly suggestive, and second, whether the procedu | 2 | 2009–2011 |
State v. Moore
green
2 sentences2011ORDER This matter having come to the Court on a grant of certification, 195 N.J. 521 , 950 A.2d 907 , 908 (2008), to address whether evidence of eyewitness identification used against defendant was impermissibly suggestive and thus inadmissible under the two-part test applied in Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 , 97 S.Ct. 2243 , 53 L.Ed.2d 140 (1977), and followed as a state law standard in State v. Madison, 109 N.J. 223, 232-33 , 536 A.2d 254 (1988); And that test requiring inquiry into, first, whether the identification procedure was impermissibly suggestive, and second, whether the procedu 2011ORDER This matter having come to the Court on a grant of certification, 195 N.J. 521 , 950 A.2d 907 , 908 (2008), to address whether evidence of eyewitness identification used against defendant was impermissibly suggestive and thus inadmissible under the two-part test applied in Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 , 97 S.Ct. 2243 , 53 L.Ed.2d 140 (1977), and followed as a state law standard in State v. Madison, 109 N.J. 223, 232-33 , 536 A.2d 254 (1988); And that test requiring inquiry into, first, whether the identification procedure was impermissibly suggestive, and second, whether the procedu | 2 | 2009–2011 |
American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. State
green
2 sentences2011Trucking Ass’ns v. State, 164 N.J. 183, 183-84 , 752 A.2d 1286 (2000); see also Herrera, supra, 187 N.J. at 504 , 902 A.2d 177 ; And the Court having heard argument of the parties and having concluded that an inadequate factual record exists on which it can test the current validity of our state law standards on the admissibility of eyewitness identification; And the Court having concluded that, until such a record is established, the Court should not address the question of the admissibility of the eyewitness identification presented in this case; And for good cause appearing; It is ORDERED t 2011Trucking Ass’ns v. State, 164 N.J. 183, 183-84 , 752 A.2d 1286 (2000); see also Herrera, supra, 187 N.J. at 504 , 902 A.2d 177 ; And the Court having heard argument of the parties and having concluded that an inadequate factual record exists on which it can test the current validity of our state law standards on the admissibility of eyewitness identification; And the Court having concluded that, until such a record is established, the Court should not address the question of the admissibility of the eyewitness identification presented in this case; And for good cause appearing; It is ORDERED t | 2 | 2009–2011 |
Cornett v. Johnson & Johnson
green
1 sentence2020Cornett, 211 N.J. at 387 (citing Kemp v. Medtronic, Inc., 231 F.3d 216, 236-37 (6th Cir. 2000)). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
St. Peter's University Hospital v. New Jersey Building Laborers Statewide Welfare Fund
green
1 sentence2019"Specifically, the issue of '[w]hether a state law claim is preempted by ERISA is a question of law which is reviewed de novo.'" Id. at 454 (quoting Feit v. Horizon Blue Cross & Blue Shield of N.J., 385 N.J. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Local 174, Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers v. Lucas Flour Co.
green
2 sentences2017By way of example, there is such substantial dependence when the state-law claim requires "interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement to determine the content and scope of the agreement, and what legal consequences were intended to flow from a breach of an agreement." Nieves v. Individualized Shirts, 961 F. Supp. 782, 792 (D.N.J. 1997) (citing Lucas Flour, supra, 369 U.S. at 103-04 , 82 S. Ct. at 577 , 7 L. 2017By way of example, there is such substantial dependence when the state-law claim requires "interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement to determine the content and scope of the agreement, and what legal consequences were intended to flow from a breach of an agreement." Nieves v. Individualized Shirts, 961 F. Supp. 782, 792 (D.N.J. 1997) (citing Lucas Flour, supra, 369 U.S. at 103-04 , 82 S. Ct. at 577 , 7 L. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Salvatore Puglia v. Elk Pipeline, Inc.(075171)
green
1 sentence2017Puglia, supra, 226 N.J. at 282 . | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Committee
green
2 sentences2016There, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that a state-law claim against the generic manufacturer PLIVA for its failure to adopt the 2004 FDA-approved brand-name-warning label for metoclopramide was “a claim that PLIVA breached a federal labeling obligation [that] sounds exclusively in federal (not state) law, and is preempted.” Ibid, (citing 21 U.S.C.A § 337(a); Buckman, supra, 531 U.S. at 349 n. 4, 121 S.Ct. at 1018 n. 4, 148 L.Ed.2d at 862 n. 4). 2016There, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that a state-law claim against the generic manufacturer PLIVA for its failure to adopt the 2004 FDA-approved brand-name-warning label for metoclopramide was “a claim that PLIVA breached a federal labeling obligation [that] sounds exclusively in federal (not state) law, and is preempted.” Ibid, (citing 21 U.S.C.A § 337(a); Buckman, supra, 531 U.S. at 349 n. 4, 121 S.Ct. at 1018 n. 4, 148 L.Ed.2d at 862 n. 4). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Salvatore Puglia v. Elk Pipeline, Inc. neutral | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Hospice Of Metro Denver, Inc. v. Group Health Insurance Of Oklahoma, Inc. green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| 1975 Salaried Retirement Plan for Eligible Employees of Crucible, Inc. v. Nobers green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Goins v. Lang green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Buchanan v. United States green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| 1975 Salaried Retirement Plan for Eligible Employees of Crucible, Inc. v. Nobers green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| State v. Goodson green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| State v. Reed green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| cluster 765707 green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Pascack Valley Hospital, Inc. v. Local 464a Ufcw Welfare Reimbursement Plan green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Michael Hingson v. Pacific Southwest Airlines, a California Corporation green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Winick v. United Engineering Co. neutral | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| English v. General Electric Co. green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Tony L. Miller v. Norfolk and Western Railway Company green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| cluster 520409 green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| James C. Rayner v. Daniel W. Smirl Csx Corporation green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| English v. General Electric Co. green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Martin v. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Welsh v. Wisconsin green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.