state law claim in Indiana

2016Holiday v. Kinslow, 659 N.E.2d 647, 649 (Ind.Ct.App.1995). [20] A bankruptcy case may be re-opened at the bankruptcy court’s discretion.

2014Id.

2026See generally, e.g., id. at 448 , 448 n.5. [24] Congress specified that the purpose of FRSA “is to promote safety in every area of railroad operations and reduce railroad-related accidents and incidents.” 49 U.S.C. § 20101 .

2020A state-law claim is completely preempted if (1) “an individual, at some point in time, could have brought [the] claim under” this section and (2) “there is no other independent legal duty that is implicated by [a] defendant’s actions.” Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 210 (2004).

2020As the Seventh Circuit held in Kolbe & Kolbe Health & Welfare Benefit Plan v. Medical College of Wisconsin, Inc., 657 F.3d 496 (7th Cir. 2011), there is no express preemption “merely because [a state-law claim] requires a cursory examination of ERISA plan provisions.” Id. at 504 (citation omitted).

2020As the Seventh Circuit held in Kolbe & Kolbe Health & Welfare Benefit Plan v. Medical College of Wisconsin, Inc., 657 F.3d 496 (7th Cir. 2011), there is no express preemption “merely because [a state-law claim] requires a cursory examination of ERISA plan provisions.” Id. at 504 (citation omitted).

2019See Bausch, 630 F.3d at 552 (noting that state- law claims “based on violations of federal law are not expressly preempted”); cf. McGookin, 942 N.E.2d at 838 (determining claims were expressly preempted where the plaintiffs failed to allege a violation of federal law).

2019See Bausch, 630 F.3d at 552 (noting that state- law claims “based on violations of federal law are not expressly preempted”); cf. McGookin, 942 N.E.2d at 838 (determining claims were expressly preempted where the plaintiffs failed to allege a violation of federal law).

2011See Christ, 979 F.2d at 576-582 (concluding that “[b]e-cause the divorce decree and constructive trust remedy are inconsistent with the order of precedence incorporated in the policy, § 8709(d)(1) — aside from any other principles of preemption — expressly requires that the policy preempts the divorce decree and constructive trust”); 7 see also Zaldivar, 413 F.3d at 120 (holding that FEGLIA preempted a state law claim for the imposition of a constructive trust upon the proceeds of a federal group life insurance policy and that to alter the designation of the beneficiary by imposing a construct

2011See Christ, 979 F.2d at 576-582 (concluding that “[b]e-cause the divorce decree and constructive trust remedy are inconsistent with the order of precedence incorporated in the policy, § 8709(d)(1) — aside from any other principles of preemption — expressly requires that the policy preempts the divorce decree and constructive trust”); 7 see also Zaldivar, 413 F.3d at 120 (holding that FEGLIA preempted a state law claim for the imposition of a constructive trust upon the proceeds of a federal group life insurance policy and that to alter the designation of the beneficiary by imposing a construct

2011See Christ, 979 F.2d at 576-582 (concluding that “[b]e-cause the divorce decree and constructive trust remedy are inconsistent with the order of precedence incorporated in the policy, § 8709(d)(1) — aside from any other principles of preemption — expressly requires that the policy preempts the divorce decree and constructive trust”); 7 see also Zaldivar, 413 F.3d at 120 (holding that FEGLIA preempted a state law claim for the imposition of a constructive trust upon the proceeds of a federal group life insurance policy and that to alter the designation of the beneficiary by imposing a construct

2009See Fisher v. Ford Motor Co., 224 F.3d 570, 574 (6th Cir.2000) (holding that the visor warning language is both a floor and a ceiling as the sole language NHTSA wanted for in-car warnings to avoid "information overload" and a state law claim that would impose a duty to warn by means of additional and different in-car warnings was therefore preempted).

2009See Fisher v. Ford Motor Co., 224 F.3d 570, 574 (6th Cir.2000) (holding that the visor warning language is both a floor and a ceiling as the sole language NHTSA wanted for in-car warnings to avoid "information overload" and a state law claim that would impose a duty to warn by means of additional and different in-car warnings was therefore preempted).

2008See Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 285 , 113 S.Ct. 753 , 122 L.Ed.2d 34 (1993) (determining on appeal of district court’s decision in favor of the plaintiffs on state and federal claims that the plaintiffs were not entitled to relief on their federal claim and therefore were not entitled to attorney fees and costs under section 1988).

2008See Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 285 , 113 S.Ct. 753 , 122 L.Ed.2d 34 (1993) (determining on appeal of district court’s decision in favor of the plaintiffs on state and federal claims that the plaintiffs were not entitled to relief on their federal claim and therefore were not entitled to attorney fees and costs under section 1988).

2007See Seals v. Quarterly County Court of Madison County, Tenn., 562 F.2d 390 (6th Cir.1977); Albright v. Good Shepherd Hosp., 901 F.2d 438 , 440 (5th Cir.1990) (citing Heath v. Brown, 807 F.2d 1229 (5th Cir.1987)).

2001See Lennon v. Seaman, 63 F.Supp.2d 428, 485 (S.D.N.Y.1999) (an extra element in a state law claim may avoid preemption, but it must "alter the nature of the claim such that it is qualitatively different from a claim pursuant to the federal copyright laws").