state law claim in California

2026(Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 2.) Senate Bill 775 allowed criminal defendants convicted of attempted murder to file resentencing petitions. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).) The statute requires “[t]he trial court on receiving a petition must appoint counsel to represent the petitioner if the petitioner has requested counsel. (§ [1172.6], subd. (b)(3).) After the parties are given an opportunity to submit briefs it ‘shall hold a hearing to determine whether the petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief’ and if the petitioner has done so, it must issue an order to show cause. (§ [1172.6], subd. (c).)”

2026The California Supreme Court has “yet to determine whether a trial court’s failure to instruct on a requested affirmative defense instruction supported by substantial evidence is federal constitutional error or state law error.” (People v. Gonzalez (2018) 5 Cal.5th 186, 199 ; People v. Salas (2006) 37 Cal.4th 967, 984 ; see Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [federal harmlessness standard]; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836-837 [state law harmlessness standard].) We need not resolve the question in this case, because the error was prejudicial even under the state law standar

2026Doan 17 contends that the curtailment of his cross-examination of Doe was prejudicial under the standard for constitutional error (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 , 23-24) as well as the standard for state law error (Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836 ).

2026The California Supreme Court has “yet to determine whether a trial court’s failure to instruct on a requested affirmative defense instruction supported by substantial evidence is federal constitutional error or state law error.” (People v. Gonzalez (2018) 5 Cal.5th 186, 199 ; People v. Salas (2006) 37 Cal.4th 967, 984 ; see Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [federal harmlessness standard]; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836-837 [state law harmlessness standard].) We need not resolve the question in this case, because the error was prejudicial even under the state law standar

2016A state-law principle that takes its meaning precisely from the fact that a contract to arbitrate is at issue does not comport with [the text of § 2].’ [Citation].)” (Doctor’s Associates, supra, 517 U.S. at p. 685 ; see Pinnacle Museum Tower Assn. v. Pinnacle Market Development (US), LLC, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 245 [“That is, the [Federal Arbitration Act] precludes judicial invalidation of an arbitration clause based on state law requirements that are not generally applicable to other contractual clauses, such as proof of actual notice, meaningful reflection, signature by all parties, and/or

2014A state-law principle that takes its meaning precisely from the fact that a contract to arbitrate is at issue does not comport with this requirement of § 2.” (Perry v. Thomas, supra, 482 U.S. at p. 492, fn. 9 .) It is easy to address the situation of a state statute or common law rule which prohibits the arbitration of a particular type of claim—the United States Supreme Court has held that such state law is preempted by the FAA.

2025In Concepcion, the high court described “fundamental attributes of arbitration” in terms of the parties’ “discretion in designing arbitration processes” and “the informality of arbitral proceedings,” which are “desirable” because they “allow for efficient, streamlined procedures tailored to the type of dispute” and “reduc[e] the cost and increas[e] the speed of dispute resolution.” (Concepcion, supra, 563 U.S. at pp. 344-345.) Concepcion invalidated a state-law rule against class waivers as applied to arbitration agreements, explaining that class arbitration “requires procedural formality” (id

2022(Southland Corp. v. Keating (1984) 465 U.S. 1, 16, fn. 10 [“the [FAA] preempts a state law that withdraws the power to enforce arbitration agreements”]; AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion (2011) 563 U.S. 333 , 343 [a state law rule that “stand[s] as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the FAA’s objectives” is preempted].) The State-must-consent rule does just that.

2014(See People v. Jackson (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1164, 1232 [nonviolent jail escape]; People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1169-1170 [threat to correctional officer]; Brown, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 449 [food riot, sexual misconduct, and possession of stolen wirecutters in jail].) Having rejected this state law claim, we likewise reject his derivative federal constitutional claims. 7.

2014(See People v. Jackson (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1164, 1232 [ 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 49 , 920 P.2d 1254 ] [nonviolent jail escape]; People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1169-1170 [ 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 235 , 885 P.2d 1 ] [threat to correctional officer]; Brown, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 449 [food riot, sexual misconduct, and possession of stolen wirecutters in jail].) Having rejected this state law claim, we likewise reject his derivative federal constitutional claims. 7.

2023(Tran, supra, 13 Cal.5th at pp. 1209–1211; see also Ramos, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 1131 [applying Watson prejudice standard to asserted section 1109 error].) Under that standard, reversal is not proper unless it is reasonably probable the defendant would have achieved a more favorable outcome at trial but-for the purported state-law error.

2023The evidence showed that it was found in a safe but not that the safe was locked. 13 evidence, even if erroneous under state law, results in a due process violation only if it makes the trial fundamentally unfair.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169 , 1209.) And if the admission of the evidence was harmless under the state-law standard, then we can hardly say that the resulting trial was fundamentally unfair.

2021The parties’ obligation under the RLA to arbitrate disputes arising out of the application or interpretation of the CBA did not relieve petitioners of this duty.” (Hawaiian Airlines, supra, 512 U.S. at p. 258 .) In Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., supra, 486 U.S. 399 , the United States Supreme Court held that a state law claim of retaliatory discharge for exercising state workers’ compensation rights was not preempted because the dispute did not turn on the meaning of any terms in the collective bargaining agreement.

2021We begin by pointing out that the term “ ‘ “interpret” ’ ” in the context of RLA preemption “ ‘is defined narrowly—it means something more than “consider,” “refer to,” or “apply.” ’ ” (Melendez, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 8 .) Preemption is warranted only “when [the] resolution of a state law claim is ‘substantially dependent’ on analysis of a collective bargaining agreement, such as ‘when pertinent principles of state law require[ ] construing the relevant collective-bargaining agreement.’ ” (Valles v. Ivy Hill Corp. (9th Cir. 2005) 410 F.3d 1071, 1081 , citing Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef,

2025(People v. Beames (2007) 40 Cal.4th 907, 920 (Beames); accord, People v. Strozier (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 55, 60 ; People v. Jeffers (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 840, 850 .) “Under this state law standard, discretion is abused only when the court exceeds the bounds of reason, all circumstances being considered.” (Beames, at p. 920.) “A reviewing court considers the circumstances of each case and the reasons presented for the request to determine whether a trial court’s denial of a continuance was so arbitrary as to deny due process.” (People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 450 (Doolin).) A trial court

2024(People v. Beames (2007) 40 Cal.4th 907, 920 .) “Under this state law standard, discretion is abused only when the court exceeds the bounds of reason, all circumstances being considered.” (Ibid.) “A reviewing court considers the circumstances of each case and the reasons presented for the request to 19. determine whether a trial court’s denial of a continuance was so arbitrary as to deny due process.” (People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 450 .) A trial court may not exercise its discretion over continuances in a manner that deprives defendants or their attorneys a reasonable opportunity to

2026(People v. Mora and Rangel (2018) 5 Cal.5th 442, 508 .) “The party challenging a ruling on a continuance bears the burden of establishing an abuse of discretion, and an order denying a continuance is seldom successfully attacked.” (Beames, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 920 .) “Under this state law standard, discretion is abused only when the court exceeds the bounds of reason, all circumstances being considered.” (Ibid.) Ambriz argues that the court could not have properly exercised its discretion regarding granting defense counsel’s request for a continuance because it mistakenly believed that rese

2025(People v. Beames (2007) 40 Cal.4th 907, 920 (Beames); accord, People v. Strozier (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 55, 60 ; People v. Jeffers (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 840, 850 .) “Under this state law standard, discretion is abused only when the court exceeds the bounds of reason, all circumstances being considered.” (Beames, at p. 920.) “A reviewing court considers the circumstances of each case and the reasons presented for the request to determine whether a trial court’s denial of a continuance was so arbitrary as to deny due process.” (People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 450 (Doolin).) A trial court

2023Turning then to the second step under Zabelle, we assess whether the court “would have imposed the upper term sentence even absent the error” (Zabelle, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at p. 1112) under the state law standard set forth in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 .

2022(Id. at pp. 500-501 [failure to have facts supporting aggravating factors determined by a jury is harmless error where appellate court concludes a single aggravating factor would have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt]; People v. Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 825, 839 ; but see People v. Zabelle (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 1098 , 1112 [suggesting a Watson5 review of state law error is also required] (Zabelle).) 4 Defendant testified he had served time for the two corporal injury counts, growing marijuana, and stealing utilities. 5 People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 . 11 Because this area of

2026Nothing in the court’s order denying compelled arbitration indicates that it considered anything other than “factors that are relevant to the specific state law defense the party resisting arbitration has raised” (Quach, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 584)—which in this case was waiver.

2025Agnes are some that are relevant to other defenses, such as forfeiture, estoppel, laches or 5 timeliness, but not to waiver.” (Ibid.) Going forward, courts must “be careful to consider only those factors that are relevant to the specific state law defense the party resisting arbitration has raised.” (Ibid.) When analyzing a waiver defense, Quach held that under generally applicable contract law, the party asserting waiver “must prove by clear and convincing evidence” that it is highly probable “the waiving party knew of the contractual right and intentionally relinquished or abandoned it.” (Qu

2025(Ibid.; see People v. Snow (2003) 30 Cal.4th 43, 70 (Snow).) “Although a defendant is not entitled to the same procedural safeguards at a sentencing hearing as he is at trial, the procedures must be fundamentally fair.” (People v. Leffel (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 1310, 1318 (Leffel), overruled on another ground in People v. Bullock (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 985, 987-989 .) Not every denial of a request for a continuance constitutes a due process violation, “even if the party seeking the continuance thereby fails to offer evidence.” (Beames, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 921 .) “Although ‘a myopic insistence

2013(See, e.g., People v. Snow (2003) 30 Cal.4th 43, 70, 77 .) “[T]he decision whether or not to grant a continuance of a matter rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. [Citations.] The party challenging a ruling on a continuance bears the burden of establishing an abuse of discretion, and an order denying a continuance is seldom successfully attacked. [Citation.] “Under this state law standard, discretion is abused only when the court exceeds the bounds of reason, all circumstances being considered. [Citations.] Moreover, the denial of a continuance may be so arbitrary as to deny du

2019Our only job is to decide whether, as pleaded, the claim 'in this case is "independent" of the [CBA] in the sense of "independent" that matters for ... preemption purposes: resolution of the state-law claim does not require construing the collective-bargaining agreement.' " ( Id . at p. 924.) The high court has also said that preemption applies "when resolution of a state-law claim is substantially dependent *293 upon analysis of the terms of an agreement made between the parties in a labor contract." ( Allis-Chalmers , supra , 471 U.S. at p. 220 , 105 S.Ct. 1904 .) These concepts are not brig

2019Our only job is to decide whether, as pleaded, the claim 'in this case is "independent" of the [CBA] in the sense of "independent" that matters for ... preemption purposes: resolution of the state-law claim does not require construing the collective-bargaining agreement.' " ( Id . at p. 924.) The high court has also said that preemption applies "when resolution of a state-law claim is substantially dependent *293 upon analysis of the terms of an agreement made between the parties in a labor contract." ( Allis-Chalmers , supra , 471 U.S. at p. 220 , 105 S.Ct. 1904 .) These concepts are not brig

2019In People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142 , our Supreme Court held that, in a noncapital case, an erroneous failure to instruct on heat of passion is a violation of state law only, and not a violation of the federal constitution; hence, it is subject to the state- law standard of review.

2019In People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142 , 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870 , 960 P.2d 1094 , our Supreme Court held that, in a noncapital case, an erroneous failure to instruct on heat of passion is a violation of state law only, and not a violation of the federal constitution; hence, it is subject to the state-law standard of review. ( Id. at pp. 164-178, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870 , 960 P.2d 1094 ; accord, People v. Beltran , supra , 56 Cal.4th at p. 955 , 157 Cal.Rptr.3d 503 , 301 P.3d 1120 .) Justice Kennard, dissenting in Breverman , argued that such a failure is a federal constitutional violation, becaus

2018(See Diaz , supra , 60 Cal.4th at p. 1195 , 185 Cal.Rptr.3d 431 , 345 P.3d 62 ["We apply the standard for state law error....

2018(See Diaz , supra , 60 Cal.4th at p. 1195 , 185 Cal.Rptr.3d 431 , 345 P.3d 62 ["We apply the standard for state law error....

2026Because such an agreement has as its ‘object, . . . indirectly, to exempt [the employer] from responsibility for [its] own . . . violation of law,’ it is against public policy and may not be enforced.” (Iskanian, at p. 383; accord, Villalobos v. Maersk, Inc. (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 1170 , 1195-1196.) While a state law rule “may not be enforced if it is preempted by the FAA,” the Supreme Court in Iskanian held 15 the rule against PAGA waivers did not frustrate the FAA’s objectives because “a PAGA action is a dispute between an employer and the state Agency.” (Iskanian, at p. 384.) In Viking Rive

2026Because such an agreement has as its ‘object, . . . indirectly, to exempt [the employer] from responsibility for [its] own . . . violation of law,’ it is against public policy and may not be enforced.” (Iskanian, at p. 383; accord, Villalobos v. Maersk, Inc. (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 1170 , 1195-1196.) While a state law rule “may not be enforced if it is preempted by the FAA,” the Supreme Court in Iskanian held 15 the rule against PAGA waivers did not frustrate the FAA’s objectives because “a PAGA action is a dispute between an employer and the state Agency.” (Iskanian, at p. 384.) In Viking Rive

2024In denying the petition, the trial court followed then-controlling precedent in Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC (2014) 59 Cal.4th 348 (Iskanian), which held that a worker’s right to pursue a representative PAGA action cannot be waived and that this state law rule is not preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).

2022Lexis 805, at pp. *5-*6].) In Iskanian, supra, 59 Cal 4th 348, 380, 383-390, the California Supreme Court held that a trial court may not enforce an employee’s predispute waiver of the right to bring a PAGA claim in any forum, and where such a waiver appears in the employee’s arbitration agreement, the FAA does not preempt this state law rule.

2026(Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 2.) Senate Bill 775 allowed criminal defendants convicted of attempted murder to file resentencing petitions. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).) The statute requires “[t]he trial court on receiving a petition must appoint counsel to represent the petitioner if the petitioner has requested counsel. (§ [1172.6], subd. (b)(3).) After the parties are given an opportunity to submit briefs it ‘shall hold a hearing to determine whether the petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief’ and if the petitioner has done so, it must issue an order to show cause. (§ [1172.6], subd. (c).)”

2024(See Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 973 .) Our Supreme Court has held that a trial court’s statutory omissions at the first step process under section 1172.6 are not state or federal constitutional violations. ( Lewis, supra, at p. 973 ; see Hurtado, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 893.) Hence, a trial court’s failure to follow the procedures enacted in section 1172.6 is analyzed for prejudice under the state law standard of People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 . ( Lewis, supra, at pp. 973-974 .) 10 “A petitioner is ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law if the record of conviction c

2023(See Aranda, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 374, fn. 14 [recognizing that both CALCRIM No. 220 and CALJIC No. 2.90 define beyond a reasonable doubt in terms of an abiding conviction that the charge is true].) Such a state law error is subject to harmless error review under the standard in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 837 , which asks whether there are “reasonable probabilities” that a result more favorable to the defendant would have occurred absent the error.

2021Therefore, we review defendant’s claim of error under the state law standard set forth in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 837 , which requires a determination “whether there is a ‘reasonable probability’ that a result more favorable to the defendant would have occurred absent the error.” (People v. Aranda (2012) 55 Cal.4th 342, 354 ; accord, People v. Richardson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 959, 1001 ; People v. Partida, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 439 .) 24. b.

2019In People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142 , 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870 , 960 P.2d 1094 , our Supreme Court held that, in a noncapital case, an erroneous failure to instruct on heat of passion is a violation of state law only, and not a violation of the federal constitution; hence, it is subject to the state-law standard of review. ( Id. at pp. 164-178, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870 , 960 P.2d 1094 ; accord, People v. Beltran , supra , 56 Cal.4th at p. 955 , 157 Cal.Rptr.3d 503 , 301 P.3d 1120 .) Justice Kennard, dissenting in Breverman , argued that such a failure is a federal constitutional violation, becaus

2019In People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142 , 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870 , 960 P.2d 1094 , our Supreme Court held that, in a noncapital case, an erroneous failure to instruct on heat of passion is a violation of state law only, and not a violation of the federal constitution; hence, it is subject to the state-law standard of review. ( Id. at pp. 164-178, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870 , 960 P.2d 1094 ; accord, People v. Beltran , supra , 56 Cal.4th at p. 955 , 157 Cal.Rptr.3d 503 , 301 P.3d 1120 .) Justice Kennard, dissenting in Breverman , argued that such a failure is a federal constitutional violation, becaus

2017Our FAA holding applies specifically to a state law rule barring predispute waiver of an employee's right to bring an action that can only be brought by the state or its representatives, where any resulting judgment is binding on the state and any monetary penalties largely go to state coffers." ( Iskanian, supra , 59 Cal.4th at pp. 387-388, 173 Cal.Rptr.3d 289 , 327 P.3d 129 .) Following Iskanian , the court in Williams v. Superior Court (Pinkerton) (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 642 , 648-649, 188 Cal.Rptr.3d 83 ( Williams ), rejected a defendant's attempt to compel arbitration of an employee's indi

2017Our FAA holding applies specifically to a state law rule barring predispute waiver of an employee's right to bring an action that can only be brought by the state or its representatives, where any resulting judgment is binding on the state and any monetary penalties largely go to state coffers." ( Iskanian, supra , 59 Cal.4th at pp. 387-388, 173 Cal.Rptr.3d 289 , 327 P.3d 129 .) Following Iskanian , the court in Williams v. Superior Court (Pinkerton) (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 642 , 648-649, 188 Cal.Rptr.3d 83 ( Williams ), rejected a defendant's attempt to compel arbitration of an employee's indi